2026-09-18T18:58:11Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1120212022-01-13T07:54:52Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Rodrigo S. Verdi and Eric C. So.
Kim, Jinhwan
Sloan School of Management.
Sloan School of Management
2017-10-30T15:28:02Z
2017-10-30T15:28:02Z
2017
2017
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/112021
1006378585
Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2017.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 32-34).
Information about one firm has the potential to affect the stock price of another firm. I investigate whether managers recognize this potential and strategically alter their disclosure decisions when doing so is beneficial. Using data on media coverage and merger negotiations, I find that bidders in all-cash mergers originate substantially more negatively (positively)-charged press release articles when the bidders' disclosure content is expected to positively (negatively) co-vary with the targets' value during merger negotiations. This strategy generates a short-lived walk-down in the targets' stock prices during the period when the targets' takeover price is determined, which substantially increases the relative wealth gains realized by bidders. My results demonstrate that the timing and content of disclosures may be biased by firms seeking to manipulate the stock prices of other firms.
by Jinhwan Kim.
S.M. in Management Research
45 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Sloan School of Management.
Weaponized disclosure : the feedback effect of disclosure externalities
Feedback effect of disclosure externalities
Thesis
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<Abstract>Information about one firm has the potential to affect the stock price of another firm. I investigate whether managers recognize this potential and strategically alter their disclosure decisions when doing so is beneficial. Using data on media coverage and merger negotiations, I find that bidders in all-cash mergers originate substantially more negatively (positively)-charged press release articles when the bidders' disclosure content is expected to positively (negatively) co-vary with the targets' value during merger negotiations. This strategy generates a short-lived walk-down in the targets' stock prices during the period when the targets' takeover price is determined, which substantially increases the relative wealth gains realized by bidders. My results demonstrate that the timing and content of disclosures may be biased by firms seeking to manipulate the stock prices of other firms.</Abstract>
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