2026-09-18T20:15:38Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1179952022-01-13T07:54:52Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
David Thesmar.
Martins, Fernando Miguel Pinto
Sloan School of Management.
Sloan School of Management
2018-09-17T15:53:05Z
2018-09-17T15:53:05Z
2018
2018
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/117995
1051300054
Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2018.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 38-40).
This paper examines the relationship between classified boards and managerial entrenchment by applying a panel regression discontinuity design to shareholder proposals on board declassification. We focus on shareholder proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes in order to provide a causal estimate of the impact of board declassification. We find that shareholder proposal approval leads to a reduction in CEO compensation, an increase in the likelihood of CEO replacement, a positive but insignificant impact on pay-performance elasticity, and an increase in firm value. The reduction in CEO compensation is strongest among firms who possess weaker levels of corporate governance. These findings suggest that classified boards protect top management and lead to higher levels of managerial entrenchment.
by Fernando Miguel Pinto Martins.
S.M. in Management Research
50 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Sloan School of Management.
Do classified boards protect top management? : evidence from shareholder proposals
Thesis
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