2026-09-20T20:25:26Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1182192026-06-16T18:52:07Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Lily L. Tsai.
Rosenzweig, Leah R
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
2018-09-28T20:57:23Z
2018-09-28T20:57:23Z
2018
2018
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/118219
1052612681
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2018.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 167-176).
In dominant-party states, why do individuals vote in elections with foregone conclusions when they are neither bought nor coerced? It is especially curious in these cases why the rural poor decide to cast their ballots. I posit that communities that collectively rely on the government for public services foster social norms of voting to influence turnout. Motivated by the perception that regimes reward high turnout areas with public goods, communities use esteem "carrots" and social "sticks" to overcome free-rider incentives and increase the likelihood of receiving services. The norm is strongest in less politically-competitive areas, precisely where the puzzle of participation is most obvious. At the individual level, those who rely on their local community for non-material goods, such as information and kinship, are more likely to comply with the norm in order to secure their access to these social benefits. Findings from a lab-in-the-field voting experiment in rural Tanzania indicate a strong influence of the social norm of voting. In the experiment, when turnout is public to their neighbors, respondents are 11 percentage points more likely to vote, compared to when they are in private. The theory, which applies broadly to many patronage-based regimes, explains how communities sustain social norms of voting even when elections lack legitimacy, elucidating the paradox of high turnout in dominant-party systems.
by Leah R. Rosenzweig.
Ph.D.
198 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Political Science.
Community carrots and social sticks : why the poor vote in a dominant-party system
Why the poor vote in a dominant-party system
Thesis
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Publication
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<Abstract>In dominant-party states, why do individuals vote in elections with foregone conclusions when they are neither bought nor coerced? It is especially curious in these cases why the rural poor decide to cast their ballots. I posit that communities that collectively rely on the government for public services foster social norms of voting to influence turnout. Motivated by the perception that regimes reward high turnout areas with public goods, communities use esteem "carrots" and social "sticks" to overcome free-rider incentives and increase the likelihood of receiving services. The norm is strongest in less politically-competitive areas, precisely where the puzzle of participation is most obvious. At the individual level, those who rely on their local community for non-material goods, such as information and kinship, are more likely to comply with the norm in order to secure their access to these social benefits. Findings from a lab-in-the-field voting experiment in rural Tanzania indicate a strong influence of the social norm of voting. In the experiment, when turnout is public to their neighbors, respondents are 11 percentage points more likely to vote, compared to when they are in private. The theory, which applies broadly to many patronage-based regimes, explains how communities sustain social norms of voting even when elections lack legitimacy, elucidating the paradox of high turnout in dominant-party systems.</Abstract>
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