2026-09-21T04:37:39Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1182622022-01-13T07:54:09Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Karl F. Seidman.
Bowling, William C., Jr
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Real Estate. Program in Real Estate Development.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Real Estate. Program in Real Estate Development.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Real Estate
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Urban Studies and Planning
n-us-la
2018-09-28T20:59:14Z
2018-09-28T20:59:14Z
2018
2018
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/118262
1054174870
Thesis: M.C.P., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, 2018.
Thesis: S.M. in Real Estate Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Program in Real Estate Development in conjunction with the Center for Real Estate, 2018.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 81-89).
Following Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans demolished nearly all of its public housing. Mirroring a national trend, not all of it was replaced. What was replaced largely took different forms: tenants received portable Housing Choice Vouchers and developers built new housing subsidized by the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). Now, New Orleans has over 18,000 voucher households and approximately 10,000 LIHTC units. While this might appear to add up to 28,000 affordable units, the two programs overlap in significant ways. Tenants are permitted to use vouchers in LIHTC developments and LIHTC developers must accept tenants with vouchers. I start with a seemingly simple question: What is the prevalence of this practice? Through spatial analysis, some relationships between LIHTC and vouchers appear. Through interviews and review of property level data, I find that approximately 50% of LIHTC units are occupied by individuals with tenant-based vouchers. By permitting tenants with portable vouchers to live in LIHTC developments, do we "lose" affordable units? Through interviews with developers, policymakers, and property managers, I find that LIHTC developers do not consider tenant-based subsidy in the development process, nor do they depend on it for underwriting deals. However, due to different methodologies for rent determination, tenant-based vouchers allow LIHTC developers to earn higher rents. This "Tenant- Based Section 8 Overhang" brings additional unanticipated revenue to developments. This is essentially lagniappe - a phrase used in New Orleans to describe an unexpected small gift. Using New Orleans as a case study, I analyze payments standards and suggest that by requiring developers to accept the lower LIHTC rents, it may be possible to save millions of dollars per year. I conclude with policy proposals that seek to preserve tenant choice while pushing for maximum program savings to potentially create additional vouchers.
by William C. Bowling, Jr.
M.C.P.
S.M. in Real Estate Development
89 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Urban Studies and Planning.
Center for Real Estate. Program in Real Estate Development.
Double-dipping or lagniappe? : a study on the use of tenant-based vouchers in low-income housing tax credit developments in New Orleans, Louisiana
Study on the use of tenant-based vouchers in low-income housing tax credit developments in New Orleans, Louisiana
Thesis
application/pdf
false
Publication
unknown
unknown
<Publication xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/" id="47982dd4-7bdb-45e0-aa69-3ba5c769b690">
<Type xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843</Type>
<Language>eng</Language>
<Title>Double-dipping or lagniappe? : a study on the use of tenant-based vouchers in low-income housing tax credit developments in New Orleans, Louisiana</Title>
<Subtitle>Study on the use of tenant-based vouchers in low-income housing tax credit developments in New Orleans, Louisiana</Subtitle>
<PublishedIn>
<Publication>
</Publication>
</PublishedIn>
<PublicationDate>2018</PublicationDate>
<Authors>
<Author>
<DisplayName>Bowling, William C., Jr</DisplayName>
<Affiliation>
<OrgUnit>
</OrgUnit>
</Affiliation>
</Author>
</Authors>
<Editors>
</Editors>
<Publishers>
<Publisher>
<DisplayName>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</DisplayName>
<OrgUnit />
</Publisher>
</Publishers>
<License>http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</License>
<Keyword>Urban Studies and Planning.</Keyword>
<Keyword>Center for Real Estate. Program in Real Estate Development.</Keyword>
<Abstract>Following Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans demolished nearly all of its public housing. Mirroring a national trend, not all of it was replaced. What was replaced largely took different forms: tenants received portable Housing Choice Vouchers and developers built new housing subsidized by the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). Now, New Orleans has over 18,000 voucher households and approximately 10,000 LIHTC units. While this might appear to add up to 28,000 affordable units, the two programs overlap in significant ways. Tenants are permitted to use vouchers in LIHTC developments and LIHTC developers must accept tenants with vouchers. I start with a seemingly simple question: What is the prevalence of this practice? Through spatial analysis, some relationships between LIHTC and vouchers appear. Through interviews and review of property level data, I find that approximately 50% of LIHTC units are occupied by individuals with tenant-based vouchers. By permitting tenants with portable vouchers to live in LIHTC developments, do we "lose" affordable units? Through interviews with developers, policymakers, and property managers, I find that LIHTC developers do not consider tenant-based subsidy in the development process, nor do they depend on it for underwriting deals. However, due to different methodologies for rent determination, tenant-based vouchers allow LIHTC developers to earn higher rents. This "Tenant- Based Section 8 Overhang" brings additional unanticipated revenue to developments. This is essentially lagniappe - a phrase used in New Orleans to describe an unexpected small gift. Using New Orleans as a case study, I analyze payments standards and suggest that by requiring developers to accept the lower LIHTC rents, it may be possible to save millions of dollars per year. I conclude with policy proposals that seek to preserve tenant choice while pushing for maximum program savings to potentially create additional vouchers.</Abstract>
<Access xmlns="http://purl.org/coar/access_right"
>
</Access>
</Publication>