2026-09-19T09:29:30Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1195122026-06-06T00:55:13Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Howard Shrobe.
Caldera, Carlos, M. Eng. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
2018-12-11T20:38:13Z
2018-12-11T20:38:13Z
2017
2017
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/119512
1066344441
Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2017.
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 73-77).
The growing frequency and scale of cyber security attacks is daunting. Notable areas of concern are the Internet of Things (IoT) and Operational Technology (OT) systems; the IoT is becoming intimately integrated into our lives, and the physical repercussions of attacks on OT systems can be devastating. Risk analysis tools can prove to be very helpful towards defining counter measures that can either prevent or dampen the effect of these seemingly inevitable cyber security attacks. One such tool, attack trees, provide a formal way of describing the varying attacks that could be mounted against a system. Though they are limited because their development is time intensive, work has been done on automating this process with attack tree generators. In this thesis, we provide suggested design modifications to be made on existing attack tree generators to work on IoT and OT systems.
by Carlos Caldera.
M.Eng.
77 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Towards an automated attack tree generator for the IoT
Thesis
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<Abstract>The growing frequency and scale of cyber security attacks is daunting. Notable areas of concern are the Internet of Things (IoT) and Operational Technology (OT) systems; the IoT is becoming intimately integrated into our lives, and the physical repercussions of attacks on OT systems can be devastating. Risk analysis tools can prove to be very helpful towards defining counter measures that can either prevent or dampen the effect of these seemingly inevitable cyber security attacks. One such tool, attack trees, provide a formal way of describing the varying attacks that could be mounted against a system. Though they are limited because their development is time intensive, work has been done on automating this process with attack tree generators. In this thesis, we provide suggested design modifications to be made on existing attack tree generators to work on IoT and OT systems.</Abstract>
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