2026-09-18T18:19:49Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1206772026-06-16T18:16:31Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Alex Byrne.
Gray, David Michael, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
2019-03-01T19:57:25Z
2019-03-01T19:57:25Z
2018
2018
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/120677
1088555033
Thesis: Ph. D. in Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2018.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 121-125).
Machine ethics is a nascent subfield of computer ethics that focuses on the ethical issues involved in the design of autonomous software agents ("artificial agents"). Chapter 1 of this thesis considers how best to understand the central projects of this new subfield, and reconstructs a prominent theory of how artificial agents ought to be designed. This theory, which I call the "agential theory" of machine ethics, says that artificial agents morally ought to be designed to behave only in ways that would be permissible for a human agent to behave, and that only artificial agents that have been designed in this way are morally permissible for human beings to use. Chapter 2 critically assesses two versions of the agential theory-one that assumes that artificial agents are moral agents, and another that does not. After considering arguments for both versions of the theory, I argue that both versions should be rejected. Chapter 3 sets out and analyzes a case study in machine ethics, focusing on the development of an artificial agent to assist with the planning of a public health social work intervention.
by David Michael Gray.
Ph.D. in Philosophy
125 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Linguistics and Philosophy.
Ethics for artificial agents
Thesis
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<Abstract>Machine ethics is a nascent subfield of computer ethics that focuses on the ethical issues involved in the design of autonomous software agents ("artificial agents"). Chapter 1 of this thesis considers how best to understand the central projects of this new subfield, and reconstructs a prominent theory of how artificial agents ought to be designed. This theory, which I call the "agential theory" of machine ethics, says that artificial agents morally ought to be designed to behave only in ways that would be permissible for a human agent to behave, and that only artificial agents that have been designed in this way are morally permissible for human beings to use. Chapter 2 critically assesses two versions of the agential theory-one that assumes that artificial agents are moral agents, and another that does not. After considering arguments for both versions of the theory, I argue that both versions should be rejected. Chapter 3 sets out and analyzes a case study in machine ethics, focusing on the development of an artificial agent to assist with the planning of a public health social work intervention.</Abstract>
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