2026-09-19T00:57:40Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1222642021-07-05T14:03:20Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Michael S. Triantafyllou.
Gilligan, Brian Kenneth.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mechanical Engineering.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mechanical Engineering
2019-09-17T22:44:35Z
2019-09-17T22:44:35Z
2019
2019
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122264
1117714720
Thesis: S.M. in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Mechanical Engineering, 2019
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 90-95).
This thesis presents a dynamic model that can be used for a digital twin of an electric ship. The model is an end-to-end simulation of a ship from prime mover to maneuvering, seakeeping, and propeller ventilation in random waves representing the behavior of a physical ship. There is a trend towards increasingly networked sensors and actuators to enable condition monitoring, ensure efficient operation, and allow for autonomy. However, a cyberattack on a networked control system presents not just the possibility of information theft but of physical system damage and loss of control. Thus, a detection scheme is proposed for cyber-physical systems using a joint unscented Kalman filter. It is employed to detect cyberattacks in the simulation model of an electric ship including sensor attacks and controller attacks on a gas turbine, synchronous generator, and automatic heading control. Finally, a system theoretic framework is presented for optimal sensor placement to minimize cyber vulnerability.
United States. Office of Naval Researchgrant N00014-16-1- 2956
by Brian Kenneth Gilligan.
S.M. in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering
S.M.inNavalArchitectureandMarineEngineering Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Mechanical Engineering
95 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Mechanical Engineering.
Electric ship digital twin : framework for cyber-physical system security
Thesis
application/pdf
2019-09-17T22:44:33Z
Publication
Master
MechE
unknown
unknown
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