2026-09-19T17:52:41Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1223922026-06-06T00:54:47Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Silvio Micali.
Vlachos, Georgios,M. Eng.Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
2019-10-04T21:31:55Z
2019-10-04T21:31:55Z
2017
2017
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122392
1120769237
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2017
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (page 25).
The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players' own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other's valuations. Not much is known about generating revenue in auctions of multiple identical copies of a same good. (In particular the celebrated Vickrey mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) For such auctions, we (1) put forward an attractive revenue benchmark, based on the players' possibilistic about each other, and (2) construct a mechanism that achieves such benchmark, assuming that thplayers are two-level rational (where the rationality is in the sense of Aumann).
by Georgios Vlachos.
M.Eng.
M.Eng. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
25 pages ;
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Multi-unit auction revenue with possibilistic beliefs
Thesis
application/pdf
2019-10-04T21:31:54Z
Publication
Master
EECS
unknown
unknown
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<Abstract>The revenue of traditional auction mechanisms is benchmarked solely against the players' own valuations, despite the fact that they may also have valuable beliefs about each other's valuations. Not much is known about generating revenue in auctions of multiple identical copies of a same good. (In particular the celebrated Vickrey mechanism has no revenue guarantees.) For such auctions, we (1) put forward an attractive revenue benchmark, based on the players' possibilistic about each other, and (2) construct a mechanism that achieves such benchmark, assuming that thplayers are two-level rational (where the rationality is in the sense of Aumann).</Abstract>
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