2026-09-21T20:45:58Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1224262026-06-16T18:16:03Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Tamar Schapiro and Kieran Setiya.
Muñoz, Daniel(Daniel B.)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
2019-10-04T21:33:55Z
2019-10-04T21:33:55Z
2019
2019
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122426
1120127064
Thesis: Ph. D. in Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2019
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
Some sacrifices-like giving a kidney or heroically dashing into a burning building-are supererogatory: they are good deeds beyond the call of duty. But if such deeds are really so good, philosophers ask, why shouldn't morality just require them? The standard answer is that morality recognizes a special role for the pursuit of self-interest, so that everyone may treat themselves as if they were uniquely important. This idea, however, cannot be reconciled with the compelling picture of morality as impartial-the view that we are each anyone's equal. I propose an alternative Self- Other Symmetric account of our moral freedom: the limits on what morality may demand of us are set by the duties we owe to ourselves. I begin with a defense of the Self-Other Symmetry: the idea that we owe the same duties to ourselves-and have the same rights against ourselves-as any relevantly similar other. Because we are consenting parties to our own actions, I argue, our rights against ourselves do not function like the rights of unwilling others. Instead, they play a permissive function, allowing us to block the demand to give up what is ours. I conclude by uniting, aggravating, and trying to solve some paradoxes of supererogatory permissions, guided by the idea that morality cannot be reduced to a ranking of options from best-to-worst. Rights against oneself are an irreducible second dimension, one that we need if we are to unify rights and supererogation into an impartial moral vision.
by Daniel Muñoz.
Ph.D. in Linguistics
Ph.D.inLinguistics Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
195 pages ;
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Linguistics and Philosophy.
What we owe to ourselves : essays on rights and supererogation
Essays on rights and supererogation
Thesis
application/pdf
2019-10-04T21:33:54Z
Publication
Doctoral
Ling
unknown
unknown
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<Abstract>Some sacrifices-like giving a kidney or heroically dashing into a burning building-are supererogatory: they are good deeds beyond the call of duty. But if such deeds are really so good, philosophers ask, why shouldn't morality just require them? The standard answer is that morality recognizes a special role for the pursuit of self-interest, so that everyone may treat themselves as if they were uniquely important. This idea, however, cannot be reconciled with the compelling picture of morality as impartial-the view that we are each anyone's equal. I propose an alternative Self- Other Symmetric account of our moral freedom: the limits on what morality may demand of us are set by the duties we owe to ourselves. I begin with a defense of the Self-Other Symmetry: the idea that we owe the same duties to ourselves-and have the same rights against ourselves-as any relevantly similar other. Because we are consenting parties to our own actions, I argue, our rights against ourselves do not function like the rights of unwilling others. Instead, they play a permissive function, allowing us to block the demand to give up what is ours. I conclude by uniting, aggravating, and trying to solve some paradoxes of supererogatory permissions, guided by the idea that morality cannot be reduced to a ranking of options from best-to-worst. Rights against oneself are an irreducible second dimension, one that we need if we are to unify rights and supererogation into an impartial moral vision.</Abstract>
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