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Thomas Kochan. Kowalski. Alexander Marion. Sloan School of Management. Sloan School of Management 2020-01-08T19:39:40Z 2020-01-08T19:39:40Z 2019 2019 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/123378 1132233734 Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2019 Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (pages 40-42). Although it is commonly suggested that employees of different ability levels respond in different ways to performance pay, there is little research documenting such a relationship. In this study, I examine how employee ability moderates the effectiveness of two types of incentives in a field experiment with warehouse workers at Picklnc, a large U.S.-based retailer. The incentives are distinguished by their level of reward: one is tied to individual performance, the other to group performance. I find, first, that the individual incentive is superior in improving productivity and, second, that there is variation in how employees of different ability levels respond. The relationship between individual performance pay and ability is J-shaped: weak performers respond most positively, followed by top performers, followed by middle performers. Group performance pay is negatively related to ability. The results suggest that more effective performance pay systems will need to account for variability in employee response. by Alexander M. Kowalski. S.M. in Management Research S.M.inManagementResearch Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management 46 pages eng Massachusetts Institute of Technology MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 Sloan School of Management. Is there folly when worker A is more productive than worker B? : examining heterogeneous responses to individual and group performance pay Examining heterogeneous responses to individual and group performance pay Thesis application/pdf 2020-01-08T19:39:36Z Publication Master Sloan unknown unknown <Publication xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/" id="ae7d2e4c-8587-44bc-9207-da94a1dbcd06"> <Type xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843</Type> <Language>eng</Language> <Title>Is there folly when worker A is more productive than worker B? : examining heterogeneous responses to individual and group performance pay</Title> <Subtitle>Examining heterogeneous responses to individual and group performance pay</Subtitle> <PublishedIn> <Publication> </Publication> </PublishedIn> <PublicationDate>2019</PublicationDate> <Authors> <Author> <DisplayName>Kowalski. Alexander Marion.</DisplayName> <Affiliation> <OrgUnit> </OrgUnit> </Affiliation> </Author> </Authors> <Editors> </Editors> <Publishers> <Publisher> <DisplayName>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</DisplayName> <OrgUnit /> </Publisher> </Publishers> <License>http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</License> <Keyword>Sloan School of Management.</Keyword> <Abstract>Although it is commonly suggested that employees of different ability levels respond in different ways to performance pay, there is little research documenting such a relationship. In this study, I examine how employee ability moderates the effectiveness of two types of incentives in a field experiment with warehouse workers at Picklnc, a large U.S.-based retailer. The incentives are distinguished by their level of reward: one is tied to individual performance, the other to group performance. I find, first, that the individual incentive is superior in improving productivity and, second, that there is variation in how employees of different ability levels respond. The relationship between individual performance pay and ability is J-shaped: weak performers respond most positively, followed by top performers, followed by middle performers. Group performance pay is negatively related to ability. The results suggest that more effective performance pay systems will need to account for variability in employee response.</Abstract> <Access xmlns="http://purl.org/coar/access_right" > </Access> </Publication>