2026-09-19T12:19:08Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1269762026-06-17T14:46:28Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Eric So and Rodrigo Verdi.
Eric So and Rodrigo Verdi.
Noh, Suzie.
Sloan School of Management.
Sloan School of Management
2020-09-03T16:46:37Z
2020-09-03T16:46:37Z
2020
2020
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/126976
1191222150
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, May, 2020
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 51-53).
I examine whether mandating the disclosure of investments influences firms' strategic interactions. I exploit an SEC regulation requiring firms to report off-balance sheet purchase obligations, such as commitments to inventory purchases, CAPEX, R&D, and advertising. Motivated by theory on strategic investments, I predict and find that firms respond to the regulation by increasing investments if they have substitutive product market strategies with competitors, and decreasing investments if they have complementary strategies. This two-way finding is consistent with firms using investments to influence competitors' behavior in ways that increase their own profits. I show that changes in investments are concentrated among firms with large market share, which have a greater ability to influence competitors' actions, and that they have real effects on firms' sales and profit margins. Collectively, my results illustrate a novel channel through which financial reporting shapes firms' investments and competition.
by Suzie Noh.
Ph.D.
Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management
53 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Sloan School of Management.
The effect of financial reporting on strategic investments : evidence from purchase obligations
Thesis
application/pdf
2020-09-03T16:46:36Z
Publication
Doctoral
Sloan
unknown
unknown
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