<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-09-19T01:28:58Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/127024" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/127024</identifier><datestamp>2026-06-16T18:52:30Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_1721.1_7582</setSpec><setSpec>com_1721.1_7581</setSpec><setSpec>col_1721.1_131022</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">Vinod Vaikuntanathan and Virginia Vassilevska Williams.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" lang="en_US">LaVigne, Rio(Kristen Rio)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2020-09-03T17:42:37Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2020-09-03T17:42:37Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="copyright" lang="en_US">2020</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued" lang="en_US">2020</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/127024</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="oclc" lang="en_US">1191625265</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, May, 2020</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Cataloged from the official PDF of thesis.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Includes bibliographical references (pages 157-168).</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">One of the fundamental goals of cryptography is to be able to offer security and privacy without sacrificing functionality. Cryptographers have been able to achieve the best of all three by exploiting the assumed hardness of some problems (e.g. discrete log), and have been able to build protocols for secure multiparty computation, collision-resistant hash functions, public key cryptography, and much more. This thesis explores three facets of this balance. First, we delve into Topology-Hiding Computation, which is multiparty computation where we also hide the communication network, strengthening the notion of privacy. Second, we study Property Preserving Hashing, which can be thought of as an extension of collision-resistant hashing where we add functionality. Finally, we explore Fine-Grained Cryptography, and develop a public key cryptosystem. In this model of cryptography, security takes on a much less restrictive role (e.g. adversaries must run in O(n¹⁰) time), but the protocols and security reductions must run in "fine-grained" time (e.g. less than O(n⁵)).</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="statementofresponsibility" lang="en_US">by Rio LaVigne.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Ph.D.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="collection" lang="en_US">Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="format" qualifier="extent" lang="en_US">168 pages</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en_US">eng</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" lang="en_US">MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" qualifier="uri" lang="en_US">http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Relationships between functionality, security, and privacy for multiparty computation, hashing, and encryption</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="mit" element="thesis" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Doctoral</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="mit" element="thesis" qualifier="department" lang="en_US">EECS</dim:field>
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   	&lt;Title>Relationships between functionality, security, and privacy for multiparty computation, hashing, and encryption&lt;/Title>
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   	&lt;PublicationDate>2020&lt;/PublicationDate>
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        	&lt;DisplayName>LaVigne, Rio(Kristen Rio)&lt;/DisplayName>
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   	&lt;Abstract>One of the fundamental goals of cryptography is to be able to offer security and privacy without sacrificing functionality. Cryptographers have been able to achieve the best of all three by exploiting the assumed hardness of some problems (e.g. discrete log), and have been able to build protocols for secure multiparty computation, collision-resistant hash functions, public key cryptography, and much more. This thesis explores three facets of this balance. First, we delve into Topology-Hiding Computation, which is multiparty computation where we also hide the communication network, strengthening the notion of privacy. Second, we study Property Preserving Hashing, which can be thought of as an extension of collision-resistant hashing where we add functionality. Finally, we explore Fine-Grained Cryptography, and develop a public key cryptosystem. In this model of cryptography, security takes on a much less restrictive role (e.g. adversaries must run in O(n¹⁰) time), but the protocols and security reductions must run in &amp;quot;fine-grained&amp;quot; time (e.g. less than O(n⁵)).&lt;/Abstract>
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