2026-09-19T03:45:32Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1290882023-01-24T13:46:41Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Hui Chen.
Sun, Jian(Scientist in business management)Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Sloan School of Management.
Sloan School of Management
2021-01-06T17:39:08Z
2021-01-06T17:39:08Z
2020
2020
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129088
1227097180
Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, September, 2020
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 27-28).
This paper studies a long run relationship between two players while one player has reputation concern and the other player's decision is a stopping time. The equilibrium structure depends on the value of the long run relationship: when the value of the relationship is low, a simple threshold equilibrium is the unique equilibrium; when the value becomes higher, a probationary period endogenously arises when reputation is in an intermediate region. Reputation concern also has discipline effect, moral hazard problem is mitigated when player's reputation becomes worse, and the discipline effect is dominating when reputation is sufficiently bad.
by Jian Sun.
S.M. in Management Research
S.M.inManagementResearch Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management
40 pages ;
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Sloan School of Management.
Reputation with stopping time decision
Thesis
application/pdf
2021-01-06T17:39:07Z
Publication
Master
Sloan
unknown
unknown
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