2026-09-19T03:24:09Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1290932026-06-17T14:47:44Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Eric So and Rodrigo Verdi.
Rickmann, Georg(Georg Alexander)
Sloan School of Management.
Sloan School of Management
2021-01-06T17:39:42Z
2021-01-06T17:39:42Z
2020
2020
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129093
1227097625
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, September, 2020
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 52-54).
Market prices and trading in financial markets are important information signals that reveal firm specific information to the public. I study how the observability of such prices and trading (hereafter, "market transparency") affects firms' disclosure incentives. I exploit the staggered introduction of TRACE, which made bond prices and transactions publicly observable, and show that firms provide more guidance when their bonds' prices and trading become observable. This effect is stronger for firms with informationally sensitive bonds and firms without exchange-listed bonds prior to TRACE. Also, firms become particularly more likely to disclose bad news, consistent with the notion that investors' access to market information limits managers' incentives to withhold information. I corroborate my results using (1) a small controlled experiment, in which prices and trading are revealed for a randomized set of bonds, and (2) threshold rules used by the regulator. Taken together, my results suggest that observable market outcomes inform investors not only directly, by aggregating and revealing investors' information and beliefs, but also indirectly by increasing corporate disclosure.
by Georg Rickmann.
Ph.D.
Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management
75 pages ;
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Sloan School of Management.
The effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure
Thesis
application/pdf
2021-01-06T17:39:42Z
Publication
Doctoral
Sloan
unknown
unknown
<Publication xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/" id="dd9a6f1c-9763-4928-9fd5-069297aa780f">
<Type xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843</Type>
<Language>eng</Language>
<Title>The effect of market transparency on corporate disclosure</Title>
<PublishedIn>
<Publication>
</Publication>
</PublishedIn>
<PublicationDate>2020</PublicationDate>
<Authors>
<Author>
<DisplayName>Rickmann, Georg(Georg Alexander)</DisplayName>
<Affiliation>
<OrgUnit>
</OrgUnit>
</Affiliation>
</Author>
</Authors>
<Editors>
</Editors>
<Publishers>
<Publisher>
<DisplayName>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</DisplayName>
<OrgUnit />
</Publisher>
</Publishers>
<License>http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</License>
<Keyword>Sloan School of Management.</Keyword>
<Abstract>Market prices and trading in financial markets are important information signals that reveal firm specific information to the public. I study how the observability of such prices and trading (hereafter, "market transparency") affects firms' disclosure incentives. I exploit the staggered introduction of TRACE, which made bond prices and transactions publicly observable, and show that firms provide more guidance when their bonds' prices and trading become observable. This effect is stronger for firms with informationally sensitive bonds and firms without exchange-listed bonds prior to TRACE. Also, firms become particularly more likely to disclose bad news, consistent with the notion that investors' access to market information limits managers' incentives to withhold information. I corroborate my results using (1) a small controlled experiment, in which prices and trading are revealed for a randomized set of bonds, and (2) threshold rules used by the regulator. Taken together, my results suggest that observable market outcomes inform investors not only directly, by aggregating and revealing investors' information and beliefs, but also indirectly by increasing corporate disclosure.</Abstract>
<Access xmlns="http://purl.org/coar/access_right"
>
</Access>
</Publication>