<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-09-18T19:35:45Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/130704" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/130704</identifier><datestamp>2026-06-06T00:55:18Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_1721.1_7582</setSpec><setSpec>com_1721.1_7581</setSpec><setSpec>col_1721.1_131023</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">Anish Athalye, M. Frans Kaashoek and Nickolai Zeldovich.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" lang="en_US">Moroze, Noah(Noah F.)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2021-05-24T19:52:27Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2021-05-24T19:52:27Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="copyright" lang="en_US">2021</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued" lang="en_US">2021</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130704</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="oclc" lang="en_US">1251800583</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, February, 2021</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Cataloged from the official PDF of thesis.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Includes bibliographical references (pages 97-99).</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">Notary [3] uses formal verification to prove a hardware-level security property called deterministic start for a simple system-on-chip (SoC). Deterministic start requires that an SoC's state is fully reset by boot code to ensure that secrets cannot leak across reset boundaries. However, Notary's approach has several limitations. Its security property requires that all of the SoC's microarchitectural state can be reset to known values through software, and the property and proof technique apply only to SoCs with a single clock domain. These limitations prevent Notary's approach from being applied to more complex systems. This thesis addresses these limitations through Kronos, a system consisting of a verified SoC that satisfies a new security property called output determinism. Output determinism provides the same security guarantees as Notary without requiring that all of an SoC's state be reset by software. The SoC used in Kronos, called MicroTitan, is based on the open-source OpenTitan [16] and includes multiple clock domains. This thesis evaluates Kronos and demonstrates that existing open-source hardware can be modified to satisfy output determinism with minimal changes, and that the process of proving output determinism reveals hardware issues that violate desired security guarantees.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="statementofresponsibility" lang="en_US">by Noah Moroze.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">M.Eng.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="collection" lang="en_US">M.Eng. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="format" qualifier="extent" lang="en_US">99 pages</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en_US">eng</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" lang="en_US">MIT theses may be protected by copyright. Please reuse MIT thesis content according to the MIT Libraries Permissions Policy, which is available through the URL provided.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" qualifier="uri" lang="en_US">http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Kronos : verifying leak-free reset for a system-on-chip with multiple clock domains</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" qualifier="alternative" lang="en_US">Verifying leak-free reset for a system-on-chip with multiple clock domains</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="mit" element="thesis" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Master</dim:field>
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   	&lt;Title>Kronos : verifying leak-free reset for a system-on-chip with multiple clock domains&lt;/Title>
   	&lt;Subtitle>Verifying leak-free reset for a system-on-chip with multiple clock domains&lt;/Subtitle>
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   	&lt;PublicationDate>2021&lt;/PublicationDate>
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        	&lt;DisplayName>Moroze, Noah(Noah F.)&lt;/DisplayName>
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    &lt;Keyword>Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.&lt;/Keyword>
   	&lt;Abstract>Notary [3] uses formal verification to prove a hardware-level security property called deterministic start for a simple system-on-chip (SoC). Deterministic start requires that an SoC&amp;apos;s state is fully reset by boot code to ensure that secrets cannot leak across reset boundaries. However, Notary&amp;apos;s approach has several limitations. Its security property requires that all of the SoC&amp;apos;s microarchitectural state can be reset to known values through software, and the property and proof technique apply only to SoCs with a single clock domain. These limitations prevent Notary&amp;apos;s approach from being applied to more complex systems. This thesis addresses these limitations through Kronos, a system consisting of a verified SoC that satisfies a new security property called output determinism. Output determinism provides the same security guarantees as Notary without requiring that all of an SoC&amp;apos;s state be reset by software. The SoC used in Kronos, called MicroTitan, is based on the open-source OpenTitan [16] and includes multiple clock domains. This thesis evaluates Kronos and demonstrates that existing open-source hardware can be modified to satisfy output determinism with minimal changes, and that the process of proving output determinism reveals hardware issues that violate desired security guarantees.&lt;/Abstract>
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