2026-09-19T18:30:58Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1625142025-08-28T03:07:49Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Sollins, Karen R.
Bansal, Umang
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
2025-08-27T14:30:44Z
2025-08-27T14:30:44Z
2025-05
2025-06-23T14:00:56.580Z
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/162514
Distributed Denial of Service attacks, and particularly DNS Amplification attacks, have seen a steady rise in deployment over the past few decades. DNS Amplification attacks, in particular, are challenging to identify and mitigate because of their apparent similarity to legitimate DNS traffic. This thesis proposes a new Proof-of-Work mitigation strategy that provides a defense against DNS Amplification attacks and shifts the burden of mitigation to the attackers. Through our experiments, we show that our Proof-of-Work strategy is effective in reversing the impact of DNS Amplification attacks on the victim’s ability to service legitimate clients. We also provide an evaluation framework to evaluate the mitigation strategy’s impact on the victim’s quality of service.
M.Eng.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted
Copyright retained by author(s)
https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/
Proof-of-Work Mitigation Strategy for DNS-Based
Amplification Attacks
Thesis
application/pdf
Master
Master of Engineering in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Publication
unknown
unknown
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<Abstract>Distributed Denial of Service attacks, and particularly DNS Amplification attacks, have seen a steady rise in deployment over the past few decades. DNS Amplification attacks, in particular, are challenging to identify and mitigate because of their apparent similarity to legitimate DNS traffic. This thesis proposes a new Proof-of-Work mitigation strategy that provides a defense against DNS Amplification attacks and shifts the burden of mitigation to the attackers. Through our experiments, we show that our Proof-of-Work strategy is effective in reversing the impact of DNS Amplification attacks on the victim’s ability to service legitimate clients. We also provide an evaluation framework to evaluate the mitigation strategy’s impact on the victim’s quality of service.</Abstract>
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