2026-09-19T16:56:40Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/1629672026-08-04T05:06:55Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Win, Moe Z.
Ricard, Michael J.
Schatz, Ensign Nathan Caleb
2025-10-06T17:37:20Z
2025-10-06T17:37:20Z
2025-05
2025-06-23T14:45:12.119Z
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/162967
Reliable location awareness is essential for the development of new services and applications in non-terrestrial networks (NTN). The ability of malicious users to report false location information poses a significant threat to NTN performance. This threat introduces the need for a flexible and robust location verification system (LVS) that can reliably detect malicious users. This paper proposes a single-satellite LVS based on round-trip time and angle-of-arrival measurements. We characterize several sources of uncertainty unique to the NTN scenario and examine their combined effect on positioning error. To detect spoofing probabilistically, we approximate the likelihood function for the unknown user position using a Gaussian mixture model and employ a likelihood ratio decision rule for location verification. Results display receiver operating characteristic curves to evaluate the LVS performance under various satellite ephemeris error conditions, spoofing distances, number of measurements available to the system, and wireless channel properties. The proposed LVS is shown to reliably detect spoofing among malicious users.
S.M.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Copyright retained by author(s)
https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/
Location Verification for Spoofing Detection in Non-Terrestrial Networks
Thesis
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
application/pdf
Master
Master of Science in Aeronautics and Astronautics
Publication
unknown
unknown
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<Abstract>Reliable location awareness is essential for the development of new services and applications in non-terrestrial networks (NTN). The ability of malicious users to report false location information poses a significant threat to NTN performance. This threat introduces the need for a flexible and robust location verification system (LVS) that can reliably detect malicious users. This paper proposes a single-satellite LVS based on round-trip time and angle-of-arrival measurements. We characterize several sources of uncertainty unique to the NTN scenario and examine their combined effect on positioning error. To detect spoofing probabilistically, we approximate the likelihood function for the unknown user position using a Gaussian mixture model and employ a likelihood ratio decision rule for location verification. Results display receiver operating characteristic curves to evaluate the LVS performance under various satellite ephemeris error conditions, spoofing distances, number of measurements available to the system, and wireless channel properties. The proposed LVS is shown to reliably detect spoofing among malicious users.</Abstract>
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