2026-09-18T21:56:40Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/286712022-01-13T07:54:42Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Stephen W. Van Evera.
Clinkenbeard, Steven E., 1958-
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
2005-09-27T17:38:37Z
2005-09-27T17:38:37Z
2004
2004
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28671
58974813
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2004.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 461-493).
Donors versus Dictators examines the "exporting democracy debate" and the related issue of "nation-building" as manifested in the foreign aid relationship in the post-Cold War era. This dissertation centers on two in-depth case studies of countries where all major donors froze aid on a multilateral basis in order to pressure authoritarian regimes to legalize opposition parties and hold democratic elections. Through careful historical process-tracing, hypotheses drawn from both sides of the debate and from the academic literatures on democratization, aid and economic sanctions are assessed with respect to the attempts at democratization in Kenya and Malawi from 1989 to 2003. Conclusions include the finding that aid conditionality is generally effective in producing multiparty elections and pushing the reform process forward in aid-dependent countries where incumbent regimes have historically been pro-Western and desire to remain engaged in the global economy. However, the ultimate effectiveness of donor policy in producing democratization in these cases has been limited by the patterns of ethnic cleavage within the recipient countries and the relative ability of the emerging constitutional and electoral systems to channel ethnic and clientelist politics in democratic directions, factors which have so far been beyond the scope and level of coherence of donor policy.
by Steven E. Clinkenbeard.
Ph.D.
493 p.
38163603 bytes
38233177 bytes
application/pdf
application/pdf
en_US
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Political Science.
Donors versus dictators : the impact of multilateral aid conditionality on democratization : Kenya and Malawi in comparative context
Donors vs. dictators : the impact of multilateral aid conditionality on democratization : Kenya and Malawi in comparative context
Thesis
application/pdf
false
Publication
unknown
unknown
<Publication xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/" id="f591075b-1aab-42c3-93b0-99c6edd24b33">
<Type xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843</Type>
<Language>en_US</Language>
<Title>Donors versus dictators : the impact of multilateral aid conditionality on democratization : Kenya and Malawi in comparative context</Title>
<Subtitle>Donors vs. dictators : the impact of multilateral aid conditionality on democratization : Kenya and Malawi in comparative context</Subtitle>
<PublishedIn>
<Publication>
</Publication>
</PublishedIn>
<PublicationDate>2004</PublicationDate>
<Authors>
<Author>
<DisplayName>Clinkenbeard, Steven E., 1958-</DisplayName>
<Affiliation>
<OrgUnit>
</OrgUnit>
</Affiliation>
</Author>
</Authors>
<Editors>
</Editors>
<Publishers>
<Publisher>
<DisplayName>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</DisplayName>
<OrgUnit />
</Publisher>
</Publishers>
<License>http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</License>
<Keyword>Political Science.</Keyword>
<Abstract>Donors versus Dictators examines the "exporting democracy debate" and the related issue of "nation-building" as manifested in the foreign aid relationship in the post-Cold War era. This dissertation centers on two in-depth case studies of countries where all major donors froze aid on a multilateral basis in order to pressure authoritarian regimes to legalize opposition parties and hold democratic elections. Through careful historical process-tracing, hypotheses drawn from both sides of the debate and from the academic literatures on democratization, aid and economic sanctions are assessed with respect to the attempts at democratization in Kenya and Malawi from 1989 to 2003. Conclusions include the finding that aid conditionality is generally effective in producing multiparty elections and pushing the reform process forward in aid-dependent countries where incumbent regimes have historically been pro-Western and desire to remain engaged in the global economy. However, the ultimate effectiveness of donor policy in producing democratization in these cases has been limited by the patterns of ethnic cleavage within the recipient countries and the relative ability of the emerging constitutional and electoral systems to channel ethnic and clientelist politics in democratic directions, factors which have so far been beyond the scope and level of coherence of donor policy.</Abstract>
<Access xmlns="http://purl.org/coar/access_right"
>
</Access>
</Publication>