2026-09-18T23:39:04Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/295702022-01-13T07:54:23Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Fred Moavenzadeh.
Lin, Jye-Shing, 1974-
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
2006-03-24T16:03:14Z
2006-03-24T16:03:14Z
2003
2003
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29570
52734201
Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 2003.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 86-88).
With a foreseeable, constrained financial status of a government, it is a feasible way to make public infrastructures viable for private sectors to participate. This concession can create a win-win situation for both the government and the private company. It also generates the maximum benefit for the public and the society if the project is well organized. Besides, private participation brings efficiency into infrastructure field and spur the economy in the long run. The degree of government involvement is vital to the success of a BOT project. If the government imposes too many restrictions on the project, it stifles the incentives. If the government helps the concessionaire too much, the project deviates from the main spirit of BOT delivery method. As a case study, the Taiwan High Speed Rail Project is discussed. This project changed its planned financial structure after the project encountered different difficulties in both debt and equity financing. However, the Taiwan government played an active role to help the project proceed. From this case study, one can also see how risks are allocated through different contractual agreements.
by Jye-Shing Lin.
S.M.
88 leaves
2955463 bytes
2955271 bytes
application/pdf
application/pdf
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Civil and Environmental Engineering.
The conflicts and risks in BOT projects
Conflicts and risks in Build-Operate-Transfer projects
Thesis
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<Abstract>With a foreseeable, constrained financial status of a government, it is a feasible way to make public infrastructures viable for private sectors to participate. This concession can create a win-win situation for both the government and the private company. It also generates the maximum benefit for the public and the society if the project is well organized. Besides, private participation brings efficiency into infrastructure field and spur the economy in the long run. The degree of government involvement is vital to the success of a BOT project. If the government imposes too many restrictions on the project, it stifles the incentives. If the government helps the concessionaire too much, the project deviates from the main spirit of BOT delivery method. As a case study, the Taiwan High Speed Rail Project is discussed. This project changed its planned financial structure after the project encountered different difficulties in both debt and equity financing. However, the Taiwan government played an active role to help the project proceed. From this case study, one can also see how risks are allocated through different contractual agreements.</Abstract>
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