2026-09-22T20:30:43Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/324002022-01-13T07:54:28Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Esther Duflo, Abhijit Banerjee and Antoinette Scholar.
Paravisini, Daniel
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
2006-03-29T18:41:11Z
2006-03-29T18:41:11Z
2005
2005
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/32400
61690882
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2005.
Includes bibliographical references.
The first essay provides evidence that banks are liquidity constrained and hold private information about borrowers that hinders substitution of financing sources. Using loan level data from a public credit bureau and exploiting an exogenous shock to bank liquidity, I show that adverse selection prevents full arbitrage of profitable opportunities by competing lenders and thus liquidity constraints propagate to bank-dependent borrowers. The second essay evaluates a government program that targeted credit to small firms through existing financial intermediaries. Using the program eligibility rule to identify the effect on target firms, I find that target firms' total bank debt increased by 8 cents for every dollar of program financing provided to the banks. This effect is larger when the intermediary bank is more likely to lend to smaller firms according to observable bank characteristics. The third essay evaluates empirically the effect of credit history disclosure on the financial position of a sample of manufacturing firms in Argentina. Results indicate that credit history disclosure has a negative impact in the ability of firms to raise external finance when firms are exposed to a high liquidity risk.
by Daniel Paravisini.
Ph.D.
116 p.
6759225 bytes
6766265 bytes
application/pdf
application/pdf
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Economics.
Essays on banking and corporate finance
Thesis
application/pdf
false
Publication
unknown
unknown
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<Abstract>The first essay provides evidence that banks are liquidity constrained and hold private information about borrowers that hinders substitution of financing sources. Using loan level data from a public credit bureau and exploiting an exogenous shock to bank liquidity, I show that adverse selection prevents full arbitrage of profitable opportunities by competing lenders and thus liquidity constraints propagate to bank-dependent borrowers. The second essay evaluates a government program that targeted credit to small firms through existing financial intermediaries. Using the program eligibility rule to identify the effect on target firms, I find that target firms' total bank debt increased by 8 cents for every dollar of program financing provided to the banks. This effect is larger when the intermediary bank is more likely to lend to smaller firms according to observable bank characteristics. The third essay evaluates empirically the effect of credit history disclosure on the financial position of a sample of manufacturing firms in Argentina. Results indicate that credit history disclosure has a negative impact in the ability of firms to raise external finance when firms are exposed to a high liquidity risk.</Abstract>
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