2026-09-19T19:08:33Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/338292022-01-13T07:54:28Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Daron Acemoglu, Olivier Blanchard and Ricardo Caballero.
Rappoport, Veronica E. (Veronica Eva)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
2006-08-25T18:49:11Z
2006-08-25T18:49:11Z
2005
2005
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33829
65198095
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2005.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 119-123).
The first essay explains why credit contracts in developing countries are often denominated in foreign currencies, even after many of these economies succeeded in controlling inflation. I propose a new interpretation based on the demand for insurance against real aggregate shocks. The fact that devaluations occur more frequently in adverse states of the world provides a motive for holding dollar assets when the risk of recession is the main source of volatility in consumption. The model predicts persistence in the degree of "dollarization" in economies with low inflationary risk. The second essay looks at how the government's lack of commitment technology affects the capacity of resident agents to optimally diversify risk. I find that government's moral hazard introduces a trade-off between pooling idiosyncratic risk and diversifying aggregate country uncertainty. As a result, local agents face excessive consumption risk. This paper also explores how institutions can be designed as to overcome this moral hazard problem. The third essay proposes an explanation for the variation across countries in the quality of the institutions governing the financial. The explanation based on the proportion of local investors participating in the domestic financial sector.
(cont.) I find that the participation of local investors in the financial market and, correspondingly, the resulting institutions vary according to wealth distribution and the size of capital inflows.
by Veronica E. Rappoport.
Ph.D.
123 p.
6085354 bytes
6090473 bytes
application/pdf
application/pdf
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Economics.
Essays on international finance and economics
Thesis
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<Abstract>The first essay explains why credit contracts in developing countries are often denominated in foreign currencies, even after many of these economies succeeded in controlling inflation. I propose a new interpretation based on the demand for insurance against real aggregate shocks. The fact that devaluations occur more frequently in adverse states of the world provides a motive for holding dollar assets when the risk of recession is the main source of volatility in consumption. The model predicts persistence in the degree of "dollarization" in economies with low inflationary risk. The second essay looks at how the government's lack of commitment technology affects the capacity of resident agents to optimally diversify risk. I find that government's moral hazard introduces a trade-off between pooling idiosyncratic risk and diversifying aggregate country uncertainty. As a result, local agents face excessive consumption risk. This paper also explores how institutions can be designed as to overcome this moral hazard problem. The third essay proposes an explanation for the variation across countries in the quality of the institutions governing the financial. The explanation based on the proportion of local investors participating in the domestic financial sector.</Abstract>
<Abstract>(cont.) I find that the participation of local investors in the financial market and, correspondingly, the resulting institutions vary according to wealth distribution and the size of capital inflows.</Abstract>
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