2026-09-19T15:59:28Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/367592022-01-13T07:54:29Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Ronald L. Rivest.
Forsythe, Joy Marie
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
2007-03-12T17:51:08Z
2007-03-12T17:51:08Z
2005
2005
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/36759
78617481
Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2005.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-64).
Voters are now demanding the ability to verify that their votes are cast and counted as intended. Most existing cryptographic election protocols do not treat the voter as a computationally-limited entity separate from the voting booth, and therefore do not ensure that the voting booth records the correct vote. David Chaum and Andrew Neff have proposed mixnet schemes that do provide this assurance, but little research has been done that combines voter verification with homomorphic encryption. This thesis proposes adding voter verification to an existing multi-candidate election scheme (Baudron et al.) that uses Paillier encryption. A "cut and choose" protocol provides a probabilistic guarantee of correctness. The scheme is straightforward, and could easily be extended to multi-authority elections. The feasibility of the proposed scheme is demonstrated via a simple implementation.
by Joy Marie Forsythe.
M.Eng.
64 leaves
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Voter verifiability in homomorphic election schemes
Thesis
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