2026-09-18T23:41:46Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/374152022-01-13T07:54:28Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Abhijit Banerjee and Xavier Gabaix.
Basu, Karna
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
2007-05-16T18:33:26Z
2007-05-16T18:33:26Z
2006
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/37415
123030513
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2006.
"September 2006."
Includes bibliographical references.
This thesis is a collection of three theoretical essays that examine the role of time-inconsistent preferences in informal banking. The first two chapters focus on specific banking institutions, while the third studies individual welfare more generally. In Chapter 1, I develop a model of rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) where members are quasi-hyperbolic discounters. I show that, in this setting, roscas function as commitment savings devices, and can survive in equilibrium even in the absence of formal contracting or informal social sanctions. In Chapter 2, I study the behavior of quasi-hyperbolic discounters who have access to credit and a non-secure savings technology. I show that these agents might simultaneously save and borrow to create optimal investment incentives for future selves. Chapter 3 evaluates and compares the welfare outcomes for time-inconsistent agents under several banking environments.
by Karna Basu.
Ph.D.
94 p.
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Economics.
Essays on informal banking
Thesis
application/pdf
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Publication
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