2026-09-18T19:51:07Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/456212022-01-13T07:54:31Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Robert C. Stalnaker.
Ninan, Dilip
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
2009-06-25T20:35:14Z
2009-06-25T20:35:14Z
2008
2008
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45621
320459177
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2008.
This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 109-113).
I begin with a discussion of two ways of imagining something: 'from the inside' and 'from the outside'. My interest in this topic is two-fold: First, I want to see what studying this topic can teach us about the nature of mental content -- in particular, about the content of de se and de re thoughts. Second, I want to formulate an account of this distinction which will help us understand the role these two types of imagining play in philosophical thought experiments about personal identity over time. The first three chapters of this dissertation focus on the first set of issues, issues of imagination and content. Chapter 4 extends and applies some of these insights to a puzzle about personal identity over time.
by Dilip Ninan.
Ph.D.
113 p.
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by
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http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Linguistics and Philosophy.
Imagination, content, and the self
Thesis
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