<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-09-18T22:15:55Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/45893" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/45893</identifier><datestamp>2022-01-13T07:54:31Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_1721.1_7582</setSpec><setSpec>com_1721.1_7581</setSpec><setSpec>col_1721.1_131022</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">Robert Stalnaker and Stephen Yablo.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" lang="en_US">Yalcin, Seth</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department">Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2009-06-30T16:33:33Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2009-06-30T16:33:33Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="copyright" lang="en_US">2008</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued" lang="en_US">2008</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45893</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="oclc" lang="en_US">320451563</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2008.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Includes bibliographical references (p. 117-125).</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">The possibilities we consider or eliminate in inquiry are epistemic possibilities. This dissertation is mainly about what it is to say or believe that something is possible in this sense. Chapter 1 ('Epistemic Contradictions') describes a new puzzle about epistemic modals and uses it to explore their logic and semantics. Chapter 2 ('Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality') situates the work of chapter 1 into a larger picture of content and communication, developing a broadly expressivist account of the language of epistemic modality. Chapter 3 ('Content and Modal Resolution') argues that states of belief should be understood as relativized to an inquiry, understood formally as a certain way of dividing up logical space.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="statementofresponsibility" lang="en_US">Seth Yalcin.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Ph.D.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="format" qualifier="extent" lang="en_US">125 p.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en_US">eng</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" lang="en_US">M.I.T. theses are protected by 
copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but 
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" qualifier="uri" lang="en_US">http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Linguistics and Philosophy.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Modality and inquiry</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">Thesis</dim:field>
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   	&lt;Title>Modality and inquiry&lt;/Title>
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   	&lt;PublicationDate>2008&lt;/PublicationDate>
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   	&lt;Abstract>The possibilities we consider or eliminate in inquiry are epistemic possibilities. This dissertation is mainly about what it is to say or believe that something is possible in this sense. Chapter 1 (&amp;apos;Epistemic Contradictions&amp;apos;) describes a new puzzle about epistemic modals and uses it to explore their logic and semantics. Chapter 2 (&amp;apos;Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality&amp;apos;) situates the work of chapter 1 into a larger picture of content and communication, developing a broadly expressivist account of the language of epistemic modality. Chapter 3 (&amp;apos;Content and Modal Resolution&amp;apos;) argues that states of belief should be understood as relativized to an inquiry, understood formally as a certain way of dividing up logical space.&lt;/Abstract>
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