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Roger I. Khazan. Kannan, Steven (Steven K.) Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science 2009-06-30T16:54:16Z 2009-06-30T16:54:16Z 2007 2007 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45979 334756582 Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 107-109). This thesis addresses the development of an end-to-end secure Voice over IP (VoIP) conference system. We are particularly interested in challenges associated with deploying such a system in ad-hoc networks containing low bandwidth and/or high latency data links. End-to-end security is handled by the decentralized Public Key Group Encryption library (PKGE) developed at Lincoln Laboratory; PKGE allows real-time keying of conference users without an on-line central keying authority.We present a system design and its prototype implementation in accordance with a set of appropriate design goals. The final product demonstrates the feasibility of using PKGE in the demanding conditions of VoIP conferencing. The system development sheds light on a number of issues and engineering challenges that ultimately affect call quality, functionality, security, and usability, motivating our recommendations for the next generation system. by Steven Kannan. M.Eng. 109 p. eng Massachusetts Institute of Technology M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Secure Voice over IP conferencing with decentralized group encryption Secure VoIP conferencing with decentralized group encryption Thesis application/pdf Publication unknown unknown <Publication xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/" id="92dc0370-e1d0-40fc-b8ec-314ff433429d"> <Type xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843</Type> <Language>eng</Language> <Title>Secure Voice over IP conferencing with decentralized group encryption</Title> <Subtitle>Secure VoIP conferencing with decentralized group encryption</Subtitle> <PublishedIn> <Publication> </Publication> </PublishedIn> <PublicationDate>2007</PublicationDate> <Authors> <Author> <DisplayName>Kannan, Steven (Steven K.)</DisplayName> <Affiliation> <OrgUnit> </OrgUnit> </Affiliation> </Author> </Authors> <Editors> </Editors> <Publishers> <Publisher> <DisplayName>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</DisplayName> <OrgUnit /> </Publisher> </Publishers> <License>http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</License> <Keyword>Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.</Keyword> <Abstract>This thesis addresses the development of an end-to-end secure Voice over IP (VoIP) conference system. We are particularly interested in challenges associated with deploying such a system in ad-hoc networks containing low bandwidth and/or high latency data links. End-to-end security is handled by the decentralized Public Key Group Encryption library (PKGE) developed at Lincoln Laboratory; PKGE allows real-time keying of conference users without an on-line central keying authority.We present a system design and its prototype implementation in accordance with a set of appropriate design goals. The final product demonstrates the feasibility of using PKGE in the demanding conditions of VoIP conferencing. The system development sheds light on a number of issues and engineering challenges that ultimately affect call quality, functionality, security, and usability, motivating our recommendations for the next generation system.</Abstract> <Access xmlns="http://purl.org/coar/access_right" > </Access> </Publication>