2026-09-19T16:23:19Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/465112022-01-13T07:54:29Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Silvio Micali.
Reyzin, Alissa Natanovna
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
2009-08-26T16:39:16Z
2009-08-26T16:39:16Z
2007
2007
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/46511
404129222
Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2007.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-60).
Recent work has attempted to bridge the fields of Cryptography and Game Theory in order to create more robust protocols that allow for a variety of player types. A keystone functionality used in cryptography is Secret Sharing. While there are several well known, efficient protocols that implement Secret Sharing in the Cryptographic model, designing a Rational Secret Sharing protocol which works in the Game Theoretic model has proved challenging. In this thesis, we contrast several recently proposed protocols for Rational Secret Sharing based on their channel models, utility tolerances, equilibrium types, and efficiencies. We also discuss two more general results bridging Cryptography and Game Theory that can be used to construct Rational Secret Sharing protocols. Finally, we highlight several issues of context that influence the ways in which Rational Secret Sharing protocols might be used.
by Alissa Natanovna Reyzin.
M.Eng.
60 p.
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by
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http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Rational secret sharing
Thesis
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