2026-09-19T03:26:41Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/551772022-01-13T07:54:31Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Robert Stalnaker.
Glick, Ephraim N
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
2010-05-25T20:58:11Z
2010-05-25T20:58:11Z
2009
2009
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/55177
608215768
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2009.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 115-118).
The thesis is an exploration of the relations between know-how, abilities, and ordinary knowledge of facts. It is shown that there is a distinctively practical sort of know-how and a corresponding interpretation of 'S knows how to [phi]', and that this special sort of know-how, while possessing representational content, is not simply ordinary knowledge-that. The view rests on a novel distinction between two interpretations of the Intellectualist slogan, familiar from the work of Gilbert Ryle, that know-how is a kind of knowledge-that. The distinction allows us to clarify the issues that are at stake in the debate and see the possibility of a position that combines aspects of both Intellectualism and anti-Intellectualism. An entailment from knowhow to a certain sort of ability is defended, and it is shown that the present view preserves the possibility of appealing to know-how to block Frank Jackson's "knowledge argument" against physicalism.
by Ephraim N. Glick.
Ph.D.
118 p.
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by
copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but
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http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Linguistics and Philosophy.
Practical knowledge and abilities
Thesis
application/pdf
Publication
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unknown
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