2026-09-18T22:54:48Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/request

oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/660202022-01-13T07:54:29Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023

Dina Katabi. Al-Hassanieh, Haitham (Haitham Zuhair) Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science 2011-09-27T18:33:19Z 2011-09-27T18:33:19Z 2011 2011 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/66020 751988597 Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2011. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-78). Modern implantable medical devices (IMDs) including pacemakers, cardiac defibrillators and nerve stimulators feature wireless connectivity that enables remote monitoring and post-implantation adjustment. However, recent work has demonstrated that flawed security tempers these medical benefits. In particular, an understandable lack of cryptographic mechanisms results in the IMD disclosing private data and being unable to distinguish authorized from unauthorized commands. In this thesis, we present IMD-Shield; a prototype defenses against a previously proposed suite of attacks on IMDs. IMD-Shield is an external entity that uses a new full dulpex radio design to secure transmissions to and from the IMD on the air wihtout incorporating the IMD itself. Because replacing the install base of wireless-enabled IMDs is infeasible, our system non-invasively enhances the security of unmodified IMDs. We implement and evaluate our mechanism against modern IMDs in a variety of attack scenarios and find that it effectively provides confidentiality for private data and shields the IMD from unauthorized commands. by Haitham Al-Hassanieh. S.M. 78 p. eng Massachusetts Institute of Technology M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Encryption on the air : non-Invasive security for implantable medical devices Thesis application/pdf false Publication unknown unknown <Publication xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/" id="d6420e07-d1ef-4d61-b3a6-b6016e052387"> <Type xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843</Type> <Language>eng</Language> <Title>Encryption on the air : non-Invasive security for implantable medical devices</Title> <PublishedIn> <Publication> </Publication> </PublishedIn> <PublicationDate>2011</PublicationDate> <Authors> <Author> <DisplayName>Al-Hassanieh, Haitham (Haitham Zuhair)</DisplayName> <Affiliation> <OrgUnit> </OrgUnit> </Affiliation> </Author> </Authors> <Editors> </Editors> <Publishers> <Publisher> <DisplayName>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</DisplayName> <OrgUnit /> </Publisher> </Publishers> <License>http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</License> <Keyword>Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.</Keyword> <Abstract>Modern implantable medical devices (IMDs) including pacemakers, cardiac defibrillators and nerve stimulators feature wireless connectivity that enables remote monitoring and post-implantation adjustment. However, recent work has demonstrated that flawed security tempers these medical benefits. In particular, an understandable lack of cryptographic mechanisms results in the IMD disclosing private data and being unable to distinguish authorized from unauthorized commands. In this thesis, we present IMD-Shield; a prototype defenses against a previously proposed suite of attacks on IMDs. IMD-Shield is an external entity that uses a new full dulpex radio design to secure transmissions to and from the IMD on the air wihtout incorporating the IMD itself. Because replacing the install base of wireless-enabled IMDs is infeasible, our system non-invasively enhances the security of unmodified IMDs. We implement and evaluate our mechanism against modern IMDs in a variety of attack scenarios and find that it effectively provides confidentiality for private data and shields the IMD from unauthorized commands.</Abstract> <Access xmlns="http://purl.org/coar/access_right" > </Access> </Publication>