2026-09-18T18:15:27Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/685192022-01-13T07:54:31Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Robert C. Stalnaker and Stephen Yablo.
Pérez Carballo, Alejandro
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
2012-01-12T19:34:15Z
2012-01-12T19:34:15Z
2011
2011
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/68519
770749232
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2011.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 103-109).
This dissertation is about whether and how non-representational attitudes could play a role in our theories of rationality. In Chapter 1 ('Negation, expressivism, and intentionality') I argue that the best explanation for why two mental states are inconsistent need not presuppose that such states are representational-that they have, in the jargon, truth-conditions. I use this to provide a solution to the 'negation problem' for metaethical expressivism. In Chapter 2 ('Structuring logical space') I sketch an account of mathematical practice along non-representational lines. I show how it can do justice to the applicability of mathematics, and propose ways in which one's epistemic goals can impose substantial constraints on which mathematical theories to accept. Chapter 3 ('Good questions') provides a general account of the way in which rationality constrains changes in our hypothesis space. In particular, I show how some such changes can be better than others by placing the discussion within a general framework of rational dynamics, on which rational epistemic change involves maximizing expected epistemic utility.
by Alejandro Perez Carballo.
Ph.D.
109 p.
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by
copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but
reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written
permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Linguistics and Philosophy.
Rationality without representation
Thesis
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