2026-09-19T14:44:39Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/698062022-01-13T07:55:03Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Kent Larson.
Papanikolaou, Dimitrios, M.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Architecture. Program in Media Arts and Sciences.
Program in Media Arts and Sciences (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
2012-03-16T16:04:44Z
2012-03-16T16:04:44Z
2011
2011
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/69806
777967019
Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, School of Architecture and Planning, Program in Media Arts and Sciences, 2011.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-62).
Mobility on Demand (MOD) systems allow users to pick-up and drop-off vehicles (bikes, automobiles) ubiquitously in a network of parking stations. Asymmetric demand patterns cause unbalanced fleet allocation decreasing level of service. Current redistribution policies are complex to plan and typically cost more that the usage revenues of the system. The Market Economy of Trips (MET) explores a new operation model based on a double auction market where cost-minimizing users are both buyers and sellers of trip rights while profit-maximizing stations are competing auctioneers that trade them. Trip rights are priced relatively to the inventory needs of origin and destination stations. A theory, a game, and a model are presented to explore equilibrium and limits of efficiency of MET under different demand patterns and income distribution.
by Dimitris Papanikolaou.
S.M.
66 p.
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by
copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but
reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written
permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Architecture. Program in Media Arts and Sciences.
The market economy of trips
Thesis
application/pdf
false
Publication
unknown
unknown
<Publication xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/" id="2933f83c-50fe-48d6-8285-f9ff7506316b">
<Type xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843</Type>
<Language>eng</Language>
<Title>The market economy of trips</Title>
<PublishedIn>
<Publication>
</Publication>
</PublishedIn>
<PublicationDate>2011</PublicationDate>
<Authors>
<Author>
<DisplayName>Papanikolaou, Dimitrios, M.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology</DisplayName>
<Affiliation>
<OrgUnit>
</OrgUnit>
</Affiliation>
</Author>
</Authors>
<Editors>
</Editors>
<Publishers>
<Publisher>
<DisplayName>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</DisplayName>
<OrgUnit />
</Publisher>
</Publishers>
<License>http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</License>
<Keyword>Architecture. Program in Media Arts and Sciences.</Keyword>
<Abstract>Mobility on Demand (MOD) systems allow users to pick-up and drop-off vehicles (bikes, automobiles) ubiquitously in a network of parking stations. Asymmetric demand patterns cause unbalanced fleet allocation decreasing level of service. Current redistribution policies are complex to plan and typically cost more that the usage revenues of the system. The Market Economy of Trips (MET) explores a new operation model based on a double auction market where cost-minimizing users are both buyers and sellers of trip rights while profit-maximizing stations are competing auctioneers that trade them. Trip rights are priced relatively to the inventory needs of origin and destination stations. A theory, a game, and a model are presented to explore equilibrium and limits of efficiency of MET under different demand patterns and income distribution.</Abstract>
<Access xmlns="http://purl.org/coar/access_right"
>
</Access>
</Publication>