<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-09-19T14:42:53Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/77798" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/77798</identifier><datestamp>2022-01-13T07:54:31Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_1721.1_7582</setSpec><setSpec>com_1721.1_7581</setSpec><setSpec>col_1721.1_131022</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">Caspar Hare.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" lang="en_US">Hedden, Brian (Brian Robert)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department">Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2013-03-13T15:48:20Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2013-03-13T15:48:20Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued" lang="en_US">2012</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/77798</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="oclc" lang="en_US">828196528</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2012.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">"September 2012." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-78).</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">This thesis concerns epistemic and practical rationality. That is, it is about what to believe and what to do. In Chapter 1, 1 argue that theories of practical rationality should be understood as evaluating decisions as opposed to ordinary sorts of non-mental actions. In Chapter 2, I use the machinery developed in Chapter 1 to rebut 'Money Pump' or 'Diachronic Dutch Book' arguments, which draw conclusions about rational beliefs and preferences from premises about how rational agents will behave over time. In Chapter 3, I develop a new objection to the Synchronic Dutch Book Argument, which concludes that rational agents must have probabilistic degrees of belief in order to avoid predictable exploitation in betting scenarios.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="statementofresponsibility" lang="en_US">by Brian Hedden.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Ph.D.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="format" qualifier="extent" lang="en_US">78 p.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en_US">eng</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" lang="en_US">M.I.T. theses are protected by 
copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but 
reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written 
permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" qualifier="uri" lang="en_US">http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Linguistics and Philosophy.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Consistency in choice and credence</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">Thesis</dim:field>
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   	&lt;Title>Consistency in choice and credence&lt;/Title>
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   	&lt;PublicationDate>2012&lt;/PublicationDate>
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        	&lt;DisplayName>Hedden, Brian (Brian Robert)&lt;/DisplayName>
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    &lt;Keyword>Linguistics and Philosophy.&lt;/Keyword>
   	&lt;Abstract>This thesis concerns epistemic and practical rationality. That is, it is about what to believe and what to do. In Chapter 1, 1 argue that theories of practical rationality should be understood as evaluating decisions as opposed to ordinary sorts of non-mental actions. In Chapter 2, I use the machinery developed in Chapter 1 to rebut &amp;apos;Money Pump&amp;apos; or &amp;apos;Diachronic Dutch Book&amp;apos; arguments, which draw conclusions about rational beliefs and preferences from premises about how rational agents will behave over time. In Chapter 3, I develop a new objection to the Synchronic Dutch Book Argument, which concludes that rational agents must have probabilistic degrees of belief in order to avoid predictable exploitation in betting scenarios.&lt;/Abstract>
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