2026-09-19T14:43:33Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/784442022-01-13T07:54:01Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Silvio Micali.
Chen, Jing, Ph. D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
2013-04-12T19:24:29Z
2013-04-12T19:24:29Z
2012
2012
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/78444
831486536
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2012.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-66).
In settings of incomplete information, we put forward: (1) a very conservative - indeed, purely set-theoretic- model of the beliefs (including totally wrong ones) that each player may have about the payoff types of his opponents, and (2) a new and robust solution concept, based on mutual belief of rationality, capable of leveraging such conservative beliefs. We exemplify the applicability of our new approach for single-good auctions. In particular we show that, under our solution concept, there exists a simple normal-form mechanism, which always sells the good, always has non-negative revenue, and guarantees (up to an arbitrarily small, additive constant) a revenue benchmark that is always greater than or equal to the second-highest valuation, and sometimes much greater. By contrast, we also prove that the same benchmark cannot even be approximated within any positive factor, under classical solution concepts.
by Jing Chen.
Ph.D.
66 p.
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Mechanism design with set-theoretic beliefs
Thesis
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<Abstract>In settings of incomplete information, we put forward: (1) a very conservative - indeed, purely set-theoretic- model of the beliefs (including totally wrong ones) that each player may have about the payoff types of his opponents, and (2) a new and robust solution concept, based on mutual belief of rationality, capable of leveraging such conservative beliefs. We exemplify the applicability of our new approach for single-good auctions. In particular we show that, under our solution concept, there exists a simple normal-form mechanism, which always sells the good, always has non-negative revenue, and guarantees (up to an arbitrarily small, additive constant) a revenue benchmark that is always greater than or equal to the second-highest valuation, and sometimes much greater. By contrast, we also prove that the same benchmark cannot even be approximated within any positive factor, under classical solution concepts.</Abstract>
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