2026-09-23T08:59:16Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/79702022-01-13T07:54:42Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Harvey M. Sapolsky.
Burbach, David T
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
2005-08-24T23:22:05Z
2005-08-24T23:22:05Z
2003
2003
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/7970
54783594
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2003.
Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, leaves 407-420).
This dissertation assesses U.S. presidents' incentives for diversionary war. The political benefits of the use of force were measured and compared to the benefits of other dramatic foreign policy activities. Gains from force were modest, not unique, and discounted in many circumstances of political need. Statistical tests measured the changes in presidential approval ratings following uses of force, major diplomatic events, presidential speeches, and foreign travel by presidents, in the period 1953-2000. Historical sources and newspaper archives were used to identify and characterize uses of force and diplomatic events. Uses of force provide only modest and short-lived approval gains (average 6% increase with 3 month half life for major uses). Approval changes were greater with more media coverage, Congressional support, or popular goals (e.g., protecting American lives, not humanitarian intervention). Approval gains were higher during recessions, but losses occurred when prior approval was low for non-economic reasons (e.g., scandals). Diplomatic events produced slightly smaller benefits, conditioned by similar variables except for retaining their popularity during scandals. Foreign travel and speeches had little impact. The frequency of presidential activities changes in response to political variables, in ways that are consistent with maximization of political benefits. Uses of force became slightly more common during recessions, less common when approval was low for non-economic reasons.
(cont.) Elections reduced the rate of all activities. These results may explain previous negative findings for U.S. diversionary war: presidential incentives for diversionary force are weak because potential gains are small, other tools are available, and they are discounted during times of need. Diversionary use of force would be attractive during economic slowdowns, however.
by David T. Burbach.
Ph.D.
2 v. (458 leaves)
39577170 bytes
39576925 bytes
application/pdf
application/pdf
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Political Science.
Diversionary temptations : presidential incentives and the political use of force
Thesis
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<Abstract>This dissertation assesses U.S. presidents' incentives for diversionary war. The political benefits of the use of force were measured and compared to the benefits of other dramatic foreign policy activities. Gains from force were modest, not unique, and discounted in many circumstances of political need. Statistical tests measured the changes in presidential approval ratings following uses of force, major diplomatic events, presidential speeches, and foreign travel by presidents, in the period 1953-2000. Historical sources and newspaper archives were used to identify and characterize uses of force and diplomatic events. Uses of force provide only modest and short-lived approval gains (average 6% increase with 3 month half life for major uses). Approval changes were greater with more media coverage, Congressional support, or popular goals (e.g., protecting American lives, not humanitarian intervention). Approval gains were higher during recessions, but losses occurred when prior approval was low for non-economic reasons (e.g., scandals). Diplomatic events produced slightly smaller benefits, conditioned by similar variables except for retaining their popularity during scandals. Foreign travel and speeches had little impact. The frequency of presidential activities changes in response to political variables, in ways that are consistent with maximization of political benefits. Uses of force became slightly more common during recessions, less common when approval was low for non-economic reasons.</Abstract>
<Abstract>(cont.) Elections reduced the rate of all activities. These results may explain previous negative findings for U.S. diversionary war: presidential incentives for diversionary force are weak because potential gains are small, other tools are available, and they are discounted during times of need. Diversionary use of force would be attractive during economic slowdowns, however.</Abstract>
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