2026-09-23T14:51:52Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/81332026-06-06T01:06:50Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Michael Golay.
Withee, Jon E. (Jon Erek), 1970-
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Nuclear Engineering.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Ocean Engineering
2005-08-24T20:36:57Z
2005-08-24T20:36:57Z
2002
2002
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8133
51757911
Thesis (S.M. in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Ocean Engineering; and, (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Nuclear Engineering, 2002.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 77-78).
The resurgence of interest in the use of nuclear technology for electrical power production has resulted in a desire to improve the existing licensing structure. Improving the licensing structure will result in reduced design time and cost for new reactor plants. An improved regulatory process is also necessary in order to license advanced reactors that are not light water technology. Risk based reactor licensing, which uses the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to justify most licensing questions, is a proposed replacement for the current methods. This work further develops the risk-based regulatory process by analyzing a portion of a new reactor concept. A reactor similar to the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) is the design chosen for the analyses. The designers of the PBMR assert that the reactor's inherently safe design justifies the use of a non-standard containment system. This assertion can be treated as a design question to be justified using the risk-based approach. The effect of the changing the containment system is incorporated into the PRA for the PBMR. The contributions to the event and fault trees of the PBMR are determined for two casualties that affect the plants decay heat removal system. The initiating event for both of these casualties is assumed to be a beyond design basis earthquake. The first casualty is steam blanketing of the reactor vessel due to a rupture in the Reactor Cavity Cooling System (RCCS). This casualty is shown to have little effect on the safety of the plant. The second casualty was failure of the RCCS due to operator inaction. If this casualty were to occur the reactor vessel has the possibility of failing catastrophically. The failure of the reactor vessel could result in damage to the fuel and release of radionuclides. The probability of this casualty resulting in a significant release of radionuclides is 7.5-10-11 / year. For the two casualties evaluated in this work, the use of a non-standard containment is justified.
by Jon E. Withee.
S.M.
S.M. in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering
80 leaves
6138748 bytes
6138506 bytes
application/pdf
application/pdf
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Ocean Engineering.
Nuclear Engineering.
Deterministic casualty analysis of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor for use with risk-based safety regulation
Deterministic casualty analysis of the PBMR for use with risk-based safety regulation
Thesis
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