2026-09-20T08:13:10Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/822692026-06-06T01:05:20Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Emilio J. Castilla.
Rissing, Ben A. (Ben Arthur)
Sloan School of Management.
Sloan School of Management
n-us---
2013-11-18T19:02:13Z
2013-11-18T19:02:13Z
2013
2013
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/82269
861187636
Thesis (S.M. in Management Research)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2013.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-43).
This study examines how U.S. immigration policies, as implemented by agents acting on behalf of the federal government, shape migration and key employment outcomes of skilled foreign nationals. Using a unique dataset, which encompasses the entire population of 1,441,856 H-1B temporary work visa requests evaluated by government agents from May 2005 to April 2010, I assess whether agents' visa approval and denial decisions are shaped by immigrants' sending country characteristics. Through this program, government agents mediate a key institutional boundary: access to the U.S. labor market, by conferring or withholding "current" legal standing to potential immigrants. Controlling for important application evaluation criteria, I find that immigrant workers from sending countries with lower levels of economic development are less likely to receive approvals for initial and continuing employment requests, all else equal. Government agents' visa approvals may also shape career mobility among those immigrants previously granted legal standing through the evaluation of requests to change jobs or employers. In these evaluations, however, sending country level of economic development is not a statistically significant predictor of approval. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for theories of inequality and labor market mobility, in addition to practical considerations regarding the efficient and fair administration of immigration policy.
by Ben A. Rissing.
S.M. in Management Research
43 p.
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by
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http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Sloan School of Management.
Inequality in the work visa approvals of U.S. immigrants
Thesis
application/pdf
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Publication
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<Abstract>This study examines how U.S. immigration policies, as implemented by agents acting on behalf of the federal government, shape migration and key employment outcomes of skilled foreign nationals. Using a unique dataset, which encompasses the entire population of 1,441,856 H-1B temporary work visa requests evaluated by government agents from May 2005 to April 2010, I assess whether agents' visa approval and denial decisions are shaped by immigrants' sending country characteristics. Through this program, government agents mediate a key institutional boundary: access to the U.S. labor market, by conferring or withholding "current" legal standing to potential immigrants. Controlling for important application evaluation criteria, I find that immigrant workers from sending countries with lower levels of economic development are less likely to receive approvals for initial and continuing employment requests, all else equal. Government agents' visa approvals may also shape career mobility among those immigrants previously granted legal standing through the evaluation of requests to change jobs or employers. In these evaluations, however, sending country level of economic development is not a statistically significant predictor of approval. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for theories of inequality and labor market mobility, in addition to practical considerations regarding the efficient and fair administration of immigration policy.</Abstract>
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