2026-09-23T11:40:54Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/82982022-01-13T07:54:28Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Peter A. Diamond and Jonathan Gruber.
Aura, Saku P., 1971-
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
2005-08-23T19:00:09Z
2005-08-23T19:00:09Z
2001
2001
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8298
50438202
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2001.
Includes bibliographical references.
The first essay of this thesis studies within-family decision making regarding investment in income protection for surviving spouses using a simple and tractable Nash-bargaining model. A change in US pension law (the Retirement Equity Act of 1984) is used as an instrument to derive predictions from the bargaining model and to contrast these with the predictions of the classical single-utility-function model of the household. In the empirical part of the essay, the predictions of the classical model are rejected in favor of the predictions of the Nash-bargaining model. Second essay studies married couple's dynamic investment and consumption choices under the assumption that the couple cannot commit across time to not to renegotiate their decisions. The inefficiencies that can arise are characterized. Efficiency properties of different divorce asset division regimes are examined. The effect of inability to commit across time on the savings level is examined under a tractable special case of the model. Third essay is coauthored with Professor Peter Diamond and Professor John Geanakoplos. In this essay we extend Arrow's analysis of portfolio choice in a one-period model to savings and portfolio choice in a two-period model.
by Saku P. Aura.
Ph.D.
91 leaves
6542420 bytes
6542179 bytes
application/pdf
application/pdf
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Economics.
Essays in the economics of retirement income security and household decision-making
Thesis
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