2026-09-18T18:15:36Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/848532022-01-13T07:54:08Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Edward Steinfeld.
Distelhorst, Gregory Michael
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
a-cc---
2014-02-10T16:54:45Z
2014-02-10T16:54:45Z
2013
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/84853
868233810
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2013.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
What, if anything, renders unelected bureaucrats accountable to the public? This thesis draws upon field research on contemporary China's news media, officials, and activists to theorize the role of publicity in non-electoral accountability. "Publicity-driven accountability" argues that even in highly undemocratic settings officials respond to critical media coverage for two reasons: revealing agency slippage and producing common knowledge about government failings. This mechanism empowers the news media and individual citizens even when formal political rights are severely curtailed, producing a degree of public accountability within authoritarian institutions. The study begins with original evidence that China's Internet news outlets created forms of journalistic autonomy within the constraints of state censorship. Next it documents the sensitivity of Chinese officials to negative media coverage with an original survey experiment on local bureaucrats. The third empirical chapter provides case studies of contemporary activists in China wielding publicity to change the behavior of unelected officials. Publicity-driven accountability has consequences for theories of political development and the roles of both authority and information in aligning nondemocratic governance with the public interest.
by Gregory Michael Distelhorst.
Ph.D.
122 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by
copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but
reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written
permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Political Science.
Publicity-driven accountability in China
Thesis
application/pdf
Publication
unknown
unknown
<Publication xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/" id="2b53aa6f-7883-4707-acb8-8faff04be435">
<Type xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843</Type>
<Language>eng</Language>
<Title>Publicity-driven accountability in China</Title>
<PublishedIn>
<Publication>
</Publication>
</PublishedIn>
<PublicationDate>2013</PublicationDate>
<Authors>
<Author>
<DisplayName>Distelhorst, Gregory Michael</DisplayName>
<Affiliation>
<OrgUnit>
</OrgUnit>
</Affiliation>
</Author>
</Authors>
<Editors>
</Editors>
<Publishers>
<Publisher>
<DisplayName>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</DisplayName>
<OrgUnit />
</Publisher>
</Publishers>
<License>http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</License>
<Keyword>Political Science.</Keyword>
<Abstract>What, if anything, renders unelected bureaucrats accountable to the public? This thesis draws upon field research on contemporary China's news media, officials, and activists to theorize the role of publicity in non-electoral accountability. "Publicity-driven accountability" argues that even in highly undemocratic settings officials respond to critical media coverage for two reasons: revealing agency slippage and producing common knowledge about government failings. This mechanism empowers the news media and individual citizens even when formal political rights are severely curtailed, producing a degree of public accountability within authoritarian institutions. The study begins with original evidence that China's Internet news outlets created forms of journalistic autonomy within the constraints of state censorship. Next it documents the sensitivity of Chinese officials to negative media coverage with an original survey experiment on local bureaucrats. The third empirical chapter provides case studies of contemporary activists in China wielding publicity to change the behavior of unelected officials. Publicity-driven accountability has consequences for theories of political development and the roles of both authority and information in aligning nondemocratic governance with the public interest.</Abstract>
<Access xmlns="http://purl.org/coar/access_right"
>
</Access>
</Publication>