2026-09-18T22:57:33Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/858172022-01-13T07:53:59Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Emilio Frazzoli.
Bui, Kim Thien
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
2014-03-19T15:47:24Z
2014-03-19T15:47:24Z
2013
2013
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/85817
872133938
Thesis: S.M. in Transportation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 2013.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 85-95).
In this thesis, we consider the problem of designing real-time traffic routing systems in urban areas. Optimal dynamic routing for multiple passengers is known to be computationally hard due to its combinatorial nature. To overcome this difficulty, we propose a novel mechanism called User-Centric Dynamic Pricing (UCDP) based on recent advances in algorithmic mechanism design. The mechanism allows for congestion-free traffic in general road networks with heterogeneous users, while satisfying each user's travel preference. The mechanism first informs whether a passenger should use public transportation or the road network. In the latter case, a passenger reports his maximum accepted travel time with a lower bound announced publicly by the road authority. The mechanism then assigns the passenger a path that matches with his preference given the current traffic condition in the network. The proposed mechanism introduces a fairness constrained shortest path (FCSP) problem with a special structure, thus enabling polynomial time computation of path allocation that maximizes the sequential social surplus and guarantees fairness among passengers. The tolls of paths are then computed according to marginal cost payments. We show that reporting true preference is a weakly dominant strategy. The performance of the proposed mechanism is demonstrated on several simulated routing experiments in comparison to user equilibrium and system optimum.
by Kim Thien Bui.
S.M. in Transportation
95 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Civil and Environmental Engineering.
Dynamic traffic congestion pricing mechanism with user-centric considerations
Thesis
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<Abstract>In this thesis, we consider the problem of designing real-time traffic routing systems in urban areas. Optimal dynamic routing for multiple passengers is known to be computationally hard due to its combinatorial nature. To overcome this difficulty, we propose a novel mechanism called User-Centric Dynamic Pricing (UCDP) based on recent advances in algorithmic mechanism design. The mechanism allows for congestion-free traffic in general road networks with heterogeneous users, while satisfying each user's travel preference. The mechanism first informs whether a passenger should use public transportation or the road network. In the latter case, a passenger reports his maximum accepted travel time with a lower bound announced publicly by the road authority. The mechanism then assigns the passenger a path that matches with his preference given the current traffic condition in the network. The proposed mechanism introduces a fairness constrained shortest path (FCSP) problem with a special structure, thus enabling polynomial time computation of path allocation that maximizes the sequential social surplus and guarantees fairness among passengers. The tolls of paths are then computed according to marginal cost payments. We show that reporting true preference is a weakly dominant strategy. The performance of the proposed mechanism is demonstrated on several simulated routing experiments in comparison to user equilibrium and system optimum.</Abstract>
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