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Andrew W. Lo. Jin, Li, 1970- Sloan School of Management. Sloan School of Management 2005-08-23T21:33:20Z 2005-08-23T21:33:20Z 2001 2001 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8593 49280159 Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2001. Includes bibliographical references (p. 213-225). This dissertation is composed of four pieces of independent but related works. The first is on optimal risk sharing and CEO compensation. Using a principal agent model, I addressed theoretically the optimal tradeoff between the inefficient risk sharing and a high incentive, to conclude that the optimal CEO pay performance level should be negatively related to the level of idiosyncratic (undiversifiable) risk in the firm. I empirically tested the hypothesis and found strong support. The second paper is on the intermediation of labor income risk. From the perspective of optimal risk sharing, it looks at the recent trend of the rise intermediated labor force and its relationship with the riskness of human capital. I built an overlapping generations model to address the following issues: 1) what types of laborers get to work in conventional firms versus in labor intermediation firms? 2) how will the labor intermediation business be endogenously determined in equilibrium? 3) what effect does labor intermediation have on the ex ante decision of laborers to acquire specialized human capital? The third paper is a joint work with Stewart Myers. Empirical researches document that more developed financial systems seem to have higher level of idiosyncratic risk. Also, in the United States, idiosyncratic risk level goes up as the level of economic activity increases. This paper uses the framework developed in Myers (2000 JF) to explain such phenomena. The fourth paper is a joint work with Andrew Lo. It is on data-mining, and its role in explaining the financial anomalies documented in the literature. We developed a series of statistical and econometric methodologies to differentiate spurious statistical artifact from a real anomaly. We also give an extensive literature review of the landscape of the financial anomalies. by Li Jin. CEO compensation, diversification and incentives -- Risk sharing and labor intermediation -- Explaining the cross sectional variation of idiosyncratic risk in international stock markets (joint with Stewart C. Myers) -- How anomalous are financial anomalies? (joint with Andrew W. Lo) Ph.D. 225 p. 16192033 bytes 16191794 bytes application/pdf application/pdf eng Massachusetts Institute of Technology M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 Sloan School of Management. Four essays in financial economics Essays in financial economics Thesis application/pdf Publication unknown unknown <Publication xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/" id="98ce80fd-46ab-43ea-a657-1739669fecd3"> <Type xmlns="https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843</Type> <Language>eng</Language> <Title>Four essays in financial economics</Title> <Subtitle>Essays in financial economics</Subtitle> <PublishedIn> <Publication> </Publication> </PublishedIn> <PublicationDate>2001</PublicationDate> <Authors> <Author> <DisplayName>Jin, Li, 1970-</DisplayName> <Affiliation> <OrgUnit> </OrgUnit> </Affiliation> </Author> </Authors> <Editors> </Editors> <Publishers> <Publisher> <DisplayName>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</DisplayName> <OrgUnit /> </Publisher> </Publishers> <License>http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</License> <Keyword>Sloan School of Management.</Keyword> <Abstract>This dissertation is composed of four pieces of independent but related works. The first is on optimal risk sharing and CEO compensation. Using a principal agent model, I addressed theoretically the optimal tradeoff between the inefficient risk sharing and a high incentive, to conclude that the optimal CEO pay performance level should be negatively related to the level of idiosyncratic (undiversifiable) risk in the firm. I empirically tested the hypothesis and found strong support. The second paper is on the intermediation of labor income risk. From the perspective of optimal risk sharing, it looks at the recent trend of the rise intermediated labor force and its relationship with the riskness of human capital. I built an overlapping generations model to address the following issues: 1) what types of laborers get to work in conventional firms versus in labor intermediation firms? 2) how will the labor intermediation business be endogenously determined in equilibrium? 3) what effect does labor intermediation have on the ex ante decision of laborers to acquire specialized human capital? The third paper is a joint work with Stewart Myers. Empirical researches document that more developed financial systems seem to have higher level of idiosyncratic risk. Also, in the United States, idiosyncratic risk level goes up as the level of economic activity increases. This paper uses the framework developed in Myers (2000 JF) to explain such phenomena. The fourth paper is a joint work with Andrew Lo. It is on data-mining, and its role in explaining the financial anomalies documented in the literature. We developed a series of statistical and econometric methodologies to differentiate spurious statistical artifact from a real anomaly. We also give an extensive literature review of the landscape of the financial anomalies.</Abstract> <Access xmlns="http://purl.org/coar/access_right" > </Access> </Publication>