2026-09-19T13:30:10Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/883622022-01-13T07:54:52Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Thomas Anton Kochan.
Hughes, J. Jerome (Jermaine Jerome)
Sloan School of Management.
Sloan School of Management
2014-07-11T21:06:13Z
2014-07-11T21:06:13Z
2014
2014
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/88362
881178857
Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2014.
Page 74 blank. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 49-59).
Theories of human capital investment, which emphasize encouraging and protecting investments in human capital, have become salient in rationalizing the adoption of firm asset-sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements, such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Yet, mechanisms such as bargaining power have also been a key part of the literature on employee and firm bargaining outcomes. Part of the puzzle with bargaining power as an explanation is that not all forms of bargaining power significantly explain the adoption of firm asset sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements. In order to provide an improved explanation for the adoption of these arrangements, we utilize distributive conceptions of property rights and economic institutions to highlight how power is allocated, segmented, and distributed by economic institutions and, thus, impacts firm asset sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements.
by J. Jerome Hughes.
S.M. in Management Research
74 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Sloan School of Management.
Asset sharing and stakeholder arrangements : human capital investments, the distribution of powers, and the role of property rights and economic institutions
Thesis
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Publication
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<Abstract>Theories of human capital investment, which emphasize encouraging and protecting investments in human capital, have become salient in rationalizing the adoption of firm asset-sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements, such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans. Yet, mechanisms such as bargaining power have also been a key part of the literature on employee and firm bargaining outcomes. Part of the puzzle with bargaining power as an explanation is that not all forms of bargaining power significantly explain the adoption of firm asset sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements. In order to provide an improved explanation for the adoption of these arrangements, we utilize distributive conceptions of property rights and economic institutions to highlight how power is allocated, segmented, and distributed by economic institutions and, thus, impacts firm asset sharing and employee stakeholder arrangements.</Abstract>
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