2026-09-20T15:17:16Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/88942022-01-13T07:54:52Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Edward S. Steinfeld.
Lee, Jim T. (Jim Tianjian), 1968-
Zhuo Anne R. 1972-
Sloan School of Management.
Sloan School of Management
2005-08-23T16:11:03Z
2005-08-23T16:11:03Z
2001
2001
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8894
48859559
Thesis (M.B.A.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2001.
Includes bibliographical references (leaf 77).
The paper studies China's telecommunication industry and Chinese-owned companies. From analysis on the regulatory environment. corporate governance structure and management incentives, we discuss the challenges of building world-class companies in China. The paper is in two parts. In the first part, we use the frameworks of supply chain and disruptive technology to investigate the competitive landscape of China's telecom industry. We conclude that the state-owned operators dominate the entire telecom value chain. Because of the internal and external environments, these carriers have rigid technology and market outlooks. The regulatory environment reinforces the rigidity. We argue that the industry structure has stifled the emergence of truly disruptive technologies in China. In the second part, we analyze the corporate governance and management incentives of the state-owned operators in greater details. We conclude that the state imposes on the operators many, often conflicting, goals unrelated to profit maximization. As a result, the carriers have government responsibilities that are incompatible to their business goals. The problem will not be fundamentally solved until the roles of ownership. corporate governance and management are clearly defined.
by Jim T. Lee and Anne R. Zhuo.
M.B.A.
79 leaves
5490581 bytes
5490341 bytes
application/pdf
application/pdf
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Sloan School of Management.
Building world-class Chinese companies
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