<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-09-19T16:20:06Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/99090" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/99090</identifier><datestamp>2022-01-13T07:54:09Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_1721.1_7582</setSpec><setSpec>com_1721.1_7581</setSpec><setSpec>col_1721.1_131023</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">Bishwapriya Sanyal.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" lang="en_US">Rajashekar, Anirudh V</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Urban Studies and Planning.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department">Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Urban Studies and Planning</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2015-09-29T19:02:40Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2015-09-29T19:02:40Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued" lang="en_US">2015</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99090</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="oclc" lang="en_US">922043397</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Thesis: M.C.P., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, 2015.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">"June 2015." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Includes bibliographical references (pages 99-104).</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">While there is an increasing acceptance in academic literature about the importance of informal water delivery in cities around the developing world, public opinion is often divided. Many citizens see informal water vendors as businesses controlled by extortionary "mafias" and call for government regulation. This thesis explores whether government regulation is justified in the case of Bangalore, India where water issues have become increasingly pressing and informal water vendors, also known as the "water mafia," have grown in number and in influence. In particular, this thesis will explore whether private tankers display any form of anti-competitive behavior by addressing two questions: 1) Do private water tankers exhibit monopoly power, and 2) Do private water tanker prices vary depending on the characteristics of the customers they serve? Evidence collected in July-August 2014 and January 2015 indicates that tankers do not operate in an anti-competitive manner and that government intervention is not justified on these grounds. However, tankers do contribute to declining groundwater levels and government intervention on these grounds ought to be explored.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="statementofresponsibility" lang="en_US">by Anirudh Rajashekar.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">M.C.P.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="format" qualifier="extent" lang="en_US">122 pages</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en_US">eng</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" lang="en_US">M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" qualifier="uri" lang="en_US">http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Urban Studies and Planning.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Do private water tankers in Bangalore exhibit "mafia-like" behavior?</dim:field>
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   	&lt;Title>Do private water tankers in Bangalore exhibit &amp;quot;mafia-like&amp;quot; behavior?&lt;/Title>
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   	&lt;PublicationDate>2015&lt;/PublicationDate>
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        	&lt;DisplayName>Rajashekar, Anirudh V&lt;/DisplayName>
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    &lt;Keyword>Urban Studies and Planning.&lt;/Keyword>
   	&lt;Abstract&gt;While there is an increasing acceptance in academic literature about the importance of informal water delivery in cities around the developing world, public opinion is often divided. Many citizens see informal water vendors as businesses controlled by extortionary &amp;quot;mafias&amp;quot; and call for government regulation. This thesis explores whether government regulation is justified in the case of Bangalore, India where water issues have become increasingly pressing and informal water vendors, also known as the &amp;quot;water mafia,&amp;quot; have grown in number and in influence. In particular, this thesis will explore whether private tankers display any form of anti-competitive behavior by addressing two questions: 1) Do private water tankers exhibit monopoly power, and 2) Do private water tanker prices vary depending on the characteristics of the customers they serve? Evidence collected in July-August 2014 and January 2015 indicates that tankers do not operate in an anti-competitive manner and that government intervention is not justified on these grounds. However, tankers do contribute to declining groundwater levels and government intervention on these grounds ought to be explored.&lt;/Abstract>
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