2026-09-19T19:46:55Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/995612022-01-13T07:54:08Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131023
Christopher Warshaw.
Stokes, Leah C
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
2015-10-30T18:55:28Z
2015-10-30T18:55:28Z
2015
2015
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99561
924273940
Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2015.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 34-40).
Retrospective voting studies typically examine policies where the public has common interests. By contrast, climate policy has broad public support but concentrated opposition in communities where costs are imposed. This spatial distribution of weak supporters and strong, local opponents mirrors opposition to other policies with diffuse public benefits and concentrated local costs. I use a natural experiment to investigate whether citizens living in proximity to wind energy projects retrospectively punished an incumbent government because of its climate policy. Using both fixed effects and instrumental variable estimators, I identify electoral losses for the incumbent party ranging from 4-10%, with the effect persisting 3 km from wind turbines. Voters also discriminate by correctly punishing the level of government responsible for the policy, providing evidence that voters are informed. I conclude that the spatial distribution of citizens' policy preferences can affect democratic accountability and exacerbate political barriers to addressing climate change.
by Leah C. Stokes.
S.M.
48 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Political Science.
Electoral backlash against climate policy : a natural experiment on retrospective voting and local resistance to public policy
Thesis
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Publication
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<Abstract>Retrospective voting studies typically examine policies where the public has common interests. By contrast, climate policy has broad public support but concentrated opposition in communities where costs are imposed. This spatial distribution of weak supporters and strong, local opponents mirrors opposition to other policies with diffuse public benefits and concentrated local costs. I use a natural experiment to investigate whether citizens living in proximity to wind energy projects retrospectively punished an incumbent government because of its climate policy. Using both fixed effects and instrumental variable estimators, I identify electoral losses for the incumbent party ranging from 4-10%, with the effect persisting 3 km from wind turbines. Voters also discriminate by correctly punishing the level of government responsible for the policy, providing evidence that voters are informed. I conclude that the spatial distribution of citizens' policy preferences can affect democratic accountability and exacerbate political barriers to addressing climate change.</Abstract>
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