<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-09-19T21:10:56Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/99611" metadataPrefix="dim">https://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/99611</identifier><datestamp>2026-06-06T00:54:47Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_1721.1_7582</setSpec><setSpec>com_1721.1_7581</setSpec><setSpec>col_1721.1_131023</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">John P. Attanucci.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" lang="en_US">Lu, Fangping, M. Eng. Massachusetts Institute of Technology</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department">Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2015-10-30T19:00:32Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2015-10-30T19:00:32Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="copyright" lang="en_US">2015</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued" lang="en_US">2015</dim:field>
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   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="oclc" lang="en_US">925531883</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 2015.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" lang="en_US">Includes bibliographical references (pages 88-91).</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">Congestion pricing has been widely regarded as the most effective technique used to manage travel demand. Since congestion pricing is about charging road users to internalize the external cost induced by their travels, there have been concerns about the social equity issues it raises and the political opposition it often faces. This thesis focuses on another travel demand management strategy that is contrary to congestion pricing, a reward-based scheme which provides positive incentives to commuters when they change their travel behavior. More specifically, commuters could be rewarded credits when they travel to work via walking, bicycling, taking public transit or carpooling instead of driving alone. The credits accrued can either be used to exchange for a deterministic cash prize, or a chance to enter a grand lottery draw. This thesis reviews the research literature to explain the influence of lottery schemes on behaviors and modifies a theoretical model to suggest how equilibrium mode choices can be influenced by lotteries. A general framework to design such a lottery scheme is proposed and, based on the framework, several alternatives to implement a lottery-based incentive scheme to manage commuter parking demand at MIT are developed and evaluated.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="statementofresponsibility" lang="en_US">by Fangping Lu.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">M.Eng.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="format" qualifier="extent" lang="en_US">91 pages</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en_US">eng</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="publisher" lang="en_US">Massachusetts Institute of Technology</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" lang="en_US">M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="rights" qualifier="uri" lang="en_US">http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Civil and Environmental Engineering.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Framework for a lottery-based incentive scheme and its influence on commuting behaviors : an MIT case study</dim:field>
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   	&lt;Title>Framework for a lottery-based incentive scheme and its influence on commuting behaviors : an MIT case study&lt;/Title>
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   	&lt;PublicationDate>2015&lt;/PublicationDate>
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        	&lt;DisplayName>Lu, Fangping, M. Eng. Massachusetts Institute of Technology&lt;/DisplayName>
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    &lt;Keyword>Civil and Environmental Engineering.&lt;/Keyword>
   	&lt;Abstract>Congestion pricing has been widely regarded as the most effective technique used to manage travel demand. Since congestion pricing is about charging road users to internalize the external cost induced by their travels, there have been concerns about the social equity issues it raises and the political opposition it often faces. This thesis focuses on another travel demand management strategy that is contrary to congestion pricing, a reward-based scheme which provides positive incentives to commuters when they change their travel behavior. More specifically, commuters could be rewarded credits when they travel to work via walking, bicycling, taking public transit or carpooling instead of driving alone. The credits accrued can either be used to exchange for a deterministic cash prize, or a chance to enter a grand lottery draw. This thesis reviews the research literature to explain the influence of lottery schemes on behaviors and modifies a theoretical model to suggest how equilibrium mode choices can be influenced by lotteries. A general framework to design such a lottery scheme is proposed and, based on the framework, several alternatives to implement a lottery-based incentive scheme to manage commuter parking demand at MIT are developed and evaluated.&lt;/Abstract>
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