2026-09-18T22:52:40Zhttps://dspace.mit.edu/server/oai/requestoai:dspace.mit.edu:1721.1/998412026-06-17T14:47:09Zcom_1721.1_7582com_1721.1_7581col_1721.1_131022
Daniel Jackson.
Near, Joseph P. (Joseph Paul)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
2015-11-09T19:52:26Z
2015-11-09T19:52:26Z
2015
2015
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/99841
927410712
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2015.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 129-133).
This thesis proposes new techniques for finding and eliminating application-specific bugs in web applications. We demonstrate three approaches to finding these bugs, each representing one position in the compromise between specificity and automation. All three are powered by a scalable symbolic execution specifically tailored to the structure of web application implementations, allowing analysis of even the largest real-world applications. In contrast to existing general-purpose verification approaches, this work was inspired by the hypothesis that narrowing our focus might produce more effective tools. Our approach has been to take advantage of properties specific to application-specific security bugs in web applications in order to produce more effective tools. The results suggest that focusing on a particular class of applications (web applications) and on a particular class of bugs (missing security checks) we can build static analysis tools that are both significantly more scalable and more automated than general-purpose bug-finding tools.
by Joseph P. Near.
Ph.D.
133 pages
eng
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission.
http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
Finding security bugs in web applications using domain-specific static analysis
Thesis
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