Percolation of secret correlations in a network

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Percolation of secret correlations in a network

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In this work, we study secrecy distribution in secret-key networks; see Fig. 1(a). More precisely, we are interested in secret-key networks in which each edge \( ab \), secure secret-key measures \([1,4,5]\). The connection between entanglement and secure secret key has benefited the research in both fields. On one hand, Gisin and Wolf asked whether a classical secrecy analog of bound entanglement \([4]\) existed. This question was positively answered in \([6]\), where a tripartite (plus Eve) distribution \( P_{ABCE}(a,b,c,e) \) was shown to need previously established secrecy between the honest parties to be generated, but from which no secret key could be distilled. Despite further results \([7,8]\), it is still an open question whether bipartite bound secrecy exists, while bipartite bound entanglement is known to exist. On the other hand, the secrecy measure intrinsic information, introduced in \([9]\) and shown to be a lower bound of the secret distillation and an upper bound of the secret of formation in \([5]\), was generalized to the quantum scenario in \([10]\). There, the authors introduced the squashed entanglement measure, which has recently received a lot of attention \([11,12]\).

In this paper, we want to explore the analogy between entanglement and secret classical correlations in the context of large networks. More precisely, we study the percolation of secret correlations in lattices. In the quantum case, when the goal is to establish ebits between two arbitrary nodes of a quantum lattice, there exists a phase transition for entanglement percolation for which the success probability does not decrease exponentially with the distance between the two nodes \([13]\). More interestingly, Ref. \([13]\) gave the first example of a quantum protocol that changes the topology of the network, making possible the distillation of a perfect entanglement link in a regime where traditional percolation would fail. This phenomenon was further studied in \([14–18]\) and extended to the mixed-state scenario \([19–21]\). In the present work, we show that the same phenomenon already happens in the purely classical context of Maurer’s secret-key agreement scenario.

II. SECRET-KEY NETWORKS

In this work, we study secrecy distribution in secret-key networks; see Fig. 1(a). More precisely, we are interested in secret-key networks in which each edge \( ab \),
between nodes $A$ and $B$, corresponds to a biased secret-key bit,

$$P_{A,B}(a,b,e) = (1-p)\delta_{a,b,0} + p\delta_{a,b,1} \mathcal{E}(e),$$

where $\delta_{a,b,0} := \delta_{a,b} \delta_{a,0}$ and $p \leq 1/2$.

The question we want to address is the following: given a secret-key network and a choice of two nodes, does there exist a strategy, based on local manipulations of the bits and public classical communication, allowing the distillation of a secret bit (sbit) between these two nodes? Let us first start by considering some simple examples of networks as their analysis will be useful for the rest of the paper.

A. Simple examples

A single link. The simplest network consists of two nodes, $A$ and $B$, sharing a biased secret bit following a Bernoulli distribution of parameter $p \leq 1/2$ given by Eq. (3). The results for probabilistic conversion of [2] (see Appendix, Sec. 1) show that the probability of converting this biased secret bit into an unbiased one is equal to $2p$. A protocol achieving this optimal value is as follows: Let $a$ be Alice and Bob’s bit. If $a = 0$ (which happens with probability $1 - p \geq 1/2$), Alice tosses a biased coin that gives “heads” with probability $(1 - 2p)/(1 - p)$. If she gets heads, she tells Bob to abort the protocol; otherwise, they keep $a$ as the final sbit. It is easy to check that conditioned on the fact that the protocol did not abort, the value of $a$ is unbiased.

A chain with 2 links. Consider the scenario shown in Fig. 1(b), with three nodes where $A$ and $B$ share a biased secret bit ($a = b_1$) while $B$ and $C$ share a second biased secret bit $b_2 = c$. The probability of establishing an unbiased bit between nodes $A$ and $C$ can only be less than or equal to the probability of conversion of a single link. Surprisingly, there exists a strategy succeeding with average probability $2p$. This strategy uses one-time pad, the secret-key protocol analogous to quantum teleportation: node $B$ simply publicly announces the value of $b_1 \oplus b_2$. If $b_1 \oplus b_2 = 1$, which happens with probability $2p(1 - p)$, $C$ flips his bit and obtains an unbiased secret bit shared with $A$. If $b_1 \oplus b_2 = 0$, $A$ and $C$ secret-key (unnormalized) distribution becomes

$$P_{A,C}(a,c,e) \propto [(1-p)^2 \delta_{a,c,0} + p^2 \delta_{a,c,1}] \mathcal{E}(e),$$

which has a conversion probability $P_c = 2p^2/[(1 - p)^2 + p^2]$. Putting everything together gives an average probability of success of

$$P_{\text{succ}} = P(b_1 \oplus b_2 = 1) + P(b_1 \oplus b_2 = 0) P_c = 2p(1 - p) + 2p^2 = 2p.$$  

Two parallel links. If nodes $A$ and $B$ share two biased secret bits $a_1$ and $a_2$ (with $p \leq 1 - 1/\sqrt{2}$), the optimal probabilistic conversion strategy (see Theorem 2 of Sec. A1) consists of trying to convert each biased secret bit (corresponding to each edge of the lattice) into an unbiased secret bit, each conversion succeeding with some probability $p_{\text{succ}}$. If there exists a path among the edges of the unbiased secret bit graph connecting nodes $A$ and $B$, then, using one-time pad along this path, one can produce a secret bit between nodes $A$ and $B$. Based on percolation theory, one can show that the probability that two arbitrary nodes are connected by a path does not depend on their distance in the graph if $p_{\text{succ}}$ is larger than the critical percolation threshold probability $p_c^\text{L}$ of the lattice. For $p_{\text{succ}} \leq p_c^\text{L}$ the success probability of the overall procedure decreases exponentially with the distance in the lattice between the two nodes (see Sec. A2 for details). The question that one wishes to answer is whether or not this simple strategy is optimal and whether the bound corresponding to $p_c^\text{L}$ is tight. In the case of entanglement percolation, it was shown in [13] that the strategy described above is asymptotically optimal in the case of one-dimensional chains but not in general for two-dimensional lattices. In the following, we show that these two statements also apply to the case of secret classical correlations.

III. ONE-DIMENSIONAL CHAIN

A. Presentation of the problem

Let us consider a one-dimensional chain with $n$ links and $n + 1$ nodes: $A_0, A_1, \ldots, A_n$. Each link $i$ corresponds to a pair of biased perfectly correlated variables, as in Eq. (3). Because each pair is perfectly correlated, we simplify the discussion by noting $a_i$ the single bit shared by $A_{i-1}$ and $A_i$, as shown in Fig. 2. In this model, the eavesdropper has no prior information on the bits $a_i$ (except for the value of $p$), meaning that her initial probability distribution is uncorrelated.
with \((a_1, \ldots, a_n)\). We will now show that the probability of establishing a perfect secret bit between the extremities of a chain (between \(A_0\) and \(A_n\)) decreases exponentially fast with \(n\), except if the chain is initially composed of perfect secret bits, i.e., if \(p = 1/2\). Hence, with that respect, distribution of secrecy and distribution of entanglement display the same behavior in the case of one-dimensional chains.

### B. Description of the optimal protocol

Let us first start with the smallest, but nontrivial, case of two links. The general proof will then follow by induction. As shown in Fig. 2, nodes \(A_0\) and \(A_1\) share the biased secret bit \(a_1\) and nodes \(A_1\) and \(A_2\) share \(a_2\). Both bits, \(a_1\) and \(a_2\), are biased and have value 0 with probability \(1 - p\). The goal is for \(A_0\) and \(A_2\) to distill a secret bit unknown to Eve, who had no prior information on \(a_1\) and \(a_2\).

In order to succeed, node \(A_1\) has to publicly announce some information \(z_1\) depending on his own bits \(a_1\) and \(a_2\) and possibly on some random ancillary bits. This public information should allow nodes \(A_0\) and \(A_2\) to distill a secret bit, without giving any information to Eve. In full generality, node \(A_1\) may use a probabilistic strategy to generate \(z_1\). However, because every probabilistic strategy is a convex combination of deterministic ones, a probabilistic strategy cannot be better than the best deterministic one. Therefore, it is sufficient to consider the set of deterministic functions \(z_1 = f(a_1, a_2)\), since \(A_1\) simply needs to tell node \(A_2\) whether it should keep its bit \(a_2\) or flip it in order to match the secret bit \(a_1, z_1\) only needs to take two possible values: 0 or 1. As a consequence, we only need to analyze 16 possible functions \(f\) of \(a_1\) and \(a_2\). The constraints of the problem help us find the only possibility for \(f\). First, node \(A_2\) should be able to recover \(a_1\) from the knowledge of \(a_2\) and \(z_1\), imposing \(f(0, a_2) \neq f(1, a_2)\). Second, Eve should not learn any information about \(a_1\), imposing \(\sum_{a_2} f(0, a_2) = \sum_{a_2} f(1, a_2)\). Up to a relabeling, the only function that satisfies these constraints is the exclusive or \(XOR\): \(f(a_1, a_2) = a_1 \oplus a_2\). It is not surprising that we obtain exactly the one-time pad protocol, which achieves a success probability of \(2p\) for a three node chain, as shown before.

**Generalization to \(n\) links.** In a scenario with more links, it is easy to see that the same reasoning applies. In particular, all the intermediate nodes should announce the XOR of their two bits, up to some relabeling. The protocol is therefore as follows: Each intermediate node \(A_i\) (for \(1 \leq i \leq n - 1\)) publicly announces \(z_i = a_i \oplus a_{i+1}\). The final node can then compute the value of \(a_1\) since \(a_1 = a_n \oplus z_{n-1} \oplus z_{n-2} \oplus \cdots \oplus z_1\). Once nodes \(A_0\) and \(A_n\) share this (biased) secret bit, they can proceed with the optimal probabilistic conversion protocol of Theorem 2 and end up with an unbiased secret bit. The average success probability reads

\[
p_n = \sum_{z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1}} p(z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1})p({\text{success}}|z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1}), \tag{6}
\]

where \(p({\text{success}}|z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1})\) corresponds to the success probability of conversion of the bit given that the vector announced by the intermediate nodes is \((z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1})\). The success probability is equal to (twice) the first half of the binomial expansion (see Appendix, Sec. 3):

\[
p_n = 2 \sum_{k=0}^{n/2} \binom{n}{k} p^{n-k} (1-p)^k, \tag{7}
\]

which can be lower bounded, as shown in the Sec. A3, by

\[
p_n \leq 2 \sqrt{n} p (1-p)^{n/2}. \tag{8}
\]

Despite doing better than the straightforward strategy, which gives a success probability of \((2p)^n\), it still decreases exponentially fast with \(n\) for initial unbiased secret bit \((p \neq 1/2)\), similarly as in the quantum scenario [13]. This result is not surprising as for percolation to occur, it is crucial that the topology of the network allows for many different paths between two given nodes to exist, which is not possible in a one-dimensional chain.

### IV. TWO-DIMENSIONAL CASE

A possible strategy to distill a secret-key between arbitrary nodes of a lattice consists of using the straightforward strategy presented in Sec. II B. First, one tries to distill a secret bit over each link in the lattice. If the probability of success is above the percolation threshold of the lattice, then with a positive probability, this procedure creates a path consisting of secret bits between the two arbitrary nodes. This path can then be used to establish a secret bit between these two nodes thanks to one-time pad.

Following Ref. [13], we now give an explicit example of a two-dimensional lattice where local preprocessing and public communication allow one to change the topology of the initial lattice into another one with a lower percolation threshold. This shows that there exist nontrivial strategies that succeed in establishing a secret bit between two nodes when the naive strategy would fail. The protocol involves three basic operations that were described in Sec. II: (i) the conversion of a single link into an sbit with success probability \(p_1 = 2p\); (ii) the conversion of two consecutive links into an sbit, also...
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In Ref. [2], the authors characterized the set of transformations which are allowed among probability distributions. Their characterization is reminiscent of the quantum case [22] and uses the same notion of majorization.

Theorem 1 (Deterministic conversion [2]). If Alice and Bob begin with an arbitrary classical bipartite pure state \( P_{ABE}(i,j,k) = \delta_{i,j} p_{i} P_{E}(k) \), then they can produce a new state \( P'_{ABE}(i,j,k) = \delta_{i,j} q_{i} P_{E}(k) \) if and only if \( \bar{q} \) majorizes \( \bar{p} \).

Recall that the vector \( \bar{q} = \{q_i\} \) (with \( p_1 \geq p_2 \geq \cdots \) and \( q_1 \geq q_2 \geq \cdots \)) if

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{k} q_i \geq \sum_{i=1}^{k} p_i \quad \forall k. \tag{A1}
\]

Whereas Theorem 1 is only concerned with conversion strategies which work with probability 1, the following result deals with strategies which work with a finite probability. Note that again, one recovers the same result as in the quantum case [23].

Theorem 2 (Probabilistic conversion [2]). If Alice and Bob begin with an arbitrary classical bipartite pure state \( P_{ABE}(i,j,k) = \delta_{i,j} p_{i} P_{E}(k) \), then the maximal probability with which they can produce a new state \( P'_{ABE}(i,j,k) = \delta_{i,j} q_{i} P_{E}(k) \) is given by

\[
\min_{k} \frac{1 - \sum_{i=1}^{k} p_i}{1 - \sum_{i=1}^{k} q_i}. \tag{A2}
\]

APPENDIX

1. Pure-state conversions

2. Bond percolation in lattices

In this paper, using known analogies between entanglement and classical secret-key correlations, we have studied secrecy percolation in networks. More precisely, we have shown that local operations and public communication can be used to change the topology of a secrecy network and to establish a secret key between nodes, in a regime where the initial lattice configuration is not compatible with percolation of secrecy. This effect was already known to exist in quantum entanglement networks. Our work shows that this phenomenon, thought to be of a genuine quantum nature, already appears in the context of classical secret correlations.

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, using known analogies between entanglement and classical secret-key correlations, we have studied secrecy percolation in networks. More precisely, we have shown that local operations and public communication can be used to change the topology of a secrecy network and to establish a secret key between nodes, in a regime where the initial lattice configuration is not compatible with percolation of secrecy. This effect was already known to exist in quantum entanglement networks. Our work shows that this phenomenon, thought to be of a genuine quantum nature, already appears in the context of classical secret correlations.

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size of $\mathbb{L}$ is infinite, one can define the probability $\theta(p)$ that a randomly chosen node belongs to a cluster of infinite size. Then, there exists a critical percolation probability $p_{c}^{\mathbb{L}}$ such that

1. $\theta(p) > 0$ if $p > p_{c}^{\mathbb{L}}$,
2. $\theta(p) = 0$ if $p < p_{c}^{\mathbb{L}}$.

The link to our problem is immediate. Given two arbitrary nodes of the lattice, one is interested in whether an unbiased secret bit can be established between them. Otherwise, if there is no cluster of infinite size, the probability of establishing an unbiased secret bit decreases exponentially with the distance between the nodes in the lattice $\mathbb{L}$.

3. Analysis of the protocol of Sec. III B

Let us consider the same scenario of a chain of $n$ links where each link is a biased secret bit that takes value 1 with probability $p \leq 1/2$, and bound the probability of creating a secret bit between the extremities.

As we saw in Sec. III B, the protocol consists first in publicly announcing the vector $\mathbf{z} = (z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1})$, and then conditionally on the value of $\mathbf{z}$, try to convert the bit shared by the intermediate nodes $A_0$ and $A_n$ into an sbit. The probability of success $p_n$ of this procedure is therefore given by

$$p_n = \sum_{z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1}} p(z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1}) p(\text{success}|z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1}), \quad \text{(A3)}$$

where $p(\text{success}|z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1})$ corresponds to the success probability of conversion of the bit given that the vector announced by the intermediate nodes is $(z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1})$.

The probability that the public communication is described by $\mathbf{z} = (z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1})$ is

$$p(\mathbf{z}) = p(A = 0, a_2 = z_1, \ldots, a_n = \bigoplus_k z_k) + p(A = 1, a_2 = 1 \oplus z_1, \ldots, a_n = 1 \bigoplus_k z_k).$$

Given a particular value of $\mathbf{z}$, the success probability for the probabilistic conversion of Theorem 2 reads

$$p(\text{success}|\mathbf{z}) = \frac{\min[p(a_1=0, \ldots, a_n=\bigoplus_k z_k), p(a_1=1, \ldots, a_n=1 \bigoplus_k z_k)]}{p(a_1=0, \ldots, a_n=\bigoplus_k z_k) + p(a_1=1, \ldots, a_n=1 \bigoplus_k z_k)}.$$ 

Putting everything together, one has

$$p_n = 2 \sum_a \min[p(a_1, \ldots, a_n), p(\overline{a_1}, \ldots, \overline{a_n})] = 2 \sum_a \min[p_{w(a)}(1-p)^{n_{-w(a)}}, p_{n-w(a)}(1-p)^{w(a)}] = 2 \sum_a p_{w(a)}(1-p)^{w(a)} = 2 \sum_{\text{first half}} \binom{n}{k} p^{n-k} (1-p)^k,$$

where $a = (a_1, \ldots, a_n)$, $\overline{a} := 1 \oplus a_1$, $w(a)$ denotes the Hamming weight of the vector $a$ and “first half” means that the sum contains exactly the first half of the binomial expansion, that is, the first $2^{n-1}$ terms of this expansion.

This probability is achieved if all the intermediate nodes ($n-1$ such nodes) reveal the value of the XOR of their two bits.

This success probability is equal to (twice) the first half of the binomial expansion. Let us bound this quantity:

$$p_n = 2 \sum_{\text{first half}} \binom{n}{k} p^{n-k} (1-p)^k \leq 2 p^{\lfloor n/2 \rfloor} (1-p)^{\lfloor n/2 \rfloor} \sum_{k=0}^{\lfloor n/2 \rfloor} \binom{n}{k} \leq p^{\lfloor n/2 \rfloor} (1-p)^{\lfloor n/2 \rfloor} \sum_{k=0}^{n} \binom{n}{k} \leq 2^n p^{\lfloor n/2 \rfloor} (1-p)^{\lfloor n/2 \rfloor} \leq (2\sqrt{p(1-p)})^n,$$

which goes down to 0 exponentially fast with $n$ for $p \neq 1/2$.