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The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment*

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Draft date: January 2011

Abstract

The mechanism design approach to student assignment involves the theoretical, empirical, and experimental study of systems used to allocate students into schools around the world. Recent practical experience designing systems for student assignment has raised new theoretical questions for the theory of matching and assignment. This article reviews some of this recent literature, highlighting how issues from the field motivated theoretical developments and emphasizing how the dialogue may be a roadmap for other areas of applied mechanism design. Finally, I conclude with some open questions.

Keywords: school choice, market design, matching

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*Posted with permission from the Annual Review of Economics, Volume 3 (c) 2011 by Annual Reviews, http://www.annualreviews.org/. I would like to thank Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Fuhito Kojima, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez for allowing me to draw upon our joint work and the editor (Esther Duflo) for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support was provided by the National Science Foundation.

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1 Introduction

In the last decade, there has been a great deal of activity and excitement among economists who study the design of systems used to assign students to schools. Theory has matured to a point where economists have been able to advise a handful of U.S. school districts on their allocation procedures and hundreds of thousands of students have been assigned to schools via new mechanisms. Moreover, the initial evidence suggests that these mechanisms are improvements over previous alternatives.

The potential for mechanism design and matching theory to illuminate the practical design of student assignment systems was brought to light by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003). This article summarizes features of some public school choice plans in the U.S., describes desiderata for assignment mechanisms, and proposes two alternative mechanisms. These alternative mechanisms are adaptations of widely-studied mechanisms in the literature on matching and assignment markets, dating back to seminal contributions by Gale and Shapley (1962) and Shapley and Scarf (1974).

After Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) was published in June 2003, a reporter for the Boston Globe contacted the authors. The Globe published an article describing flaws with Boston’s student assignment system. The newspaper article also explained how alternatives might share features of the system used to assign medical students to residency programs in the United States, known as the National Residency Matching Program or NRMP (Cook 2003). Around the same time, in May 2003, Alvin E. Roth was contacted by officials at the New York City (NYC) Department of Education, for advice about their high school admissions process. As part of the Children’s First Initiative, the mayor and chancellor centralized the organization and governance of the New York City’s public schools. One major change was the creation of over one hundred new small high schools, which dramatically increased the supply of choice options. Although the district had experimented with various forms of school choice for decades and had developed procedures to assign students to schools, many aspects of the plan were problematic and generated widespread dissatisfaction (Herszenhorn 2004). Some NYC officials were aware of the NRMP, which had been reformed in the mid-1990s (Roth and Peranson 1999), and contacted Roth wondering whether similar ideas could be employed to place high school students.

The result was a collaboration involving Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, myself, Alvin Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez in various combinations, to assist Boston and NYC in aspects of the design of their new mechanism. Confronting aspects of the existent theory with real-world challenges led to new theoretical problems and issues. The initial article of Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), together with practical developments in Boston and New York City, ushered in a new decade of research on the mechanism design approach to student assignment.

The purpose of this article is to review some of these developments focusing on the interplay
between work in the field designing mechanisms and theory. At the outset, I want to emphasize that this article is not a comprehensive literature review. Rather, I focus on a subset of issues that have been motivated from field experiences and hence only a subset of contributions. As with most selective surveys, my own papers probably get more attention than they deserve.

The organization of this article is as follows: Section 2 provides background on school choice and describes the canonical model. The next three sections describe theoretical issues which arose from practice, related to how students are prioritized at schools (Section 3), market size (Section 4), and heterogenous levels of sophistication (Section 5). Section 6 concludes with some open questions.

2 Background

2.1 Rationale for school choice

School choice is a popular and widespread education reform in urban districts. Most U.S. states have open enrollment policies and there are estimates that the total enrollment in these plans is greater than enrollment in charter schools and voucher programs (Holme and Wells 2008). In a choice plan, families express preferences over what schools their children may want to attend. Using this information, the district assigns children to schools according to various objectives. In residence-based or neighborhood school assignment systems, families express their preferences over schools through their choice of residential location. Critics of neighborhood school assignment challenge that only wealthier families are able to purchase the rights to better schools for their children. As a result, neighborhood school assignment may lead to school segregation and has the potential to perpetuate inequalities. School choice, on the other hand, may weaken the link between the housing market and schooling options and lead to more equitable educational opportunities.

The origins of school choice in the United States can be traced back to the history of school desegregation. Despite the legal end of segregation in public schools following the Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, in the subsequent decades many urban districts continued to be de facto segregated. As a result, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, school districts implemented mandatory busing plans under court supervision. One of the most controversial busing plans was in Boston Public Schools. In 1974, Federal Judge W. Arthur Garrity ruled that the school committee “knowingly carried out a systematic program of segregation.” He required Boston follow Massachusetts law requiring any school with a student enrollment that was more than half white be

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balanced by race. In 1975, Harvard Education School Professor Charles Willie served as a court-appointed master in the case. For the next fifteen years, in a series of court proceedings, the Boston school committee and Judge Garrity wrestled with the appropriate way to assign students to school. School assignment became an intense political struggle and the city even erupted in violence at various points. Throughout the period, there was a drop in enrollment in Boston’s public schools, and this trend was common in other urban districts as wealthier families left urban districts for the suburbs (Baum-Snow and Lutz 2010, Boustan 2010).

Mortified observing Boston’s experience with desegregation, residents and public officials in nearby Cambridge envisioned a system of open enrollment as a “pre-emptive strike” against court-ordered busing (Fiske 2002). In March 1981, the district abolished all neighborhood zones and adopted a comprehensive school choice plan where a student could apply to any school in the city. Given his experience in Boston’s desegregation case, Willie was retained as a consultant and chief architect of Cambridge’s controlled choice plan, one of the first plans in the nation. With this test case in hand, Willie together Michael Alves developed a choice plan for Boston Public Schools, following the last Garrity ruling in 1988 (Alves and Willie 1987). Both Cambridge and Boston’s plan used race as a factor to obtain balance at schools. The initial principles of the choice plan aspired towards having schools of choice, which were also diversified, in that there was a balanced distribution of students across racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic characteristics. Controlled choice was advertised as a reform plan which brought together choice, diversity, and school improvement.

The typical goals of choice plans start with allowing families to express their preferences over schooling options. In a comprehensive choice system, families can apply to any school in the district and do not have a default school. In more limited choice systems, families have a default school, and can opt out through a choice application. District objectives in student placement are numerous. Some districts guarantee students transportation to schools and, as a result, wish to minimize costs of busing by ensuring that students do not travel too far from their homes. Moreover, a district may want to maintain neighborhood cohesion, allowing any children from a given neighborhood to attend the same school. Another common objective involves allowing children from the same family – siblings – to attend the same school. Finally, many districts desire balance across racial, socio-economic, and ability dimensions across their schools. Willie argued that racially-diverse schools have a positive impact on student achievement, and others have argued for the achievement benefits of socioeconomic balance (Kahlenberg 2001).\footnote{There is some empirical literature studying these types of effects. See, e.g., Angrist and Lang (2004), Card and Rothstein (2007), and Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2009).}

School choice advocates argue that choice is a way to inject competition from the marketplace into the regulated public school sector. Demand-side pressure from families would generate competitive
pressure to improve schools. A key condition for “regulated” competition to realize market-based improvement is that supply-side responses are flexible. In a choice plan, administrators would have information on what schools were preferred and could make programming decisions based on this information. This, in turn, leads to better matches between students and schools, and incentives for schools to improve to attract students.

With so many competing objectives, it is not surprising that some of the goals of choice plans came into conflict and existing plans reflected compromises. In the 1980s, the Cambridge plan, for instance, evolved into a system where families register by choosing up to four schools. The district had a computer system which tried to assign student to their top choices, up to school capacity and making sure not to violate the district’s goals on racial and ethnic composition. In some years, the district made slight changes to guidelines on balance and in other years, with the opening and closing of school options, plans were modified to allow entry at earlier grades or changes in neighborhood boundaries. The current Cambridge plan now allows families to rank three out of twelve choices and uses sibling, residential location, and income to guide assignments. Many plans evolved in a similar manner, tweaking initial designs.

There have been two major developments related to school choice policies in the last decade. First, by the early 2000s, many districts came out of court-ordered desegregation plans. Districts such as Chicago Public Schools and San Francisco Unified Public School District wished to keep choice options given that parts of the infrastructure had developed under desegregation, and parents had some experience expressing choices. This development led to the creation of choice plans with different features reflecting the historical legacies of desegregation in particular cities.

The second major development has been elimination of race as a factor in school assignment. Beginning with a highly publicized case involving racial preferences at Boston Latin School, *McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Committee (1996)*, the Boston School committee dropped race as a factor in their choice plan in 1999. Cambridge followed suit in 2000 and replaced race with an income-based criteria. A few years later the U.S. Supreme court broached the subject of racial preferences in two cases, *Parents Involved in Community Schools Inc. v. Seattle School District* and *Meredith v. Jefferson County (Ky.) Board of Education*. In 2007, the Court decided that the Seattle and Louisville plans were unconstitutional because of the way they used race-conscious criteria to achieve diversity. In a 5-to-4 decision, Chief Justice Roberts famously wrote that “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discrimination on the basis of race.” The dissenting argument claimed that the decision would strip local communities of the tools they need and have used to prevent resegregation of public schools. This ruling left a number of districts to modify their plans without using race as a factor. Districts adapted by using socio-economic criteria for student placement, redrawing
attendance zones, or selecting sites for new schools. Throughout, the design of choice plans involved a compromise between the competing objectives of giving choice, having a fair procedure, and ensuring that the demographic composition of schools are not too far out of balance.

2.2 The canonical school choice model

The school choice model consists of $I$ students and $N$ schools. There are three main features:

1. preferences of students $P = (P_1, ..., P_I)$
2. a vector of school capacities $q = (q_1, ..., q_n)$
3. school priorities $\pi = (\pi_1, ..., \pi_n)$.

The student preferences express a strict rank ordering over schools; this ranking need not be complete. Denote the weak ordering for student $i$ by $R_i$. The school capacities express how many seats are available at each school. The school priorities encode information on how applicants are ordered, or prioritized, at schools. The school choice problem is sometimes denoted by the pair $(P, \pi)$. I call this model the canonical model because it was the first model proposed by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) and subsequent developments have involved enriching it in various ways.

Problems of assignment are often categorized into two classes: one-sided and two-sided. In one-sided problems, there is a set of agents and objects. The agents have preferences over the objects and may also have existing priorities, or claims, over the objects. The normative properties of the allocation are evaluated from only their viewpoint. In two-sided problems, in contrast, both sides of the market express preferences over each other. As a result, evaluation of the properties of the allocation may depend on preferences from both sides of the market. The school choice model falls in between these two extremes.

In many U.S. school choice plans, as in one-sided problems, schools do not express preferences over students. Rather, district administrators prioritize applications at schools using some exogenous criteria. One such criteria is neighborhood or walk-zone priority. In Boston’s school choice plan, for instance, elementary school applicants obtain walk-zone priority if they reside within 1 mile of the school. In other districts, schools construct an ordering of students, as in two-sided problems. In Chicago, for instance, students applying for admissions to selective high schools take an admissions test. The nine schools then order students by their test score. Schools also evaluate applicants using criteria other test scores than to determine their strict rank ordering over applicants. In New York City’s high school admissions process, some schools use 7th grade attendance and grades together with interviews at schools to determine their ordering. In some choice plans, there are both schools
that use exogenous criteria and schools that actively rank applicants. High school admissions in New York City is a prominent example of this hybrid case.

The outcome of a school choice problem is a student assignment, or matching $\mu : I \rightarrow S$, where $\mu(i)$ indicates the school assignment of student $i$. There are two properties of assignments which feature centrally in the student assignment literature. A matching $\mu$ is Pareto efficient if there is no way to improve the allocation of a student without making another student worse off. It is important to note that this definition does not take the school’s perspective into account in the welfare judgement.

A matching $\mu$ is stable if there is no student-school pair $(i, s)$ such that

i) student $i$ prefers school $s$ to her assignment $\mu(i)$, and

ii) there is another student $j$ with lower priority than student $i$ assigned to $s$ under $\mu$.

This pair is called a blocking pair. In the canonical model, this concept is sometimes referred to as the elimination of justified envy rather than stability. The reason is that the canonical model is phrased as a one-sided problem, while the traditional interpretation of stability is based on strategic interpretation related to the possibility of re-contracting among matched pairs as in a two-sided problem. Under the one-sided interpretation, stability embodies a notion of fairness: a student should not envy another school over her assignment, and have a higher claim to that school. To keep things simple, I will use the term stability keeping in mind these two potential interpretations. A matching $\mu$ is student-optimal if it is stable and no other stable matching that is better for some students, and no worse for all students.

A mechanism $\phi$ is a systematic procedure to construct a matching for each school choice problem. That is, it is a function which maps each school choice problem $(P, \pi)$ to a matching. Let $\phi(P, \pi)$ denote the matching produced by mechanism $\phi$ for problem $(P, \pi)$. Let $\phi(P, \pi)(i)$ denote the assignment of student $i$ in this matching.

A mechanism $\phi$ is strategy-proof if truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all students. That is, no matter the report of the other students, a student can do no better than reporting her preference. More formally, for all players $i$, for all $Q_{-i}$ (arbitrary reports of students other than $i$), for all $\hat{P}_i$ (arbitrary report of player $i$),

\[
\begin{align*}
\phi((P_i, Q_{-i}), \pi)(i) & \overset{R_i}{\geq} \phi((\hat{P}_i, Q_{-i}), \pi)(i) \\
\text{assignment of } i, \text{ when report truth} & \overset{R_i}{\geq} \text{assignment of } i, \text{ for arbitrary report}
\end{align*}
\]

Strategy-proofness is a strong requirement because it simplifies the preference submission problem of participants to one where their best possible response does not depend on the reports of others.
2.3 Mechanisms

Three mechanisms have been closely studied for the school choice problem. The first is a mechanism based on the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962). For \((P, \pi)\), the mechanism works as follows:

Step 1) Each student proposes to her first choice. Each school tentatively assigns its seats to its proposers one at a time following their priority order. Any remaining proposers are rejected.

In general, at

Step k) Each student who was rejected in the previous step proposes to her next choice. Each school considers the students it has been holding together with its new proposers and tentatively assigns its seats to these students one at a time following their priority order. Any remaining proposers are rejected.

The algorithm terminates either when there are no new proposals, or when all rejected students have exhausted their preference lists. Gale and Shapley show that a mechanism based on this algorithm produces the student-optimal stable matching. Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) show that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for students.

The next mechanism defined by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) is an adaptation of Gale’s top trading cycles (TTC) described in Shapley and Scarf (1974). First, assign a counter for each school that keeps track of how many seats are still available at the school. Initially set the counters equal to the capacities of the schools. Given the counters and \((P, \pi)\), the mechanism works as follows:

Step 1) Each student points to her favorite school. Each school points to the student who has the highest priority. There is at least one cycle. Every student can only be part of one cycle. Assign every student in a cycle to the school she points, and remove the student. The counter of each school in a cycle is reduced by one and if it is zero, remove the school.

In general, at

Step k) Each remaining student points to her favorite school among the remaining schools, and each remaining school points to the student with the highest priority. There is at least one cycle. Every student in a cycle is assigned the school she points to and the student is removed. The counter of each school in a cycle is reduced by one and if it is zero, remove the school.

The procedure terminates when either all students are assigned a school or unassigned students have exhausted their preference lists. In the original Shapley and Scarf version of TTC, agents are endowed
with objects, but many variations of TTC are possible. In this adaptation with counters, the priorities of students are traded among themselves starting with the highest priority students. The mechanism is strategy-proof as a direct mechanism (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 2003, Roth and Postlewaite 1977). It also produces an assignment which is Pareto efficient.

The third mechanism is the Boston mechanism, named after the system used in Boston until 2005 by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003). The mechanism works as follows:

Step 1) Only the first choices of the students are considered. For each school, consider the students who have listed it as their first choice and assign seats of the school to these students one at a time following their priority order until either there are no seats left or there is no student left who has listed it as her first choice.

In general, at

Step k) Consider the remaining students. Only the $k^{th}$ choices of these students are considered. For each school with still available seats, consider the students who have listed it as their $k^{th}$ choice and assign the remaining seats to these students one at a time following their priority order until either there are no seats left or there is no student left who has listed it as her $k^{th}$ choice.

Variations of this mechanism are common in many other school districts. This mechanism has the drawback that it is not strategy-proof for students. as we illustrate in the following example.

**Example:** Consider a problem with three students $i_1$, $i_2$, and $i_3$ and three schools $s_1$, $s_2$, and $s_3$, each with one seat. Student preferences, $P$, are:

\[
\begin{align*}
    i_1 &: s_2 - s_1 - s_3 \\
    i_2 &: s_1 - s_2 - s_3 \\
    i_3 &: s_1 - s_2 - s_3,
\end{align*}
\]

and priorities, $\pi$, are:

\[
\begin{align*}
    s_1 &: i_1 - i_3 - i_2 \\
    s_2 &: i_2 - i_1 - i_3 \\
    s_3 &: i_3 - i_1 - i_2.
\end{align*}
\]

Under the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, the matching produced is

$$
\mu_{DA} = \begin{pmatrix} i_1 & i_2 & i_3 \\ s_1 & s_2 & s_3 \end{pmatrix}.
$$

\[3^a\text{See, for instance, Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999), Papai (2000), and Pycia and Unver (2009).}\]
In this matching, none of the students obtain their top choice. The matching is not Pareto efficient, but since there are no blocking pairs, it is stable.

Under the top trading cycles mechanism, the matching produced is

$$\mu_{TTC} = \begin{pmatrix} i_1 & i_2 & i_3 \\ s_2 & s_1 & s_3 \end{pmatrix}.$$  

This matching is Pareto efficient and both student $i_1$ and $i_2$ obtain their top choice. However, student $i_3$ and school $s_1$ form a blocking pair, so the matching is not stable.

Under the Boston mechanism, the matching produced is

$$\mu_{BOS} = \begin{pmatrix} i_1 & i_2 & i_3 \\ s_2 & s_3 & s_1 \end{pmatrix}.$$  

This matching is Pareto efficient, but student $i_2$ and school $s_2$ form a blocking pair, so the matching is not stable. Moreover, had student $i_2$ reported that $s_2$ was her top choice, she would have received an assignment there, which demonstrates that the mechanism is not strategy-proof.

While the first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, the third mechanism is not. This raises the question: are the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism and top trading cycles mechanism the only two strategy-proof mechanisms for the school choice problem? Another important mechanism, a serial dictatorship, is also strategy-proof for this problem. This mechanism places the students into a queue and then processes students in order of the queue. If the ordering of students is drawn at random, then the mechanism is called a random serial dictatorship. The first student obtains her top choice, the second student obtains her top choice among schools with available seats, and so on. This mechanism is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof, but does not consider the priorities in any natural way. It is important to note, however, that there is no rigorous criteria where a serial dictatorship involves more instances of creating blocking pairs than the TTC mechanism, though recent work by Abdulkadiroğlu and Che (2010) provides a particular characterization of TTC that is relevant for the school choice problem\footnote{Earlier characterizations of TTC have focused on environments where agents are endowed with objects. See Ma (1994) and also Sönmez (1999).}. Their characterization can be interpreted as showing the particular way in which TTC respects the student who has the highest priority for a school: if she is not assigned to that school, then she is assigned somewhere she prefers at least as much. While there are some characterizations of the class of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms together with additional axioms, e.g., Papai (2000), and Pycia and Unver (2009), a characterization of all strategy-proof mechanisms remains elusive.
Another issue highlighted by these examples is that the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is stable, but not efficient, while the top trading cycles mechanism is efficient, but not stable. It is natural to ask for a weaker requirement: is there an efficient and strategy-proof mechanism which also produces a stable outcome whenever it exists? Kesten (2010) shows that this is not possible, highlighting a general tension between Pareto efficiency and stability. His paper advocates for an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism. Another question is under what conditions are stability and efficiency compatible. Ergin (2002) provides a set of necessary and sufficient conditions on priority structures for which an efficient mechanism is also stable.

2.4 Important assumptions

The canonical school choice model makes a number of important assumptions that are worth highlighting. The student preferences, which are taken as given, are *hedonic*: students only care about the school they are assigned independent of the other students who are assigned there. This rules out forms of peer effects or consumption externalities in preferences, as in the case where groups of students all wish to attend the same school only when each member of the group attends. In practice, preferences may depend on a student’s distance to the school, a student’s own academic and demographic characteristics, and various aspects of school quality. Some aspects of school quality may depend on the realized assignment such as the incoming grade’s peer group. On the other hand, many aspects of school quality may be more certain at the time of application such as expenditure per student, building facilities, course offerings, and the composition of students in higher grades.

The school priorities are expressed in terms of strict orderings, involving pairwise comparisons of individual students. In practice, many districts have coarser criteria which are not strict orderings. For instance, students with siblings at the school obtain a higher priority than students who do not, but among students with siblings, all students are given equal priority. Expressing priorities in terms of pairwise comparisons between students also rules out forms of complementarities for schools. However, the model does allow for certain types of complementarities through suitable definitions of what constitutes a school. Moreover, it is possible to enrich school preferences to a larger class than simple pairwise comparisons to include substitutable preferences (Roth and Sotomayor 1990). For example, in 2010, priorities at Chicago’s Gifted and Enriched Academic Programs (GEAP) worked as follows: students are required to take an admissions test and were assigned to one of four tiers based on an index of the socio-economic of their census tract geographic location. Half of the seats at a program are assigned solely based on the score. The other half of the seats are split between the four tiers. If there are not enough applicants in a given tier, the school admits students in the following order: first the highest scoring student in the lowest remaining tier who had not yet been admitted,
next the highest scoring student in the second lowest remaining tier, and finally the highest scoring student in the other remaining tier. These preferences, though complex, can be accommodated by a suitable generalization of the canonical model. Finally, as discussed above, in the canonical model, school priorities are also taken as exogenous, while some districts have schools which actively rank students.

In the canonical model, the information submitted by students is only ordinal and does not convey information on preference intensities. This focus is sometimes defended on two grounds: (1) mechanisms which elicit cardinal information may no longer be strategy-proof, and (2) submitting cardinal information may be difficult for participants. For instance, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) defend their focus on ordinal mechanisms by writing (page 297) “it can be justified by the limited rationality of agents participating in the mechanisms. There is convincing experimental evidence that the representation of preferences over uncertain outcomes by vNM utility functions is inadequate. One interpretation of this literature is that the formulation of rational preferences over a given set of lotteries is a complex process that most agents do not engage into if they can avoid it.” Providing theoretical foundations for restricting attention to mechanisms which only elicit ordinal preferences is an open question. For interesting recent work in this direction, see Carroll (2011).

One recent development involves studying mechanisms which elicit some form of cardinal information (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2009)). Another feature of the information that participants can convey in the canonical model is that it is not constrained in any way. This assumption is in contrast to current practice in some districts, where there are constraints on the number of choices that can be submitted.

Finally, the efficiency notions introduced for the canonical model utilize only the ordinal information of students. That is, the objectives of the planner are only implicitly linked to productive dimensions of the assignment such as whether students benefit from attending the school. For instance, depending on the nature of peer effects, it may be better to group students of the same ability together, but this may conflict with student preferences. Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2010) argue that tracking students based on ability can generate test score gains based on experimental evidence. The implications of peer effects on school choice are undeniably important, but are outside the scope of this survey. Models incorporating these features will likely require the development of frameworks which impose more structure on preferences and the nature of education production as in Epple and Romano (1998).
3 Coarse School Priorities and Efficiency

One of the first ways the basic model has been enriched is by examining the implications of coarse school priorities. This issue obtained attention during the design of New York City’s High school assignment process. In New York, there are over 600 high school programs, and 8th and 9th grade students can apply to any program in the city. There are two main types of high school programs in New York. The first are those who express a rank ordering over applicants as in screened or audition schools. The second are schools that have fixed criteria to order students, such as limited unscreened schools which give priority to first priority to students who attend information fairs or live in various parts of the district. Abdulkadir o˘ glu, Pathak, and Roth (2005) and Abdulkadir o˘ glu, Pathak, and Roth (2009) present more institutional details about schooling options in New York City.

During the course of the designing the new mechanism, policymakers agreed to two phases to assign schools: the main round which involved both classes of schools and was to be based on student-proposing deferred acceptance, and the supplementary round involving students who were unassigned in the main round and remaining school capacities, where school orderings of students do not play a role. In both of these rounds, students would be allowed to rank up to 12 school choices.

One practical issue was how coarse priorities should be turned into strict priorities at schools. This issue was relevant for both rounds. During the course of the policy discussion, an official remarked:

I believe that the equitable approach is for a child to have a new chance with each […] program. […] the fact is that each child had a chance. If we use only one random number, and I had the bad luck to be the last student in the line this would be repeated 12 times and I would never get a chance. I do not know how we could explain this to a parent.

This policy discussion motivated a reconsideration of the assignment mechanisms in the presence of coarse priorities. To illustrate the issue, consider the earlier example, but now suppose that schools $s_1$ and $s_2$ are indifferent between all applicants. That is, the priorities, $\pi$, are:

$\begin{align*}
  s_1 & : \{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \\
  s_2 & : \{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \\
  s_3 & : i_3 - i_1 - i_2.
\end{align*}$

If the mechanism based on student-proposing deferred acceptance uses lotteries to convert these indifferences into strict orderings, and the resulting orderings are as in the earlier example, then both

\footnotetext{Specialized high schools, such as Stuyvesant High School and Bronx High School of Science, are assigned through in an earlier round based on a special admissions test.}
students $i_1$ and $i_2$ are assigned to their second choice, when they would be better off trading their placements with one another. If the priorities at $s_1$ had been strict, then one might justify preventing this trade because student $i_3$ forms a blocking pair with school $s_1$ after the trade. However, this is not a blocking pair when $s_1$ is indifferent between applicants. Hence, the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism does not always produce a student-optimal stable matching and allows for efficiency loss.

Given that tie-breaking may have welfare consequences, one question raised by the quotation is whether it is better for students to have school-specific lotteries or a single lottery draw. In Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth (2009) we show that any student-optimal stable matching can be produced by a single lottery draw, so that school-specific lotteries only add matchings which are not student-optimal relative to a single lottery draw. These statements are from an ex post perspective, and there is currently no known stronger ex ante argument for single versus multiple tie-breaking based on the distribution of matchings.

These facts suggest a number of additional questions. First, with coarse orderings at schools, is there a strategy-proof mechanism which produces a student-optimal matching? Erdil and Ergin (2008) show that no such mechanism exists. Second, is it possible to construct mechanisms which are student-optimal? Erdil and Ergin (2008) advocate one proposal, stable improvement cycles, which finds a student-optimal stable matching in polynomial time. Next, is it possible to recover some of the efficiency loss of the single-tie breaker version of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism? Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth (2009) consider this question and show that this mechanism is on the efficient frontier. That is, suppose there exists a mechanism $\tilde{\phi}$ which produces a Pareto-dominating matching:

$$\mu = \begin{pmatrix} i_1 & i_2 & i_3 \\ s_2 & s_1 & s_3 \end{pmatrix}. $$

To show that this mechanism is not strategy-proof, consider the economy where student $i_1$ only prefers school $s_2$ and denote the new preference profile by $Q$. In the problem $(Q, \pi)$, the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism produces the matching

$$\nu = \begin{pmatrix} i_1 & i_2 & i_3 \\ i_1 & s_2 & s_1 \end{pmatrix}, $$

where student $i_1$ is unassigned. If mechanism $\tilde{\phi}$ dominates the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, it must also yield matching $\nu$. But in school choice problem $(Q, \pi)$, student $i_1$ could manipulate $\tilde{\phi}$ by submitting the elongated preference list $s_1 - s_1 - s_3$. This shows that $\tilde{\phi}$ is not strategy-proof.
The fact that no strategy-proof mechanism Pareto dominates the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism places it on the efficient frontier of strategy-proof mechanisms. The lesson that emerges is that incentives together with stability must necessarily entail efficiency loss.

Motivated by these theoretical results, Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth (2009) compare the extent of efficiency loss using data from the field from the new systems in Boston and New York. Table 1 reports the average number of students obtaining a choice on their rank order list averaged over 250 draws of the random tie breaker. DA-STB is the outcome of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with a single tie breaker, while DA-MTB is the outcome with school-specific tie breaking. SOSM is a student-optimal stable matching computed by applying the procedure of Erdil and Ergin (2008) with a cycle selection rule and with initial matching from DA-STB. When there are indifferences, there may be multiple stable matchings, so in the table we select a particular student-optimal stable matching which Pareto dominates the matching produced by DA-STB.

Table 1: Impact of Tiebreaking in New York City and Boston

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>New York City</th>
<th></th>
<th>Boston</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DA-STB (1)</td>
<td>DA-MTB (2)</td>
<td>SOSM (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>32,105.3</td>
<td>29,849.9</td>
<td>32,701.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>14,296.0</td>
<td>14,562.3</td>
<td>14,382.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9,279.4</td>
<td>9,859.7</td>
<td>9,208.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6,112.8</td>
<td>6,653.3</td>
<td>5,999.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,988.2</td>
<td>4,386.8</td>
<td>3,883.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,628.8</td>
<td>2,910.1</td>
<td>2,519.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,732.7</td>
<td>1,919.1</td>
<td>1,654.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,099.1</td>
<td>1,212.2</td>
<td>1,034.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>761.9</td>
<td>817.1</td>
<td>716.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>546.4</td>
<td>548.4</td>
<td>485.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>348.0</td>
<td>353.2</td>
<td>316.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>236.0</td>
<td>229.3</td>
<td>211.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td>5,613.4</td>
<td>5,426.7</td>
<td>5,613.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is based on data from the main round of the New York City high school admissions process in 2006-2007 for students requesting an assignment for grade 9 and from the Boston elementary school (grade K2) admissions process in 2006-07. The table reports the number from 250 draws of a random tie-breaker. Reproduced from Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak and Roth (2009).

The first comparison is between DA-STB and DA-MTB. Even though both matchings are stable, DA-STB has more students obtaining their top choice, though the magnitude of the difference is larger in New York City, where about 2,000 more students obtain their top choice under a single
lottery draw. Interestingly, fewer students are unassigned under DA-MTB than DA-STB, however. The second comparison between DA-STB and SOSM provides one measure of the efficiency loss due to the presence of indifferences. In New York City, about 1,500 could receive a better high school choice in a student-optimal stable matching relative to the outcome produced by the single-tie breaking version of the student proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. In Boston, on the other hand, less than 7 students on average obtain an improved assignment in the student-optimal matching in Boston. Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth (2009) conjecture that the main difference is that the pattern of preferences in Boston is different than in NYC, due in large part to different geographic and transportation situations, and to the fact that in Boston, the preferences are for younger children. But these empirical results raise the need for quantitative results in matching theory that provide guidance on what features of the student preferences and school priorities are responsible for these differences. They also raise the question of what type of behavior is expected in mechanisms which might improve on the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism.

The discussion on how to convert coarse priorities to strict priorities is also relevant for other mechanisms. In particular, in the supplementary round in New York City, schools are indifferent between applicants, so one approach might be to conduct school specific lotteries and then apply the TTC mechanism. Pathak and Sethuraman (2010) show that this mechanism is equivalent to a random serial dictatorship. Another mechanism might be to randomly endow each student with a school seat and then let them trade. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1998) show that this mechanisms is equivalent to a random serial dictatorship. Hence, three mechanisms are the same for the special case when each school is indifferent between applicants.

Given that two alternative mechanisms are equivalent to a random serial dictatorship, there has been a renewed interest in understanding the efficiency properties of this mechanism. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) point out that a random serial dictatorship may produce a matching that is not ordinally efficient. It may be possible to find a random assignment, which stochastically dominates the random assignment produced by a random serial dictatorship. That is, for each student $i$, the probability of receiving the $k^{th}$ choice is at least high under an alternative mechanism than the random serial dictatorship for all $k$ choices. They develop and analyze the probabilistic serial mechanism that produces an ordinally efficient assignment, but is not strategy-proof. In Pathak (2007), using field data from NYC’s supplementary round, I compare the empirical performance of the probabilistic serial mechanism to a random serial dictatorship. I find that the difference between the two mechanisms is relatively small, out of about 8,000 students just over 15 more students received their top choice under probabilistic serial and about 50 more students receive a more preferred assignment.

\footnote{Erdil and Ehlers (2010) provide conditions on priorities under which the constrained efficient rule is efficient.}
This finding was one motivation for the study of Che and Kojima (2010), who provide conditions under which the random serial dictatorship and probabilistic serial mechanism are asymptotically equivalent. Their result implies conditions under which the inefficiency of random serial dictatorship becomes small in large allocation problems. A nice feature of this result is that it is quantitative: rather than illustrating existence of ordinal inefficiency, they show what conditions ensure that it is quantitatively small. Another related paper is Kesten (2009), who shows the equivalence of random serial dictatorship and probabilistic serial under a different set of assumptions. Manea (2009) considers a different asymptotic notion: in his model, preferences are randomly generated and the object of interest is the likelihood that the assignment from a random serial dictatorship is ordinally inefficient. He shows that a random serial dictatorship is highly likely to produce an ordinally inefficient allocation. The reason for the apparently different result is it is only about the existence of ordinal inefficiency and not the extent of efficiency loss, as in Che and Kojima (2010).

4 Mechanisms and Market Size

The empirical study on NYC’s Supplementary round provided motivation for subsequent theoretical developments. In a similar vein, empirical and simulation evidence on the performance of two-sided matching models when there are a large number of participants played a key role in suggesting theoretical work on these topics.

In the main round in New York City, about half of the school districts submit rankings over applicants. In such a setting, there is no strategy-proof mechanism for both students and schools (Roth 1982). Returning to our example, suppose now that the schools order students in the following way:

\[ s_1 : i_1 - i_2 - i_3 \]
\[ s_2 : i_2 - i_1 - i_3 \]
\[ s_3 : i_3 - i_1 - i_2, \]

but now school \( s_1 \) is one that ranks applicants, so her ordering is not from exogenous priorities. Under the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, the resulting matching is:

\[ \nu = \begin{pmatrix} i_1 & i_2 & i_3 \\ s_2 & s_1 & s_1 \end{pmatrix}, \]

and school \( s_1 \) is assigned her second-ranked student. If, instead, school \( s_1 \) declared that student \( i_2 \) is
not acceptable and only ranked $i_1$, the resulting matching is:

$$\nu' = \begin{pmatrix} i_1 & i_2 & i_3 \\ s_1 & s_2 & s_3 \end{pmatrix}.$$ 

School $s_1$’s strategic rejection of student $i_2$ results in her obtaining her top choice; this shows that schools can manipulate the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism.

The presence of schools who actively rank applicants in New York City makes the canonical school choice model closer to two-sided matching market models, surveyed in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). In the labor market context, Roth and Peranson (1999) conduct a series of simulations on data from the NRMP and on randomly generated data. In their simulations, very few agents could have benefitted by submitting false preference lists or by manipulating capacity in large markets given the reports of other agents. These simulations lead them to conjecture that the fraction of participants with preference lists of limited length who can manipulate tends to zero as the size of the market grows.\footnote{Roth and Peranson (1999) also investigate the complications that couples create for two-sided matching markets.}

The first theoretical attempt to understand these findings is Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), which focuses on one-to-one matching models. This paper is particularly innovative because a number of subsequent papers have built on and extended some of its analytical tools. In Kojima and Pathak (2009), we consider many-to-one matching markets with the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, where schools have arbitrary preferences such that every student is acceptable, and students have random preferences of fixed length drawn iteratively from an arbitrary distribution. We show that the expected proportion of schools that have incentives to manipulate the mechanism when every other school is truth-telling converges to zero as the number of schools approaches infinity. The key step in the argument involves showing that, when there are a large number of schools, the chain reaction caused by a school’s strategic rejection of a student is unlikely to make a more preferred student apply to that school. Loosely speaking, this means in the example it is unlikely that school $s_1$’s strategic rejection leads student $i_1$ to apply to her in the course of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism under the large market assumptions.

Roth and Peranson (1999)’s simulations hold fixed the behavior of all other participants and consider deviations by particular agents one-by-one. As such, they are not necessarily about equilibrium implications. This consideration is where the theory pushes the envelope one step further. In Kojima and Pathak (2009) we conduct equilibrium analysis in the large market. With an additional condition, which we call sufficient thickness, we show that truthful reporting is an approximate equilibrium in a large market that is sufficiently thick.\footnote{Roth and Peranson (1999) also investigate the complications that couples create for two-sided matching markets. Kojima, Pathak, and Roth (2010) build on large market techniques to student existence of stable matchings and incentives of matching mechanisms in the presence of couples.
The feedback from the field, where on the surface the potential for manipulation did not appear to undermine systems based on the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, to empirical and simulation evidence left a challenge for theory: what conditions would ensure that manipulations are unlikely. Kojima and Pathak (2009) take a step towards understanding these results, though it is not yet known whether it is possible to tighten the rates of convergence. Nonetheless, this case also illustrates the potential for the development of quantitative aspects of matching market design, where empirical and simulation evidence feeds into theoretical developments.

5 Confronting Mechanisms with the “Real-World”

5.1 Levels of Sophistication

One important issue that emerges when designing and implementing actual mechanisms is that participants may not behave according to the theoretical assumptions of the models. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) summarize these considerations nicely in their description of online auctions: “In designing new markets, we need to consider not only the equilibrium behavior that we might expect experienced and sophisticated players to eventually exhibit, but also how the design will influence the behavior of inexperienced participants, and the interaction between sophisticated and unsophisticated players.”

One challenge with this statement is having a defensible way to model unsophisticated players. In student assignment problems, a natural approach is to assume unsophisticated players simply report the truth even when it may not be in their best interest to do so. In studying the equilibrium properties of the Boston mechanism, this approach finds support in based on data from laboratory experiments. For example, Chen and Sönmez (2006), show that about 20% of subjects in a laboratory experiment report the truth under the Boston mechanism. Recall that the major difficulty with the Boston mechanism is that participants may benefit by submitting a rank order list that is different from their true underlying preferences over schools. Loosely speaking, the Boston mechanism attempts to assign as many students as possible to their first choice school, and only after all such assignments have been made does it consider assignments of students to their second choices, and so on. If a student is not admitted to her first choice school, her second choice may be filled with students who have listed it as their first choice. That is, a student may fail to get a place in her second choice school that would have been available had she listed that school as her first choice. If a student is willing to take a risk with her first choice, then she should be careful to rank a second choice that she has a chance of obtaining.

If a mechanism is not strategy-proof, a natural direction is to analyze its equilibrium properties. Assuming all players are sophisticated, Ergin and Sönmez (2006) characterize the set of Nash equilibrium of the preference revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism under complete information.
and strict priorities. Consider the previous example where student preferences, $P$, are:

\begin{align*}
i_1 &: s_2 - s_1 - s_3 \\
i_2 &: s_1 - s_2 - s_3 \\
i_3 &: s_1 - s_2 - s_3,
\end{align*}

and priorities, $\pi$, are:

\begin{align*}
s_1 &: i_1 - i_3 - i_2 \\
s_2 &: i_2 - i_1 - i_3 \\
s_3 &: i_3 - i_1 - i_2.
\end{align*}

It is possible to construct a Nash equilibrium where student $i_1$ reports $s_1$, student $i_2$ reports $s_2$, and student $i_3$ reports $s_3$ as top choices. The resulting matching is

$$\mu^{\text{NE}} = \begin{pmatrix} i_1 & i_2 & i_3 \\ s_1 & s_2 & s_3 \end{pmatrix},$$

which is the student-optimal stable matching. For this problem, it is the only Nash equilibrium outcome, but more generally Ergin and Sönmez (2006) show that Nash equilibrium outcomes of the Boston game are equivalent to the set of stable matchings. This result implies that the best possible equilibrium outcome under the Boston mechanism is equal to the student-optimal stable matching, an outcome that can be attained via a strategy-proof mechanism. Moreover, players need to have a high degree of coordination to obtain this outcome.

It is important to recognize the strong assumptions underlying this analysis: players have complete information about the rank order lists and priorities of each another and all players can compute their optimal strategies in the Boston mechanism. There are some sophisticated families who understand the strategic features of the Boston mechanism and have developed rules of thumb for how to submit preferences strategically. For instance, the West Zone Parents Group (WZPG), a well-informed group of approximately 180 members who meet regularly prior to admissions time to discuss Boston school choice for elementary school (grade K2), recommends two types of strategies to its members. Their introductory meeting minutes on 10/27/2003 state:

One school choice strategy is to find a school you like that is undersubscribed and put it as a top choice, OR, find a school that you like that is popular and put it as a first choice and find a school that is less popular for a “safe” second choice.

This quote only indicates some sort of strategic sophistication. It would be interesting to understand what types of evolutionary or learning rules would support the predictions of Nash equilibrium behavior.
in this setting. Alternatively, one could consider alternative equilibrium notions such as self-confirming equilibrium to model this situation.

During the 2005 policy discussion about abandoning the mechanism, policymakers focused on how under a strategy-proof mechanism if families have access to advice on how to strategically modify their rank order lists from groups like the WZPG or through family resource centers, they can do no better than by submitting their true preferences. Superintendent Payzant’s recommendation to change the mechanism emphasized this feature and the BPS Strategic Planning team, in their 05/11/2005 dated recommendation to implement a new BPS assignment algorithm, state:

A strategy-proof algorithm "levels the playing field" by diminishing the harm done to parents who do not strategize or do not strategize well.

The model in Pathak and Sönmez (2008) has both sincere families who report the truth and sophisticated families who best respond to the preference revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism. We characterize the Nash equilibria of this game and compare the equilibrium outcomes with the dominant-strategy outcome of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism.

There are two main results. The first is a characterization of the equilibrium outcomes of the Boston game as the set of stable matchings of a modified problem where sincere students lose their priorities to sophisticated students. This result implies that there exists a Nash equilibrium outcome where each student weakly prefers her assignment to any other equilibrium assignment. Hence, the Boston game is a coordination game among sophisticated students.

Returning to our main example, suppose that student $i_2$ is sincere, and hence reports $s_1 - s_2 - s_3$ in the preference revelation game of the Boston mechanism. Our characterization implies that $i_2$ “loses priority” at each school other than her top choice, and the Nash equilibrium outcome is simply the set of stable matching with the following priorities:

$$
\pi_{s_1} : i_1 - i_3 - i_2 \\
\tilde{\pi}_{s_2} : i_1 - i_3 - i_2 \\
\tilde{\pi}_{s_3} : i_3 - i_1 - i_2,
$$

where $i_2$ is ordered last at school $s_2$ and $s_3$. Since the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the Boston game are equal to the set of stable matchings of this modified economy, the Nash equilibrium outcome for the example is

$$
\mu^{\text{NE}} = \begin{pmatrix} i_1 & i_2 & i_3 \\ s_2 & s_3 & s_1 \end{pmatrix}.
$$

Sincere student $i_2$ obtains her last choice, under the Boston mechanism, when previously she obtained
her second choice as the Nash outcome, when she was sophisticated.

Next, we compare the equilibria of the Boston game to the dominant-strategy outcome of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. We show that any sophisticated student weakly prefers her assignment under the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium outcome of the Boston game over the dominant-strategy outcome of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. In the example, student $i_1$ is assigned to $s_1$ (her second choice) and student $i_3$ is assigned to $s_3$ (her third choice), while under the Nash equilibrium of the Boston game both receive their top choice. When only some of the students are sophisticated, the Boston mechanism gives a clear advantage to sophisticated students provided that they can coordinate their strategies at a favorable equilibrium.

In our example, the Boston game has a unique equilibrium, but in general, there may be many stable matchings and hence the equilibrium may no longer be unique. There is, however, evidence in the literature which suggests that the size of the set of stable matchings may be very small in real-life applications of matching models. Using data for years 1991-1994 and 1996 for thoracic surgery market, Roth and Peranson (1999) show that there are two stable matchings each for years 1992 and 1993, and one stable matching each for 1991, 1994 and 1996. One caveat of these computational experiments is that the thoracic surgery market used the hospital-optimal stable mechanism in these years and truth-telling is neither a dominant strategy for interns nor for hospitals under this mechanism. So it is theoretically possible that the small number of stable matchings is an implication of preference manipulation.

The same computational exercise is on firmer ground for school years 2005-06 and 2006-07 for Boston Public Schools student admissions when a strategy-proof mechanism is used. The results of these computational experiments are very similar to those of Roth and Peranson: At grade K2 for school years 2005-06 and 2006-07, there is only one stable matching for either year. At grade 6 the situation is not very different. For school year 2005-06 there are only two stable matchings, and among more than 3,200 students only two are affected by the choice of a stable matching. For school year 2006-07 there are also two stable matchings, and among more than 2,900 students only three are affected by the choice of a stable matching. The likely reason this occurs is that for most students the factors which give a student higher priority at a Boston school (i.e. proximity and the presence of a sibling) also makes it more preferable for the student.

These computational experiments suggest that while multiple equilibria is a theoretical possibility under the Boston game, it likely affects a very small minority of students. Since the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes is equal to the set of stable matchings of an augmented economy where sincere students lose priority to sophisticated students. Using data for school years 2005-06 and 2006-07 and admission to grade K2 and grade 6, Pathak and Sönmez (2008) ran computational experiments by
randomly setting 20 percent of students to be sincere and the rest to be sophisticated. We calculated the student-optimal stable matching and the school-optimal stable matching for the resulting augmented economy and repeated the same exercise 1,000 times to calculate how many students are affected on average by the multiplicity of the Nash equilibria. We repeated the same experiment for the cases where 40 percent, 60 percent, and 80 percent of the students are sincere respectively. Table 2 summarizes the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fraction of Sincere Students</th>
<th>Grade K2</th>
<th>Grade 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60%</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80%</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Average Number of Students Receiving Different Schools in Student-Optimal vs. School-Optimal Matching

Most of the time the augmented economy has a unique stable matching and more specifically no more than 0.38 students (less than 0.013 percent of students) are affected on average by the multiplicity of the Nash equilibria in each of the cases. Hence while the main result does not theoretically extend to all equilibria, the computational experiments suggest that multiplicity may not be a significant problem in our application.

What about sincere students in the new mechanism? In the example, the sincere student is better off because she receives her second choice. However, this is not a general result, as Pathak and Sönmez (2008) show. While no sophisticated student loses priority to any other student, some of the sincere students may gain priority at a school at the expense of other sincere students by ranking the school higher on their preference list. As a result, it is possible that a sincere student might benefit from the Boston mechanism.
This model and the computational experiments enrich the discussion of the rationale for changing
the Boston mechanism. Even with players with heterogeneous levels of sophistication, changing
the mechanism does not unambiguously benefit sincere students. Hence, under the assumptions of
the model, this policy change cannot be seen as a Pareto improvement even for this subset of play-
ers. Rather, the ‘levelling the playing field’ idea only indicates that sophisticated students lose their
strategic rents under the new mechanism.

5.2 New Approaches to Incentive Constraints

In the 2009 Nemmers Prize lecture, Paul Milgrom argued that practical experiences implementing
auction mechanisms led him to reconsider the nature of incentive constraints for applied mechanism
design problems (Milgrom 2009). He argued that incentive-compatible mechanisms can have very bad
properties and in his view perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on incentives as constraints in
mechanism design.

For instance, Day and Milgrom (2007) consider package auctions, and consider an incentive metric
which is to minimize the incentives to misreport in core-selecting auctions. This notion is not based
on equilibrium, but it may highlight a potentially relevant consideration for the setting of a package
auction. Erdil and Klemperer (2010) argue, instead, that in core-selecting package auctions it may be
preferable to consider a bidder’s marginal incentive to deviate, rather than her maximal incentive to
deviate (the best possible deviation). Their argument is that the marginal incentive is not as sensitive
to other bidders’ behavior, and hence may be easier to calculate. This criteria leads them to advocate
the minimum revenue core outcome closest to some given point which does not depend on the winners’
bids unlike the proposals that consider distance to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payment (which depends
on winners’ bids).

In student assignment problems, it is also useful to consider other ways to think about incentive
constraints. In Pathak and Sönmez (2010), we explore a formalization of how easy a mechanism may
be to manipulate or “game.” We compare two direct mechanisms based on the following notion:
mechanism $\varphi$ is weakly more manipulable than mechanism $\psi$, if whenever $\psi$ can be manipulated,
$\varphi$ can also be manipulated (even though the converse does not hold). This notion allows for both
a weak and strong version. In the strong version, the manipulating agent must be the same across
the problems, while in the weak version, the agent may be different. Like Day and Milgrom (2007),
this notion is not intended to be based on equilibrium. However, it has the benefit of an equilibrium
interpretation. In particular, an equilibrium reformulation of the weak notion is that $\varphi$ is weakly more
manipulable than $\psi$, if whenever truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium of $\psi$ it is also a Nash equilibrium
of $\varphi$. 

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To provide one illustration of this general idea in the context of student assignment, we return to a practical issue from New York City. One feature of their new mechanism is that it only allows students to submit a rank order list of their top 12 choices. Based on the strategy-proofness of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, the following advice was given to students:

**You must now rank your 12 choices according to your true preferences.**

For a student who has more than 12 acceptable schools, truth-telling is no longer a dominant strategy. In practice, between 20 to 30 percent of students rank 12 schools. This issue was first theoretically investigated by Haeringer and Klijn (2009). In general, there are many equilibrium outcomes, and these depend on high levels of sophistication among participants.

In contrast, it is possible to show that the greater the number of choices a student can make, the less vulnerable the constrained version of student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is to manipulation. More formally, let $GS$ be the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, and $GS^k$ be the constrained version of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism where only the top $k$ choices are considered. In Pathak and Sönmez (2010) we show that if $\ell > k > 0$, and there are at least $\ell$ schools, then $GS^k$ is weakly more manipulable than $GS^\ell$. This result provides a formal criteria to encourage a district to relax constraints on rank order lists.

Policymakers seem to dislike the idea of “gaming,” presumably because it is costly and some participants may be able to bear its costs more easily than others. Given the prevalence of this sentiment, it is surprising that we have very few models of how gaming or manipulation is undesirable. These intuitions may rest on procedural aspects of a mechanism, rather than the properties of the outcomes of a mechanism. Understanding these dimensions of mechanisms will provide an important bridge between mechanism design in theory and in practice.

### 5.3 Experiments

The other way theoretical developments have confronted the real-world is through experiments. During the initial meetings with the strategic planning team at Boston Public Schools, school officials had studied the experiments in Chen and Sönmez (2006) closely. This experiment compares the performance of students in the Boston mechanism, the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, and the top trading cycles mechanism. One nice feature of the experiment is that it is able to induce participant preferences, so it can compare how these are related to submitted preferences. The experiment finds that there is a higher degree of preference manipulation under the Boston than the two alternatives, and this negatively impacts efficiency.
Since this initial experiment, a flurry of additional experiments have been conducted. Many of these experiments are intended to fill in areas where theory is silent or gives only weak predictions. For instance, Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Klijn (2010) investigate the performance of mechanisms in the presence of constraints on the number of schooling options one can list. They are motivated by theoretical work on this topic in Haeringer and Klijn (2009). Featherstone and Niederle (2008) investigate the role of incomplete information in the Boston mechanism. They are motivated by recent discussions highlighting how the Boston mechanism, though manipulable, may be able to elicit preference intensity (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu, Che, and Yasuda (2009) and Miralles (2008)).

6 Conclusion

In the last decade, problems related to student assignment have invigorated theoretical research on matching and assignment models. The literature reviewed in this paper provide examples of how field experience implementing mechanisms can motivate subsequent theoretical developments. While impossibility results indicate that there is no student-optimal stable assignment when there are coarse priorities, field evidence suggest that this may not significantly impact student welfare in Boston, but impacts thousands of students in New York’s high school choice plan. The simulations of Roth and Peranson (1999) showed that despite impossibility results on strong incentive properties of two-sided matching mechanisms, market size may ameliorate strategic issues. Lastly, field evidence on heterogenous levels of sophistication among participants in Boston motivated examining models where players have varying understanding of the choice plan. This and subsequent work illustrated the importance of considering procedural aspects of student assignment mechanisms in addition to the conventional focus on the outcomes produced by mechanisms.

Roth (2002) advocates for the creation of an engineering-style branch of applied mechanism design. Each of the three cases described here – coarse priorities, market size, heterogeneous levels of sophistication – are areas where theoretical developments can trace their origins to particular engineering episodes. Their existence reinforces the argument for recording and creating a literature on case studies of applied mechanism design.

Of course, many interesting questions remain. In particular, some of this work is part of an emerging quantitative theory of matching market design, which moves away from impossibility and knife-edge results. In a quantitative theory, comparative statics can inform how the magnitude of certain issues may be depend on features of the environment and can provide guidance for these situations. Another wide-open area involves building bridges between laboratory experiments and evidence on actual play in mechanisms in the field. This work, however, is challenging since measuring
true preferences in the field is considerably more difficult than in the lab. Finally, much remains to be done to examine the effects of particular student mechanisms on outcomes beyond the assignment such as student achievement and to broaden the scope of the design objectives to include the overall organization of the educational system.
References


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