Made in Mexico: How Chinese Firms Navigate Nearshoring Amid Global Trade Disruptions

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ABSTRACT

This research explores the surge of Chinese manufacturing investments in Mexico as a strategic adaptation to recent global trade disruptions, specifically the U.S.–China trade tensions and the COVID-19 pandemic. By analyzing Chinese firms' motivations and strategies, the study highlights how they leverage Mexico's strategic geographic proximity, favorable trade conditions under the USMCA, competitive labor market, and established industrial infrastructure to secure continued access to the North American market while minimizing tariff impacts and supply chain risks. Sector-specific analyses of the automotive, electronics, and renewable energy industries reveal distinct operational, regulatory, and cultural challenges encountered by these companies during their transition to Mexican production facilities. In addressing these challenges, Chinese firms have adopted strategies such as supply chain localization, rigorous adherence to North American regulatory frameworks, and effective cross-cultural management practices. Furthermore, the analysis situates this trend within the broader geopolitical context, emphasizing the role of evolving U.S. trade policies and proactive Mexican industrial initiatives in shaping the nearshoring landscape. The findings suggest that while Chinese investment in Mexico presents significant opportunities for industrial upgrading and enhanced bilateral cooperation, the longevity and effectiveness of these ventures depend on firms' strategic flexibility, deeper integration into local economies, and adept management of complex geopolitical and regulatory environments. By evaluating these elements, the research provides valuable insights into the drivers behind the increased Chinese presence in Mexico and the broader implications for global trade patterns, supply chain resilience, and regional economic integration.

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Chapter I: Introduction

I.a Background: Supply Chain Reshuffled by Geopolitics

In the wake of recent global disruptions, companies worldwide are rethinking where they manufacture goods. One strategy gaining prominence is nearshoring, which involves moving production or sourcing to countries geographically closer to target markets. This approach shortens supply chains, reduces transit times, and can improve control and resilience in manufacturing operations. Nearshoring is part of a broader shift in global manufacturing: after decades of offshoring production to distant low-cost centers (most notably China), firms are now considering *"regionalization"* of supply chains (Howells, 2024). This trend is driven by a confluence of geopolitical and economic factors that have upended business-as-usual in global trade.

Over the past few years, several shocks have highlighted the vulnerabilities of far-flung supply chains. The U.S.–China trade war, beginning in 2018, imposed tariffs up to 25% on roughly two-thirds of Chinese exports to the U.S. (Torres & Jayashankar, 2023). These tariffs – introduced under the Trump administration and largely maintained to date – significantly increased the cost of importing from China, prompting firms to seek ways to avoid punitive duties (Martin, 2023). Around the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted production and logistics worldwide. Lockdowns in manufacturing hubs, shipping container shortages, and port closures led to delays and soaring freight costs (Torres & Jayashankar, 2023). For example, the cost of shipping a container from Shanghai spiked by several hundred percent during the pandemic peak (Larraín B & Cifuentes V., 2024). These disruptions exposed the risk of over-reliance on any single country or distant region for critical supplies. As a result, companies and policymakers began emphasizing supply chain resilience over lowest-cost efficiency, with strategies like reshoring (bringing production back home) and nearshoring gaining traction. In addition, other geopolitical events such as the Russia–Ukraine war and rising U.S.–China tech tensions have further underscored the need to diversify supply chains. By 2022–2023 there was a strong impetus to relocate manufacturing closer to end markets to mitigate risks from trade conflicts, pandemics, and geopolitical uncertainties.

Against this backdrop, Mexico has emerged as a compelling location for nearshoring, especially for manufacturing aimed at the U.S. market. Mexico offers geographic proximity to the U.S., deep integration through free trade agreements, and a large industrial base with competitive labor costs. Notably, Chinese companies are increasingly taking advantage of these unique conditions, especially since 2020. It has become Mexico's fastest-growing source of inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) in manufacturing. In 2022, Chinese FDI into Mexico hit a record high, nearly four times its 2015 level, as Chinese manufacturers set up factories in sectors from electronics to automotives. In the first quarter of 2024 alone, a record 41 Chinese manufacturing and logistics projects were announced in Mexico – a remarkable indicator of nearshoring momentum. One notable hotspot is Nuevo León, a Mexican state bordering Texas, which received nearly half of Mexico's new Chinese investment in 2023. The rise of Chinese-led production in Mexico is reflected in trade patterns: in 2023, Mexico surpassed China to become the U.S.'s largest trading partner (*Figure 1*). U.S. imports from Mexico jumped almost 19% in 2022 and a further 4.6% in 2023, even as imports directly from China fell over 20% (Ide & Darling, 2024). In effect, some of the goods once made in China for the U.S. market are now being produced in Mexico, sometimes still by Chinese companies, and entering the U.S. tariff-free under the U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). This development has not gone unnoticed: U.S. policymakers have voiced concern about Mexico becoming a backdoor for Chinese exports, suggesting the strategic significance of the topic (Ide & Darling, 2024). Importantly, the recent sweeping tariffs introduced by the second Trump administration further adds another layer of complexity for companies contemplating nearshoring strategies.



Figure 1. U.S. trade with Mexico and China (U.S. Census, as cited in Axios, 2023)

I.b Literature Review

The strategic shift of Chinese manufacturing operations to Mexico has garnered significant academic attention, particularly in the context of global value chain (GVC) reconfigurations. Recent research by

Habib, Plotnikov, and Presbitero (2024) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) identifies significant shifts in China's outward FDI patterns, with particular emphasis on "connector countries" like Mexico. Their gravity model indicates that Chinese investment increasingly targets geopolitically aligned countries with established free trade agreements, particularly those specializing in manufacturing exports. This scholarly evidence suggests that strategic geopolitical considerations, rather than purely economic factors, have become significant determinants of Chinese investment locations.

Hong (2024) provides a theoretical framework for understanding Chinese motivations, arguing that "Mexico warrants attention as the optimal candidate for nearshoring in the U.S.-led supply chain reorganization" due to its strategic value "in securing a stable supply chain for key raw materials, such as critical minerals, and serving as a gateway for expansion into North, Central, and South America". The author's analysis categorizes Mexico's strategic response as twofold: "actively attracting FDI while strengthening national control over key minerals".

Gereffi (2025) emphasizes that Mexico's integration into North American production networks offers diverse opportunities for industrial upgrading, especially as firms seek to mitigate risks associated with U.S.–China trade tensions. This perspective aligns with broader analyses of supply chain resilience, where nearshoring is viewed as a response to geopolitical uncertainties and the need for more localized production. Ringer (2024) from the China-Mexico Studies Center provides a nuanced analysis of how the USMCA's stricter rules of origin (ROO) are reshaping the US-China-Mexico trade triangle, especially in the automotive sector. There is the ongoing debate over compliance and enforcement. Some manufacturers localize supply chains to meet ROO, while others may opt to pay tariffs for non-compliance, especially for non-core parts where penalties are lower. This dynamic underscores the complexity of using Mexico as a backdoor for Chinese goods and the evolving nature of US trade policy.

González Pandiella and Maravalle (2024) from OECD provide further context by examining Mexico's positioning within restructured GVCs. Their working paper emphasizes the "historic opportunity to spread the benefits of trade throughout the country, integrate SMEs more forcefully into value chains and to create more and better value chain linkages". Their analysis of Mexico's GVC participation reveals high backward integration (foreign value-added in Mexican exports) but limited forward participation (Mexican value-added in foreign exports), suggesting Chinese investment could potentially address structural imbalances in Mexico's global trade positioning. González Pandiella and Maravalle

(2024) also identify several structural challenges that may impede the full realization of nearshoring benefits in Mexico. These long-standing challenges are identified as "transport and digital connectivity, regulations, the rule of law, renewable energy or water scarcity. " The authors note the low enforcement of existing legislation, which potentially complicates business operations for Chinese firms and limiting positive spillover effects for domestic SMEs.

I.c Research Significance and Objectives

The phenomenon of Chinese nearshoring to Mexico sits at the intersection of global supply chain reorganization and international political economy. It raises important questions about how geopolitical forces are reshaping investment flows and industrial geography. Mexico stands to gain industrial investment and jobs, while Chinese firms seek to maintain access to North American markets despite trade barriers. The U.S., in turn, faces a complex policy question: trade with Mexico benefits the integrated North American economy, but the growing presence of Chinese manufacturers in Mexico blurs the lines of *"decoupling"* from China. Given the recency of this trend, there is a need for a detailed examination of its drivers and implications. This thesis seeks to understand why Chinese manufacturers are increasingly choosing Mexico for nearshoring. It compares Mexico's advantages against other potential nearshoring locations and identifies the practical challenges—operational, cultural, and strategic—that Chinese firms face when relocating their manufacturing to Mexico. By examining these issues through detailed case studies, the research will also explore the broader implications for the global trade environment and supply chain dynamics.

Key questions guiding the research include:

- *Why do Chinese manufacturers prefer Mexico over other nearshoring destinations?*
- *What key operational, logistical, and cultural challenges do Chinese firms face when nearshoring to Mexico, and how are they adapting?*
- *How does Chinese nearshoring to Mexico influence global trade, supply chain resilience, and regional economic dynamics?*

By exploring these dimensions, this thesis seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of the evolving strategic calculus driving manufacturing nearshoring, highlighting both opportunities and complexities within the current global economic environment.

Chapter II: Historical and Strategic Context

II.a China's Rise in Global Manufacturing and Shifting Dynamics

To understand the current drive toward nearshoring, it is important to recognize China's outsized role in global manufacturing over the past few decades. China's ascension as the "factory of the world" accelerated after its 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the early 1990s, China accounted for only a small share of world manufacturing output (under 5–10%), but by the early 2020s it had become the dominant producer. In fact, by 2023 China was responsible for roughly 29% of global manufacturing value-added – more than the next four largest manufacturing economies combined (China Power Team, 2024). This leap was fueled by China's abundant and low-cost labor, massive scale, and pro-investment policies. Throughout the 2000s, multinational companies offshored production to China to take advantage of cheaper wages and economies of scale. This resulted in lower prices for consumers in developed countries, but it also led to factory closures and job losses in many other manufacturing hubs. Economists dubbed this upheaval the "China shock," as Chinese export growth fundamentally altered global trade patterns (China Power Team, 2024). By the 2010s, China had been the U.S.'s top trading partner for about two decades (Ide & Darling, 2024), underscoring how integral Chinese production was to U.S. supply chains for everything from electronics to machinery.

However, several factors began to erode China's cost advantage and alter strategic calculations in the late 2010s. First, labor costs in China rose significantly as the country developed. Chinese factory wages more than doubled over the 2010s, converging with – and by some measures exceeding – wages in Mexico. By 2022, the average monthly wage in China's manufacturing sector was around $840 USD, compared to roughly $480 USD in Mexico (Huld & Zhou, 2022). This labor cost gap means that Mexico today offers cheaper labor for manufacturing than China – a stark reversal from two decades ago.

Secondly, the hidden costs of a far-flung supply chain became more apparent. Lengthy shipping routes from East Asia introduce higher transportation expenses and lead times. For instance, sending a container from China to a U.S. port can cost thousands of dollars (around $4,800 to the U.S. West Coast, or $8,800 to the Midwest), whereas trucking the same container from Mexico to the U.S. border might cost only a few hundred dollars (Martin, 2023). These logistical differences translate into significant time and cost savings when production is in North America rather than Asia. Furthermore, geopolitical frictions – most notably the U.S.–China trade confrontation – added new tariff costs to Chinese-made goods. All these shifts weakened the once-compelling rationale of manufacturing in China solely for cost reasons. By the early 2020s, global firms were increasingly pursuing a *"China Plus One"* strategy: maintaining some operations in China while also expanding production in an alternative country to diversify risk. This set the stage for Mexico's renewed appeal.

II.b Mexico's Evolution as a Manufacturing Hub: From NAFTA to USMCA

Mexico's role in global manufacturing has been shaped by its integration with the U.S. through regional trade agreements. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), implemented in 1994, was a turning point that knitted together the U.S., Mexican, and Canadian economies. NAFTA eliminated most tariffs on goods traded among the three countries and encouraged investment in export-oriented industry (Chatzky et al., 2020). As a result, Mexico's trade with its northern neighbors expanded dramatically, and a large share of this export boom came from manufacturing sectors like automotive, electronics, and appliances, where U.S. companies established or expanded factories in Mexico to take advantage of lower wages. In fact, the Mexican government launched the IMMEX initiative (Manufacturing Industry, Maquiladora, and Export Services Industry) in 2006 to facilitate the offshore production. The program allows authorized companies to temporarily import raw materials, components, and machinery into Mexico duty-free and VAT-free, provided these are used to produce goods for export (*Mexican Secretariat of Economy*, 2016).

Indeed, over NAFTA's first decade, U.S. automakers and suppliers ramped up production in Mexico, contributing to a surge in Mexican auto industry employment from about 120,000 workers to 550,000 by the early 2000s (Chatzky et al., 2020). Mexico became tightly integrated into North American supply chains, operating as a nearshore extension of U.S. industry for products ranging from cars to computers. By 2010, Mexico's total exports reached $298 billion USD (nearly six times the pre-NAFTA level), with roughly 80% destined for the United States (Davies, 2023). This underscores the deep U.S.–Mexico economic interdependence forged under NAFTA.

However, Mexico's manufacturing sector also faced challenges and shifts in this period. The early 2000s brought China's entry into the WTO (2001), which introduced a powerful new competitor for low-cost manufacturing. Many multinational firms that might have otherwise expanded in Mexico chose to invest in China to capitalize on even lower wages at the time. As a result, Mexico saw some lower-end assembly operations (particularly in electronics and apparel) relocate to China after 2001. Mexico's maquiladora industry – the assembly plants along the border that import components tariff-free and export finished products – had to move up the value chain to stay competitive, shifting toward higher-tech and higher-productivity manufacturing in the 2000s (Torres & Jayashankar, 2023). Economists have noted that competition from China's low-cost exports likely depressed some of Mexico's potential manufacturing growth in the 2000s (Chatzky et al., 2020).

In 2020, NAFTA was updated and replaced by USMCA, which maintained tariff-free access in North America but introduced new rules and requirements. For example, in the auto sector, the regional content requirement was raised — vehicles must have 75% North American content, up from 62.5% under NAFTA, to qualify for zero tariffs and new labor provisions were included to favor higher wages for auto workers (Torres & Jayashankar, 2023). These changes aimed to incentivize more North American sourcing of parts (potentially at China's expense) and better labor conditions in Mexico. USMCA also added rules for digital trade, intellectual property, and periodic reviews of the agreement. While it preserved the core free-trade framework, USMCA is generally seen as somewhat more restrictive than NAFTA in certain areas. For instance, the stricter rules of origin can make it harder for products with substantial non-North American to enjoy tariff-free entry. This is directly relevant to Chinese companies considering manufacturing in Mexico – they must navigate USMCA's requirements to ensure their Mexico-made goods qualify as "North American" if they want tariff-free access to the U.S. market.

II.c Recent Shifts in Supply Chains and Trade Policy (2018-2025)

(The First) U.S.–China Trade War

Trade tensions between the United States and China sharply escalated in 2018, when the U.S. imposed a series of tariffs on Chinese goods under Section 301 of the Trade Act. By 2019, the average U.S. tariff on imports from China had jumped to around 19%, more than six times higher than before the trade war. Over $300 billion USD worth of Chinese exports to the U.S. – roughly 66% of annual U.S. imports from China – became subject to these extra duties. China retaliated with its own tariffs on U.S. exports, averaging about 21% (Torres & Jayashankar, 2023). The immediate effect was to make Chinese-origin products significantly more expensive in the U.S. market, eroding the price competitiveness that Chinese manufacturers had long enjoyed. This new cost barrier gave companies a powerful incentive to relocate production for the U.S. market out of China and into tariff-free locations. As analysts noted, the tariffs suddenly made imports from countries like Vietnam and Mexico relatively more attractive, essentially penalizing “Made in China” and rewarding “Made elsewhere.” Chinese firms, in particular, faced a choice: either absorb the tariffs and risk losing U.S. customers, or find ways to bypass the tariffs. Many began looking to Mexico as a solution. By investing in factories in Mexico, Chinese companies could manufacture goods that would enter the U.S. under USMCA benefits, thus avoiding U.S. tariffs on Chinese-origin goods. This “tariff hopping” strategy is a core motivation behind Chinese nearshoring. Even during the trade war’s peak, Mexico continued trading freely with the U.S., highlighting the stability of Mexico’s market access compared to the fraught U.S.–China channel. Indeed, some trade statistics from the period reflect this shift: U.S. imports of certain goods from Mexico surged as tariffs hit the same goods from China. For example, Mexico’s share of U.S. computer imports (by value) roughly doubled after 2018 – from about 13% in 1999–2017 to 25% in 2018–2022 (Torres & Jayashankar, 2023) – suggesting that production of electronics moved out of China, with Mexico picking up much of the slack.

COVID-19 pandemic

Hot on the heels of the trade war came the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, which further transformed supply chain strategies. China’s stringent lockdowns and “zero-COVID” policies resulted in periodic shutdowns of factories and ports throughout 2020 and 2021. Entire industrial cities in China were sealed off to contain outbreaks, halting production for weeks at a time. Global companies reliant on China’s just-in-time manufacturing suddenly found themselves without critical components. At the same time, global shipping was thrown into chaos: a shortage of shipping containers and bottlenecks at ports led to months-long delivery delays. Shipping costs spiked dramatically – for instance, container freight rates from Asia to North America hit record highs, with indexes in early 2022 running over five times their pre-pandemic levels (Torres & Jayashankar, 2023). This unprecedented supply chain turmoil underscored the risks of concentrated production in far-away locations. As a result, reliability and resilience became as important as cost in evaluating supply chains.

Many companies concluded that they needed to diversify their manufacturing base geographically to hedge against future disruptions. For U.S. and European firms, that meant considering locations closer to home or at least outside China (the “China+1” approach). While China managed to restart production faster than many countries in mid-2020, the recurring lockdowns through 2022 made foreign customers uneasy about over-reliance on Chinese suppliers. This added further impetus for Chinese manufacturers to internationalize their production, including setting up plants in North America to reassure clients of supply stability.

In combination, the trade war and pandemic created a perfect storm that made Mexico highly attractive for reconfigured supply chains. Mexico offered Chinese firms a way to maintain access to the critical U.S. market without incurring heavy tariffs, and an ability to produce in a locale less likely to face the kind of trade sanctions or lockdown risks that China did. During 2020–2023, Chinese investment in Mexico, while starting from a relatively low base, expanded rapidly. Data from Mexico's government show that annual FDI inflows from China jumped from just $85 million USD in 2019 to a peak of $570 million USD in 2022. Although it dipped in 2023, which partly reflects global investment slowdowns, that was still roughly double the annual levels of the mid-2010s (Figure 2). By 2022, China accounted for about 1% of total FDI in Mexico – a small share, but up from nearly 0% a decade prior. Crucially, the bulk of this Chinese FDI has gone into manufacturing projects geared towards export. For instance, Chinese companies have invested heavily in Mexico's northern states (like Nuevo León, Chihuahua, and Baja California) where industrial parks focus on producing goods for the U.S. market (Torres & Jayashankar, 2023). Sectors drawing Chinese interest include electronics assembly, automotive parts, appliances, and renewable energy equipment, all of which tie into U.S. supply chains. Each of these investments can be seen as a strategic move to leverage Mexico's advantages in the new trade environment created by the twin shocks of tariffs and COVID-19.



Figure 2. Annual flow of FDI from China to Mexico (Secretaría de Economía, Mexico, as cited in Americas Quarterly, 2025)

**Note: 2024 Figure covers only the first half of the year (Jan-Jun).*

(The Second) Trade War: U.S. against the World

In 2025, trade policy shifted yet again with the return of a protectionist U.S. administration, starting another trade war — this time against the whole world. The second Trump administration introduced sweeping global tariffs that added a new wrinkle to Chinese nearshoring decisions. The U.S. implemented a unilateral 10% "baseline" tariff on all imports from most countries, smashing long-standing WTO norms. On top of that, steep "reciprocal" tariffs were announced on specific trade partners, with Chinese goods facing up to a 245% tariff (*The White House*, 2025). By April 2025, U.S. Customs began collecting the new tariffs, marking "the single biggest trade action of our lifetime," according to a former White House trade adviser (Lawder & Hunnicutt, 2025). These policies threatened to unleash a broader global trade war and indeed rattled financial markets. Although Mexico and Canada were exempt from the 10% baseline tariff, the U.S. simultaneously imposed a 25% tariff on goods from Mexico that do not meet USMCA origin criteria. In effect, the U.S. signaled that simply trans-shipping or lightly processing Chinese goods in Mexico would no longer escape tariffs – products must have substantial North American content or face heavy duties.

These measures introduced significant uncertainty for Chinese firms. On one hand, producing in Mexico still avoids the hefty 34% China-specific U.S. tariff and the direct impact of U.S. export controls on China. On the other hand, the new rules raise the stakes for compliance and could force Chinese manufacturers in Mexico to localize their supply chain more deeply to meet origin rules and. Mexican officials recognize how devastating broad U.S. tariffs could be: over 80% of Mexico's exports go to the U.S., so a blanket U.S. tariff would batter the Mexican economy. Thus, Mexico's government has trod carefully, even hinting at screening Chinese investments for security concerns and reassuring Washington that Mexico is not becoming a conduit for unchecked Chinese access (Murray et al., 2024). In sum, the 2018–2025 period saw tumultuous changes – from trade war to pandemic to a new tariff regime – which together served as both push and pull factors for Chinese companies to consider Mexico as a production base.

II.d Motivations and Comparative Advantages for Nearshoring to Mexico

It is instructive to compare Mexico with other popular destinations that firms consider for nearshoring. Vietnam has been a big winner of manufacturing diversion since the trade war began; it offers very low labor costs (even lower than Mexico's) and has actively courted factories relocating from China.

Chinese companies have indeed ramped up investment in Vietnam and Southeast Asia as another way to circumvent U.S. tariffs (Coffin et al., 2024). However, Vietnam's advantage is mostly in labor-intensive sectors (textiles, simple electronics) and its distance from the U.S. remains a disadvantage for serving American markets. Shipping from Vietnam to the U.S. still takes weeks and incurs high freight costs, and Vietnam does not have a free-trade agreement with the U.S. India is another contender, offering a huge labor force and government incentives for industries like electronics and smartphones. Some global companies (e.g. Apple) have started moving assembly to India. But for Chinese firms, India can be a challenging environment due to political tensions between China and India, as well as infrastructure bottlenecks. India also lacks an FTA with the U.S. and has longer transit times. Central American and other Latin American countries have been mentioned in the context of nearshoring for the U.S. market. While some have niches (e.g., Costa Rica in medical devices, Brazil in certain heavy industries), none match Mexico's combination of a vast manufacturing base, shared border with the U.S., and comprehensive trade agreement coverage. For instance, smaller Central American nations might offer cheap labor, but they lack the scale – Mexico's population and economy are several times larger, providing a depth of suppliers and skills. Additionally, Mexico's adherence to intellectual property protections and rule of law, while not without issues, is often considered stronger than in many developing countries, which gives confidence to foreign investors (Larraín B & Cifuentes V., 2024). One analysis by the Inter-American Development Bank projected that nearshoring could add up to $78 billion USD in new exports in Latin America in coming years, and Mexico is expected to capture the largest share of that due to its superior readiness for industrial projects (Bachelet & Turner, 2022).

Mexico has emerged as a premier nearshoring destination due to a unique combination of cost advantages, strategic location, trade access, and industrial capacity. For Chinese companies aiming to serve the U.S. and broader Americas market, choosing Mexico over other locations can offer distinct benefits. Several factors make Mexico particularly attractive:

Preferential Trade Access (Tariff Avoidance)

One primary motivation driving Chinese firms to relocate manufacturing operations to Mexico has been the opportunity to circumvent U.S. tariffs on Chinese-origin goods. Official data indicate that 77% of all Chinese FDI in Mexico since 2018 arrived after the U.S. imposed tariffs (Tapia, 2025). By establishing production facilities in Mexico, Chinese companies have effectively leveraged Mexico's preferential tariff treatment under USMCA, allowing them to bypass substantial tariffs that could severely erode competitiveness in the U.S. market.

However, the tariff environment shifted dramatically again in 2025 when the Trump administration introduced sweeping global. Crucially, other common nearshoring destinations such as Vietnam, India, and Cambodia are also now subject to significant tariffs (46%, 26%, and 49% respectively, although with a 90-day pause). Yet Mexico itself faces new uncertainties, as the U.S. simultaneously tightened enforcement on rules of origin with a punitive 25% tariff (Lawder & Hunnicutt, 2025). For Chinese manufacturers, this creates new risks: any perceived or actual insufficient local content in products assembled in Mexico could negate the primary tariff advantage they sought by nearshoring. Therefore, these companies must now not only relocate assembly but significantly increase local procurement and manufacturing of components within North America.

Furthermore, political discussions in Washington have indicated a potential willingness to specifically target products from Chinese-owned Mexican operations, introducing the risk that the tariff advantage might diminish further, depending on political shifts or future policy changes. For instance, U.S. lawmakers have proposed bills explicitly imposing additional tariffs on products like electric vehicles manufactured by Chinese companies—even if those goods originate from Mexico (Shokri, 2024).

Lower Labor Costs and Competitive Workforce

Mexico today offers manufacturing labor at a considerably lower cost than China. Recent estimates put Mexico's average factory labor cost around $4.50 per hour versus $6.50 in China (*NovaLink*, 2024). This wage gap has widened as China's economy matured, effectively flipping the script from 20 years ago. Moreover, Mexico's labor force is not only cheaper but also sizable and experienced in manufacturing. Mexico graduates a steady stream of engineers and technicians from its universities, supporting industries like automotive and electronics that require skilled labor. According to the Mexican Secretariat of Economy (2023), the country ranks second among the OECD member nations regarding the number of engineers. Overall, 25 percent of adults with higher education between the ages of 25 and 64 have a STEM degree. Compared to many other low-cost countries, Mexico's workforce has higher productivity in certain sectors due to decades of interaction with U.S. industry and technology transfer. For example, Mexico has a long history of assembling automobiles and appliances, meaning Chinese investors in those sectors can readily hire technicians familiar with modern manufacturing processes. In contrast, while countries like Vietnam or India also offer low wages, they may face constraints in labor supply for specific industries or require more training to reach the quality levels demanded by U.S. customers. Mexico's blend of low wages and an industrially experienced workforce is a critical draw for nearshoring firms.

Geographic Proximity and Logistics Efficiency

Mexico's location next door to the U.S. provides an inherent advantage in speed and cost of shipping. Overland transport from Mexico to the U.S. can be done in days (or even hours for border areas) rather than the weeks it takes to ship from Asia across the Pacific. As one supply chain expert noted, transporting a container from a factory in northern Mexico to a distribution center in Texas might cost only $250 USD, versus nearly $5,000 USD to ship from China to a U.S. port and thousands more to move it inland (Martin, 2023). Shorter transit means companies can operate with lower inventory and respond faster to market demand. This is especially valuable for industries with volatile demand or those that rely on just-in-time delivery, such as auto parts, electronics, and consumer appliances. Proximity also reduces the carbon footprint of transportation, an increasingly relevant factor as companies consider sustainable supply chains. Additionally, being in similar time zones facilitates real-time communication and management oversight. A U.S.-based engineering team can hop on a short flight to a Mexican plant or have a same-day video call with factory managers, which is more challenging with a plant 12 time zones away in Asia. Even within Latin America, few locales offer the combination of contiguous land transport and developed logistics infrastructure that Mexico does.

Integration into a Mature Supply Chain Ecosystem

Manufacturing in Mexico allows Chinese firms to plug into an established supply chain network that has been built around serving North American industry. Decades of investment by U.S., Japanese, and European companies mean that in Mexico there are existing suppliers for components, local subcontractors, logistics providers, and industrial parks tailored for export manufacturing, as seen in *Figure 3* (Tordjman et al., 2024). For example, the automotive sector in Mexico is highly developed – companies like GM, Ford, and Toyota have assembly plants, and there is a dense network of parts suppliers in the U.S.–Mexico border states. A Chinese auto-parts maker setting up in Mexico can find local Tier-2 suppliers for different materials and a pool of trained workers and managers who understand automotive quality standards. This ecosystem reduces the set-up time and operational friction for a newcomer. Similarly, in electronics, Mexico has longstanding assembly operations (for TVs, medical devices, etc.), so Chinese electronics companies can utilize existing clusters in Tijuana or Guadalajara.

Competing locations like India are still developing comparable industrial clusters and often involve navigating more complex regulatory and infrastructure hurdles. Smaller Central American countries like Guatemala or Honduras might offer low wages but lack the industrial depth and supplier networks Mexico has. Thus, Mexico's industrial maturity and North American integration are key comparative advantages.



Figure 3. Well-established Industrial Clusters in Mexico (Tordjman et al., 2024, prepared by BCG Global)

Diversification and Risk Mitigation

Companies learned hard lessons in recent years about the risks of concentrating manufacturing in one country. By establishing operations in Mexico, Chinese firms achieve a form of "geographical hedging." This not only helps with trade policy risk but also with operational continuity. If another disruption—be it a political conflict or a natural disaster—affects production in China, having a facility in Mexico means the company can still fulfill orders from the Mexico plant. It also can mitigate exchange-rate risks and transportation bottlenecks by spreading production. Additionally, Chinese firms may enhance their global image and market access by producing in Mexico. Some Western customers wary of sourcing directly from China (due to intellectual property or security concerns) might be more comfortable buying products made in Mexico, a U.S. ally (Coffin et al., 2024). The bottom line is that a Mexican base diversifies the Chinese firm's portfolio—geographically and politically—potentially insulating it from some future shocks.

In summary, Chinese companies are not monolithic in their motives, but tariff avoidance, cost and logistics efficiency, assured U.S. market access, risk diversification all feature prominently. Each company may emphasize a different mix of reasons – for example, a solar panel maker might focus on avoiding U.S. import quotas and benefiting from regional demand, whereas a furniture maker is chasing cheaper logistics and faster delivery. But the overarching theme is clear: Mexico has become a key strategic springboard for Chinese manufacturing firms amid shifting global trade dynamics.

Beyond these motivations, Chinese investors must also consider the other challenges such as political scrutiny, cultural differences, supply chain adjustments, which we will explore. But the historical context of China's and Mexico's manufacturing trajectories, combined with the push-pull factors in recent years, have created a powerful incentive structure that is driving an accelerating trend of Chinese nearshoring to Mexico.

Chapter III. Key Sectors Driving Chinese Investment in Mexico

Chinese investment in Mexico has been concentrated in a few key manufacturing sectors that align with both countries' economic strengths. These include:

III.a Automotive Sector

The automotive industry, including both internal combustion auto parts and the electric vehicle (EV) segment, has emerged as a primary focus of Chinese nearshoring to Mexico, especially after the U.S.–China trade war escalated in 2018. Although Chinese firms accounted for only about 4% of Mexico's automotive FDI between 2006 and 2023, their recent growth is striking (Cadena, 2025). Notably, \$3.5 billion of that \$5.6 billion USD 2023 investment went into automotive original equipment manufacturing (OEM), reflecting an intense focus on vehicle assembly and parts production (Interesse, 2024). Since mid-2022, over 20 Chinese automakers and auto-parts suppliers have announced around \$7 billion USD combined investment in Mexican auto production. This wave includes 12 new Chinese auto-parts plants – producing everything from tires to batteries to interior components – established in Mexico since the U.S. Section 301 tariffs of 2018 (Rapoza, 2024).

The main motivation is clear: to leverage Mexico's trade benefits and proximity to the U.S. The USMCA requires 75% North American content (up from NAFTA's 62.5%) for a vehicle to enter the

U.S. tariff-free. This has pressured Chinese firms to localize supply chains: rather than export parts from China, many have followed their clients to Mexico. For example, when Tesla announced a new $5 billion USD EV plant in Nuevo León in 2023, several Chinese parts suppliers set up nearby to continue serving Tesla (Rapoza, 2024). In effect, Mexico has become a strategic springboard for Chinese car companies – a "gateway to North America" – allowing them to tap the U.S. market from next door.

The impact on Mexico's auto market has been significant. Chinese-brand vehicles, once marginal, now rapidly gain share. By 2023, 11 Chinese auto brands were selling in Mexico (with 4 more preparing to enter), together capturing nearly 10% of all new car sales. This is up from just 6.5% the year prior and 2.6% four years earlier. Brands such as MG (SAIC), JAC, BAIC, Chery, and BYD have made inroads, often undercutting competitors on price by 36–50% (Esparza, 2024). Crucially, many Chinese manufacturers emphasize electric and hybrid vehicles, leveraging China's lead in electromobility to meet North America's growing EV demand. This alignment with global trends on the push for EVs gives Chinese firms a competitive edge in Mexico's market.

However, it faces challenges discussed later – from meeting USMCA rules of origin to navigating U.S. political scrutiny. Washington has grown wary of Chinese automakers "hopping" through Mexico; U.S. lawmakers have even proposed new laws to curb this practice. Notably, the recently passed *Stopping Adversarial Tariff Evasion Act* would require clarification of the country of origin of certain articles imported into the U.S (Ide & Darling, 2024). The implications from these headwinds remain to be seen as Chinese manufacturers navigate an increasingly complicated geopolitical terrain.

Case Study – JAC Motors (Giant Motors JV) in Mexico:

JAC (Anhui Jianghuai Automobile Group) was the first and currently the only Chinese automaker to establish vehicle assembly in Mexico, doing so via a joint venture with local partners. In 2017, Mexico's Giant Motors – co-owned by the Massri family and billionaire Carlos Slim's Inbursa Group – partnered with JAC to assemble its vehicles domestically. Operations began in 2019 at a plant in Hidalgo with an initial production of about 8,000 units in its first year, the venture doubled output by 2021. By 2024, Giant Motors (JAC) aimed for 30,000 units annually, with plans to reach 40,000 in 2025 as new models are introduced, signifying confidence in growth (*Mexico Business News*, 2024).

JAC's motivations for nearshoring to Mexico were twofold: to access a growing emerging market and to potentially leverage Mexico for export. Mexico buys around 1 million cars yearly, and Chinese brands saw an opportunity to offer affordable models (Esparza, 2024). At the same time, assembling in Mexico could, in theory, open a backdoor to the U.S. under USMCA. In practice, however, JAC's strategy has been to "*Mexicanize*" its vehicles and focus on the local market. CEO Elías Massri emphasized adapting designs to Mexican consumer needs – for instance, using raised suspensions and more powerful engines to handle rough local roads. Kits of completely knocked-down components are imported from China and then assembled with modifications for Mexico (*Mexico Business News*, 2024). This local tailoring, along with offering reliable after-sales service, has helped overcome any early skepticism about Chinese quality. By partnering with Slim's conglomerate, one of Mexico's most influential business groups, JAC also navigated regulatory and distribution challenges effectively. The joint venture ensured JAC benefited from local know-how, existing supplier networks, and established dealership channels. It also lent political capital – an asset when dealing with any government approvals or community relations.

The Hidalgo assembly plant sources many parts from China through JAC's robust supply chain, which helped JAC weathered the global semiconductor shortage better than some rivals. Giant Motors also invested in a new logistics center near the plant to streamline the import of kits and distribution of finished cars (*Mexico Business News*, 2024). Importantly, JAC's vehicles assembled in Mexico currently target Mexico and the rest of Latin America rather than the U.S., thus avoiding immediate complications with USMCA content rules. This was a strategic decision: given U.S. trade tensions, JAC/Giant Motors decided not to push exports north until conditions are favorable. Instead, they built up the brand domestically – by 2023 JAC was among the top-selling Chinese marques in Mexico, offering SUVs and EVs at competitive prices.

Figure 4. JAC celebrating its 6 years of operation in Mexico (Peralvillo, 2023)

JAC's nearshoring journey has not been without hurdles. Initially, it faced skepticism about Chinese vehicles and had to invest in consumer education and trust-building. CEO Massri noted they "have faced many challenges and continue to invest what is necessary to ensure profitability" (*Mexico Business News*, 2024). Adhering to Mexican labor and quality standards required adaptation from JAC's Chinese production model. Additionally, the venture had to navigate the changing trade policy landscape. In late 2024, reports suggested some Chinese EV makers, including BYD, put Mexican factory plans on hold due to U.S. scrutiny. The case of JAC Motors illustrates how a Chinese automaker used nearshoring as a defensive and offensive strategy – establishing a beachhead in Mexico to access new markets and buffer against geopolitics, while localizing its product and operations to overcome cultural and operational challenges.

III.b Electronics and Appliances Sector:

Mexico has long been an electronics manufacturing hub and Chinese companies are increasingly tapping into this ecosystem. From 2013 to 2023, Chinese firms made 22 greenfield investments in the electronics sector, with 59% occurring between 2019 and 2023. The value of these projects more than doubled from $355 million USD in 2013–2017 to $805 million USD in 2018–2022 (Coffin et al., 2024). A complementary pattern has emerged: China supplies components, and Mexico specializes in final assembly for North America. In fact, Mexico is the world's largest exporter of flatscreen TVs, a title now underpinned by Chinese investment (*Prodensa*, 2025). According to one industry analysis, Mexico's electronics manufacturing output grew 30% in the past three years largely due to nearshoring from China (SiiLA, 2024).

Television and home appliance manufacturing stand out as areas of major Chinese investment. Lenovo, the PC and server maker, was one of the early movers that invested $20 million USD to open a major assembly plant in Monterrey in 2008. The plant became Lenovo's largest manufacturing site outside China, capable of producing 5 million computers per year (Kirk, 2007). This facility allowed Lenovo to fulfill U.S. orders more rapidly and avoid import hassles, illustrating the appeal of Mexico for high-tech electronics. Hisense, a leading TV and appliance manufacturer, established operations in Mexico by acquiring a former Sharp TV factory in Baja California in 2015. This made Hisense an instant player in Mexico's Maquiladora belt. Other Chinese electronics firms such as TCL (televisions) and Midea (appliances) have also used Mexico as a manufacturing or assembly hub, often through contract manufacturers.

This trend highlights the typical motivations of Chinese electronics nearshoring: to shorten production cycles, reduce logistics costs, and localize products for North America. This electronics sector push is driven by the North American consumer market's huge size – e.g. flat-screen TVs, smartphones, and home appliances are high-volume products where avoiding a 25% U.S. tariff can make or break profitability. Additionally, Mexico's skilled workforce in and existing supplier base for components like cables and plastics facilitate such investments. The overall trend is clear: Chinese firms are contributing to Mexico's electronics manufacturing boom, often teaming up with local contract manufacturers or using "shelter" companies to manage customs and compliance while they focus on assembly operations.

Case Study – Hisense: Building a Binational Production Base

A salient case in the electronics sector is Hisense, a Qingdao-based electronics and appliance manufacturer that has strategically built up operations in Mexico. Hisense's entry came in 2015 when it purchased Sharp's TV assembly plant in Rosarito. This gave Hisense an established manufacturing base with infrastructure and trained workforce on day one. The plant, rebranded "Himex", included not just assembly lines but also a warehouse, logistics platform, and even employee amenities like a healthcare clinic and childcare center – a legacy of Japanese management that Hisense continued. The motivation was explicit: making TVs in Mexico would allow tariff-free access to the U.S. under NAFTA. "Partnering with Mexico is the cornerstone of our strategy for increasing U.S. market share," said Hisense USA CEO Jerry Liu at the time (Spoon, 2016). To achieve this, Hisense doubled down on its Mexican production with an additional investment of $30 million USD to expand and automate the Rosarito plant, raising capacity from 1.5 to 4 million TVs per year. This upgrade enabled the production of 47 different models, tailored for consumer preferences across the Americas (Spoon, 2016). By localizing assembly, Hisense could label its TVs "Made in Mexico" and avoid the U.S. import duties placed on China-made electronics in the late 2010s.

Beyond market access, Hisense's operational setup in Mexico aimed at efficiency and quality. The company established an integrated supply chain whereby bulky components (screens, LED panels) are shipped from China, but labor-intensive final assembly and testing occur in Mexico. This split capitalizes on China's strength in component manufacturing and Mexico's strength in assembly labor and proximity to customers. Hisense also worked on developing local suppliers for packaging, plastic moldings, and other inputs, gradually increasing local content (Peng, 2024).

In 2021, Hisense announced a $260 million USD "Smart Home Appliance Industrial Park" in Nuevo León, further cementing Mexico as a long-term strategic base. This new complex was expected to create 5,000–7,000 jobs when fully operational, with a capacity of up to 2 million units of refrigerators per year – making it Hisense's largest white-goods plant outside China (Eunice, 2021). That facility was constructed in an industrial park jointly developed by Chinese and Mexican investors, which allows vertical integration as Hisense plans to bring some of its Chinese suppliers to co-locate there. Nuevo León's government courted the investment by highlighting the state's skilled workforce and excellent logistics with rail and road links to the U.S. (Eunice, 2021). To serve North America, the plant was designed to meet USMCA rules of origin (e.g. using regionally made steel and inputs where required) and local energy efficiency standards. Notably, the Hisense Mexico operation reports to Hisense's Americas regional HQ, ensuring that Mexican managers have a voice alongside Chinese executives in coordinating production with market demand.

Figure 5. Hisense announced new factory setup in Nuevo León (Hisense, 2021)

Hisense's journey in Mexico reveals typical challenges Chinese firms face and how they address them. One challenge was integrating corporate cultures and management practices – Chinese firms tend to have top-down, fast-paced management, whereas Mexican labor culture places value on relationship-building and steady routines (*Prodensa*, 2025). Hisense navigated this by retaining many local managers and gradually introducing Chinese lean manufacturing practices, balancing efficiency with respect for local norms. Another key aspect has been regulatory compliance, especially customs and tax. Companies like Hisense must maintain rigorous customs documentation to import parts and avoid delays or penalties. Likewise, adhering to Mexico's labor laws (e.g. profit-sharing with workers, union rights) required adaptation. To preempt problems, Hisense offered competitive wages and benefits (as evidenced by the on-site services at the Rosarito plant) to maintain good labor relations. Lastly, market competition is an ongoing trial. By manufacturing locally, Hisense positioned itself to respond faster to U.S. customer orders and even design products for regional tastes. This local responsiveness is crucial as it battles established rivals like Samsung and LG. Summing up, Hisense's nearshoring strategy – acquiring an existing plant, ramping up capacity, and then broadening into related product lines – illustrates how Chinese electronics firms leverage Mexico to globalize their production. The result is a win-win: Hisense gained North American market share and Mexico benefited from jobs, with the company planning further expansions as it upgrades regional operation centers to fuel future growth (*Hisense USA*, 2024).

III.c Renewable Energy Sector

Renewable energy has become a dynamic sector for Chinese investment in Mexico, aligning with both countries' strategic interests. China is a world leader in solar panel and wind turbine manufacturing, while Mexico boasts abundant solar insolation and wind corridors, plus proximity to the huge clean energy market of the U.S. (*Prodensa*, 2025). In recent years, Chinese companies have begun investing in Mexico's renewable energy in two main ways: manufacturing renewable energy equipment (to supply North America) and developing/operating renewable energy projects (to capitalize on Mexico's energy transition). Bilateral cooperation in "green technologies" takes place across the supply chain. For example, Mexico's sizeable lithium reserves are seen as a natural draw for Chinese firms looking to secure upstream raw material for batteries. Further, battery-dependent EVs are an overlapping area of opportunity – Chinese EV makers investing in Mexico bring not just autos but also battery and charging tech, bridging automotive and renewable sectors (Interesse, 2024).

On the manufacturing side, a landmark development was Trina Solar's announcement in 2023 of a massive solar panel factory in Nuevo León, with a commitment of up to $1 billion USD (Dilge, 2023). By late 2024, other Chinese solar firms were reportedly exploring similar moves, encouraged by U.S. demand for solar and the benefits of nearshoring. The U.S. has had anti-dumping duties on Chinese-made solar panels for over a decade, with a tariff rate of up to 50% (before Trump's second term) (Murray, 2025). Therefore, the motivations mirror those in other sectors: to bypass U.S. trade barriers on Chinese solar products and serve the U.S. utility and rooftop market tariff-free. Additionally, Mexico's own solar market is growing, given its climate goals and high electricity prices, so local production positions Chinese solar firms to supply domestic projects more competitively. In wind energy, while major Chinese turbine makers like Goldwind and Envision have not yet built Mexican plants, they have been active in supplying and investing in Mexican wind farm projects and could consider local assembly if volumes rise (*Power Technology*, 2015).

On the project development side, Chinese state-owned and private energy companies have actively invested in Mexican renewable assets. A prime example is State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC), a Chinese state utility, which in 2020 acquired a majority stake in Mexico's Zuma Energía – then the country's largest independent renewable power producer. Through that acquisition and subsequent expansion, SPIC now operates 1.3 GW of wind and solar capacity in Mexico. In 2023, SPIC bought three additional solar plants, making it the second-largest private renewable energy producer in Mexico. The company is also scouting new opportunities including battery storage and even EV infrastructure in Mexico (*Forbes México,* 2023). These investments underscore that Chinese companies view Mexico as a key part of their global renewable strategy – both as a market and as a base to demonstrate capabilities in the West. It's noteworthy that Brazil, Chile, and Mexico are the top Latin American destinations for Chinese solar/wind investment, reflecting favorable resources and large energy markets (Álvarez, 2024). In Mexico's case, however, the previous administration's (2018-2024) policy — to keep at least 54 percent of power generation in state hands — has impacted private sector participation and investment confidence in the electricity market (Graham, 2023). Chinese firms like SPIC navigated this by acquiring already operational assets to reduce development risk and expressing long-term confidence in Mexico's energy transition.

Case Study – Trina Solar's Nearshoring of Photovoltaic Manufacturing

A representative case in renewables is Trina Solar's planned factory in Mexico, which exemplifies Chinese strategic investment in clean energy manufacturing. Trina Solar, headquartered in Changzhou, China, is among the world's largest solar panel producers. In 2023, Trina announced an investment between $700 million and $1 billion USD to establish a solar panel production facility in Nuevo León. As one of the largest single Chinese industrial investments announced in recent years, the module assembly plant is expected to potentially produce several gigawatts of panels per year (Ide & Darling, 2024).

Trina's move was directly tied to the advantages of nearshoring under USMCA. This is crucial as the U.S. solar market is booming as a result of the Inflation Reduction Act incentives and state renewable mandates. Trina already operates a smaller panel factory in Thailand; the Mexico plant similarly diversifies its manufacturing base geographically. Moreover, proximity to the U.S. reduces delivery times and allows Trina to market itself as a "North American source," which could appeal to U.S. developers seeking to mitigate political risk.

The Trina factory is set to be in the metropolitan area of Monterrey (capital of Nuevo León), an industrial powerhouse with good infrastructure. Trina will need to engage with both Mexican customs to import materials like solar cells (often from Asia) and local suppliers for other items like glass and aluminum frames. Trina will need to hire and train a sizable workforce skilled in electronics assembly and quality control, as solar panel manufacturing involves precise, automated production lines. The company's experience in other countries should help establish training programs in Monterrey's talent pool, possibly collaborating with local technical universities.

Figure 6. Trina Solar at a Trade Show in Mexico (Energia Estratégica, 2024)

While the Trina case is still unfolding, some challenges are evident. The recent detentions of Maxeon Solar Technologies' Mexican-assembled solar panels by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) highlight significant regulatory risks for solar manufacturers operating across borders. Despite Maxeon's assertions of a transparent and compliant supply chain, CBP has continued to detain shipments due to insufficient documentation proving adherence to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Pickerel, 2024). This situation underscores the complexities and potential disruptions companies may face in international trade. Another challenge is competition and technology. Trina must ensure its Mexican plant is cost-competitive with Asian production. This likely means a high degree of automation and integration of advanced technology to produce premium modules that command better efficiency and prices. On the opportunities side, Trina's presence could foster local R&D collaborations in renewable tech and possibly lead to an expansion into battery assembly or even solar farm development in Mexico. If Trina's venture succeeds, it will demonstrate how Chinese companies can leverage Mexico to anchor themselves in the Western clean energy supply chain, much as Japanese and European firms have done. The case also highlights Mexican states' active role: Nuevo León's aggressive investment promotion (the governor personally meeting Trina executives) was key to securing the project (Dilge, 2023). This suggests Chinese companies will get local support, but they must coordinate with local governments on issues like permits, utilities (power/water supply for the plant), and community engagement.

In all these sectors, it's evident that Chinese companies are leveraging Mexico not just as an export base but often as part of an integrated North American production strategy. Other goods like heavy machinery, furniture, lighting fixtures, toys, textiles, and apparel are seeing similar patterns, though to a lesser extent. They commonly choose northern Mexican states for their facilities, given the logistics advantage to the U.S. and established industrial ecosystems there. Each sector brings its own workflow and regulatory requirements, which Chinese firms must navigate as discussed below.

Chapter IV. Strategic Challenges and Organizational Adaptations

As Chinese manufacturers establish operations in Mexico, they encounter a host of strategic and operational challenges that require careful adaptation. These challenges span regulatory compliance, operational and logistical hurdles, as well as cultural and workforce management issues. This chapter examines the major challenges Chinese firms face in Mexico and how they have adapted, drawing on patterns across sectors rather than isolated cases.

IV.a Regulatory and Policy Hurdles in Mexico and North America

One of the foremost challenges is navigating regulatory frameworks in Mexico and under the USMCA trade agreement. Chinese companies often arrive with limited familiarity with Mexico's legal and business environment. They must quickly learn Mexican labor laws, tax rules, customs procedures, and trade agreement requirements, which are markedly different from China's. For example, labor regulations in Mexico mandate strict adherence to maximum working hours, mandatory benefits, profit-sharing with employees, and empower independent unions (Ley, 2024). In response, most Chinese manufacturers have made compliance a priority, treating labor law breaches as the exception rather than the rule. Companies have established robust legal teams or hired local compliance consultants to ensure they meet Mexico's worker protection laws. A notable adaptation has been the use of "shelter" service providers, wherein a local entity manages personnel, payroll, and permits on behalf of the manufacturer. This model, commonly used by foreign firms in Mexico, has helped Chinese companies comply with regulations and benefit from tax incentives without needing extensive in-house administrative expertise (*Prodensa*, 2025). By leveraging shelter companies or joint ventures with local partners, Chinese manufacturers shorten their learning curve on Mexican laws and avoid costly missteps.

Another critical regulatory hurdle comes from the USMCA, which imposes stringent rules of origin and trade standards than the previous NAFTA. This rule poses a direct challenge for many who relied on China-centric supply chains that now must be localized. The adaptation has been two-fold. First, Chinese firms are reconfiguring supply chains to source more inputs within North America. This has meant forging relationships with Mexican or U.S. suppliers for steel, plastics, electronics, and other components, or even investing in upstream facilities in Mexico (*Prodensa*, 2025). Second, where local sourcing is insufficient, Chinese companies have brought their own suppliers to Mexico, as seen in the previous example of Chinese auto-parts manufacturers establishing plants in Mexico since 2018. By co-locating component makers in Mexico, Chinese assemblers ensure they can meet origin thresholds while maintaining trusted supplier relationships. In effect, compliance with USMCA has pushed Chinese firms toward greater local integration of supply chains, a challenging process that over time can deepen Mexico's industrial base.

Beyond content rules, Chinese firms must also adhere to Mexican trade and tax regulations when importing any inputs from Asia. In 2024, Mexican authorities intensified customs inspections and reportedly confiscated over 1.4 million Chinese-origin goods due to documentation irregularities, reflecting a crackdown on undervaluation and tax evasion. In response, Chinese companies have strengthened their customs compliance, hiring brokers and lawyers to correctly navigate import paperwork and avoid delays. They also take advantage of Mexico's double taxation treaty with China and manufacturing-support programs (e.g. IMMEX) to optimize their tax position legally (*Prodensa*, 2025). The lesson learned is clear: regulatory diligence is not optional. Chinese companies that have operated in Mexico for years often serve as mentors in the investor community on matters of labor compliance and trade rules, emphasizing proactive adaptation as key to success.

IV.b Operational and Logistical Frictions

Chinese firms used to the massive industrial clusters and lightning-fast supplier responsiveness in Shenzhen or Suzhou often find Mexico's operational landscape more fragmented and less turnkey. For instance, supplier coordination can be challenging because Mexico's supplier ecosystems in certain industries are still developing. Chinese factories accustomed to just-in-time deliveries from numerous nearby suppliers must adjust to longer lead times if key inputs still come from Asia.

One adaptation pattern has been the creation of industrial clusters led by Chinese firms to recreate some of the synergies of China's manufacturing hubs. Hofusan Industrial Park in Nuevo León – a joint venture between Chinese investors and a Mexican partner – exemplifies this approach. Opened in 2017, Hofusan provides a large, master-planned industrial campus where dozens of Chinese manufacturers co-locate, sharing infrastructure and benefiting from local government support (Flores, 2024). By concentrating in such parks, Chinese firms can simplify logistics: the park operators help with utilities, permitting, and sometimes even on-site customs facilitation. The clustering also means a nascent supply network of Chinese firms supplying one another can take root on Mexican soil, mitigating the lack of an existing local supplier base.

Figure 7. Governor García of Nuevo León (center) met with executives from Hofusan Industrial Park to discuss their expansion plans (Mexico Daily News, 2024)

In addition, infrastructure and transport logistics also pose challenges. Despite Mexico's proximity to the U.S., many Chinese firms are unfamiliar with North American freight and border processes. As production scales, they face capacity constraints in warehouses, rail, and trucking, especially at key border crossings. Some firms learned that border customs clearance can introduce delays; as a result, they have adapted by building extra inventory buffers or using third-party logistics providers expert in U.S.–Mexico trade to manage cross-border shipments. Within Mexico, uneven infrastructure can be problematic: certain industrial zones have world-class highways and rail links, while more remote areas may suffer from poor roads or unreliable electricity and water supply. Site selection has thus been a crucial operational decision for Chinese investors. They overwhelmingly choose locations in northern states or well-established corridors where infrastructure is strong even if costs are slightly higher, to ensure reliable logistics (Yang, 2024). Moreover, Chinese companies coordinate closely with state governments on infrastructure needs. In Nuevo León, the state upgraded a rural road to a four-lane highway at the request of Hofusan Park to accommodate heavy truck traffic (Flores, 2024). This kind of public-private collaboration helps alleviate operational frictions for the firms.

The overall lesson is an operational one: success in Mexico requires "glocalizing" operations, blending China-honed manufacturing prowess with adjustments to fit Mexico's infrastructural realities. Firms that have thrived, like large appliance and auto parts makers, are those that treated logistics as a strategic function—relocating key suppliers, building safety stocks, and engaging local partners to streamline the supply chain end-to-end.

IV.c Cultural and Workforce Management Challenges

Beyond hard infrastructure, Chinese companies face soft challenges in managing a new workforce and bridging cultural gaps in Mexico. Differences in language, business etiquette, management styles, and labor expectations can lead to misunderstandings if not proactively addressed.

One notable area of friction arises from contrasting communication styles and hierarchical structures. Chinese business culture often emphasizes rapid decision-making within a top-down hierarchy, coupled with direct communication. In contrast, Mexican workplace culture tends to value a more consultative approach and indirect communication to maintain harmony. Chinese managers have found that instructions delivered in a brusque or urgent tone may be misinterpreted by Mexican staff, potentially causing offense or lowering morale. To bridge this gap, many firms have implemented intercultural training and hired bilingual middle managers to facilitate communication. Successful operations often involve mixed Chinese and Mexican management teams that encourage dialogue and incorporate local norms, such as engaging in pleasantries and involving local managers in decision-making processes (Feng, 2024).

Workforce management presents another critical area of learning. Mexican labor law mandates entitlements such as paid holidays, Christmas bonuses, and severance rules that may exceed those in China, requiring companies to budget accordingly. Overtime work, common in China's "996" culture (9am to 9pm, six days a week), is more regulated in Mexico, and workers may place greater importance on work-life balance. To adapt, Chinese companies have adjusted shift schedules and increased automation to meet production targets without over-relying on overtime. They have also improved workplace conditions and benefits to motivate staff, with some firms providing on-site amenities like cafes, party music and teambuilding activities to boost loyalty (Feng, 2024).

Cultural integration efforts extend beyond the factory floor. Chinese companies have learned to invest in community relations, sponsoring local events, learning Spanish, and celebrating Mexican holidays to show respect for local customs. These initiatives help overcome initial mistrust or misconceptions. Studies indicate that while Chinese firms initially experience some incompatibilities in work culture, such as differing expectations on punctuality or initiative, these can be resolved by setting clear mutual expectations and fostering a two-way cultural exchange (Ji, 2024). A notable adaptation is hiring Mexican professionals into management roles. Successful Chinese investors often appoint Mexican plant directors or HR managers who understand both cultures, empowering them to shape company policies. This mixed leadership approach balances the efficiency of Chinese business processes with local expertise in managing Mexican teams (Feng, 2024).

In summary, the challenges Chinese manufacturers face in Mexico are multifaceted, but a clear pattern emerges in their adaptations. They invest in local knowledge and partnerships to handle regulatory and legal complexities, reorganize and localize supply chains to overcome operational gaps, embrace cultural integration and local talent to manage human capital effectively. These organizational adaptations have allowed many Chinese firms not only to establish operations in Mexico but to gradually thrive there. Cultural flexibility and local empowerment are as important as capital and technology. Chinese firms that acknowledge and adjust to cultural differences—rather than attempt to impose their own ways unilaterally—end up with more motivated employees and more stable operations.

Chapter V. Future Outlook – Risks and Opportunities

Looking ahead, several factors are poised to reshape the landscape: the trajectory of U.S. trade and investment policy, broader shifts in global supply chains, the growth of green industries, and Mexico's own strategic positioning. In this chapter, we analyze the key risks and opportunities on the horizon. The goal is to provide an argument-driven projection of what the future might hold for Chinese nearshoring in Mexico.

V.a Evolving U.S. Policy Landscape and Geopolitical Risks

The strategic positioning of Chinese manufacturers in Mexico increasingly sits at the crossroads of intensifying U.S.–China geopolitical rivalry. U.S. policymakers have grown wary of what they view as "tariff circumvention," with proposals surfacing to tighten origin rules or even impose country-specific restrictions within the USMCA framework (Rapoza, 2024). In addition, the hostile stance of the Trump administration to its trade partners worldwide could also fundamentally change the calculations to use Mexico as a nearshoring base. The recent 25% tariffs on Canadian and Mexican goods, and the "reciprocal tariffs" on essentially the entire world shrouded the overall business environment in much uncertainty and could discourage companies from investing before the storm passes.

The risk of such measures, especially with the upcoming 2026 USMCA review, poses a significant threat to the long-term viability of Chinese nearshoring strategies. Legislative proposals like the *Stopping Adversarial Tariff Evasion Act* signal bipartisan interest in restricting access for firms from "non-market economies," including China. Changes could include stricter origin-tracing, elevated regional content requirements, or even barriers based on ownership structure—forcing firms to localize further or lose preferential treatment under USMCA.

Beyond trade and tariffs, enforcement of U.S. regulations on forced labor and ethical sourcing has intensified. Laws like the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act compel firms to demonstrate full traceability of inputs regardless of where final assembly occurs. Chinese firms seeking to export from

Mexico must not only localize production but also sanitize their global supply chains to remain viable suppliers in North American markets.

In response, Chinese manufacturers have begun recalibrating. Some, like BYD, have publicly committed to limiting production in Mexico to non-U.S. markets, while others structure operations through joint ventures to present a lower political profile and emphasize job creation (*Mexico News Daily*, 2025). Many firms are also engaging in reputational diplomacy—highlighting local investments, supplier engagement, and community integration—as a buffer against political backlash.

Pressure is not unilateral. Chinese authorities themselves are cautious about exposing strategic technologies to potential competitors. Beijing's reported hesitation in approving BYD's plant in Mexico reflects concerns over technology leakage to the U.S., demonstrating that firms must balance both outbound investment policy and geopolitical sensitivities at home (Li et al., 2025). Consequently, many Chinese firms are focusing their Mexico operations on less sensitive sectors—consumer electronics, appliances, and basic auto components—while retaining R&D and high-value production in China.

The broader risk remains the volatility of U.S.–China relations. A deterioration in strategic trust—especially in sectors like semiconductors, critical minerals, or telecom—could prompt the U.S. to target Chinese-owned operations in Mexico with further restrictions. While Mexico has maintained a neutral stance thus far, future alignment pressures from Washington could force policy shifts. If the U.S. moves to restrict Chinese participation in sensitive industries within North America, Mexico may have to navigate increasingly difficult diplomatic trade-offs.

Given the evolving U.S. trade and security policy, those able to adapt through local integration, transparent governance, and diversified partnerships will be best positioned to weather future policy shocks. Strategic agility and cross-border compliance are essential to ensuring that Mexico remains a sustainable platform for Chinese industrial presence in the Western Hemisphere.

V.b Global Supply Chain Fragmentation and Realignment

The world is amid a significant realignment of supply chains, driven by both geopolitical fragmentation and the hard lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic. One salient trend is the move from hyper-globalization to a more region-centered trade. Mexico's rise as a manufacturing hub fits into the "China + N" narrative as part of the North American production sphere. In the coming years, we can expect this trend to continue or even accelerate. As global supply chains fragment into different major regional hubs, Chinese multinationals could invest in each to ensure global market coverage. Mexico could thus see investment not only from firms targeting the U.S., but also those aiming to serve Latin America or even Europe via Mexico's FTAs with South American countries and the EU (*International Trade Administration*, 2023). In other words, Mexico might evolve from being solely a backdoor to the U.S. into a more diversified platform for global exports.

However, supply chain fragmentation also poses risks. One risk is increased competition from other low-cost locales as every region builds up capacity. For instance, while Chinese companies are building factories in Mexico, many are simultaneously expanding in Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam and Thailand to serve other markets. If global demand slackens, there could be overcapacity in some sectors, forcing firms to rationalize which offshore location to keep. Mexico will need to stay attractive relative to alternatives.

Additionally, fragmentation can drive up costs since maintaining parallel supply chains in different regions is inefficient. If economic pressures mount, some firms could retrench production back to fewer sites, potentially even back to China if politics allow. Thus, the sustainability of nearshoring will depend on a continued business case for resilience and regionalization outweighing pure cost considerations. So far, geopolitical factors suggest that diversification will remain a strategic priority. A wildcard is technological change: advanced automation and AI in manufacturing might reduce the labor advantage of any location, leading firms to concentrate production in one or two ultra-automated hubs. Mexico must therefore also move up the value chain instead of relying just on low labor costs to cement its role.

Global supply chain realignment is also influenced by the emergence of new trade blocs and agreements. Notably, China's participation in Asia-centric trade agreements (RCEP) and potential entry into CPTPP could alter trade flows. If China joined CPTPP (of which Mexico is a member), that might facilitate smoother trade of components between China and Mexico, strengthening the integration of their supply chains. Such an alignment could allow Chinese firms in Mexico to import intermediate goods from Asia under lower tariffs, improving their competitiveness. On the other hand, if decoupling intensifies, we might see a bifurcation: a China-centric trade bloc and a U.S.-centric one with minimal crossover. Mexico, tied to the U.S., could then face pressure to source only from U.S.-friendly countries, potentially limiting Chinese inputs. This is a risk that may force Chinese manufacturers to source less from China over time to ensure their Mexico operations are "NATO-proof" or "friend-shoring compliant."

In summary, the future global supply chain environment likely ensures that nearshoring is not a short-lived fad but part of a systemic shift toward regional production networks. The risk is that an increasingly polarized global trade system could impose new constraints on how Chinese-invested operations function in Mexico. For Chinese firms, the opportunity lies in positioning Mexico as a long-term strategic base – not just to dodge tariffs, but to be present in a stable, integrated market. The best hedge is to deepen local integration and stay nimble in adjusting supply lines across regions.

V.c Green Industry Growth and Technological Trends

The global transition toward green and high-tech manufacturing presents significant opportunities for China–Mexico collaboration through nearshoring. Chinese manufacturers for EVs, solar panels, and batteries have initiated investments in Mexico, aiming to serve domestic and broader American markets. Similarly, Mexico's favorable climate positions it as an attractive location for Chinese solar and wind equipment producers, potentially fostering a cycle where localized production aids Mexico's climate goals and attracts further investment.

However, these prospects face headwinds due to policy shifts under the Trump administration. The administration has rolled back clean energy initiatives, leading to the cancellation or delay of nearly 100 projects across green sectors, amounting to over $71 billion USD in investments and approximately 20,000 job losses (Muir, 2025). Additionally, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which provided substantial subsidies for clean energy, has been targeted by executive actions halting its funding, creating uncertainty in the clean energy industry (Shah, 2025).

Another risk is that Western governments also want to ensure the supply chains of green tech exclude China. The U.S. IRA, for instance, has provisions that aim to disqualify EVs from consumer tax credits if they have battery components made by a "foreign entity of concern" (a category that includes Chinese firms) or critical minerals processed in such countries (Buffie, 2024). It's possible that Chinese companies localizing in Mexico and employing Mexican labor will persuade U.S. policymakers to treat them as separate entities, but it's not guaranteed. If the strict interpretation holds, Chinese battery or EV makers might find that despite producing in Mexico, their product incentives in the U.S. are limited.

This could dampen some of the anticipated boom. Chinese companies may respond by increasing the extent of their *Mexicanization*, bringing expertise to process Mexican lithium, ensuring that EV batteries made in Mexico meet U.S. content rules for critical minerals. Such synergy, if achieved, would be a huge win-win: Mexico develops a lithium battery supply chain, Chinese firms secure a local source compliant with North American rules, and U.S. gets a friendly supply chain for EVs. Alternatively, Chinese firms may abandon the markets altogether if the investment costs become prohibitively high.

Furthermore, the rise of digitalization and Industry 4.0 also plays a role by upgrading the entire manufacturing value chain. Chinese firms bring advanced automation and even AI-driven processes to Mexico. This raises Mexico's productivity but also requires a more skilled workforce. In the future, China–Mexico cooperation might extend to R&D centers or training institutes. We might see Chinese companies setting up innovation hubs in Mexico that test new manufacturing processes or customize products for the Americas. This would be an opportunity for Mexico to climb the value chain from assembly to co-design and development.

Already, some Chinese telecom companies like Huawei and ZTE have tech operations in Mexico, and Alibaba has cloud computing interests. If managed well, Mexico could attract more of these high-tech investments, diversifying from pure manufacturing to tech services. The risk here is again political: certain technologies including telecom and data infrastructure are sensitive for the U.S., and Chinese involvement might be curtailed. Mexico will have to balance inviting cutting-edge Chinese tech and ensuring it aligns with security expectations of North American partners. An example will be 5G infrastructure — with the exception of areas near the U.S. border, Mexico has not banned Huawei in its networks (Carrelli, 2024). If Huawei helps build Mexico's 5G network cheaply, it could indirectly benefit Mexican industry, but it might draw U.S. concern. In the future, cybersecurity and data governance might become new areas where the U.S. pressures Mexico regarding Chinese firms, similar to how it pressures on physical goods today.

V.d Mexico's Positioning and China–Mexico Economic Integration

Mexico's own policies and positioning will critically shape the outcome of nearshoring trends. Thus far, Mexico has benefited from external forces with perhaps a degree of passivity – Chinese companies came largely on their own initiative to circumvent tariffs and serve markets. Going forward, there is an opportunity for Mexico to take a more active role in attracting and guiding this investment to maximize national benefit. The Sheinbaum administration's "Plan México" emphasizes nearshoring as a national priority, aiming to reduce reliance on Chinese imports and position Mexico as a central manufacturing hub in the Americas (Alarcón, 2025).

Key initiatives include the development of ten new industrial corridors tailored to regional strengths, such as the Interoceanic Corridor across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, which seeks to enhance logistics infrastructure and attract foreign investment. New industrial parks and infrastructure in the less-developed south of Mexico, supported by government incentives, might entice Chinese companies to also consider those regions, spreading investment beyond the current northern concentration. (*Mexico Daily News*, 2024) Such strategic moves by Mexico could amplify the nearshoring trend and even make the country a bridge between Asia and the Americas.

At the same time, Mexico will have to manage domestic sensitivities and capacity issues. Rapid inflows of FDI can strain infrastructure, labor markets, and governance. Northern states are approaching near-full industrial capacity – industrial real estate is tight, and skilled labor is becoming scarcer, driving up wages, which weakens these locations' attractiveness. Mexico's opportunity is to invest in education and workforce development to ensure a pipeline of engineers and technicians for these new industries. If Mexico can upgrade its educational offerings in engineering, automation, and bilingual business management, it will better absorb the high-tech segments of Chinese investment.

There is also the matter of security. Companies worry about cargo theft or violence as organized crime remains a threat to business operations in parts of Mexico (Yang, 2024). The outlook must account for whether Mexico can improve rule of law and security, which would greatly enhance its attractiveness. Should the security situation improve, it removes a significant risk discount that some investors factor in. Conversely, deterioration could scare away even risk-tolerant Chinese firms.

In terms of China–Mexico bilateral relations, there is potential for deeper economic integration independent of but parallel to nearshoring. We might see negotiations or informal arrangements to ease doing business: for instance, simplifying visa processes for technicians, recognizing each other's quality standards, or even a future discussion of a bilateral trade agreement. While a comprehensive free trade agreement remains unlikely due to Mexico's commitments under the USMCA, sector-specific collaborations through joint ventures could increase in a broad range of sectors including agricultural, mining, and digital infrastructure. Mexico could become a regional base for Chinese multinationals not just in manufacturing but in finance and services; indeed, Chinese banks could expand operations in

Mexico to support the growing business. The opportunity here is a broader one: Mexico integrating into China's global value chains in a complementary way, not just as a recipient of factories. If Mexican companies can supply components or expertise to Chinese companies, the relationship matures from one-way investment to two-way collaboration.

So far, Mexico has maintained a pragmatic stance: welcoming investment from China without making overt political alignments. A risk in the future is if global politics force countries to choose between U.S. and China more explicitly. Mexico would almost certainly choose the North American bloc, which could place a ceiling on just how far China–Mexico integration goes. Mexico remains one of the few major Latin American countries that have not joined China's Belt and Road Initiative, probably to avoid antagonizing Washington. From Beijing's perspective, investing in Mexico has always been about economics instead of geopolitics, and Chinese officials have been careful to frame it that way to keep the issue from becoming politicized in Mexico. As long as Chinese FDI demonstrably benefits Mexico's growth and jobs, local governments in Mexico are likely to continue competing to attract Chinese projects, given the success stories in states like Nuevo León.

Looking to the medium-term future (5–10 years), one possible outcome is a more institutionalized partnership: perhaps a high-level Mexico–China business council or regular economic dialogues to troubleshoot issues. This could facilitate addressing any frictions (such as trade imbalances or market access for Mexican goods to China) and further normalize Chinese presence. Another aspect of integration could be in financing infrastructure – Chinese development banks might co-finance Mexican infrastructure projects that aids nearshoring such as ports and rails. Should that happen, it would deepen the relationship but will require transparency to avoid past pitfalls, as seen in the $3.75 billion USD Chinese-funded rail project that was marred by controversy and cancelled in 2014 (*BBC News*, 2014).

Chapter VI: Conclusion

The phenomenon of Chinese nearshoring to Mexico represents a significant strategic shift within global manufacturing dynamics, driven by geopolitical realignments and evolving economic landscapes. Initially spurred by tariffs from the U.S.–China trade war and compounded by pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions, Chinese manufacturers increasingly perceive Mexico as an optimal gateway to North American markets. Mexico's proximity, favorable trade agreements under USMCA, competitive labor costs, and established manufacturing ecosystems have uniquely positioned it as an attractive alternative to traditional Asian manufacturing hubs.

However, the nearshoring transition has been neither seamless nor without significant strategic, operational, and cultural challenges. Chinese firms have had to rapidly adapt to stringent North American regulatory environments, logistical complexities, infrastructure variabilities, and distinct cultural norms within Mexico's workforce. Success stories reveal a clear pattern: companies that effectively integrate local knowledge, build robust compliance frameworks, and invest in cross-cultural management have been most resilient and successful.

Looking ahead, the future trajectory of Chinese nearshoring to Mexico will be shaped by several critical factors. The increasingly complex U.S.–China geopolitical relationship introduces persistent risks, particularly through policy uncertainty and potential tightening of trade restrictions within the USMCA framework. At the same time, opportunities are evident in Mexico's emerging role in green and high-tech manufacturing sectors, despite challenges from recent U.S. policy reversals under the Trump administration. These sectors promise substantial growth if Chinese companies can navigate and adapt to shifting regulatory and political environments.

Mexico's strategic decisions, particularly the proactive industrial policies under the Sheinbaum administration, will significantly influence nearshoring dynamics. Initiatives like the Interoceanic Corridor and targeted industrial parks could enhance Mexico's attractiveness and diversify investment beyond its northern states. Simultaneously, Mexico must address critical infrastructure, labor skill gaps, and security concerns to sustain and capitalize on incoming investments.

Ultimately, the future success of Chinese nearshoring in Mexico hinges upon a careful balance of economic integration, geopolitical navigation, and cultural adaptation. Chinese firms must continue to demonstrate strategic agility and deepen local connections to remain resilient against policy shifts. For Mexico, the challenge will be leveraging foreign investments not only as a production platform but as a catalyst for broader economic upgrading, technological advancement, and bilateral collaboration with China. If managed adeptly, Mexico stands to solidify its role as a pivotal manufacturing hub, effectively bridging the economic interests of the East and West in an increasingly regionalized global economy.

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