

**CITIZENSHIP, EXCLUSION, AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS:
POLITICAL RESPONSES TO IMMIGRANT POLICY**

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
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ABSTRACT

The dissertation examines whether policy can foster the political incorporation and democratic participation of immigrants. The study compares immigrants' political responses to immigrant policy in Sweden and Germany. Sweden is the critical case because Sweden's immigrant policy attempts to shorten the intergenerational integration of immigrants into the host society. The Swedish government extended the benefits of its universalistic welfare state to non-citizens, "topped off" benefits through direct measures specifically for immigrants, and extended voting and office holding rights to non-citizens. The study examines three main questions. Does extending the welfare state and the political franchise to immigrants alter the general immigrant experience of intergenerational integration into the host society? Is Sweden's extension and support for immigrant political rights successful in promoting immigrant political participation? Is Sweden's immigrant policy successful in defining the forms of immigrant political participation, configuring immigrant associational patterns, and influencing immigrant political goals? Sweden's extension of its universalistic welfare state does not seem to alter immigrants' intergenerational integration into the host society. There is little difference in the economic and social situations of immigrants in Sweden and Germany, a country which makes a less comprehensive attempt to integrate immigrants into its society. Sweden's extension and support for immigrants' political rights are partially successful in promoting immigrant political participation. Sweden's immigrant policy is successful in defining the forms of immigrant political participation, configuring immigrant associational patterns, and influencing how immigrants achieve their political goals. The study suggests that civic tradition and associational life are factors that need not translate into greater political participation. Still, government policies can strongly influence how immigrants perceive and participate in politics.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE TRANSFORMATION OF IMMIGRANTS INTO CITIZENS AS A STATE ACTIVITY

The modern state has an interest in transforming its inhabitants into citizens who exhibit some degree of affinity and loyalty to it. The state either can be a newly established entity attempting to incorporate or ideologically remake its existing or indigenous inhabitants, (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawn 1992), or an existing vehicle for the incorporation of foreigners, (Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 1993; Hammar 1990b; Hollifield 1992). The current inquiry is a discussion centered on the second issue, the state as a maker of foreigners (newcomers) into citizens. The rise in global migration and the increased presence of permanent, non-citizen populations are forcing countries to address issues previously seen as irrelevant or academic. Even in countries with an immigrant tradition, the United States for example, debate on government policy towards legal and illegal immigrants has reemerged with a new force.

The current inquiry is important because of the increasing numbers of permanent residents in many of the advanced industrialized countries. In Table 1.1, the increased presence of foreign citizens is clearly evident in Belgium, Denmark, Germany (Federal Republic of Germany), Italy, and the Netherlands. The population of foreign citizens as a percentage of the total population increased by 25.9%, 100.0%, 60.9%, 300.0%, and 82.1% respectively between 1976-1994.

Table 1.1 Population of Foreign Citizenship in Selected European Countries (as a percentage of the total population)

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1994</u>
Belgium	6.5	8.5	8.9	8.7	9.0	10.7
Denmark	-	1.8	2.0	2.3	3.1	3.5
France	-	6.5	6.8	-	6.4	-
Germany (united)	-	-	-	-	7.3	8.6
Germany (FRG)	5.6	6.4	7.5	7.4	7.2	10.3
Italy	0.2	-	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.2
Netherlands	1.8	2.8	3.7	3.8	4.6	5.1
Sweden	5.8	5.0	5.1	4.7	5.6	5.8
United Kingdom	-	-	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.5

Source: *Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 1996*.

Table 1.2 shows the percentage of population growth attributed to the growth in the immigrant population for select European countries. Even here, foreign citizens represent a significant percentage of the population growth, sometimes even accounting for more than 100% of the population growth as in Belgium between 1993-1994, in Denmark between 1986-1991, and in Italy between 1986-1991. The figures in both tables understate the actual presence of foreign born residents because these figures do not take into account naturalized citizens, which would be significant in countries with high naturalization rates such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Britain, (Reinans and Hammar 1993; Soysal 1994).

Table 1.2 Total Population Increase Attributed to Increase in Total Population of Foreign Citizens in Select European Countries (as a percentage of the total population increase)

	1986-1991	1991-1993	1993-1994
Belgium	27.6	16.1	525.4
Denmark	146.2	55.6	56.3
Germany (FRG)	47.0	61.5	7.9
Italy	146.3	43.6	31.3
Netherlands	27.0	32.8	21.9
Sweden	40.9	15.2	15.8
United Kingdom	11.7	31.1	8.3

Source: *Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 1996.*

In conjunction with immigrants and migration, increasing globalization has undermined not only conceptions of nation based citizenship, but also conceptions of political legitimacy, of appropriate forms of political representation, and of political participation. Questions of who needs representation, at what levels, and through what mechanisms have been re-opened. Consequently, governments are reassessing the political goals of citizenship policies, as well as the policy mechanisms of citizenship.

Statement of the Problem

Governments in developed countries lacking an immigrant tradition have had to confront the issue of how to treat their populations of permanent, non-citizen residents. Sweden has decided to extend universalistic social benefits to its permanent, non-citizen residents. Furthermore, the government has “topped off” its social benefits by providing direct, special measures for immigrants, such as home language instruction, Swedish language instruction, and financial support for immigrant associations and publications, (Hammar 1985b). In addition, the

Swedish government also decided to extend voting and office holding rights to its permanent, non-citizen residents. The significance of this policy is its pursuit of an equality of status between citizens and non-citizens, as well as the possibility of cultivating cross-class solidarity into a solidarity that includes citizens and immigrants, (Esping-Andersen 1990; SOU 1974:69). Stated differently, Sweden has made an attempt to alter the general “immigrant experience,” with the “immigrant experience” being the intergenerational integration of immigrants into the host society, by attempting to broaden and deepen immigrants’ exposure to Sweden’s sociopolitical institutions.

The dissertation attempts to determine whether liberal policies, including easy access to the franchise, facilitate the economic, social, and political participation of immigrants. This dissertation explores the success of Sweden’s immigrant policy, first in a general sense, and then with respect to political participation specifically. Sweden’s decision to incorporate immigrants into its political life provides an opportunity to study immigrant political activity outside the context of the struggle of immigrants to obtain and exercise rights that citizens enjoy. What theories, if any, can explain the observed political participation of immigrants in the presence of policies that explicitly encourage such participation? What is the role of institutions, especially political organizations, in the integration of immigrants?

This study attempts to add to the citizenship literature by investigating the validity of an implicit, but key assumption. The assumption is that groups will accept and respond according to an ideal of citizen participation as defined by

government policy incentives. Yasemin Soysal (1994) argues that the rules of membership define the forms of political participation and configure immigrant associational patterns. In a broader sense, Soysal argues that institutions structure politics, even for immigrants who usually have a political history and civic tradition much different from the native population of the host country. Since people rarely immigrate for the explicit purpose of participating in the politics of their adoptive country, political process and organizations would seem to be of little importance to immigrants.

Another implicit assumption in the citizenship literature is that policy somehow makes a difference in the integration of immigrants into the host society. While it is still debatable that different national policies are converging, strong arguments can be made for the convergence in the treatment of immigrants. For example, Soysal provides strong arguments that the increasing acceptance of human rights has placed pressure on governments, especially western ones, to treat immigrants without violating basic human rights. James Hollifield points to the pressures of free market ideology, the growing internationalization of the economy, and the formation of common markets as creating pressures for countries to converge on a common standard for the treatment of immigrants. This study examines the nature of the relationship between the treatment of immigrants and their integration into the host society.

This study will explore answers to the following questions. Do institutions structure politics for immigrants? Are immigrant groups really limited to forms of political participation and associational patterns as defined by

membership rules? Some scholars, Rogers Brubaker (1989) and Mark Miller (1981) for example, suggest not. Miller (1981) notes that immigrants can represent their interests through: 1) organizations oriented toward their home country, or even perhaps organizations based there; 2) advisory consultative bodies designed to represent their interests; 3) unions and workplace councils; 4) domestic political parties or religious and civic organizations; and 5) demonstrations, street protests, and the like. Since immigrants do not come to Sweden to participate in its politics, why would immigrants not simply “exit” (Hirschman 1970) from engagement in political forums they feel are detrimental to their interests? If political demands are strongly influenced by the rules of membership, why would governments create policies and institutions resulting in political consequences potentially beyond its control? The intuitive answer is that they do not, (Ålund and Schierup 1991). If institutions can structure politics for immigrants, what then are the possible roles for civic traditions and associations in increasing political participation?

Citizenship Theory

Up to this point, I have used the term ‘citizen’ as if there were agreement on what it means. There is not, a fact which is perhaps at the core of the debate over how to treat immigrants. Citizenship theory is mostly about remaking immigrants into something they presently are not. In the academic literature, the discussion of citizenship centers on two broad discussions: citizenship in political theory and citizenship in law and policy. Citizenship in political theory attempts to address why states are interested in turning people into citizens, and to provide

a picture of what a properly functioning society is. Often it is some philosophical image of society that policy makers aim to replicate.

The political goal of citizenship in the advanced industrialized democracies, I believe, is simply the maintenance of a robust form of democracy. Robust democracy is not stellar governmental performance or high voter participation, though researchers can use these measures to gauge democratic robustness. A robust democracy is one in which there exists relatively unhindered channels for political involvement, vehicles for the representation or articulation of individual and group interests, and a modicum of government response to the electoral or policy generation processes. Implicit in this definition of robust democracy is the recognition that no country will satisfy these criteria perfectly. The definition is flexible to acknowledge trade-offs in the attainment of these ideals.

The literature on the theoretical foundations of citizenship basically views citizenship as supporting three norms of democratic political activity: liberal, pluralist, and republican, (Beiner 1995; Bulmer and Rees 1996; Cohen and Rogers 1995; Miller 1995). Citizenship theory that supports liberalism emphasizes the individual who is able to transcend group or collective identities in order to define and pursue his or her own purposes. The liberal conception of citizenship can support either a Rawlsian (Rawls 1971; 1993) or libertarian (Nozick 1974) version of citizenship.

In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls (1971) does not use the word 'citizen' in his discussion of a just social regime. His point is that even persons in highly

individualistic societies would reach an agreement on the role and scope of the state and on the proper boundaries of individual liberty. For Rawls, persons in highly individualistic societies would not be adverse to implementing measures designed to protect the least well off, although such measures might be suspect. Despite the cultural heterogeneity that immigrants bring, Rawls still can conceive a society in which there is political agreement on a set of norms designed to allow everyone to pursue freely his or her cultural, religious, or life-style identity (Rawls 1993). In such a society, people view their citizenship status as holding priority over other personal identities because it is only through this ordering can they preserve their other personal identities. For example, Orthodox Jews in the United States may adhere to the belief that no commercial activity should transpire on the Sabbath, but they would not attempt to impose this belief on others through the political apparatus of the state, because as citizens first, they would only advocate the implementation of measures that they can justify to others who do not share their personal identities.

A practical criticism of Rawlsian citizenship is not only that people in liberal societies enact legislation detrimental to those worse off, but that people do not always see themselves as citizens first. Examples abound of persons more than willing to impose the dictates of their personal identities on those who do not share these identities. Furthermore, the very goal of much of immigrant policy is to get immigrants to reorder their identities.

Libertarians value citizenship not for its own sake, but rather as a contractual mechanism for providing public goods that everybody wants, but are

reluctant to provide individually. Here, citizens are rational consumers of public goods. For all other goods, citizens are synonymous to consumers in the free marketplace, (Becker 1976; Friedman 1982). A more radical proposition of libertarian citizenship consists of the state as a giant enterprise in which citizens are its voluntary customers, (Nozick 1974).

Putting aside the criticism of whether public goods are provided in the amounts society truly desires, the main criticism of libertarian citizenship is that politics often determines which goods are public goods. Stated differently, many goods and activities are not inherently public goods. Politics often plays a crucial role in creating, regulating, and destroying the marketplace for goods and activities. Politics often determines which goods or activities are non-excludable. For example, someone who thinks that pornography is harmful to women remains unsatisfied with the societal decision that using pornography is a private choice. Neither will anti-pornography advocates be satisfied with restricting the sale of pornography to 'red light districts.' The same observation holds true regarding anti-smoking advocates. Anti-pornography and anti-smoking advocates claim that the negative externalities are ignored when pornography and smoking are not seen for the public goods they really are. Governments in western democracies consider the rights of immigrant women similarly in that the legal rights of immigrant woman are usually expanded upon emigration to a western democracy.

Citizenship theory that supports the pluralist conception of political identity claims that a person's political identity or membership is grounded within the confines of the group to which one belongs. In other words, people do not

freely transcend group or collective identities. Nor do they always exhibit the ability or desire to redefine their identities. In the pluralist world, private identities are encumbered ones. Given this condition, most individual political claims can be encompassed within a group claim. Individual citizens do not have claims per se; rather, Catholics, blacks, women, veterans, and blue collar workers do. Pluralist citizenship may resemble that of liberal citizenship if there is sufficient overlapping membership and that no one group is disproportionately powerful. However, the absence of overlapping membership or proportionate power relations does not affect the pluralist conception of membership. Pluralism with a low incidence of overlapping membership or disproportionate power relations would closely resemble the interest group politics described by Theodore Lowi (1979).

Group claims are grounded on numerous bases. Communitarians place the genesis of personal identity within a cultural or ethnic solidarity built upon a shared history or tradition, which counterbalances the atomizing tendencies inherent in the liberal conception of membership, (Macintyre 1981; Sandel 1982; Walzer 1983). These shared histories and traditions are not inconsequential in that they may allow groups to possess extra economic or political capital through which to pursue their interests. The democratic robustness of pluralistic societies is enhanced when advantages which allow for political victory in one issue do not translate into advantages leading to political victories on other issues, (Walzer 1983; 1993). In other words, the same groups do not prevail in all the political battles they enter.

Human rights arguments seek to redraw the boundaries of group membership along broader lines. Human rights theories of membership, which gained increasing acceptance beginning in the postwar era, attempt to redraw membership along the common history and traditions that people share as human beings, (Gewirth 1982; Soysal 1994). The characteristic of human rights theories is that they divide society into those who enjoy basic human rights, however defined, and those who do not. Human rights can include a broad spectrum of rights such as the right to the protection of one's cultural and ethnic heritage, the right to political involvement, the right to a clean environment, and the right to personal security, (Soysal 1994).

The reality of pluralism is that it often does not promote the type of robust democracy desired. Often, the same groups do win in the political arena on issue after issue, (Lowi 1979; Young 1990; 1995). Advantages gained in one sphere, (for example, economic), often translate into advantages in another sphere, (for example, political). Immigrants experience an extra disadvantage because usually they are legally restricted from the political forums in which they can articulate and pursue their political agenda.

Group identities often are consciously created apart from shared histories, traditions, or human conditions. After all, creating a new civic identity is the primary goal of the citizenship and naturalization process in many countries.

The republican conception of citizenship holds that a citizen is someone who plays an active role in shaping society by participating in public discussion, (Arendt 1958; Barber 1984; Beiner 1995; Habermas 1984; Miller 1995; Rousseau

1968). Like liberalism, republicanism accepts that citizenship is a package of rights in the liberal tradition, but unlike liberalism, individuals cannot easily refashion their personal identities or allegiances. Like pluralism, republicanism accepts that citizens have group identities. Yet unlike pluralism, groups identify with the political community because earlier debates and discussions have resulted in voluntary agreement about what ought to be done politically. Pluralism, in contrast, achieves agreement through the force or manipulation by stronger groups. Republicanism is neither individualist nor pluralist, rather it stresses the importance of 'civicness' in the political community.

Critics of republicanism's civic identity argue that civic identity be identified as mainly a tool for making universal what is in reality particular, (Gutman 1992; Young 1990). Before the citizen enters the civic public, he leaves behind his particularity and difference in order to adopt a universal reference point that is identical to all other citizens in the civic public. However in practice, republicanism enforces homogeneity by excluding from meaningful citizenship those who are defined as different or those who desire to steer the civic public away from the accepted, universal reference point. According to Young (1990), excluded groups tend to be women, ethnic groups, and other oppressed populations.

The construction of citizenship in law and policy tries to rectify the "lack of congruence between formal citizenship and the informal membership which results from the long periods of residence" of some immigrants in their host societies, (Hammar 1990b, 192). In the process of formulating its citizenship

policies, governments weigh six ideals that are associated with citizenship. These six ideals are that citizenship should be egalitarian, sacred, nation based, democratic, unique, and consequential. Citizenship is egalitarian in that a person is a full citizen or not one at all. There should be no official or permanent status of second or third-class citizenship. Citizenship is sacred in that citizens are prepared to make sacrifices, (which includes dying in military service), for the state. Nation-based citizenship means that citizens should be part of a cultural community. Among the wide range of possible cultural attributes, the cultural community usually is defined by language, mores, and beliefs. In western industrialized democracies, it is assumed that citizens have the right to full participation in democratic government and in governing. Citizenship is unique in that a person can be a citizen of only one state. Finally, citizenship is consequential in that it should mean something. Citizenship should be better than non-citizenship. Not only is the citizenship status a prize, but people view the citizenship status as something worthy of acquiring.

These six ideals are significant because they influence citizenship policies. Western democracies tend to define citizenship from either an assimilation, empirical, or ethnic perspective. Under the assimilation perspective, political inclusion is meaningful and possible only after a person assimilates an acceptable level of the dominant culture's mores, values, and behavior. France is the best example of a universalistic, assimilation-based citizenship.

Under the empirical perspective, citizenship is granted after fulfilling various empirical requirements. Passing an exam, remaining married to a citizen

for a specified time, or simply living legally within the country for a specified period are all examples of empirical criteria some countries use in defining citizenship eligibility. Cultural assimilation is not required. *Jus soli*, when one assumes the citizenship of the country of their birth, falls under the empirical approach to citizenship. The United States has a *jus soli* citizenship policy. Though the United States, Canada, and Britain are generally cited as examples of having empirical criteria for citizenship, the empirical approach is not always synonymous with a liberal citizenship policy. Currently, Britain's approach is empirical, but highly restrictive.

Finally, citizenship can be defined in accordance to one's lineage, otherwise known as "by blood" or (in German) "*Volksgemeinschaft*." The major ramification of this policy orientation is that people not belonging to the nation generally cannot become citizens. Germany, which determines citizenship by blood, and Israel, which determines citizenship by religious affiliation, are examples of this policy set. Under the ethnic perspective, citizenship acquisition is very difficult, if not impossible to acquire.

A Normative View of Citizenship and Its Problems

Even though the goal of the study is not policy prescription, perhaps it is important to explicitly state my normative views on immigrant policy and citizenship, since I basically share the same views that guided the Swedish government in the construction of its immigrant policy. Citizenship should be preferred over permanent resident status; therefore governments should encourage naturalization. Citizenship should matter, and matter in substantive, legal, and

quantifiable ways. The problem is in what ways should the advantages of citizenship manifest themselves in the host country's economy, society, and politics?

Concerning exclusion, the host society should facilitate immigrants' economic, social, and political participation. The challenge that arises is how to accomplish this while keeping the privileges of citizenship distinctive and substantial in comparison to the limited privileges of non-citizenship. Another challenge is how to incorporate immigrants into society without agitating the fears of native or existing citizens that the privileges of their way of life are somehow in jeopardy.

Institutions, as in political organizations, should play a vital role in the representation and integration of immigrants into the host society. The issue is which types of organizations, and what roles should they play? In spite of what social scientists, policy analysts, and politicians know about institutions, institution building still seems to be more art than science.

This inquiry focuses on immigrant policy. Immigrant policy is the economic, social, and political apparatus that governments construct to facilitate management or integration of legal immigrants. There is a difference between immigration policy and immigrant policy. Immigration policy focuses on the circumstances, rules, and procedures defining who is eligible for legal admission into a country. Immigration policy determines who may legally stay. Immigrant policy outlines the rights and privileges of those immigrants who may stay legally

in the country. Since the latter is my focus, the study ignores immigration policy, refugee and asylum issues, and international migration flows.

Immigrant policy is of paramount importance because it represents the construction of economic, social, and political rights, usually without the participation of those whose rights are being codified. Unlike laws regarding the treatment of children, immigrant policy explicitly covers the treatment of adults, many of whom are theoretically capable of participating in some form of interest articulation and democratic activity. If immigrants are capable of interest articulation and democratic activity, then the challenge in advanced industrialized democracies is their determination to promote democratic values among immigrants without granting immigrants access to democratic forums for their participation in the formation and ratification of immigrant policy. In most advanced industrialized societies, holding a political office, running for a political office, and voting are the supreme advantages of citizenship.

The political inclusion of persons capable of engaging in the accepted avenues of democratic participation, I believe, is preferred to political exclusion. On a practical level, it would seem difficult to teach someone to appreciate the intricacies and benefits of democracy without allowing them to practice democracy. The political exclusion of immigrants denies them access to the instruments for registering their political and programmatic preferences. The question remains whether political exclusion promotes social movements or politically active strains of religious fundamentalism among immigrants.

Methodology

The study uses the critical case method to examine whether immigrant policy significantly alters the integration experience for immigrants. The study also employs a modified “most different” case study approach. Immigrants in Stockholm and Sweden represent the critical case. Immigrants in Berlin and Germany represent the modified most different case. Immigrants in Stockholm are the critical case because Sweden has one of the most benevolent and comprehensive immigrant policies among the advanced industrialized democracies. In comparing immigrants in Sweden with those in Germany, the ethnic group is held constant, but the scope of immigrant policy and citizenship rights vary.

Relative to the rest of Europe, Sweden’s immigrant policy is generous and comprehensive. Immigrants in Sweden have access to the same welfare benefits as Swedes. Immigrants also receive welfare benefits at the same levels as native Swedes; that is, immigrants and Swedish citizens under similar circumstances receive identical services and cash benefits. These benefits include, but are not limited to, cash payments, housing subsidies, child allowances, health care, rehabilitation services (for drug, alcohol, mental, and physical problems), wage replacement during periods of illness, pensions, cash assistance while enrolled in educational programs (university, vocational training, and job re-training schemes), and paid maternity leave (1 year if the child’s father takes a one month leave, otherwise 11 months). These benefits are in addition to whatever supplementary programs that the county or city may initiate for children

(daycare), youth (sports, cultural, and anti-delinquency programs), women (career development, support groups, and women centers), and the elderly (nursing homes and visiting attendants to help with shopping, cooking, and cleaning). Libraries in communities with high immigrant concentrations usually have extensive foreign language collections. Translation services are usually available at the government agencies that immigrants frequent. The government, at all levels, provides funds for immigrant organizations. The county and local governments provide funds for home language instruction in schools.

In the labor market, immigrants enjoy the same industrial rights as native Swedes. These rights include employment opportunities, wages, and union membership. Employers are required to provide immigrant employees with fully subsidized Swedish language training or time off with full pay to those employees who enroll in Swedish language instruction during work hours. Discrimination against immigrants in employment and housing is prohibited by law.

Last, but not least, since 1975, immigrants after three years of legal residence have the right to vote or run for local and regional, but not national, offices. Sweden was the second European country, after Ireland in 1973, to extend the franchise to non-citizens. Immigrants may become citizens after five years of residency, (four for refugees and citizens of the other Nordic countries). While individual immigrants' cultural and religious rights are explicitly recognized in Sweden, collective minority rights are not. The Swedish government does not view ethnicity as a valid basis for political claims or political organization.

Germany's immigrant policy is markedly different from Sweden's. Germany does not consider itself a country of immigration, therefore the integration of immigrants remains an unresolved policy issue. Nevertheless, immigrants in Germany are offered social services similar to those German citizens receive, but the German government is not always directly involved in providing these services to immigrants. The government provides funds to semi-public organizations that focus on an immigrant clientele. Immigrants are expected to turn to these organizations for social services. These organizations can be religious affiliated or party affiliated as in the Arbeiterwohlfahrt's affiliation with the Social Democratic Party. Immigrants have access to rent subsidies, child allowances, health care, and unemployment benefits as stipulated by the regulations of the semi-public service authority. Special education programs (German language instruction and vocational training) are available to immigrants, again through the semi-public institutions which are fully subsidized by the federal or local government. Local governments may choose to fund commissioners and immigrant organizations in order to promote immigrant cultures or participation in social life. The Berlin Senate has done this by establishing a Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs. Immigrants who belong to a union enjoy the same industrial rights as Germans.

The key difference between Germany and Sweden is that in Germany, non-citizens cannot vote or hold office on any level. Immigrant representation is limited to advisory entities primarily on the local level. Furthermore, obtaining German citizenship is very difficult, time consuming, and costly. Immigrants

may apply for citizenship after ten years of residency. Even after ten years residency and the submission of naturalization documents, immigrants are not guaranteed that their application for citizenship will be approved.

The study focuses on the Turkish population because: 1) Turks come to Sweden or Germany legally, and 2) they are a sizable immigrant population in both countries. Sweden and Germany negotiated and terminated agreements with Turkey for the immigration of Turkish workers in 1967 and 1961, and 1972 and 1973 respectively. Consequently, many Turks have been living in these countries for a long time. Turks not only constitute a sizable proportion of the immigrant community in both countries, but they also are highly concentrated within each country's major city. As of 1989, 55.2% of all Turks in Sweden lived in Stockholm county, 34.2% of those living in Stockholm county lived in the city itself, (*Tema Invandrare*). Berlin's Kreuzberg district contains Germany's highest concentration of Turks. As of December 31, 1991, there were 30,867 Turks living in Kreuzberg, or 22.4% of all the Turks living in Berlin, (*Mederechtlich registrierte Auslander in Berlin*). The study focuses on the immigrant experience from 1970-1995.

Another reason for the study's focus on the Turkish population is that they originally immigrated to Sweden and Germany for the explicit purpose of participating in the economy of these countries. The native population initially did not view Turks as taking jobs from natives. The Turks were expected to work; and the host countries were expected to provide jobs for the invited

immigrants. In both countries, Turks, as other immigrants, were employed largely in the manufacturing and service sectors.

Another reason the study focuses on the Turkish population is that Swedes and Germans both viewed Turks as fundamentally and socially different because of religion, ethnicity, and language. Therefore the governments in both Sweden and Germany viewed the integration of Turks as a policy challenge. The Swedes decided to accept that immigrants would be long term residents needing integration, but the German government rejected this view. The German government's official policy is that Germany is not a land of immigration. Consequently, Sweden encouraged the settlement of immigrants through its immigrant policy, while Germany restricted its policies to providing the basic set of social benefits crucial to survival in Germany. Regardless of their policy orientations, governments in both countries realized that integrated or not, immigrants would need access to social services. For the most part, immigrants in both countries have access to the wide variety of social benefits as the native and naturalized citizens, albeit with certain restrictions or through different providers in the case of Germany.

Immigrants' access to the political machinery in both countries is rather different: official access after three years in Sweden, but restriction of access to all non-citizens in Germany. Despite this clear cut contrast between Sweden and Germany, the potential possibilities for immigrant politicization and political expression are multifaceted. In both countries, immigrants are expected to join the union associated with their trade or employment sector. Unions are politically

influential in their own right in Sweden and Germany. In both countries, advisory councils may exist through which immigrants voice their concerns. In addition, immigrants can become politicized among themselves. Generally, Turkish associations in Germany are politicized and often mutually antagonistic (Thränhardt 1989; Soysal 1994). Even though many Turks in Germany do not plan to resettle in Turkey, their political organizations are either oriented towards politics in Turkey or constituted along political lines common in Turkey.

The economic situation is analyzed first because Turkish immigrants initially came to Sweden for economic reasons. With the cessation of the migrant worker agreements, the needs of immigrants and their families who decided to remain in the country became a principal driver of the growing importance of social policy. Politics is presented last under the assumption that the economic and social situations in which immigrants find themselves could be potential issues amenable to political solutions.

The analysis relies heavily on statistics such as employment, crime, and voting data. However, data gathered from newspapers, interviews with leaders of immigrant organizations, and visits to various government agencies are also presented to provide a more “on the ground” analysis to supplement the statistical one. The historical and statistical data will focus on immigrant policy development, the economic patterns of immigrants, immigrants’ social outcomes, immigrant association formation, and immigrant political behavior.

General Conclusions and Organization of Dissertation

Sweden's liberal policy does not appear to facilitate immigrant economic, social, and political participation. Sweden's immigrant policy is partly successful in altering the general "immigrant experience." Immigrants in Sweden live fundamentally different lives than native Swedes. In Sweden, immigrants are more unemployed, are heavier users of public social services, reside in segregated communities, achieve lower educational attainment levels, are over-represented in the crime statistics, and are less likely to politically participate even when encouraged and provided opportunities to do so. In most aspects, the lives of immigrants in Sweden and Germany are not remarkably different. Immigrants in both countries face higher unemployment rates than citizens, consume more public social services, live in segregated housing, exhibit lower educational attainment levels, and are over-represented in the crime statistics. In these areas, the differences between Swedish and German immigrant policy do not produce different outcomes in immigrants' lives. There is little evidence that policy makes a difference in the integration of immigrants into the host society.

Policy, however, influences immigrant associational patterns and political participation. The significance of this finding is that policy and institutions can structure associations and politics for immigrants who usually have different civic traditions and political histories than native citizens of the host country. Swedish immigrant policy has been successful in reorganizing immigrant associational life along the lines promoted by the government. The Swedish government also has been able to reconfigure immigrant political participation in accordance to the

political and policy apparatus in Sweden. In Sweden, Turkish immigrants do not replicate the organizational affiliations found in Turkey. German immigrant policy does not attempt to reorient the associational and political lives of immigrants. Consequently, immigrants in Germany tend to retain their social affiliations as well as the political orientations they espoused in their home countries.

Immigrants in Sweden participate in the same types of associations as native Swedes. Trade unions, sports clubs, consumer cooperatives, and parents associations all enjoy the same popularity with immigrants and native Swedes alike. These organizations are within the top five associations in terms of total membership. Sport, culture, and hobby clubs are within the top five associations in terms of active membership for both native Swedes and immigrants. Although the Swedish government financially supports immigrant associations, these associations are not particularly popular among immigrants. Immigrant associations can become relevant to their members' lives when the organizations can provide a range of services that are valued within the community. For example, the Turkish Association in Rinkeby, a Stockholm suburb, increased its profile by providing a women's and children center, by running the local mosque, and by maintaining the largest meeting facility separate from the center and the mosque.

In Sweden, immigrant participation in associations does not translate into enhanced voting or political participation. Sweden's granting the franchise to immigrants is partially successful in promoting immigrant political participation.

Immigrants not only vote at lower levels than Swedish citizens, but immigrant voting participation has steadily declined since immigrants were first allowed to vote in 1976. Despite the declining turnout of immigrant voters, immigrants maintain an interest in Swedish domestic politics. The issues that seem to captivate immigrants are economic, such as employment discrimination and pensions. Many immigrant groups in Sweden have publicly disavowed politics in their home countries. The Swedish government enforces immigrant neutrality towards politics in their home countries through its funding mechanism.

German immigrant policy also promotes immigrant civic and political associations, but through very different mechanisms than that of the Swedish government. The German government does not fund immigrant associations, which perhaps contributes to the greater independence that these organizations have from the government. Turkish associations, for example, are organized much along the same cleavages found in Turkey. Unlike Turks in Sweden, Turks in Germany find that political issues in Turkey remain relevant to their lives in Germany.

The paradox of immigrants' political life in Germany is that even though immigrants do not have the franchise, immigrants maintain organizations that have explicit alliances with political parties. These alliances are typically formed with the Social Democratic Party. In addition to economics, cultural issues command a significant share of immigrants' political attention. For Turks, religious instruction in public schools is a good example of a cultural issue that became political. (Turks were able to secure the option of obtaining Islamic

instruction in Berlin's public schools in November 1998.) Though immigrants in Germany cannot vote, they have formed an immigrant party lead by naturalized citizens. Immigrants in Sweden, on the other hand, do not maintain such organizations. For those immigrants in Sweden who want to promote the agenda of a political party, they simply join the party. There is no immigrant party in Sweden since the government expressly discourages minority politics. Finnish immigrants and the indigenous Sami population in northern Sweden seem to be the only distinct groups that can elicit sympathetic government treatment of a minority claim. All other groups must approach issues through a political party or through an umbrella immigrant organization.

While the influence of policy on immigrant political participation is clear, the role of civic associations on immigrant political life remains unclear. Immigrants in Sweden and Germany enjoy a rich associational life, but in the case of Sweden, a rich associational life does not translate into robust or effective political engagement. The ineffectiveness of immigrant organizations in Swedish politics is not surprising. Immigrants are ineffective because they cannot forge strategic alliances with other powerful, established organizations that would allow them to secure their interests during the policy process. The decreasing voter turnout of immigrant voters reinforces the low desirability of immigrant organizations as political coalition partners. The structure of most public policy in Sweden is determined at the national level, but immigrants cannot vote in the national parliamentary elections. Consequently, immigrant organizations have little to offer potential alliance partners.

The degree of Sweden's success in supplanting the civic traditions of all immigrants is unexpected. Swedish immigrant policy has been successful in transforming immigrants of various civic traditions into persons that share and practice Swedish associational patterns. Yet whereas native Swedes have high voting rates, immigrants have lower, (and declining), voting rates.

Associational life does not promote immigrants' political participation not only because immigrants and their organizations in Sweden appear politically ineffective, but also because immigrants and their organizations appear politically neutralized. Immigrant organizations are configured in accordance to the guidelines stipulated in Swedish immigrant policy. These guidelines outline governance mechanisms, financial arrangements, and program agendas. Immigrant groups can, (and sometimes do), pursue political agendas in opposition to the main corporatist bodies, but these major players in Sweden's policy process easily circumvent immigrant agendas. Perhaps this fact can help explain the lackluster political effort that immigrant groups display when participating in the policy process in Sweden. In contrast, immigrants in Germany are no more effective than immigrants in Sweden, but they have more overtly political organizations through which to advance their agendas. Some of these organizations are in explicit alliances with political parties or other political groups.

The dynamic behind the neutralization of immigrants and their organizations remains unclear. However three possible explanations emerge that might explain the political neutralization of immigrants in Sweden. The first

explanation is that Sweden's immigrant policy limits meaningful political involvement. Without the ability to vote in national elections and to engage in minority politics, immigrant organizations are limited in what they can achieve. Perhaps government funding of immigrant organizations serves as a disincentive for immigrants to fund their own, independent associations. The second explanation is that the universalistic welfare state in Sweden captures the allegiance of most immigrants so that there is very little impetus for politics. The comprehensive nature of Sweden's immigrant policy crowds out potential issues around which immigrants might organize. The third explanation is that immigrants did not come to Sweden to participate in its politics; therefore it is not reasonable to expect them to have high levels of political engagement. The implication of this view is that low immigrant political participation is the norm. The second explanation is the only dimension on which Germany differs from Sweden. Germany's corporatist approach to the provision of welfare benefits retains a significant role for semi-public organizations, which only are partially funded by the government.

This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter Two contains a discussion of the development of citizenship in Sweden, of Sweden's immigrant population, and of Sweden's immigrant policy. Chapter Two lays out the economic, social, and political criteria in which citizenship matters to Swedes. Government policy was formulated on the premise that citizenship should matter to immigrants in a similar way. Hence the success of Swedish immigrant policy is measured against what Swedes consider as normative citizenship. Chapters

Three, Four, and Five present data on immigrants' economic, social, and political situations in Sweden. These chapters attempt to answer the following questions. Are immigrants' economic, social, and political experiences comparable to those of native Swedes? This question is important because the explicit goal of Sweden's immigrant policy is to narrow the differences between immigrants and Swedes in these areas. Chapters Three through Five examines the differences between the economic, social, and political experiences of immigrants and native Swedes. Chapter Six presents a general portrait of immigrant life in Germany. The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast the ways in which the immigrant experience in Sweden conforms or diverges from that in a country with a markedly different policy orientation towards immigrants. Chapter Seven concludes the dissertation by arguing that even though immigrant policy has a mixed record in its ability to promote integration, it remains an important tool for encouraging immigrant political participation. Chapter Seven argues for the relevance of immigrant policy to immigrant political participation despite both the questionable assumptions on which the Swedish government based its policy and the dilemmas that immigrants pose to democratic theory.

CHAPTER TWO

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CITIZENSHIP, THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION, AND IMMIGRANT POLICY IN SWEDEN

The development of citizenship in Sweden, the increase in Sweden's immigrant population, and the goals behind the adoption of Sweden's immigrant policy are the three main themes of this chapter. The development of citizenship in Sweden highlights what aspects of citizenship are explicitly valuable to Swedes, (and by extension, what should be valuable to immigrants). Until the 1930's, Sweden has been a country of emigration. Therefore Sweden's status as a country of immigration warrants a brief account of this change and of Sweden's construction of immigrant policies to deal with the change. Sweden, unlike Germany, accepted the fact early on that it had become a country of immigration. This acceptance manifests itself in Sweden's immigrant policies.

The Development of Citizenship in Sweden

The historic sequence of citizenship in Sweden developed along the lines postulated for Britain by T. H. Marshall (1950). According to Marshall, the establishment of three distinct elements comprises the totality of citizenship: the civil, political, and social elements. "The civil element constitutes the rights necessary for individual freedom - liberty of person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude contracts, and the right to justice." (Marshall 1950, 5) Courts are the institutions associated with the establishment of these rights. The political element comprises "the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. The

corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government.” (Marshall 1950, 11) The social element is “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services.” (Marshall 1950, 11) Marshall then ascribes the development of civil, political, and social rights in Britain to the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries respectively. Along with the development of each package of rights was a set of characteristic institutions vital to the acquisition and security of these rights.

Three criticisms of Marshall’s thesis are pertinent to this study. Mann (1987) and Turner (1990) argue against the Anglo-centrism of Marshall’s analysis. Marshall used British history in order to make his point about the progression of citizenship rights. The important point is not the use of British history per se, but rather the failure to recognize that an examination of citizenship in other countries might reveal different patterns. Marshall’s argument would be strengthened if he were able to show that citizenship in other countries also developed along the pattern he identified.

Though valid, the Anglo-centric critique loses its power in the case of Sweden because the development of citizenship in Sweden does follow the pattern laid out by Marshall. The population in Sweden began to enjoy civil rights when Charles XIV in 1848 freed the press from government restrictions. He also removed guild and government restraints on the economy. Political rights

ensued with universal suffrage for men and the introduction of proportional representation in 1908 (effective with the 1911 elections), and with universal suffrage for women in 1919 (effective for the first time with the 1921 elections). The Social Democratic Party reinforced social rights by their development of the welfare state during their uninterrupted tenure in government from 1932 through 1976.

Another criticism against Marshall is that his theory is evolutionist (Giddens 1982; Mann 1987), meaning that Marshall plays down the fact that citizenship rights are the results of long and arduous struggles. Citizenship rights simply did not happen as the normal course of political and economic development. If citizenship is a ruling class strategy for containing class conflict, then Mann sees the British case as one of several successful strategies. Turner (1990) argues that the development of citizenship is shaped by two key variables. The first variable concerns the driver of citizenship policies, that is, whether citizenship is developed from above (the state) or from below (the labor movement). The second variable is whether society views citizenship as active and public, or passive and private. Table 2.1 depicts a summary of the possible results from the interactions of the variables Turner identifies.

Table 2.1 Citizenship as Influenced by Turner's Variables

View of Citizenship	Driver of Citizenship	
	The State	The Labor Movement
Active-Public	Fascism	Socialism
Passive-Private	Totalitarianism	Corporatism

Turner also claims that Marshall fails to pay enough attention to the political preconditions for the development and maintenance of citizenship (Turner 1990; also Barbalet 1988). In essence, Marshall fails to develop a theory of citizenship in the multi-trajectory style popularized by Barrington Moore (1966) in his famous study of the development of modern democracy.

Citizenship in Sweden was the result of a long and arduous political struggle. Trade unions, which negotiated the Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938, in which unions renounced strike threats as an immediate bargaining tactic in exchange for the employers' commitment to adhere to negotiated wage packages, played a key role in the struggle for citizenship in Sweden. However, there are other analyses of Sweden's political development that draws attention to other actors. Citizenship in Sweden can be viewed as the result of the long-term struggle and victory of working class politics and the Social Democratic Party (Gröning 1988; Korpi 1978; 1983), as the result of corporatism (Esping-Andersen 1985; Martin 1984; Scharpf 1991), or as the result of traditional pluralism with political competition between groups possessing various levels of political power (Olsson 1993a; Baldwin 1990; Hancock 1972; Särilvik 1977). For the most part, Swedish politics past and present does seem to be one of groups competing and maneuvering to attract public and political support for their policies (Särilvik 1977; Lewin, Jansson, and Sorborm 1972; Olsson 1993a; Rustow 1955).

Organizations are critical actors in any explication of citizenship and Swedish political development because of the primacy of organizations in the Swedish political process. The remiss system, in which organizations and not

individuals dominate (Immergut 1992; Hancock 1972), characterizes the Swedish policy process. In Sweden, the bulk of the political struggles over national policy takes place in its committee and the remiss system, and not in the parliament. If proposals reach the parliament for a vote, they are usually approved. The government appoints royal commissions to investigate specific policy problems and to draft legislative proposals. The commissions then present the proposals to interest groups and government representatives for written comments, otherwise known as remiss statements. Policy disagreements are settled through the bargaining inherent in the commission and remiss process. The formation of immigrant policy in Sweden was no different. In Sweden, it is crucial for individuals to have their interests represented either by one of the political parties or by a powerful, politically adept organization. Immigrant policy often is made with ineffectual immigrant representation, because immigrant organizations have difficulty attracting powerful political allies. Powerful political allies usually include a political party, trade union, or employer association. This political reality is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.

There is less consensus regarding the role and behavior of Swedish citizens in the development of citizenship in Sweden. Individuals are crucial to Swedish politics because more than 80% of the eligible voters do vote. However, the Swedish political system provides for the articulation and representation of individual interests through parties and other recognized organizations (unions, employer associations, and professional associations). To use Turner's

terminology, citizenship in Sweden is perhaps a mixture of the active and private, meaning that Sweden falls somewhere between socialism and corporatism.

The final criticism of Marshall's thesis is that Marshall suggests that the preceding rights are somehow less advanced or less progressive than the attainment of the rights that follow (Himmelfarb 1984). For example, political rights are more important than civil rights, while social rights are more important than political rights. Marshall seems to preclude the possibility that persons may have meaningful access to social rights, but limited access to civil rights and meaningless access, (or no access at all), to political rights. In the case of immigrants, they may have access to social rights, but still lack the ability to vote and to work or live where they want (Hammar 1985b; 1990b). Furthermore, it is conceivable to view civil rights, (the freedom to contract in a free market), as the sole foundation for meaningful citizenship (Friedman 1982; Hayek 1978).

This final criticism of Marshall seems valid when applied to Sweden. In regards to the development of social rights in Sweden, many academics agree that the ideas and writings of T.H. Marshall, William Beveridge, and Richard Titmuss strongly influenced the operationalization of the welfare state and social rights in Sweden after the Second World War (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1987; Hecló 1974; Korpi 1983; Kangas 1991; Olsson 1993a; 1993b; Palme 1990). Academics and policy makers in Sweden use social policy to determine the meaningfulness of citizenship to immigrants. The prominent place of academics on the royal commissions supports this claim. Similarly, regardless of whether welfare policy decommmodify workers, better distribute the fruits of capitalism, or symbolize left

power, all three views of welfare policy emphasize the benefits of social citizenship.

Social rights as a measure of citizenship got its secure launch in the formal adoption of the Swedish Model in 1938. The Swedish Model is comprised of social democratic politics, corporatism, and the Rehn-Meidner Model. Social democratic politics is important because it allows for the development of an extensive welfare state that provides both universal and generous benefits to members of Swedish society. Unions and working class voters usually are the main supporters of social democratic politics, though some academics dispute whether the working class always supported universal welfare (Kangas 1990; Baldwin 1992). Corporatism, which normally means tripartite bargaining, for Sweden means the adoption of the Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938, which allows for centralized wage bargaining between the biggest Swedish trade union, Landsorganisationen (LO), and the Swedish Employers' Confederation, or Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen (SAF). The negotiations keep government out of wage setting and unions out of the economic management of firms. The Rehn-Meidner Model supposedly promoted wage equality without sacrificing price stability and efficiency (Meidner 1994). Through application of the Rehn-Meidner Model, Sweden was supposed to achieve high wages without igniting inflation, while also remaining competitive in an international economy.

For all practical purposes, the Swedish Model today seems very sick, if not dead. The serious weakening of the Social Democratic Party is evident in its weaker electoral performance beginning in 1976. The growth of other non-LO

unions in Sweden, (white collar and public sector unions), poses a challenge to LO's hegemony in the wage bargaining process. SAF's formal withdrawal in 1990 from all centralized wage bargaining activities and all governmental bodies not only complicated LO's wage bargaining strategy, but also exposed the factions within the LO. Finally, the Swedish government has fewer policy tools at its disposal for controlling the economy due to Sweden's abolishing capital controls, floating the kronor, and joining the European Union. All of the above attest to rendering the Swedish model inoperative.

Still, much of the institutional apparatus and social policies from the Swedish Model remains in force. The Social Democratic Party, unions, wages, and social benefits continue to constitute the central nexus of Swedish politics. If anything, the integration of immigrants in Swedish society would need to show up by their participation in the Social Democratic Party and the LO, as well as their interest in wages and social benefits.

The sketch above highlights that citizenship in Sweden has its foundation in a pluralistic conception of citizen behavior influenced by the Marshallian conception of what benefits citizens desire and come to expect. The goal of the next two sections is to present the details of citizenship as defined by social benefits and labor market policy. A review of the social benefits and labor policy reveals the options potentially at the immigrant's disposal for avoiding the typical "immigrant experience." Furthermore, social benefits and labor policy are items that arguably lend themselves to becoming political issues.

The Welfare State in Sweden

If the scope and breadth of welfare benefits give citizenship meaning, then citizenship in Sweden is very meaningful indeed. Sweden has vastly expanded social rights beyond the four traditional areas of old age, accident, sickness, and unemployment insurances. Swedish citizens enjoy access to parental insurance benefits, child allowances, child care, and housing supplements. Sweden's labor market policies and unemployment insurance programs supplement its welfare benefits. This section outlines Sweden's welfare benefits while the next section outlines Sweden's labor market and unemployment insurance programs. These descriptions do not mention the qualifying criteria or the administrative mechanics of these benefits, since the qualifying criteria and administrative mechanics are in constant flux.

Most people living in Sweden will be eligible to draw a pension upon retirement. The pension has two components: a national basic pension and a national supplementary pension, (known as ATP). The basic pension is a fixed amount payable to all residents of Sweden. To receive the full amount, one must have lived in Sweden for 40 years or have 30 years of ATP points. Reduced basic pensions are available to those who do not fulfill the above criteria. The supplementary pension is provided based on the earned income amounts that exceeded the income ceiling covered under the basic pension scheme. Consequently, the number of years worked and the amount earned determine the size of the supplementary pension.

Most persons living in Sweden receive occupational injury insurance if injured at work or on the way to or from work. The insurance also covers chronic conditions that arise from the work environment, such as skin conditions due to exposure to chemicals, or back problems due to an unsuitable working posture. A person who suffers an occupational injury that leads to full or partial disability will receive an annuity. The size of the annuity depends in part on the injured person's income, size of national basic pension, and size of ATP. Survivors receive the annuity if the occupational injury resulted in death.

Health insurance is an entitlement to all residents of Sweden. Similar to the pension scheme, the health insurance scheme has two components: a component that pays for health care costs and a component that replaces lost income due to illness. The patient pays a variable, nominal fee whenever he accesses the health care system, for example, through a visit to the doctor, district nurse, medical social worker, or hospital. Health insurance also pays for the costs of prescription medicine, again, minus a nominal customer charge. All dental care is free for everyone through the age of 19, provided that the care is obtained from a practitioner affiliated with the National Dental Service. After the age of 20, dental insurance covers the cost of treatment, with the insurance assuming a greater part of the cost, the higher the cost of the treatment. Income replacement becomes effective beginning the second day of illness. The employer pays for the first 14 days, after which the social insurance scheme assumes financial responsibility. The employer pays 75% of the wage during the second and third days of illness, which increases to 90% until the end of the 14 day period. The

social insurance office replaces 80% of lost income for one year, after which the replacement rate drops to 70%.

Parental insurance provides benefits for families with children. Pregnant women who cannot work due to the nature of their jobs and pregnancy condition receive a pregnancy allowance paid at the same income replacement rates as the health insurance benefits. Parents receive 360 days of parental leave per child. Parents need not take the leave all at once. Parents can use the leave anytime during the child's first eight years. Parents can divide the leave between themselves with the condition that 30 days are non-transferable from the father. The income replacement rate associated with parental leave is 80%. All parents receive a cash child allowance for children under 16 years of age who live in Sweden. Large families (3+ children) also receive a large family supplement. Municipalities are supposed to provide child care to those who want it. Households, regardless of household composition, might qualify for a housing allowance. The size of the household, household income, and housing costs determine the size of the housing allowance.

The array of other social benefits is vast; many of which, the county or municipality provides. Either the county, municipality, or both will provide homemaker services for the elderly. Youth services span the gamut from organized sports to, as in the case of one municipality, the dispatching of social workers late into the night to aid drunken teens who either do not have enough money to return home or are too drunk to return home without assistance.

Labor Market Policy in Sweden

Labor market policy is another enduring cornerstone of the Swedish model. The primary goal of Sweden's labor market policy to place persons in jobs in the regular labor market. An alternate goal is placing unemployed persons in labor market programs, such as courses or vocational training. Swedish labor market policy is comprehensive because of the availability of various forms of cash benefits that often accompany participation in labor market programs. To accomplish their goals, the authorities rely on a variety of programs, which can be classified into five categories: matching programs, programs to influence the labor supply, programs to influence the demand for labor, programs for the disabled, and income replacing unemployment benefits. Each is discussed in turn.

The matching programs are the establishment and operation of unemployment offices. The National Labor Market Board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen or AMS), which is the central administrative agency in charge of general labor market matters, operates employment offices in conjunction with each of the 24 county labor boards. The primary tasks of the employment office are job placement and vocational counseling. The employment office maintains a computerized listing of roughly 90% of the job vacancies in the country.

The National Labor Market Board attempts to influence the labor supply through employment training, employability institutes, and relocation grants. The county labor boards or employment offices buy courses for the unemployed from various public and private providers. The National Labor Market Board

purchases courses based on labor market needs and knowledge of which types of persons cannot find work. Those who enroll in these courses often receive grants or loans to cover living expenses. Employability institutes help job seekers who need occupational rehabilitation or in-depth counseling. The cash benefits that are available to persons in employment training programs are available to those in the employability institutes. Relocation grants cover the job interviewing and relocation costs of finding a job far away from one's home.

The purpose of labor demand programs is to maintain the demand for labor during periods of low labor demand. Labor demand programs can also provide workplace experience that might prove useful for the unemployed to secure a job in the regular labor market. Labor demand programs include relief jobs in the public sector, contracted workplace introduction jobs, recruitment subsidies for private enterprise, youth traineeships, start-up grants, in-house employment training grants paid to private enterprises who provide training courses for employees during periods of low labor demand, educational leave replacements for those who temporarily leave their jobs for educational programs, and payroll fees reduction grants to firms where there exists a net increase in the number of employees from their October 1, 1993 figures.

Sweden's labor market policy emphasizes the employment of the disabled whenever possible, while compensating employers for the extra expenses involved in hiring disabled persons. Private and public sector employers who hire the disabled receive wage subsidies. The government also subsidizes the costs of buying the equipment needed at the workplace in order for the disabled person to

perform the job. Finally, the government itself operates a company, Samhall AB, which provides jobs to the disabled.

The unemployed can receive cash benefits under two systems. The larger system is the voluntary unemployment insurance based on membership in one of the 42 societies that administer unemployment insurance funds. These funds are ordinarily affiliated with a trade union, but financed through employer payroll fees. Voluntary unemployment insurance covers around 83% of the labor force. These benefits provide an 80% income replacement rate with a maximum of 564 kronors per day for 300 days. Those who do not have society based unemployment insurance can receive cash labor market assistance at 245 kronors per day for a maximum of 150 days. If an unemployed person is ineligible for either the voluntary unemployment benefit or the cash labor market assistance, then the municipality's cash assistance benefit, ('socialbidrag' in Sweden, 'welfare' in the United States) is available.

Postwar History of Immigration to Sweden

Sweden's status as a country of immigration is essentially a postwar phenomenon. Before the end of the First World War, Sweden was a country of emigration. For example, from the end of the 19th century up to the 1920s, roughly one fifth of Sweden's population emigrated, mostly to North America (Lithman 1987). As late as 1930, the number of people leaving Sweden was greater than the number of people immigrating to Sweden (*Historisk Statistik För Sverige* 1955; Hammar 1985b). The only years between 1875 and 1929 during which more people immigrated to Sweden than emigrated from Sweden were

1918, 1919, and 1920 (*Historisk Statistik För Sverige*). Before the 1930's, Sweden had an immigration policy similar to many other countries. Sweden admitted the persons or groups that it either needed or wanted, but kept out the rest (Hammar 1985b).

Sweden's first significant increase of postwar immigration consisted of citizens from the other Nordic countries. After the Second World War, the Swedish economy experienced a labor shortage, which prompted the Swedish government to institute a relatively liberal immigration policy. The culmination of the policy liberalization in the immediate postwar period was the Nordic labor market agreement that Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden signed in 1954. The Nordic labor market agreement gave Nordic citizens the freedom to seek work and residence in any Nordic country. For Sweden, the common labor market resulted in an influx of Finns.

Yet the labor shortage continued. Therefore, starting from the middle of the 1960s, Sweden encouraged immigration from Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. For example, Sweden negotiated with Turkey in 1967 an immigration agreement allowing Turkish citizens to take advantage of Sweden's labor shortage. Immigration associated with the postwar economic expansion reached its zenith in 1969 and 1970. As the expansion stalled, so did the need for foreign labor.


Despite Sweden's terminating agreements that allowed for the recruitment and immigration of foreign workers in 1972, family and refugee entry contributed to increasing the levels of immigration to Sweden. Wars, military activity, and

civil unrest have increased immigration from countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Ethiopia, and Somalia. In 1992, 84,000 people requested asylum, which was a marked increase over the 26,500 requests the previous year, (*Immigrant and Refugee Policy* 1993). The graphs below depict a better historical picture of immigration to Sweden.

Graphs 2.1-2.5 highlight some important aspects about immigration to Sweden since 1967. Graph 2.1 shows that even though Sweden encouraged non-Nordic immigration in 1967, the bulk of immigrants coming to Sweden before 1978 still came from the Nordic countries. In 1970, 40,000 of the Nordic immigrants to Sweden came from Finland alone (Lithman 1987). Starting in 1978, the character of immigration to Sweden changed. Non-Nordic immigrants became a significant component of immigration to Sweden. Graph 2.2 shows that citizens of other Nordic countries contributed heavily to the outflow of immigrants from Sweden. Graph 2.3 depicts the fluctuations in net migration to Sweden. From the graph, it is easy to see the contrasts between the fluctuating net migration of residents from other Nordic countries and the steadily increasing numbers of non-Nordic immigrants. Non-Nordic immigration erased any possible reduction in non-Nordic citizens that might ensue from return migration. Family reunion initially fueled the increase in immigration after Sweden's termination of the labor agreements with the non-Nordic countries, but refugees became the leading contributor to increased immigration. For example, in 1986, appropriately half of all immigrants to Sweden were refugees, a quarter came from the Nordic countries, and a quarter were non-Nordic immigrants coming to


Sweden for family reunion (Lithman 1987). Graphs 2.4 and 2.5 provide a detailed look at the migration patterns of Finnish and Turkish immigrants. Graph 2.4 highlights the fluid migration patterns of Finns. Turks tend to settle permanently in Sweden (Graph 2.5).

Graph 2.1 Percentage Nordic/Non-Nordic Immigrants to Sweden




Sources:
Svensk Invandrar Politik
Invandrar och Flyktingpolitiken
Immigrant and Refugee Policy

Graph 2.2 Percentage Nordic/Non-Nordic Emigrants from Sweden




Sources:
Svensk Invandrar Politik
Invandrar och Flyktingpolitiken
Immigrant and Refugee Policy

Graph 2.3 Net Migration to Sweden (1996-1994)




Sources:
Svensk Invandrar Politik
Invandrar och Flyktingpolitiken
Immigrant and Refugee Policy

Graph 2.4 Net Migration of Finns to Sweden (1969-1994)



Source:
Statistical Yearbook of Sweden

Graph 2.5 Net Migration of Turks to Sweden (1969-1994)




Source:
Statistical Yearbook of Sweden

Non-Nordic immigrants in Sweden tend to naturalize, that is, to adopt Swedish citizenship. Sweden's 4.27% naturalization rate in 1988 is high when compared to other West European countries, for example, Switzerland's 0.76% naturalization rate in 1987, the Netherlands' 1.65% naturalization rate in 1988, and (West) Germany's 0.5% naturalization rate in 1986 (Reinans and Hammar). While data on the number of naturalized foreign citizens per year is easily available, data that tracks the naturalization rates of immigrants by cohort group, (ethnicity and time of arrival), is not available. Instead, Graph 2.6 depicts the yearly naturalization rate calculated by dividing the number of naturalizations by the number of foreign residents. Graphs 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 confirm the declining role Finnish naturalizations plays in the composition of immigrant naturalization in Sweden. On the other hand, Yugoslav nationals represented a growing proportion of naturalizations in the 1990's.


As of 1993, Sweden had a total population of 8,745,109 persons, of which 8,237,569 (94.2%) were Swedish citizens and 507,540 (5.8%) were foreign citizens. In 1993, only 7,776,937 persons (88.9%) of the population in Sweden were born in Sweden, while 968,172 persons (11.07%) were born outside Sweden. Graph 2.9 presents a historic depiction of these trends in Sweden. The percentage of foreign citizens in the total population of Sweden has remained relatively constant while the percentage of foreign born persons in the total population has steadily increased.

Graph 2.6 Naturalization in Sweden (by major immigrant groups)




Source:
Statistical Yearbook of Sweden

Graph 2.7 Naturalizations in Sweden (by major immigrant groups)




Source:
Statistical Yearbook of Sweden

Graph 2.8 Composite of Naturalizations in Sweden (by select immigrant groups)




Source:
Statistical Yearbook of Sweden

**Graph 2.9 Foreign Citizens and Foreign Born in Sweden
(as a total percentage of the population)**




Graph 2.10 Foreign Citizens as a % of Total Population in Sweden



Source: *Statistical Yearbook of Sweden*

Graph 2.11 Foreign Born Persons as a % of Total Population in Sweden



Source:
Statistical Yearbook of Sweden

Though the percentage of foreign citizens in the total population has remained relatively constant, immigrants in Sweden have become more heterogeneous. In Graph 2.10, there is a steady decline of Finnish citizens in Sweden's immigrant population. Moreover, the percentage of citizens from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and Iran all seemed to have peaked and declined as a proportion of foreign citizens in Sweden. Of course, a possible explanation for this occurrence is that these groups naturalize at higher levels than other immigrant groups. Graph 2.8 clearly depicts the increasing naturalization rates in the 1990's for Turks and Yugoslavs. Graph 2.11, which focuses on the percentage of foreign born persons in the total population of foreign persons in Sweden, depicts the same trends as Graph 2.10 for persons born in Finland, Turkey, and Iran. Unlike Finns, both the Turkish and Yugoslavian populations may have stabilized since the migration patterns of these groups do not resemble the fluid pattern of Finns. In other words, the increase in Turks and Yugoslavians in Graphs 2.10 and 2.11 is just enough to stabilize their proportions in the growing immigrant population.

Demographic presentations of the ten largest immigrant groups from 1989 through 1994 follows. Table 2.2 presents the immigrant groups by rank, while Table 2.3 presents each immigrant group by the percentage of the population it represents of the ten largest immigrant groups.

The information presented in this section supports three basic conclusions. The first conclusion is that migration to Sweden has increased dramatically. However, the migration patterns of Nordic immigrants, Finns in particular,

account for the cyclical nature of migration to and from Sweden. Though immigrants from Denmark and Norway represent stable proportions of the immigrant community in Sweden, the Finnish community is shrinking as a proportion of the immigrant population. Still, the second conclusion is that despite their decreasing numbers, immigrants from the Nordic countries represent the overwhelming majority of immigrants in Sweden, a significant 46.4% in 1994. Nordic immigrants represent a significant proportion of immigrants in Sweden because of their falling naturalization rates. The third conclusion is that immigrants to Sweden tend to naturalize. This conclusion stands because although both immigration and the percentage of foreign born persons in Sweden have increased, the percentage of foreign citizens in the population has remained relatively constant. Furthermore, in comparison to other West European countries, Sweden's naturalization rate is high.

Table 2.2 Largest Foreign Citizen Groups in Sweden (1989-1994)
Country of Origin Ranking by Year

	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>
Finland	1	1	1	1	1	1
Yugoslavia	2	2	2	2	4	3
Iran	3	3	3	3	2	5
Norway	4	4	4	4	3	4
Denmark	5	5	5	5	5	6
Turkey	6	6	6	6	6	7
Chile	7	7	7	7	10	10
Poland	8	8	8	8	9	9
Germany	9	9	9	9	---	---
United Kingdom	10	10	10	---	---	---
Iraq	---	---	---	10	8	8
Bosnia-Hercegovia	---	---	---	---	7	2

Source: *Befolkningsstatistik*

Table 2.3 Largest Foreign Citizen Groups in Sweden (1989-1994)
Country of Origin Percentage Population by Top Ten by Year

	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>
Finland	36.3	34.1	33.3	32.9	32.9	29.8
Yugoslavia	11.6	11.7	11.8	11.7	9.8	11.3
Iran	10.3	11.1	11.6	11.5	10.9	9.1
Norway	10.3	10.9	10.6	10.4	10.2	9.2
Denmark	8.2	8.2	8.1	8.0	8.0	7.4
Turkey	7.1	7.3	7.6	7.8	7.1	6.1
Chile	5.6	5.7	5.5	5.3	4.8	3.9
Poland	4.3	4.5	4.7	4.8	4.9	4.5
Germany	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.8	---	---
United Kingdom	2.8	2.9	3.0	---	---	---
Iraq	---	---	---	3.7	4.9	5.3
Bosnia-Hercegovia	---	---	---	---	6.4	13.3

Source: *Befolkningsstatistik*

Immigrant Policy in Sweden

People who immigrated to Sweden before the middle 1960's sometimes express an envy of those who immigrated later because before the mid-1960's, the Swedish government undertook no special measures to help immigrants adjust to life in Sweden (Hammar 1985b). Immigrants who came before the mid-1960's were expected to find jobs or return home after an unsuccessful job search. The majority of Nordic immigrants in fact behaved this way. However, when the Swedish government encouraged non-Nordic immigration, the Swedish government quickly realized and accepted that non-Nordic immigrants would be living in Sweden permanently. A number of factors helped the government to arrive to this conclusion. By 1973, the differences between the migration patterns of Nordic and non-Nordic immigrants were already evident. Citizens of Nordic countries enjoyed similar unemployment, health, and income support benefits in their native countries in the event that their Swedish benefits were not portable. Non-Nordic citizens usually did not have the same benefits in their native countries. Even though the Swedish government had hoped that unemployed immigrants would return home, the government refused to forcibly repatriate unemployed immigrants.

The Swedish government took numerous steps in response to the permanent settlement of non-Nordic immigrants. Prompted by trade union concerns of labor market segmentation and of the economic and social consequences of immigration, the government through the revised Aliens Act of 1968 required non-Nordic citizens to possess working permits before entering the

country (Lithman 1987). In 1968, the government formed the Parliamentary Commission on Immigration in order to examine the situation of immigrants in Sweden. The commission's preliminary recommendations called for providing interpreting services for immigrants and for establishing a statutory right for employed immigrants to receive Swedish language instruction. But the commission did not stop there. The commission packaged its final recommendations into an immigrant policy bill that was eventually introduced into Parliament in 1975. This bill defines Sweden's current immigrant policy.

The bill proposed an immigrant policy based on three principles: equality, freedom of choice, and partnership. Equality translates to providing immigrants with the same living standards as Swedes. The Swedish government introduced measures to insure that immigrants had equal access to employment, social benefits, housing, and education. In 1986 the government passed the Act Against Ethnic Discrimination, which appointed an Ombudsman Against Ethnic Discrimination. The Parliament strengthened the powers of the Discrimination Ombudsman in 1994.

Freedom of choice allows immigrants to decide about retaining their own cultural identity or assuming a Swedish cultural identity. To promote freedom of choice, the government provides mother-tongue classes for immigrant children, information services for immigrants, and grants to support immigrant organizations. Some scholars view the government's support of immigrant organizations as "prescribed multiculturalism" ultimately designed to facilitate the political co-optation and control of these groups, (Ålund and Schierup 1991). The

Swedish government decides which are the legitimate national and ethnic identities and which associations are their representatives. For example, the Swedish National Board of Immigration managed to persuade several competing Kurdish associations to merge into one association so that it would be eligible for the status of 'national alliance' and the annual government subsidy.

Partnership implies that both immigrants and Swedes can benefit from working together. The extension of voting rights on the county and municipal levels to immigrants, the right of immigrants to run for and hold local offices after three years of residence in Sweden, the participation of immigrants in official consultative bodies like the Immigrants' Council, and the provision of multilingual services by trade unions are the policy manifestations of partnership. Parliament approved in 1975 the bill allowing immigrants to vote. Immigrants first exercised their new voting right in 1976. Sweden was one of the first and few European countries to grant foreign residents the right to vote and hold office on the local level. Ireland (1973), Denmark (1981), Norway (1983), and The Netherlands (1983) are the only other European countries that permit immigrants to vote on the local level (Soysal 1994).

The government does not recognize minority group rights per se. The government's immigrant policy assumes that minority groups likely will not endure as cohesive communities over several generations; that is, immigrant groups likely will integrate into the Swedish society. Towards this end, Swedish naturalization law is fairly liberal, designed to facilitate immigrant naturalization. Non-Nordic immigrants can become Swedish citizens after five years, (four years

for refugees), of residence in Sweden. Immigrants from other Nordic countries can become Swedish citizens after two years of residency. Children born to foreign residents can obtain Swedish citizenship upon individual application, or simultaneously with their parents' naturalization. Sweden officially does not permit dual citizenship. Immigrants who become Swedish citizens must relinquish their previous citizenship. In practice, the Swedish authorities will grant citizenship to immigrants from countries that refuse to release immigrants from citizenship or in situations where formally renouncing citizenship is not feasible, for example, as is the case for refugees fleeing a civil war.

Conclusion

Sweden's immigrant policy strives to incorporate immigrants into Swedish society by giving them access to all the rights available to Swedish citizens save the right to vote and hold office on the national level. Not content with extending civil, political, and social rights to immigrants, the Swedish government also tries to encourage immigrants to participate in the body politic, whether it is through political parties, unions, or through their representative immigrant organizations.

In light of such a concerted government effort, one might predict that immigrants who have resided for some time in Sweden should exhibit economic, social, and political patterns similar to those of native Swedes. If immigrants do not exhibit the same patterns as native Swedes, then immigrants' economic, social, and political patterns at least should be converging towards that of native Swedes. If the economic, social, and political patterns for immigrants as a whole do not show convergence towards those of native Swedes, then at least the

patterns of the second and third generation immigrants should exhibit convergence.

Chapters Three, Four, and Five present empirical data in an attempt to provide answers to these expectations. The empirical data also may provide clues regarding the roles of politics, parties, unions, wages, and social benefits in the lives of immigrants. Finally, the empirical data may provide clues regarding the roles that citizenship and associations play in structuring the lives of immigrants.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN SWEDEN

The last chapter outlined the practical implementation of citizenship rights in Sweden for both the citizen and the immigrant. This chapter presents empirical data on the immigrant experience in the Swedish economy. The economic patterns of foreign citizens are compared with those of Swedish citizens and native Swedes. Migrants to Sweden were initially recruited to take jobs in the sectors of the economy where native Swedes did not want to work at the prevailing wage. Therefore immigrants should be over-represented in low paying, unattractive jobs. If the sectors where immigrants find work experience an economic downturn, then immigrants in these sectors should experience greater unemployment than the entire Swedish population at large. In summary, these expected economic patterns for immigrants exist in Sweden.

The economic patterns of immigrants in Sweden resemble those of immigrants in most other countries (Widgren 1982a). They experience higher levels of unemployment and lower levels of official labor force participation. Immigrants also tend to find employment in the less desirable or lower paid jobs in the manufacturing, public, and service (cleaning, hotel, and restaurant) sectors of the economy. This chapter presents data on immigrant unemployment, labor force participation, and sectors of employment respectively. Most of the chapter's focus is on immigrant employment patterns in Sweden, and in the Stockholm area in particular. Because of this focus, it is important now to

mention briefly the general dispersion of immigrants in Stockholm county. Chapter Four contains a full treatment of the subject.

Immigrants in Stockholm: An Overview

Immigrants tend to live in the metropolitan areas. In 1994, 54% of all immigrants in Sweden lived in Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö counties (*Statistisk Årsbok för Sverige*). In 1993, Stockholm contained 19.3% of the Sweden's entire population (*Statistisk Årsbok för Stockholm*), but around 33% of the country's immigrant population (*Statistisk Årsbok för Sverige*).

Within the metropolitan counties, immigrants are concentrated within particular municipalities. In Stockholm county, immigrants are unevenly interspersed across its twenty-five municipalities. Botkyrka has the highest proportion of immigrants in its population, 34.06% (*Års Statistisk För Stockholms Län och Landsting*). In four municipalities other than Botkyrka, (Södertälje, Huddinge, Upplands-Väsby, and Solna), immigrants represent more than twenty percent of the population, 23.61%, 21.45%, 21.19%, and 20.74% respectively (*Års Statistisk För Stockholms Län och Landsting*). As in the county, so is it in the city of Stockholm itself; that is, immigrants are concentrated in certain districts of the city. Rinkeby, Kista, and Spånga are the three city districts with the highest immigrant concentrations, 73.3%, 40.3%, and 40.2% respectively (*Statistisk Årsbok för Stockholm*).

Immigrants in Sweden: Unemployment

Immigrants experience higher levels of unemployment than Swedes. The unemployment rate for immigrants is at least twice the national rate. In the late


seventies, the unemployment rate in Sweden was 2%, but 5% of foreigners were unemployed (Widgren 1982a). Between 1980-1985, only 37.0% of foreigners had gainful employment, while 32.9% were neither in full-year nor full-time employment (Vogel, Andersson, Davidsson and Häll 1988, 444). More recent data suggests that the situation for immigrants has become worse. From the second half of 1992 to the end of the first half of 1993, the unemployment rate for Iranians increased from 34.6% to 49.6%, for Africans from 37.5% to 51.8%, and for Arabic speaking immigrants from 42.5% to 45.8% (*Dagens Nyheter* October 12, 1993). In 1994, foreign citizens comprised 4% of the employed, 5% of the labor force, but 13% of the unemployed in Sweden (SOU 95:76).

The immigrants' local employment condition reflected the national situation, the only difference being that the immigrants' urban concentration made the situation more visible. The unemployment rates in Rinkeby in 1991, 1992, and 1993 were 4.9%, 7.6%, and 10.0% respectively (*Statistisk Årsbok för Stockholm*). These figures were higher than the national unemployment rates of 2.7%, 4.8%, and 8.2% respectively (*Arbetskraftsundersökningen*). The unemployment rates in Rinkeby in 1991, 1992, and 1993 also were greater than the unemployment rates for native Swedes during the same time period. Although the unemployment figures for Rinkeby are higher than the national rates, Rinkeby's unemployment is partially buffered because Rinkeby's residents are heavily dependent on public sector jobs for employment. Fortunate for Rinkeby, it is located in Stockholm county, Sweden's largest metropolitan area with the lion's share of the nation's public sector jobs.

Newspapers, academics, and various statistical offices were not the only ones concerned by declining immigrant employment; various government authorities also noted and expressed concern about immigrant unemployment. The Labor Market Department increasingly released reports highlighting the deterioration of immigrant employment (Ds 1990:34; Ds 1990:35; Ds 1994:108), as did the Finance Department (Ds 1995:68). The Swedish Parliament also considered reports created specifically for its review (SOU 95:39; SOU 95:76). The Labor Market Board, whose responsibility is to implement national labor market policy, released a report focusing on the weak labor market for non-Nordic citizens in Sweden (Ura 1996:2).

The three previous paragraphs contained a general overview of the immigrant employment situation in Sweden. The next few paragraphs contain a more systematic examination, first on the national level, followed by the Stockholm county level, then municipalities in the county, and ending with an examination of unemployment within the three city districts in Stockholm with the highest proportions of immigrants.

On the national level, immigrants are more unemployed than Swedes. Graph 3.1 highlights the differences between the unemployment rate for the entire country and that faced by immigrants in Sweden. At every point is the immigrant unemployment rate higher than that of the nation. The gap between the unemployment rates for immigrants and for the entire population in Sweden widened dramatically in the 1990s.



Source: *Arbetskraftsundersökningen* (AKU)

In addition to the disparity between the national and immigrant unemployment rates, different immigrants experience unemployment differently. Statistically speaking, male immigrants who were naturalized and lived in Sweden a long time fared the best, both in employment and in income (Ekberg and Gustafsson 1995; SOU 95:76). In 1987, male immigrants who were naturalized were more employed than those who retained their foreign citizenship (Ds 1990:35). More recent data suggests that the general situation remains unchanged (Ds 1994:108; Ekberg and Gustafsson; SOU 95:76). However the unemployment of the 1990s has made securing steady, full time employment difficult for naturalized citizens also (Ura 1996:2). In 1987, immigrants with a longer sojourn in Sweden were more likely to be employed than newer immigrants (Ds 1990:35). This situation remains unchanged (Ekberg and Gustafsson; SOU 95:76; Ura 1996:2). (See Table 3.1.)

Swedish persons born as Swedish citizens make the most money, followed by foreign-born Swedish citizens, while foreign citizens born abroad made the least money (SOU 95:76). In 1990, a foreign born male needed to have lived in Sweden for more than 23 years in order to earn more income than a Swedish born male, while a foreign born female needed to have lived in Sweden only 10 years in order to earn the same wage as her Swedish born counterpart (Ekberg and Gustafsson; SOU 95:76). One possible reason for female immigrants' needing less time to earn as much as their Swedish counterparts is that the majority of all women in Sweden find jobs in the public sector where adherence to wage agreements is enforced and wage drift avoided (Ds 1990:35). Persons born in Sweden not only make more money than their counterparts born outside of Sweden, but since 1983 the earnings gap between the two widened (Ekberg and Gustafsson).

Table 3.1 Unemployment Rate for Foreign Born Persons
Ages 16-64 by Immigration Year

Immigration Year	1987		1992	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
- 1969	1.9	3.3	8	6
1970 - 1979	4.6	3.0	8	5
1980 - 1983	6.2	9.0	13	10
1984 - 1987	9.6	13.6	18	13
1988 - 1992	-----	-----	25	27
Total Foreign Born	3.6	3.8	12	8
All Sweden	1.9	1.9	5	4

Source: Ds 1990:35 and SOU 95:76

Note: The sources do not use the same calculation methodology, but the information presented does not differ from that contain in Graph 3.1. Therefore the point regarding time of sojourn and unemployment remains valid.

Young persons encounter the greatest difficulty in finding suitable employment (SOU 1995:39). Persons, (Swedish and foreign citizens), ages 15 through 24 have fared the worst during Sweden's recent experience with rising unemployment. (See Table 3.2.) The figures in Table 3.2 are for the entire country, which imply that the situation for immigrant youth is assuredly far worse. Despite unemployment being much higher for the 18-24 age group, non-Nordic citizens within that age group are less likely than their Swedish counterparts to use the employment office (Ura 1996:2). However, the non-Nordic unemployed between ages 25-44 are more likely to use the employment office in their job search than their Swedish counterparts. These differences in employment office utilization suggests that citizens and immigrants as well as different age groups do not look for employment in the same ways.

Table 3.2 Percent Unemployed, by age

	National	Percent Unemployed, by age group				
	<u>Rate</u>	<u>16-19</u>	<u>20-24</u>	<u>25-44</u>	<u>45-54</u>	<u>55-64</u>
1980	2.0	7.6	3.7	1.5	1.0	1.6
1985	2.8	4.6	6.3	2.1	1.6	4.0
1989	1.4	3.5	3.0	1.3	0.7	1.3
1990	1.5	5.0	3.1	1.4	0.8	1.5
1991	2.7	7.6	6.2	2.8	1.4	2.1
1992	4.8	11.3	11.5	5.4	2.6	3.2
1993	8.2	19.4	18.1	8.3	4.5	5.5
1994	8.0	16.6	16.8	8.1	4.5	6.5
1995	7.7	14.0	15.7	7.8	4.4	7.4

Source: *Arbetskraftsundersökningen* (AKU)

Young and second generation immigrants also face declining relative wages. Though immigrant men in 1978 made 91.2% of the wage earned by native Swedish men, this percentage fell to 73.2% by 1990 (Ekberg and

Gustafsson). For immigrant women during the same time period, their wages fell from 103.4% of the wage earned by native Swedish women to 81.1% (Ekberg and Gustafsson). It is important to note that the earning declines occurred before the sharp increase in unemployment in Sweden beginning in the second half of 1991. The reduction in immigrant earning potential did not affect all immigrant groups equally. Some immigrant groups saw a dramatic fall in their earning power in comparison to others.

Immigrants are generally overqualified for the lower paying jobs that they hold (Ekberg and Gustafsson; Widgren 1982a), but this situation does not always apply across all immigrant age groups. If the Volvo Torslanda factory is any indication of the differences between age cohorts, then Swedish and immigrant men over thirty were more likely to possess a job commensurate with their education, but Swedes and immigrants of both sexes under thirty were much less likely to possess a job commensurate with their educational backgrounds (Paulson, Schierup and Ålund 1994). The situation is essentially the same for those with professional training, though some exceptions exist; for example, Finnish men under thirty with professional training were more likely to possess a job commensurate with their education (Paulson, Schierup and Ålund).

The Volvo Torslanda example highlights another obstacle that many immigrants face, mainly the diminishing financial rewards of higher education. Highly educated immigrants encounter slightly better employment opportunities than less educated ones, but in either case, immigrants of all education levels experience more unemployment than native Swedes with similar educational

attainment levels. For example, between 1975 and 1995, 12.4% of persons in Sweden with some, but less than three years of post-secondary education, were unemployed. The figure was 16.3%, a 3.9% difference, for immigrants with the same educational attainment levels (*Välfärd och ojämlikhet i 20 årsperspektiv, 1975-1995*). Between 1975-1995, 7.0% of all persons in Sweden with more than three years of post-secondary education were unemployed, but the figure was 12.6%, a 5.6% difference, for immigrants with the same educational attainment levels (*Välfärd och ojämlikhet i 20 årsperspektiv, 1975-1995*). Immigrant academics, for example, receive less pay than similarly trained Swedes; and they are more likely to work in fields unrelated to their training (Ekberg and Gustafsson). This is true regardless if the immigrant acquired the credentials, (academic or otherwise), from abroad or in Sweden (Ålund and Schierup). Still, young immigrants understand the need for educational preparation and job training as evidenced by their increasing enrollment in education and job training schemes. Moreover, the local labor market boards have given non-Nordic immigrants top priority for admittance into their labor market programs (Ura 1996:2).

Different ethnic groups experience unemployment differently. Graphs 3.2 through 3.5 illustrate the unemployment experiences of four immigrant groups: Finns, Turks, Yugoslavs, and Iranians. Finnish immigrants, (Graph 3.2), experience higher levels of unemployment than the national rate, but their unemployment levels have consistently been much less than those experienced by immigrants as a whole. With the exception of 1989, Finnish women were more

employed than Finnish men. Regarding income levels, in 1978 Finnish men earned 87.8% of the amount of Swedish men born in Sweden. This percentage fell to 83.3% in 1990 (Ekberg and Gustafsson). In 1978, Finnish women earned 106.8% of the amount of their native Swedish counterparts. This percentage fell to 98.5% in 1990 (Ekberg and Gustafsson).


On the other hand, Turks, (Graph 3.3), have experienced unemployment at higher levels than both the national and immigrant rates, with 1990 being an exception. Turkish men are more unemployed than Turkish women, again with 1990 being an exception. Turkish citizens endured a near collapse in their earning power. Earnings for Turkish men dropped from 63.6% of what native Swedes earned in 1978 to 39.1% by 1990: only the newly arrived Iranians did worse in 1990 at 37.2% (Ekberg and Gustafsson). The decline for Turkish women was even more severe, from 67.5% in 1978 to 34.6% in 1990 (Ekberg and Gustafsson). It is unclear why the length of stay in Sweden for Turkish citizens does not appear to be an effective buffer against earnings erosion. Finally, at no time between 1978-1990, regardless of the year of immigration, did male citizens from Middle Eastern countries earn what their Swedish counterparts earned, though men who arrived between 1968-1970 were able consistently to earn more than 80% of the wage of the native Swede. Turkish women who immigrated between 1968-1970 were able to earn 100% of the wage of native Swedish women twice during the 1978-1990 period (Ekberg and Gustafsson).

The experience of Yugoslavian immigrants is strikingly different (See Graph 3.4.) Between 1987-1990, the unemployment rate for Yugoslavs was less

than the unemployment rate for immigrants. In fact, in 1989, the unemployment rate for Yugoslavian immigrants was lower than the national rate. Starting in 1991, the situation for Yugoslavian immigrants changed dramatically. With the exception of 1993, Yugoslavian immigrants experienced unemployment at levels higher than the rate for immigrants. In 1990, Yugoslavian men earned 64.8% of the wage of native Swedish men, (a drop from 80.2% in 1978), while Yugoslavian women earned 67.0% of the wage earned by native Swedish women, which represented a 42.3 percentage point drop from the 1978 level of 109.3% (Ekberg and Gustafsson).


Iranians, being more recent immigrants, predictably have higher unemployment rates. (See Graph 3.5.) Data on the unemployment rates for Iranians has been available starting from 1991. The unemployment rate for Iranians was always at least four times the national rate and always at least twice the rate for immigrants. With the exception of 1991, Iranian women were more unemployed than Iranian men.

Graph 3.2 Finnish Unemployment Rate in Sweden (1987-1994)




Source: *Arbetskraftsundersökningen (AKU)*


Graph 3.3 Turkish Unemployment Rate in Sweden (1987-1994)



Source: *Arbetskraftsundersökningen (AKU)*



Source: *Arbetskraftsundersökningen (AKU)*



Source: *Arbetskraftsundersökningen (AKU)*

Though the traditional situation of Stockholm county having lower unemployment than the rest of the country remained intact from 1979 to 1993 (*Års Statistisk För Stockholms Län och Landsting; Arbetskraftsundersökningen*), the municipalities in Stockholm county with the highest percentages of immigrants in their populations also had the highest unemployment rates, with Norrtälje being the major exception. Table 3.3 depicts the unemployment rates

for each municipality in Stockholm county from 1979-1993. Since the Stockholm Office for Research and Statistics provides data on the absolute numbers of persons and foreign citizens looking for work, it is possible to calculate what percentage of the general unemployment rate consists of foreign citizens looking for work. This is shown in Table 3.4. Foreign citizens contribute disproportionately to the unemployment rates in both the county and the city of Stockholm. One interesting point of note is that during Sweden's most recent bout with unemployment, the proportion of foreign citizens contributing to the unemployment figures decreased, meaning that many Swedish citizens lost their jobs.

Table 3.3 Unemployment Rates by Municipality within Stockholm County

Municipality	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Botkyrka	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.4	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	1.9	3.9	6.4
Danderyd	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.7	1.8	3.1
Ekerö	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.9	2.4	4.0
Haninge	1.2	1.0	1.3	1.8	1.8	1.5	1.1	0.9	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.6	3.6	6.2
Huddinge	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.3	1.4	1.2	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.6	1.5	3.7	5.9
Jarfalla	0.9	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.3	1.3	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.7	1.7	3.5	5.3
Lidingö	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.9	2.4	4.1
Nacka	0.7	0.7	0.9	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.0	1.1	1.1	0.8	0.6	0.6	1.4	3.6	5.4
Norrtälje	1.4	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.6	1.6	1.3	1.0	0.6	0.7	1.7	4.2	7.2
Nynashamn	1.4	1.1	1.2	1.6	1.9	1.3	1.3	1.2	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.7	3.8	5.4
Salem	*****	*****	*****	*****	*****	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	1.4	2.9	4.6
Sigtuna	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.1	0.8	0.5	0.6	1.6	3.4	6.0
Sollentuna	0.7	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.2	2.9	4.5
Solna	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.5	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.8	1.8	4.2	6.3
Stockholm	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.2	0.9	1.0	2.1	4.2	6.5
Sundbyberg	0.9	0.9	1.2	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.8	2.0	4.7	7.1
Södertälje	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.7	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.2	1.9	1.5	1.3	1.1	2.6	4.7	7.3
Tyreso	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.7	1.6	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.4	0.5	1.4	3.3	5.2
Taby	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.4	1.2	2.9	4.4
Upplands-Bro	0.9	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.3	1.2	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.9	4.3	7.2
Upplands-Vasby	0.7	0.6	0.8	1.2	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.6	1.5	3.4	5.9
Vallentuna	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.6	1.4	3.7	4.7
Vaxholm	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.8	1.3	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.4	1.2	2.7	4.7
Värmdö	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.0	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.4	0.6	1.5	3.6	5.7
Osteröker	*****	*****	*****	*****	*****	1.2	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.5	1.3	3.1	5.4
County	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.8	1.8	3.8	6.1
Sweden	2.1	2.0	2.5	3.2	3.5	3.1	2.8	2.2	1.9	1.6	1.4	1.5	2.7	4.8	8.2

Source:
*Års Statistisk För Stockholms Län och Landsting
 Arbetskraftsundersökningen*

Table 3.4 Unemployment Rates in Sweden, Stockholm County, and Stockholm City and the Percentage of the County's and City's Unemployment Rate Represented by Foreign Citizens

Year	National	Stockholm County		Stockholm City	
		County	Foreign	City	Foreign
1979	2.1	1.2	27.8	1.3	25.2
1980	2.0	1.1	28.5	1.1	26.2
1981	2.5	1.2	26.2	1.2	23.3
1982	3.2	1.4	24.2	1.3	21.6
1983	3.5	1.8	23.3	1.8	21.1
1984	3.1	1.7	23.2	1.6	21.8
1985	2.8	1.5	20.8	1.6	19.4
1986	2.2	1.2	18.6	1.4	17.4
1987	1.9	1.0	17.7	1.2	16.3
1988	1.6	1.0	19.5	1.0	18.0
1989	1.4	0.7	22.7	0.8	18.3
1990	1.5	0.8	24.6	0.9	23.8
1991	2.7	2.1	27.0	2.3	21.1
1992	4.8	4.4	17.5	4.5	17.8
1993	8.2	6.7	17.6	6.8	17.9
1994	8.0	6.6	17.2	7.1	17.7

Source: *Arbetskraftsundersökningen; Statistisk Årsbok för Stockholm*

Unemployment is more prevalent in the immigrant communities within the city of Stockholm. Table 3.5 depicts this clearly. What Table 3.5 does not highlight is the continued fall in income in the areas where immigrants are heavily concentrated. Table 3.6 shows not only the median income of the 20 poorest areas in Stockholm county, but also the percentage change in income from 1991 to 1993. Immigrants are over-represented in all 20 areas in Table 3.6. Clearly, immigrants living in these areas face a weakened earnings potential. The areas in Table 3.6 are commonly acknowledged by city residents as the immigrant districts. Stockholm residents commonly refer to Rinkeby and Fittja as ghettos. Turks comprise a significant portion of the population in Rinkeby and Fittja.

Table 3.7 contains median income information and percent change in income from 1991 to 1993 for the 20 richest districts in the county.

Table 3.5 Unemployment Rates of Stockholm Districts Where Immigrants are Heavily Concentrated

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Rinkeby	2.4	3.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.7	4.9	7.6	10.0	9.9
Kista	1.3	1.7	1.2	1.8	1.5	1.5	3.2	5.3	9.1	9.5
Spånga	1.7	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3	3.0	4.8	8.5	8.1
Stockholm	1.4	1.7	1.3	1.1	0.8	1.1	2.5	4.7	6.5	6.3

Source: *Statistisk Årsbok för Stockholm*

Table 3.6 Top 20 Areas with the Lowest Incomes in Stockholm County

Area	City	Medium Income (1993)	Change from 1991	Change in %
Norra Rinkeby	Stockholm	78,200	-11,100	-12
Södra Rinkeby	Stockholm	78,800	-9,200	-10
Södra Fittja	Botkyrka	82,700	-5,600	-6
Södra Norsborg	Botkyrka	83,100	-200	0
Albyslätten	Botkyrka	87,400	-6,900	-7
Norra Tensta	Stockholm	90,800	-5,300	-6
Skärhomens Center	Stockholm	93,800	-4,100	-4
Södra Husby	Stockholm	99,200	-8,700	-8
Albyberget	Botkyrka	103,500	-6,300	-6
Södra Tensta	Stockholm	103,900	-5,500	-5
Hjulsta	Stockholm	104,400	-5,900	-5
Snösätra	Stockholm	105,800	-16,800	-14
Sollentuna Center	Sollentuna	106,600	-300	-3
Valsta Center	Sigtuna	107,300	-1,700	-2
Östra Väsby	Uplands Väsby	108,000	-2,100	-2
Grantorp	Huddinge	109,900	-5,100	-4
Jordbro flerbostadhus	Haninge	110,300	-3,000	-3
Vårby Gård	Huddinge	110,400	-500	0
Nyboda	Tyresö	114,000	-3,700	-3
Central Akalla	Stockholm	115,300	-2,800	-2

Source: *Dagens Nyheter*, February 5, 1996, page D6.

Table 3.7 Top 20 Areas with the Highest Incomes in Stockholm County

Area	City	Medium Income (1993)	Change from 1991	Change in %
Ösby	Danderyd	289,200	+80,000	+38
Karlaplan	Stockholm	283,500	+51,000	+22
Östra Käppala	Lidingö	261,400	+41,500	+19
Näsby Slott	Täby	257,500	+51,800	+25
Högländet	Stockholm	255,300	+19,400	+8
Färjestadsvägen	Stockholm	248,900	+29,100	+13
Norra Stickleby	Lidingö	248,300	+16,500	+7
Södra Djursholm	Danderyd	247,700	+26,600	+12
Neglingeön	Nacka	246,600	+42,300	+21
Stora Mossen	Stockholm	244,400	+16,800	+7
Södra Hersby	Lidingö	243,700	+33,300	+16
Äppelvikens	Stockholm	241,400	+16,900	+8
Bo	Lidingö	239,300	+22,100	+10
Norra Stocksund	Danderyd	238,400	+26,100	+12
Duvnäs	Nacka	236,600	+26,200	+12
Ängbyhöjden	Stockholm	236,000	+15,300	+7
Solsidan	Nacka	235,900	+20,400	+9
Islinge	Lidingö	235,900	+22,100	+10
Kottla-Mölndal-Kappsta	Lidingö	235,200	+26,300	+13
Södra Djurgården	Stockholm	235,100	+4,300	+2

Source: *Dagens Nyheter*, February 5, 1996, page D6.

Tables 3.6 and 3.7 reflect a microcosm of the larger economic and political profiles in Sweden, a country where economic equality is a core tenet held by many. The fact that residents in the wealthiest area in Stockholm county make 3.7 times as much as the residents in the county's poorest area is relatively inconsequential when compared to the larger income differentials in other advanced industrialized countries. By most accounts, Sweden has been quite successful in its commitment to economic equality and wage compression (Flanagan 1987; Hibbs 1990; Lindbeck 1975). Some argue that Sweden's past


success with wage compression is partially to blame for pricing young and immigrant workers out of the labor market (SOU 1995:39).

What emerges from Tables 3.6 and 3.7 is an important trend towards greater wage and economic inequality in Sweden. The Swedish Employers' Confederation's withdrawal from all centralized wage bargaining and governmental bodies in 1990 not only signaled its repudiation of using wage drift as a tool for effectively adjusting wages, but also its embracing of competitive wages and labor market restructuring. Furthermore, the Swedish government's ability to shift disposable income and savings from households and firms to the public sector is severely restricted by its already high tax rates, its relaxation of capital controls, and its admission into the European Union. All this means that the disparity between the highest and lowest paid workers in Sweden likely will continue to grow.



As noted earlier, unemployment does not hit all immigrant groups equally. Two possible factors contributing to how immigrants experience unemployment are labor force participation rates and the sectors of the economy where immigrants are employed. Immigrants could be more unemployed because they have higher labor force participation rates, which would lead to higher levels of official unemployment. Immigrants could be more unemployed because they are employed in the sectors of the economy that experienced the heaviest job losses or the lowest job growth.

Immigrants in Sweden: Labor Force Participation

With the exception of 1977, the labor force participation rates for immigrants were lower than the labor force participation rates for the nation. Graphs 3.6 through 3.8 show that although the immigrant labor force participation rates were close to the national rates during the 1977-1981 period, an ever widening gap begins to develop in 1982. The difference between the national labor force participation rate from 1977 to 1994 was only 1.8%, but the difference in the immigrant labor force participation rate from 1977 to 1994 was 22.6%. During the same period, (1977-1994), the national rate for men declined by 8.6%, but the rate for immigrant men declined by 24.6%. There was a 5.1% increase in the participation rate of women in the labor force between 1977 and 1994, yet a 19.8% decrease in the female immigrant participation rate during the same period. By the end of the 1977-1994 period, the immigrant unemployment rate was 17.0% higher, but the ratio of immigrants participating in the labor force dropped by 22.6%.



Source: *Arbetskraftsundersökningen (AKU)*



Source: *Arbetskraftsundersökningen (AKU)*

The decline in labor force participation means different things to different immigrant groups. (See Table 3.8.) The Finnish participation rates are consistently higher than the rates for immigrants as a whole; the Turkish rates are consistently lower than the general immigrant rate; and the Yugoslavian rates are generally higher from 1987-1992, but lower thereafter. The labor force

participation rate reveals interesting differences between Finns and Turks. In the case of Finns, they are becoming a smaller proportion of the immigrant population, but their labor participation rates have remained comparable to the national rate. This lends some support to the hypothesis that Finnish immigrants return to Finland when job prospects are limited in Sweden. Consequently, Finnish labor force participation remains comparable to the national rate because in times of unemployment, the Finnish labor pool contracts. In the case of Turks, their population stabilized as a proportion of the immigrant population, yet their participation rates continued to decline. Since Turkish citizens are less likely to return to Turkey when jobs in Sweden are scarce, Turkish immigrants drop out of the labor force. Even though Turks and Yugoslavs were established immigrant groups in Sweden by 1994, their participation rates in the labor force in 1994 were comparable to those of Iranians, who were relatively recent immigrants to Sweden. The war in the former Yugoslavia, which has increased the numbers of immigrants from that area, is partly responsible for the decreasing Yugoslavian participation rates (Ds 1995:68). No such dynamic exists that would help explain the low labor force participation rate for Turks. The last row of Table 3.8 is the difference in labor force participation rates from 1987 to 1994.

Table 3.8 Immigrant Labor Force Participation Rate (Select Immigrant Groups)

Year	National	Immigrant	Finnish	Turkish	Yugoslav	Iranian
1987	83.4	74.2	82.3	66.9	76.3	
1988	84.0	73.5	81.7	63.9	78.4	
1989	84.5	73.8	80.7	64.6	79.5	
1990	84.8	74.4	81.5	67.5	76.5	
1991	83.9	70.9	80.7	62.5	70.0	49.7
1992	82.0	67.4	79.9	56.5	68.8	45.4
1993	79.1	61.6	72.6	54.6	59.5	45.5
1994	77.6	56.9	72.2	47.3	42.2	45.5
Diff	5.8	17.3	10.1	19.6	34.1	5.2

Source: *Arbetskraftsundersökningen* (AKU)

There are many explanations for the discrepancies between the labor force participation rates of native Swedes and foreigners. One obvious explanation is that immigrants need either language instruction or other work-related training before they can effectively seek work. This fact may account for the overrepresentation of immigrants in job training or educational programs (Ura 1996:2). This hypothesis might also explain the labor participation rate of Finns, who generally are more familiar with the Swedish language than non-Nordic immigrants.


There are three problems with the deficient language skills hypothesis as an explanation for lower immigrant labor participation rates. While newly arrived immigrants might need language training, Turks are not new immigrants. Despite the pejorative term “Rinkeby Swedish,” immigrants’ language skills generally increase with time and across generations. In this respect, Turks are no different than other immigrant groups. The language training hypothesis cannot explain

the differences between the labor participation rates of Turkish citizens and those from Yugoslavia during 1987 to 1992. It remains undetermined whether Yugoslavian citizens of working age spoke better Swedish than Turkish citizens during these years. Immigrants are usually overqualified for the jobs that they do get, which is a situation that casts doubt on the central role of Swedish language skills in securing employment.

Other reasons for the differences in labor participation rates should include, but are not limited to, underdeveloped employment information networks for immigrants and discrimination against immigrants. If there is a dearth of information about jobs, then the national and immigrant labor participation rates should converge since the government's labor market policies make information on job opportunities easily available. (Employers are required to list most available jobs with the local employment office.) Unfortunately, there is no convergence between the national and immigrant labor force participation rates. The discrepancy between the two rates has become wider. While new immigrants from the war-torn former Yugoslavia might have depressed the labor participation rates of Yugoslavs, no such explanation can account for the low and declining rates of Turkish nationals.

Still, questions about the relationship between employment information networks and finding a job remain because of the distinctive ways immigrants use the employment office when they do decide to go there. In Graph 3.9, non-Nordic immigrants in 1995 were less likely to use the employment office during the first six months of their unemployment than Swedish citizens. This suggests

that non-Nordic immigrants first try to locate a job through networking. After exhausting their job information networks, non-Nordic citizens are much more likely to resort to the employment office for locating work than Swedish citizens. After two years of unemployment, non-Nordic immigrants again are less likely to turn to the employment office for help in finding work. The lower employment office registrations for non-Nordic immigrants could plausibly signal their withdrawal from the labor force. As mentioned earlier, the non-Nordic unemployed, aged 25-44, are more likely to use the employment office during their job search than their Swedish counterparts, suggesting that Swedish citizens have access to alternative, if not better, networks for locating employment.



Source: Ura 1996:2

Discrimination remains a disputed explanation for immigrant employment patterns (Ålund and Schierup; Ura 1996:2). If discrimination is a major

determinant of immigrants' inability to secure employment, then discrimination also might serve as a contributing cause to the low labor participation rates among immigrants; that is, when immigrants become discouraged in their job search, they give up looking for work. If this explanation is to be accepted, then one would expect to see immigrants over-represented on the social assistance rolls. Although immigrants are over-represented on the social assistance rolls, unemployment, rather than low labor force participation, remains the most plausible direct cause of immigrants' overrepresentation on the social assistance rolls (Ds 1995:68). Chapter Four contains a detailed discussion of immigrants and social assistance.

Immigrants in Sweden: Sectors of Employment

Not only are immigrants less likely to be employed, but when employed, they are concentrated in the less desirable and lower paid jobs in declining or more volatile sectors of the economy. Immigrants are concentrated in the manufacturing, public, and service (cleaning, hotel, and restaurant) sectors. (See Table 3.9.) Within the manufacturing sector, immigrants are concentrated in menial, physically strenuous, monotonous, or dirty jobs (Ålund and Schierup). A high proportion of immigrants are employed in the public sector, especially in hospitals and transport. In 1995, 18% of employed immigrants were working in the hotel and restaurant sector while only 7% of Swedish citizens held such jobs (Ura 1996:2). Few immigrants are in the construction sector, which has a high unionization rate and high wages (*Arbetskraftsundersökningen*; Widgren 1982a).

Table 3.9 Sector of Employment in 1987 (by citizenship status and gender, in %)

Industry Sector	Male			Female		
	Foreign Born		TP	Foreign Born		TP
	FC	NC		FC	NC	
Agriculture	1.6	1.4	5.5	0.7	1.1	2.3
Mining & Manufacturing	43.7	43.8	32.5	23.8	19.6	13.4
Building Trades	6.5	7.6	11.4	0.6	0.7	1.0
Restaurant & Hotel	16.6	13.5	13.1	12.7	12.2	15.0
Post, Telephone, & Communications	8.1	8.2	9.5	3.0	3.8	4.6
Banking & Insurance	4.5	6.4	7.7	6.0	7.5	7.5
Public Sector	18.9	18.9	20.3	52.9	54.9	56.1

FC-Foreign Citizen
 NC-Naturalized Citizen
 TP-Total Population

Source: Ds 1990:35

Due to industrial and public sector restructuring, where immigrants are employed is a critical factor influencing immigrant employment levels. Both the manufacturing and public sectors in Sweden are undergoing a downsizing transformation. The magnitude of the industrial transformation is depicted in Table 3.10. From 1990-1993 there was a 15.5% and 24.7% decline in the number of firms and the number of employees respectively in the Swedish manufacturing sector. Since immigrant men are over-represented in the manufacturing workforce, they suffered disproportionately from the shrinkage in the manufacturing sector. In 1995, 24.3% of those who traditionally worked in a manufacturing plant were unemployed (RU 95:2).

Table 3.10 Number of Firms and Employees in Swedish Manufacturing

Year	All Manufacturing			
	Number of Firms	% Change from Previous Year	Number of Employees	% Change from Previous Year
1990	9,601		780,052	
1991	9,323	-3%	717,755	-8%
1992	8,835	-5%	642,881	-10%
1993	8,109	-8%	587,462	-9%
(Engineering) Manufacturing				
Year	Number of Firms	% Change from Previous Year	Number of Employees	% Change from Previous Year
1990	4,361		386,458	
1991	4,242	-3%	352,245	-9%
1992	3,922	-8%	314,283	-11%
1993	3,557	-9%	284,824	-9%

Source: Industri 1990-1993

The fact that the Swedish labor market is characterized by ethnic niches, along with the high concentration of immigrant men in manufacturing, contributes to the steep climb in immigrant unemployment in the 1990s. Finns and immigrants from the former Yugoslavia concentrate in the manufacturing sector, while immigrants from Greece and Third World countries gravitate towards cleaning and other menial jobs in the service sector (Ålund and Schierup). Knowing about the ethnic niches helps to explain the unemployment rates for Finnish and Yugoslavian males between 1987 and 1994, but not the unemployment rates for Turkish males since they generally do not find work in the manufacturing sector. (See Table 3.11.) The decrease in unemployment among Finnish males in 1994 also corroborates the finding that when

unemployment increases in Sweden, Finns return home. The negative net migration figures for Finns during the 1990s confirm the return of Finns to Finland.

Table 3.11 Unemployment Rates for Select Groups

	Sweden	All Immigrants	Finns (Males)	Yugoslavs (Males)	Turks (Males)
1987	1.9	4.4	3.4	2.6	10.6
1988	1.6	3.8	3.2	2.3	12.6
1989	1.4	3.4	1.8	0.8	8.3
1990	1.5	4.0	3.3	3.1	2.6
1991	2.7	6.6	5.1	7.3	7.7
1992	4.8	12.8	7.7	15.6	13.4
1993	8.2	20.8	16.5	19.3	24.2
1994	8.0	21.0	13.4	23.7	28.2

Source: *Arbetskraftsundersökningen* (AKU)

Pressures to downsize the public sector in Sweden have had an adverse impact on (immigrant) women. Capital and exchange decontrol, a recession beginning in 1992, and Sweden's joining the European Union have all served to force the Swedish government to curtail the growth, if not shrink, various aspects of the public sector. Since more than half of the employed (immigrant) women in Sweden are employed in the public sector, any shrinkage in public sector jobs means a substantial loss of jobs for women. From 1991 to 1994, the state released 35.6% of its employees while the local governments, (the largest public sector employers), only released 9.1% of its employees. In total, 15.7% of the employees in the public sector had their jobs eliminated between 1991 and 1994. In February 1995, the pressures to control and reduce the public sector meant 7% and 14% unemployment among healthcare and social workers respectively in Sweden with the government forecasting more substantial job losses in both

sectors: 5,000 and 10,000 jobs to be eliminated in healthcare and social work respectively (RU 1995:2; Ura 1995:6). This reduction is especially noteworthy because it signifies the possibility that local governments in Sweden are planning staff reductions along the magnitude undertaken by the state government.

It is much more difficult to obtain reliable data on the service sector. The main reason for the difficulty is that persons who work in the service sector, (cleaning), are interspersed across a number of employment sectors: manufacturing, hotel and restaurant, real estate, medical care, and the public sector. The number of cleaning personnel is not identified in the official statistics. Still, the official government estimate is that the general job markets for cleaning, hotel, and restaurant work will remain flat (Ura 1995:6). In February 1995 the unemployment rate for hotel workers, chefs, and restaurant workers were 35.0%, 21.9%, and 25.2% respectively (RU 1995:2).

On the local level, immigrant employment opportunities are largely determined by the presence of potential employers within the community. In communities where manufacturing constitutes a major presence, immigrants face declining job prospects. Rinkeby, the focus community of this study, is not a manufacturing district. It is a district where the public sector clearly dominates the employment market. In Rinkeby the percentage of public sector jobs of the total number of jobs available in the community never fell below 60% from 1975 through 1991. Within the city of Stockholm, the seat of the national government and the nation's most populous municipality, the public sector only provided 35% of the jobs during the same period (*Stadsdelsutveckling i Rinkeby*). In 1991,

75% of all jobs in Rinkeby were in the public sector compared to 35% in Stockholm. Real estate, banking, and insurance provided 10% of the jobs in Rinkeby, but 15% of the jobs in Stockholm. However, the real estate, banking, and insurance categories are misnomers when applied to Rinkeby. Real estate, (fastighet), when applied to immigrants usually means cleaning. For example, the Stockholm Transit Authority has a sizable 'fastighet' department that has nothing to do with real estate. It is the transit authority's cleaning and maintenance crews, which are largely staffed by immigrants. Department stores, restaurants, and hotels provided 6% of all employment in Rinkeby, but 20% of all employment in Stockholm. Again, the department store, restaurant, and hotel categories are misnomers for Rinkeby since there are no department stores or hotels in Rinkeby. With such a high percentage of immigrants depending on the public sector for jobs in Rinkeby, downsizing the public sector in Rinkeby obviously has widespread implications.

The general conclusion regarding the economic situation of immigrants in Sweden is that despite the government's labor market policy, the employment situation of immigrants is not similar to that of the nation. Immigrants are unemployed more, despite being in the labor market less. The evidence strongly suggests that immigrants are delegated to employment in the sectors that are less attractive to Swedes: manufacturing and cleaning. The situation for immigrant women is more complex. Immigrant women, like all women in Sweden, are largely confined to the public sector for employment, but unlike all women in Sweden, immigrant women are leaving the work force as they encounter higher

unemployment. Moreover, non-Nordic immigrant women experience unemployment at vastly different rates than Nordic immigrant women, i.e., 9.2% unemployment for Finnish women versus 39.5% unemployment for Turkish women in 1994 (*Arbetskraftsundersökningen*). The concentration of immigrants in the manufacturing and public sectors is a primary factor that determines the employment situation of immigrants in Sweden. Finally, Nordic and West European immigrants fare better than Southern European immigrants, while non-European immigrants fare the worst.

Responses to the Immigrant's Economic Situation

Given the gravity of the immigrants' unemployment situation in the 1990s, the Swedish government and immigrants felt compelled to act. This section examines the actions of both. The Swedish government's responses to the immigrants' economic situation fall into four categories: initiating more labor market policies, convincing businesses to hire immigrants, encouraging immigrants to become more self sufficient, and providing more social assistance funds to immigrants. Immigrants responded to their high unemployment by returning to their native countries, starting new businesses, or going on the social assistance rolls.

The Swedish government, primarily through the Labor Market Department and the Labor Market Board, focused their efforts on training immigrants in the employment offices' job training schemes, persuading more businesses to hire immigrants, and getting immigrants to become more self sufficient through starting small businesses. The Discrimination Ombudsman

took a major role in the government's efforts to convince businesses to hire immigrants while the Labor Market Board and the Immigrant Policy Committee were in the forefront in promoting immigrant self sufficiency. Local governments were responsible for provision of social assistance payments.

Though the effectiveness of the government's job training programs is in question, there cannot be any question regarding the expansion of job training programs in absolute or relative terms. The employment office publicly acknowledged that part of its mission was to deal with high immigrant unemployment by giving immigrants top priority for admittance into job training programs (Ura 1996:2). One hundred and nine thousand persons participated in labor market programs, (job training), in 1983, which was the high point for participation in such programs in the 1980's. In contrast, during the first quarter of 1993, just under 200,000 persons participated in labor market programs (SOU 1995:39). Over 300,000 persons were in the active labor market programs in 1994 (*Arbetskraftsundersökningen*). In December 1995, the Labor Market Board reported that 27,000 non-Nordic immigrants participated in its job training programs (Ura 1996:2). Moreover, the Labor Market Board planned to increase that number by at least 7,000 non-Nordic persons. In relative terms, the increase in expenditures for these labor market programs was real, but less impressive. In terms of gross domestic product, the Swedish government's increase in spending for labor market programs was from 1.7% to 2.6% of GDP between 1991 and 1994 (SOU 1995:39).

Convincing businesses to hire more immigrants also was on the government's agenda. With the help of academics, the government made a concerted effort to get Swedish businesses to accept, if not embrace, the idea of a multicultural workforce. The Labor Market Board, as a participant in the "Sweden 2000" campaign, had a small budget specifically earmarked towards promoting the goal that Sweden's workplaces must reflect Sweden's demographics, in other words, become more heterogeneous. McDonald's, ABB, Handelsbanken, the Post Office, Stockholm Energi, Volvo, S-E Banken, Ericsson, Skandia, and Telia participated in the program along with the Labor Market Board, the Discrimination Ombudsman, and the major labor unions. Government reports read by parliamentary members also highlighted the importance of getting businesses to accept a degree of multiculturalism (SOU 1995:76). Finally, businesses themselves began to wonder aloud whether they had been discriminatory in the past (*Dagens Nyheter* July 5, 1995:A5). To strengthen the office of the Discrimination Ombudsman, Parliament granted it additional powers in 1994, over the strenuous objections from the business community.

The Labor Market Board and the Immigrant Policy Committee increased their efforts to get immigrants to become more self-reliant by starting businesses. The reason for their advocacy of immigrant self-reliance was obvious. It was cheaper than training programs or providing social assistance payments. In 1991, the Labor Market Board did not provide anyone with funds or bank guarantees for starting a business, but by 1994, the Labor Market Board extended loans or bank guarantees to 9,000 persons (*Arbetskraftsundersökningen*). A typical project that

immigrants proposed was “catering,” (SOU 95:76), which involved providing lunches to schools or daycare centers with high immigrant populations.

Immigrants themselves viewed self employment as a viable option to unemployment. In 1978, 3.9% and 4.2% of Southern European and Middle Eastern male immigrants respectively relied on their businesses as their primary source of income; however 7.2% of the men born in Sweden listed their businesses as their primary source of income (Ekberg and Gustafsson). By 1990, 6.1%, 8.0% and 4.5% of Southern European, Middle Eastern, and native Swedish males respectively reported their businesses as their primary source of income. The same dynamic existed for males who listed a private business as a part of their total annual income. In 1978, 5.6%, 5.4%, and 11.0% of Southern European, Middle Eastern, and native born Swedish males listed a private business as a partial source of income, but by 1990, the figures were 8.9%, 9.9%, and 8.9% respectively.

If an immigrant decides against leaving Sweden, is unable or unwilling to find a job, to enroll in a labor market scheme, or to start a business, then reliance on public cash assistance is the only other option available. The unemployment of the 1990s resulted in increased government expenditures on cash social assistance. The government spent 0.8% of GDP on unemployment benefits in 1991, an amount that rose to 3.1% of GDP in 1994 (SOU 1995:39). The increased spending on cash unemployment benefits was uncontroversial. Rather, immigrants’ overrepresentation on the social assistance rolls became a politically volatile issue in Sweden.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN SWEDEN

It should not come as a surprise that the social situation for immigrants in Sweden is significantly different than that for Swedes. What is surprising is the relatively indeterminate role the Swedish welfare state plays in affecting immigrants' social outcomes. Given the picture of immigrant unemployment, one should expect a higher incidence of immigrants on the social assistance (welfare) rolls. The direct correlation between immigrant overrepresentation in a declining manufacturing sector with that of higher unemployment and greater reliance on social assistance seems obvious. However, the role that Swedish housing policy plays in the formation of housing segregation is less obvious, while the roles that the Swedish education and legal system play in immigrant educational performance and attainment levels, and that of immigrant criminality are not clear and often politically contentious.

This chapter examines immigrants' social situation in seven areas: settlement patterns, housing, social assistance, education, crime, health, and organizations. There are two reasons for the chapter's focus on these areas. First, the availability of quantitative data makes measuring how immigrants fare possible. Second, many of these areas are potential political issues around which immigrants can mobilize. Settlement patterns and organizations are included because both reflect methods of social organization and participation in which immigrants must initiate and take an active part. Examining settlement patterns and organizations may provide insight into the validity of claims that immigrants

are “victims” of Swedish welfare policy. Settlement patterns also indicate the localities where immigrant political power would be the strongest.

Immigrants in Sweden: Settlement Patterns

The majority of immigrants lives in the metropolitan areas: Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö counties. An explanation for immigrants’ gravitation towards these three cities is that these cities are the major points of entry for most immigrants. Danish immigrants congregate in Malmö because Malmö’s forty-five minute ferry ride from Copenhagen makes it a natural port of entry for Danish residents, who may enter Sweden due to the 1954 treaty permitting the free movement of Nordic citizens among Nordic countries. The same point can be made for Finns in Stockholm; that is, Stockholm is the main point of entry for Finnish immigrants on the ferry from Helsinki. Norwegians who arrive by boat arrive in Gothenburg, hence that city’s large Norwegian population. For immigrants arriving by air, Stockholm and Gothenburg are the major points of international arrival. For example, Stockholm’s centrality for international air travel can help account for its large Chilean population.

Another persuasive explanation for the concentration of immigrants in urban areas is that of chain migration. Chain migration is the migratory pattern embodied by immigrants’ establishing legal residence in a host country and then sending for other family members to join them in the country of immigration (Castles and Miller 1993; Björklund 1981). The migrant responsible for establishing residency usually arranges housing and employment for the newly arrived immigrants. In many cases, chain migration means bringing over a

spouse, children, and elderly parents. These persons may not contribute economically to the household at first. This migratory pattern has been confirmed by Ulf Björklund for Turks in Södertälje, (a municipality in Stockholm county), by Mazhar Göker, (Chairman of Rinkeby's Turkish-Swedish Association), for Turks in Rinkeby, and by Ulla-Britt Engelsbrettsson for Turks in Gothenburg.

A direct result of chain migration is the development of localized immigrant communities. Björklund attributes chain migration to the rise of the Turkish community in Södertälje despite efforts by Swedish authorities to disperse the incoming immigrant population. Furthermore, newly arrived immigrants themselves seem to prefer living in a community of their national or ethnic peers, at least until they learn more about their new environment (Andersson-Brolin 1984; Engelbrettsson 1995; Gerholm and Lithman 1988; Svanberg 1988; Ålund and Schierup 1991; Özüekren 1990).

The third possible explanation for immigrant settlement in the major cities is that most of the job opportunities are located there. Though Sweden has long since experienced a labor shortage, immigrants still view Sweden as a land of economic opportunity in comparison to the lands they left.

After Haparanda, which is always the municipality with the highest foreign population ratio, municipalities in Stockholm county contain some of the highest foreign population ratios in Sweden. (Haparanda is a small northern city very near the Finnish-Swedish border.) In every year from 1989 to 1994, Stockholm county municipalities comprised at least six out of the top ten Swedish

cities most heavily populated by foreign citizens or foreign born persons. (See Tables 4.1 through 4.4 below.)

Table 4.1 Stockholm County Municipalities with the Largest Foreign Citizen Population in Sweden from 1989-1994

County	Ranking by Year					
	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Botkyrka	2	2	2	2	2	2
Haninge	8	8	8	8	8	-
Huddinge	5	5	5	5	4	4
Sigtuna	-	10	10	-	-	-
Solna	10	9	9	7	7	7
Södertälje	4	3	4	4	5	6
Upplands-Bro	7	7	7	8	9	10
Upplands-Väsby	6	6	6	6	6	5

Source: *Befolkningsstatistik*

Table 4.2 Stockholm County Municipalities with the Largest Foreign Citizen Populations in Sweden from 1989-1994

County	Foreign Citizens Percent of Population by Year					
	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Botkyrka	20.7	20.9	21.0	21.1	19.8	19.4
Haninge	11.3	11.5	11.6	11.4	10.9	-
Huddinge	12.7	13.0	12.9	12.8	12.5	12.3
Sigtuna	-	10.9	10.8	-	-	-
Solna	10.4	11.0	11.4	11.6	11.4	11.3
Södertälje	13.8	14.2	13.9	13.3	11.9	11.5
Upplands-Bro	11.5	11.6	11.7	11.4	10.8	10.8
Upplands-Väsby	12.4	12.6	12.5	12.2	11.8	12.0
Entire Country	5.4	5.6	5.7	5.7	5.8	6.1

Source: *Befolkningsstatistik*

Table 4.3 Stockholm County Municipalities with the Largest Foreign Born Populations in Sweden from 1989-1994

County	Ranking by Year					
	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Botkyrka	2	2	2	2	2	2
Huddinge	6	6	6	7	8	7
Sigtuna	10	9	9	10	-	-
Solna	8	8	7	6	6	6
Sundbyberg	-	-	-	-	10	10
Södertälje	3	3	3	3	3	3
Upplands-Väsby	7	7	8	9	9	9

Source: *Befolkningsstatistik*

Table 4.4 Stockholm County Municipalities with the Largest Foreign Born Populations in Sweden from 1989-1994

County	Foreign Born Percent of Population by Year					
	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Botkyrka	27.4	27.9	28.6	29.0	29.2	29.5
Huddinge	17.6	17.9	18.1	18.3	18.5	19.0
Sigtuna	16.3	17.0	17.2	17.4	-	-
Solna	17.0	17.4	18.1	18.5	18.8	19.3
Sundbyberg	-	-	-	-	17.8	18.2
Södertälje	20.6	21.0	21.1	21.0	20.9	21.0
Upplands-Väsby	17.4	17.6	17.9	18.0	18.2	18.6
Entire Country	9.9	10.3	10.5	10.7	11.1	11.5

Source: *Befolkningsstatistik*

From the tables, a number of peculiarities about immigrant settlement patterns emerge. The first is that not only does Botkyrka has a significant foreign citizen community, but also when these foreign citizens naturalize, many seem to remain in Botkyrka. This is the case for all the Stockholm municipalities on the list except for Haninge and Upplands-Bro. The fact that naturalized citizens remain in communities with high immigrant populations may be of little

consequence for the social situation of immigrants, but may have significant political implications. These implications are discussed in Chapter Five.

Haninge and Upplands-Bro have significant populations of foreign citizens, but drop entirely off the top ten list of foreign born persons within their boundaries. There are a number of factors that might plausibly contribute to this situation. Both municipalities have refugee reception centers that process incoming refugees, which might explain their high ratio of foreign citizens in their populations. The data suggests that immigrants who naturalize tend not to remain in Haninge or Upplands-Bro. The absence of these cities from Tables 4.3 and 4.4 may reflect the unattractiveness of these areas for immigrants who naturalize. Furthermore, the ratio of foreign citizens in the population of both municipalities decreased from 1989 to 1994.

Finally, Tables 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4, reveal Solna and Sundbyberg as increasingly becoming areas in which immigrants settle. The fact that Solna and Sundbyberg are emerging as core immigrant settlements is significant because both areas are old working class cities (and Social Democratic strongholds) that are not negatively stigmatized as immigrant areas in the minds of many Swedes. The immigrants in both cities are overwhelmingly European. Sundbyberg is of special note because it does not register in the top 10 municipalities of the highest foreign citizen population ratios, meaning that many of its immigrants are naturalized citizens. How Solna and Sundbyberg compare with the rest of Stockholm county and with each other in political participation is a topic in the next chapter.

Though the evidence is not conclusive, the absolute figures from which the percentages in Table 4.5 are calculated suggest a residential reshuffling is currently underway in Stockholm county. When compared to Tables 4.3 and 4.4, the figures in Table 4.5 are different because the sources define and count who is foreign born differently. What is driving the population movements remains unclear. Botkyrka, already a municipality with a high proportion of immigrants, experienced one of the highest rates of increase in the immigrant proportion of the population. In order for the foreign born population to increase by 3.24% in Botkyrka from 1985-1993, then 2,076 of the 2,899 increase in population had to have been immigrants. From 1970 through 1993, Solna's population decreased by 2,069 persons, but the ratio of foreign born in the population has increased. Specifically, from 1970 through 1984, Solna's population decreased by 6,750 persons, but from 1985 through 1993, the population in Solna grew by 4,681. This evidence supports the conclusion that immigrants disproportionately replaced the Swedish population that left Solna. Sundbyberg's ratio of foreign born population grew the most, by 3.67%, but much of that increase can be attributed to the growth in naturalized citizens as a proportion of Sundbyberg's population. On the other hand, some cities in Stockholm county experienced significant growth in their total populations, but little, if any, growth in the immigrant proportion of their populations. Nacka grew by 7,633 persons from 1985 through 1993, but the percent increase in foreign born as a proportion of the population was 0.8%. Värmdö grew by 6,020 persons from 1985 through 1993, but the

percent increase in foreign born as a proportion of the population was negative, -1.24%.

Table 4.5 Percent Foreign Born by Municipalities in Stockholm from 1985-1993

City	1985	1987	1989	1991	1993	% CHG
Botkyrka	30.82	31.26	32.49	33.76	34.06	3.24
Danderyd	9.83	10.15	10.95	11.55	12.30	2.47
Ekerö	7.72	8.09	8.49	8.79	9.04	1.32
Haninge	17.36	17.30	17.93	18.39	18.50	1.14
Huddinge	19.30	19.76	20.44	21.10	21.45	2.15
Järfälla	15.52	15.60	16.33	17.01	17.65	2.13
Lidingö	12.25	12.51	12.76	13.10	13.15	0.9
Nacka	17.20	17.28	17.48	17.96	18.00	0.8
Norrtälje	7.42	7.70	8.09	8.50	8.82	1.4
Nynäshamn	7.02	7.63	8.38	8.54	8.84	1.82
Salem	13.33	13.24	14.10	14.52	16.46	3.13
Sigtuna	18.23	18.11	18.53	19.41	19.42	1.19
Sollentuna	13.16	13.81	14.91	16.07	16.72	3.56
Solna	17.71	17.40	18.63	19.96	20.74	3.03
Stockholm	14.96	15.39	16.38	17.41	18.23	3.27
Sundbyberg	15.77	16.65	17.58	18.41	19.44	3.67
Södertälje	22.37	21.91	23.54	24.11	23.61	1.24
Tyresö	16.04	15.85	15.77	15.81	15.76	-0.28
Täby	11.94	12.30	12.83	13.22	13.34	1.40
Upplands-Bro	17.33	17.43	18.80	19.38	18.72	1.39
Upplands-Väsby	20.19	20.15	20.57	21.04	21.19	1.00
Vallentuna	9.60	10.09	10.85	10.89	11.11	1.51
Vaxholm	7.04	6.96	7.57	7.97	8.58	1.54
Värmdö	15.38	15.04	14.82	14.21	13.54	-1.84
Österåker	10.52	10.88	11.44	11.81	11.74	1.22
County	15.84	16.11	16.93	17.67	18.12	2.28

Source: *Års Statistik För Stockholms Län och Landsting*

The story of uneven immigrant settlement is more extreme in the city of Stockholm. Table 4.6 clearly reveals that over a ten year period, the growth in foreign born persons as a percentage of the total population barely registered a

trickle in some districts in Stockholm, while other districts experienced double-digit increases.

Table 4.6 Foreign Born Persons as Percent of Population within selected Stockholm City Districts

District	1985	1990	1994	% Change
Central City	12.4	13.8	14.3	1.9
Östermalm	13.4	13.7	14.1	0.7
Kungsholmen-Essingen	10.8	11.8	12.6	1.8
Maria-Högalid	12.1	12.8	13.4	1.3
Katarina-Sofia	12.5	13.4	13.5	1.0
Rinkeby	54.3	69.3	73.8	19.5
Kista	24.2	31.5	40.3	16.1
Spånga	25.8	37.0	40.2	14.4
Stockholm (Entire City)	15.0	16.9	18.7	3.7

Source: *Statistisk Årsbok för Stockholm*

Within Stockholm county, immigrants are concentrated in certain areas. The same is true in Gothenburg and Malmö counties. Earlier I stressed that integration as a normative value should be preferred over segregation, but the rise of immigrant communities can have many positive effects. Recent immigrants can draw support from fellow nationals while families can enjoy the benefits of having relatives close by. Ethnic activities and organizations should be easier to form. From the viewpoint of the social service authorities, immigrant settlement concentration should translate into easier arrangement of public services such as schools, health, interpreting, and information. From a political perspective, immigrant concentration should make it easier for immigrants not only to organize, but also to demonstrate their political power in the voting booth. Conversely, immigrant concentration can mean social isolation from the rest of

mainstream society, receipt of inferior social services, and political marginalization.

Immigrants in Sweden: Housing

Sweden's postwar housing policies were not initiated specifically for immigrants. Instead, the needs of immigrants were supposed to be addressed through general social policy (Hammar 1985b). This approach would seem consistent with the government's later policy of equality between immigrants and Swedes. Though housing policy did focus on the needs of the general population, immigrants in Stockholm county face a segregated and segmented housing market. Residential segregation is defined as people with similar socio-economic characteristics living together in a separate physical community apart from others with different socio-economic characteristics. Housing market segmentation is defined as groups with common characteristics not having access to all forms of housing: private, cooperative, or rental. Though different concepts, segregation and segmentation often work in tandem.

Immigrants in Stockholm tend to live in segregated areas. There is wide spread documentation of ethnic residential segregation (Andersson-Brolin; Daun, Ehn, and Klein 1992; Hall 1991; Kemeny 1987; Lunden 1982; Murdie and Borgegård 1992; Özüekren). In Stockholm and its immediate suburbs, immigrants are over-represented in Rinkeby, Tensta, Fittja, Alby, Hallunda, Norsborg, and Skärholmen. Statistics on ethnic residential segregation in the Stockholm area were contained in a feature article in the March 27, 1995 *Dagens Nyheter*. Abbreviated tables from the article have been reproduced. (See Tables

4.7 and 4.8.) The first table lists the top twenty areas in Greater Stockholm with the highest proportion of immigrant residents. (The Greater Stockholm Area and Stockholm county are roughly congruent.) The second table is a list of the top twenty areas in the Greater Stockholm Area with the lowest proportion of immigrants.

Table 4.7 Top 20 Areas in Greater Stockholm with the Highest Proportion of Immigrant Residents

City Area	City	Most Common Building Type	Mil. Home Bldg	Foreign Born-Citizen (1993)	
				Total %	% S. & Non Eur.
Södra Rinkeby	Stockholm	rental	yes	75	65
Södra Fittja	Botkyrka	rental	yes	74	64
Norra Rinkeby	Stockholm	rental	yes	71	57
Albyslätten	Botkyrka	rental	yes	68	53
Norra Tensta	Stockholm	rental	yes	67	58
Södra Norsborg	Botkyrka	rental	yes	62	47
Södra Tensta	Stockholm	rental	yes	59	46
Hjulsta	Stockholm	rental	yes	58	42
Albyberget	Botkyrka	rental	yes	56	32
Södra Husby	Stockholm	rental	yes	55	42
Grantorp	Huddinge	rental	yes	54	36
Rotemannen	Botkyrka	co-op	no	51	39
Sollentuna Ctr	Sollentuna	rental	yes	50	39
Östa Väsby	Upplands Väsby	rental	yes	49	30
Vårby Gård	Huddinge	rental	yes	49	33
Skärholmen Ctr	Stockholm	rental	yes	48	36
Valsta Ctr	Sigtuna	rental	yes	48	33
Norra Husby	Stockholm	co-op	yes	45	31
Central Akalla	Stockholm	rental	no	44	30
Fittja Gård	Botkyrka	house	no	44	32

“Mil Home” indicates if the housing was built as a part of the “Million Homes” Program

“S. & Non Eur” means “South and Non-European”

Source: *Dagens Nyheter*, March 27, 1995, page D10-11.

Table 4.8 Top 20 Areas in Greater Stockholm with the Lowest Proportion of Immigrant Residents

City Area	City	Most Common Building Type	Mil. Home Bldg	Foreign Born-Citizen (1993)	
				Total %	% S. & Non Eur.
Olovslund	Stockholm	house	no	3	1
Ytterby-Överby	Vaxholm	house	no	5	1
Jägartorp	Haninge	house	no	5	1
Stora Ängby	Stockholm	house	no	6	2
Smedslätten	Stockholm	house	no	6	6
Östra Vaxön	Vaxholm	rental	no	6	2
Ålsten	Stockholm	house	no	6	2
Södra Ellagård	Täby	house	no	6	2
Tattby	Nacka	house	no	6	1
Stora Mossen	Stockholm	house	no	7	1
Hemmestahöjden	Värmdö	rental	no	7	2
S. Bagarmossen	Stockholm	house	no	7	2
Gubbängens Gård	Stockholm	house	no	7	3
Norra Sköndal	Stockholm	house	no	7	1
Nockeby	Stockholm	house	no	7	2
Östra Träkvista	Ekerö	house	no	7	2
Farsta Gård	Stockholm	house	no	7	1
Östra Råcksta	Stockholm	house	no	7	1
Bo	Lidingö	house	no	7	2
Gamla Sigtuna	Sigtuna	house	no	7	1

“Mil Home” indicates if the housing was built as a part of the “Million Homes” Program

“S. & Non Eur” means “South and Non-European”

Source: *Dagens Nyheter*, March 27, 1995, page D10-11.

From Table 4.7, it is easy to see that immigrants are highly concentrated in some areas in Greater Stockholm. The ten areas with the highest proportion of immigrants are in the Rinkeby/Tensta area of Stockholm and north Botkyrka. Roughly, the geographical areas of high immigrant concentrations are located in

Stockholm's northwest corner, Stockholm's southwest corridor, northwest Huddinge, and north Botkyrka.

There is also significant housing market segmentation. Areas in which immigrants are over-represented usually consist of rental apartments built during the "Million Homes" Program. The "Million Homes" Program was the national government's response to the chronic and severe housing shortage in post-war Sweden. For example, there were over 100,000 persons on the apartment wait list in Stockholm during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Social Democrats in 1967 committed itself to the production of one million new units by 1975. The aim of the initiative was to provide cheaper dwellings in well-planned communities.

Not only are immigrants over-represented in certain "Million Homes" complexes, but immigrants are limited to the rental market when they look for housing. In the Greater Stockholm Area in 1980, five years after the official termination of the "Million Homes" Program, 24% of the housing was single family dwellings while 76% were multifamily dwellings (Anas, Jirlow, Gustafsson, Hårsman, and Snickars 1985). Though the majority of Stockholm's residences was apartments, immigrants generally had open access only to those units that were publicly owned. Of the multifamily dwellings, 35% were owned by the municipalities, 25% by cooperative associations, and 39% by private persons or companies (Anas, Jirlow, Gustafsson, Hårsman, and Snickars). Calculated from these numbers, immigrants in 1980 had effective access to only 26.6% (35% of 76%) of the housing market in the Greater Stockholm Area. In

the Greater Stockholm Area, 76% of Turkish households live in public rental housing compared with 25% of German and Swedish households (Murdie and Borgegård 1992). Moreover, 78% of those Turkish households lived in “Million Homes” apartments while only 26% of Germans and 25% of Swedes lived in such housing (Murdie and Borgegård 1992).

The private rental market is closed to many, but not all, immigrant groups. American, British, Danish, German, and Norwegian immigrants seem to have full access to the entire Swedish housing market (Kemeny). Özüekren concludes that Turks themselves see public housing as the only housing market open to them. Turks are not the only immigrant groups concentrated in public housing. Immigrants from Asia, Africa, South America, and Southern Europe are also concentrated in public housing (Linden and Lindberg 1991).

The government’s general aim to create a single housing market did not prevent a high level of social segmentation in the public rental sector (Murdie and Borgegård 1994; Lindberg and Linden 1986). Younger household heads, large families, women out of the labor force, unskilled employees, and low income households, in addition to immigrants of all income levels are over-represented in particular public housing complexes (Murdie and Borgegård 1994). Income segregation has always manifested itself in that there exists high-status, high-income neighborhoods such as Östermalm, but housing market segmentation seems to maintain and perpetuate income segregation and housing tenure inequality (Lunden). One conclusion that is clear is that Swedish housing policy

failed to prevent outcomes similar to those in countries where housing markets are not as organized and regulated as Sweden's.

Explanations for residential segregation and housing market segmentation in Sweden can be divided into four groups. The first group of explanations links the timing of two unrelated events: the arrival of immigrants and the completion of units under the "Million Homes" Program. Cultural identity and cultural maintenance form the core of the second group of explanations. The undesirability of the "Million Home" units is often cited as an explanation for Swedes avoiding the immigrant housing complexes. Finally, racial discrimination and prejudice are the fourth set of reasons for residential segregation and housing market segmentation. Each of these explanations is examined in turn.

The first group of explanations links residential segregation and housing market segmentation to the synchronism of large-scale immigration and the completion of housing units under the "Million Homes" Program. This theory is important because of its parsimony and logical appeal. Immigrants are over-represented in "Million Homes" rentals because when they came to Sweden, these apartments were freely available and easy to get. Immigrants are over-represented in public housing because the rent setting mechanism that links apartment rents to utility valuation keeps rents for central Stockholm apartments below their true value to tenants. When tenants of central Stockholm apartments are ready to move, their apartments command such a high swap or second-hand contract (sublet) value that tenants rather lease their apartments to others rather than give them up completely. Therefore tenants in central Stockholm

apartments, even small ones, are less inclined to give up their apartments for the newer, larger units in the suburbs. Immigrants are underrepresented in single family houses because immigrants have not been in Sweden long enough to acquire the financial resources to position themselves in that housing market.

Immigration from non-Nordic countries dramatically increased just at the time when much of the "Million Homes" apartments came on the market. This fact coupled with the sudden housing surplus would seem to be the most obvious and compelling reason for the initial residential segregation and housing market segmentation. However valid these factors are, they do not tell the complete story. As Kemeny's analysis points out, Turks who arrived before 1969 were already concentrated in public rental units. Of the Turks who arrived before 1969, 66% lived in public rental housing (Kemeny). Immigrants have lower overall levels of income when compared to Swedes, but analyses conclude that these income differences explain little of the residential segregation (Andersson-Brolin; Kemeny). For certain groups, Turks for example, even people in professional and managerial careers are over-represented in public rental units (Kemeny). Sixty percent of all Turkish professionals and managers lived in public housing, 56% of which lived in "Million Homes" units (Kemeny). The length of time an immigrant group has been in Sweden affects but does not determine the degree of segregation (Andersson-Brolin). The longer an immigrant remained in Sweden, the more likely the immigrant's housing patterns will resemble those of a Swede, but certain immigrant groups, (Greeks and Turks), are exceptions (Andersson-Brolin).

Demographic factors cannot explain the residential segregation. In the Andersson-Brolin study, Swedish and non-Swedish families with the same family composition live in different areas. This is especially true of families with children. Kemeny arrives at a similar conclusion.

“It must be concluded, then that neither holding constant socio-economic status, nor age of head of household, nor the number of children in a household make any substantial difference to the housing conditions of immigrants as compared with Swedes. We have therefore been unable to prove the null hypothesis, that differences in housing conditions between immigrant and non-immigrant groups can be largely explained by social factors rather than by ethnic factors.... It does appear, however, that ethnic factors play at least a major part in determining whether and to what extent immigrant housing conditions differ from those of Swedes.” (Kemeny, p. 108)

The second set of explanations is cultural. Cultural explanations claim the immigrants’ desire either to preserve their ethnic identity or have neighbors of the same ethnic background as a key factor in the formation and preservation of residential segregation (Andersson-Brolin). Swedes as well as immigrants may also express this cultural preference. Özüekren’s in-depth analysis of Turkish immigrants in Fittja concluded that Turks initially were housed there because vacancy rates were high, and have chosen to remain in the area because of cultural reasons. In the meantime, Swedes moved away because they did not

want to live in an ethnically mixed community. Özüekren's findings suggest that for Turks, the housing market is limited to public rental housing and a few neighborhoods where Turks are represented in significant numbers because of their limited knowledge of the housing market and their cultural values. Özüekren also acknowledges that due to their current dwellings, even if Turks wanted to live in another neighborhood, and had very good knowledge of the housing market, the low exchange value of their current apartment would make it difficult for Turks to find anyone who would want to exchange with them (Özüekren). Engelbrektsson's research confirms a similar pattern in the Turkish communities in Gothenburg.

The undesirability of the "Million Homes" units is often cited as an explanation for Swedes avoiding these complexes (Holm; Hall). The inadequate planning and inferior quality of the building materials simply made these homes unattractive to Swedes. Starting with Skärholmen, the more infamous "Million Homes" developments were built. These include Rinkeby, Tensta, Fittja, Alby, Hallunda, and Norsborg. Notice that with the exception of Hallunda, all the areas listed are in the top 20 areas in Stockholm with the highest proportions of immigrants in their populations. (See Table 4.7.) Even the design descriptions by the city building office were anything but enticing. For example, Skärholmen is described in the following way. The italics are mine.

"The architectural *slabs*, standing on high ground and *marching down* like a stairway to the underground station and square, are visible from afar off like an *outpost* of the city to the motorist

approaching by the motorway from the south.” (Stockholms stadsbyggnadskontor, page 67)

Skärholmen residents must climb long banks of stairs whenever they leave or return to their homes.

The “Million Homes” estates are plagued with other problems as well. Rinkeby has two bank machines, but no banks. Vällingby, (a solidly Swedish, non-“Million Homes” complex nearby), has six bank machines with as many banks, all in a 75 meter radius. Until April 1996, Rinkeby did not have a police station, despite its reputation as a haven for narcotics dealers. Before then, the nearest police station was in Vällingby. Rinkeby is not the only area known for its criminality and asociality. Alby and Fittja are known for their gangs.

Many native Swedes simply refuse to accept these conditions, but arriving immigrants with no place to live have little choice but to accept and move into these apartments. Once there, cultural and housing market factors combined to keep them there and Swedes away. Consequently, to remedy the poor quality and unattractiveness of the “Million Homes” units, the government has begun to refurbish and remodel them. This process began in the 1980s, but residential segregation and housing market segmentation remained unaffected.

The official Swedish policy of tenure neutrality implies that all households should have equal access to different tenures. Public housing in theory should not be reserved for the lowest income households, immigrants, and high problem groups. Yet there exists a high degree of social differentiation among tenants in housing estates of the same tenure composition (Murdie and Borgegård 1992).

Older public housing contained more elderly and fewer immigrants. Older public housing also has the reputation of being more desirable than the “Million Homes” units (Elander; Jensfelt; Murdie and Borgegård 1992). There is also social differentiation between public housing built before and after the “Million Homes” Program and other housing built during the same period (Murdie and Borgegård 1992).

The issue of discrimination is probably the hardest to evaluate and the one addressed the least in the literature on Swedish housing policy. Swedish research recognizes residential segregation and housing market segmentation, (Bieterman 1993; Murdie and Borgegård 1994; Vogel, Andersson, Davidsson, and Häll 1988 for example), but remains silent on whether discrimination has a role in the perpetuation of ethnic segregation or whether segregation itself is problematic.

Discrimination in the housing market is difficult to assess because of the government’s active involvement in the housing market and because of the poor financial condition of immigrants in Sweden. If discrimination is at the root of residential segregation and housing market segmentation, then the official Swedish policy of equal access and tenure neutrality, as well as the immigrant policy of equality, has been a failure. The government’s immigrant policy, which assumes that minority groups will not likely endure over several generations as cohesive communities, also would be a failure if discrimination generates or maintains separate immigrant and Swedish communities. Yet the plausible cause of the government’s policy failure is not one of intent but of design. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the government’s rent setting mechanism for

Stockholm underestimates the value of apartments. Therefore, tenants are encouraged to sublet their Stockholm apartments at high rents or swap their apartments for desirable accommodations in the suburbs. Immigrants neither can afford the high rents nor have the residences for which city residents will swap.


Discrimination against immigrants is hard to prove empirically because of the low incomes of immigrants. Given their low paying jobs, immigrants must work longer in order to accrue the financial resources necessary to purchase a house. Purchasing a house usually means purchasing a car also, which is a high expense item. Immigrants who receive their income from social assistance are further limited in their choice of housing, since the welfare authorities must encourage its clients to locate housing appropriate for their situations. The “Million Homes” units are one of the best sources of affordable housing for the large families immigrants tend to have.

Immigrants in Sweden: Social Assistance

Given the employment outlook of immigrants in Sweden, one would expect immigrants to be disproportionately represented on the social assistance rolls, which of course is the case. Social assistance is the provision of cash grants to those not covered by unemployment insurance and to the very poor. This section first examines who is on the social assistance rolls followed by a brief presentation regarding how the money is spent across the different household types.

Immigrant households have been an increasing percentage of the households on social assistance, from 15.2% in 1970 to 33.1% in 1987

(*Utredningsrapport 1989:1*). In 1988, 35.6% of the households on social assistance were immigrant households (*Statistisk Årsbok för Stockholm*). This number has increased in the 1990s. In conjunction with immigrant households representing an increasing proportion of the households on social assistance, non-Nordic immigrant households in particular comprise the bulk of the increasing presence of immigrants on the social assistance rolls. (See Graph 4.1.) In 1979 when Nordic households as a percentage of the total social assistance rolls peaked at 13.7%, the percentage of non-Nordic immigrant households continued to rise. By 1987, Nordic households represented only 7.4% of the households on the rolls, but non-Nordic immigrants represented 25.7% of the social assistance households. The most likely reason for the sharp decline in the proportion of Nordic households on social assistance is the negative net immigration of Nordic citizens from 1983 through 1987.



Source: *Utredningsrapport 1989:1*

Some immigrant groups are more likely to be on social assistance than others. While Finns have always been the largest immigrant group on social assistance, their numbers in relation to the rising numbers of non-Nordic immigrants on social assistance has been decreasing. With increasing immigration from non-Nordic countries, immigrants from these countries are becoming the greater share of immigrants on social assistance. Table 4.9 presents a snap shot view of the percentage of persons by citizenship who were on social assistance in Stockholm in 1985. Finns comprise the largest foreign contingent on social assistance at 4,132 persons. However taken as a percentage of its population, citizens from countries in the last group are overwhelmingly over-represented on social assistance. The percentages for the last four countries are 100% or more because the recently arrived immigrants who qualify for social assistance are automatically counted while there is a lag before the census bureau includes these persons in its count. The figures for Turkish and Polish citizens are all the more remarkable because these two groups are not recently arrived immigrants. Taken as a whole, immigrants from the last eight countries on the list total 64.4% of the immigrants on social assistance. This picture remained unchanged during the 1983-1987 period, (*Utredningsrapport* 1989:1). More recent data indicates no fundamental change to this picture.

Table 4.9 Total Persons, Social Assistance Recipients, and Long Term (3 years, 4 months) Social Assistance Recipients by Citizenship in Stockholm in 1985


Citizenship	Number of Persons (a)	Social Assistance Recipients (b)	% (b/a)	Long Term Recipients (c)	% (c/a)
Sweden	529,188	34,759	7	15,274	3
Denmark	880	79	9	33	4
Norway	1,680	194	12	84	5
Finland	15,545	4,132	27	2,407	15
United Kingdom	1,167	104	9	38	3
West Germany	1,166	78	7	55	5
United States	1,201	106	9	43	4
Italy	670	76	11	40	6
Yugoslavia	2,474	274	11	103	4
Greece	2,656	414	16	187	7
Turkey	3,612	1,621	45	1,107	31
Poland	2,158	1,408	65	850	39
Chile	1,566	1,984	127	1,108	71
Iran	1,478	1,459	99	573	39
Iraq	639	642	100	339	53
Ethiopia	589	843	143	395	67

Source: *Utredningsrapport 1989:1*

Disaggregating more recent data for the city of Stockholm into its distinctive immigrant districts provides a clearer picture of the magnitude of the difference between the percentage of the population on social assistance for the city and the three districts where immigrants are the most heavily concentrated. (See Graph 4.2.) In 1990, when the percentage of the city's pop on social assistance was the lowest between the 1985-1994 period (7.6%), the rates for Rinkeby, Kista, and Spånga were 28.5%, 13.5%, and 16.4% respectively. In 1994, admittedly a very bad year for the Swedish economy, 10.2% of the city's

residents received social assistance. The rates in Rinkeby, Kista, and Spånga were again significantly higher: 40.6%, 22.2%, and 21.2% respectively.

Distinguishing between Swedish, Nordic, and non-Nordic recipients reveals the extent of the overrepresentation of non-Nordic immigrants on the social assistance rolls. (See Table 4.10.) In Spånga for 1994, 9.7% of its Swedish citizen population received social assistance and 22.7% of its Nordic population received social assistance, but a stunning 63.2% of its non-Nordic population received social assistance. Spånga's numbers of foreign citizens on social assistance, though bad, were still considerably better than Rinkeby's since only 25% of Spånga's residents were foreign citizens. In Rinkeby, with 52.7% of its residents being foreign citizens, 58.0% of them were on social assistance in 1994. Forty-six percent of Rinkeby's Nordic residents were on social assistance in 1994. For the entire city of Stockholm in 1994, 49.7% of its non-Nordic citizens, 16.5% of its Nordic citizens, but only 6.6% of its Swedish citizens were on the social assistance rolls. Keep in mind that naturalized immigrants are included in the figures for Swedish citizens. Therefore the number of foreign born persons on social assistance is higher than the numbers for Nordic and non-Nordic citizens.



Source: *Statistisk Årsbok för Stockholm*

Table 4.10 Percentage of Population Receiving Social Assistance, by Citizenship

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
FOREIGN BORN						
Rinkeby	11.9	17.4	17.6	20.0	22.0	22.4
Kista	8.7	8.2	9.4	10.3	12.0	12.3
Spånga	8.2	7.5	7.9	8.1	8.9	9.7
Stockholm City	5.3	5.2	5.6	5.9	6.7	6.6
NORWEGIAN BORN						
Rinkeby	27.1	32.6	32.8	37.1	42.7	45.6
Kista	16.6	16.1	20.3	19.7	20.2	20.3
Spånga	22.0	22.6	22.6	22.4	22.5	22.7
Stockholm City	17.0	16.1	16.3	16.7	17.2	16.5
NON-NORWEGIAN BORN						
Rinkeby	39.7	40.2	39.1	42.9	52.9	58.0
Kista	47.9	42.5	47.8	50.6	57.0	62.9
Spånga	52.0	49.4	49.3	48.7	57.0	63.2
Stockholm City	41.1	36.2	35.3	38.1	43.8	49.7

Source: *Statistisk Årsbok för Stockholm*

The growth of the social assistance rolls in the municipalities of Stockholm county has been fueled by complex forces, sometimes divorced from

the growth of immigrants as a proportion of the population. Similar to the city districts of Stockholm, the municipalities in Stockholm county that had a high percentage of foreign citizens as residents, (Botkyrka, Huddinge, Södertälje, and Upplands-Bro), also had a high percentage of residents on social assistance. (See Table 4.11.) However none of the four cities listed above had the lowest medium income.

The five municipalities with the lowest medium incomes during the 1985-1992 period in ascending order were: Norrtälje, Södertälje, Botkyrka/Nynäshamn, and Sundbyberg (*Årsbok för Sveriges Kommuner*). Norrtälje had the lowest medium income, (and also one of the lowest ratios of immigrants in the total population), but was consistently below the county average in the percentage of residents receiving social assistance from 1983-1993. Nynäshamn, though also poor with a low immigrant population ratio, had rates of social assistance usage usually below the county average. In 1995, the top six municipalities to receive the largest tax equalization grants from the central government did not necessarily correspond with the percentage of foreign citizens or those on social assistance in their populations. The six municipalities to receive the largest grants as measured in kronors per resident were: Norrtälje with 5,051 kronors per resident, Botkyrka with 3,393 kronors per resident, Södertälje with 3,174 kronors per resident, Upplands-Bro with 2,387 kronors per resident, Stockholm with 2,183 kronors per resident, and Nynäshamn with 2,022 kronors per resident (*Årsbok för Sveriges Kommuner*). Since Norrtälje and Nynäshamn have among the lowest percentages of foreign born in its population as well as persons on social assistance, these two

cities must use the central government's grants for other purposes. Norrtälje's large elderly population is the most likely beneficiary of the central government's financial support. No such guess can be ventured at this time for Nynäshamn.

Solna and Sundbyberg present an interesting dichotomy. Solna has a higher immigrant population ratio (and absolute population) than Sundbyberg in 1993, 20.74% versus 19.44% respectively, but a lower proportion of its population on social assistance, 8% compared to Sundbyberg's 12%. Solna's unemployment rate is not that much lower than Sundbyberg's, 6.3% versus 7.1%. At this time, it remains unclear what forces lay behind the difference between the proportion of the population on social assistance in these similar, neighboring cities.

Table 4.11 Percent of Population on Social Assistance
by Municipalities in Stockholm County

Municipality	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Botkyrka	12	12	11	11	11	10	9	9	8	12	13
Danderyd	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	3
Ekero	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	6	6
Haninge	10	11	10	10	9	9	8	7	8	9	10
Huddinge	10	10	10	10	10	9	8	7	8	9	10
Jarfalla	7	8	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	7	10
Lidingo	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	4
Nacka	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	8	8
Norrtälje	3	3	4	5	5	5	5	4	5	6	6
Nynashamn	5	6	6	6	5	6	6	6	6	8	9
Salem	8	6	8	6	7	7	7	7	8	9	11
Sigtuna	11	9	11	10	8	7	7	5	6	8	8
Sollentuna	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	8	7
Solna	10	10	10	9	9	9	8	7	7	8	8
Stockholm	8	9	9	9	8	8	8	7	8	9	10
Sundbyberg	7	7	7	8	8	8	7	8	8	11	12
Sodertälje	10	11	11	12	11	10	9	9	9	9	10
Tyreso	11	11	10	10	9	9	8	6	7	9	11
Taby	3	3	4	4	4	3	3	*****	3	4	4
Upplands-Bro	10	10	11	12	10	10	9	9	9	11	11
Upplands-Vasby	7	8	7	8	7	6	6	5	6	8	10
Vallentuna	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	5	6
Vaxholm	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	6	8
Värmdö	5	5	5	6	6	6	5	4	5	6	8
Osteröker	5	6	6	7	6	5	5	6	4	4	8
County	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	8	9

Source: *Statistisk Årsbok för Stockholm*

Immigrants are more costly as social assistance recipients because they tend to have bigger families. In the early 1990s, immigrant households were 30% of the social assistance households, but 45% of the costs (Daun, Åke, Stenberg, Svanström, and Åhs 1994; *Social Bidrag 1997*). Single men and women without children total 70% of the households on the social assistance rolls. This fact is true for the 1980s (*Utredningsrapport 1989:1*) as well as the 1990s (Daun, Åke, Stenberg, Svanström, and Åhs; *Social Bidrag 1997*). However, these households

account for only 54% of the social assistance costs (Daun, Åke, Stenberg, Svanström, and Åhs; *Social Bidrag 1997*). Households with children are the most costly. Single women with children make up 17% of the rolls, but 21% of the costs, while pairs with children are 9% of the rolls and 16% of the costs (Daun, Åke, Stenberg, Svanström, and Åhs). In 1992, 63% of pair households on social assistance were immigrant households (Daun, Åke, Stenberg, Svanström, and Åhs). Consequently, not only are immigrants over-represented on the social assistance rolls, but a disproportionate share of the kronors (around 45%) went to immigrants. This situation has remained unchanged since 1985 (*Statistisk Årsbok för Stockholm; Social Bidrag 1997*).

Immigrants in Sweden: Education

Assessing immigrant educational attainment, (the last year of school completed), and patterns presents a tricky proposition for three reasons. The first reason is that the majority of immigrants did not come to Sweden in pursuit of an education. They initially came for jobs and then for family reunification. To find that immigrants are less likely to pursue higher, non-vocational education is hardly surprising. The second factor that complicates the meaningfulness of comparing immigrant educational performance to that of Swedes is that the majority of immigrants have a rural or low educational background. A low educational background not only would lower educational attainment levels, but it might also lower the involvement of immigrant parents in their children's education. The majority of Turkish immigrants are from rural villages in central Turkey. Therefore many Turkish immigrants only possess a rudimentary

education upon arrival to Sweden. Moreover, even when immigrants complete compulsory education in their home countries, the level of education they received is lower than that of Swedish compulsory education. Consequently, one should hardly be surprised to find immigrants over-represented in basic education courses for adults. Finally, the available statistics on immigrants in higher educational institutions do not separate students domiciled in Sweden from those who are in Sweden explicitly to participate in an educational program. This situation would seem relevant in many of Sweden's major academic institutions, for example, the Karolinska Institute (medicine), the Royal Institute of Technology (engineering sciences), the Stockholm Business School, and the universities of Stockholm, Uppsala, and Lund.

Given the above qualifications, the educational attainment levels and educational patterns of immigrants are different from those of Swedes. Table 4.12 shows that Swedish students tend to take more advanced courses than immigrant students. Excluding the performance of Swedish-adopted immigrants in advance English and general Swedish language courses, immigrant students do not receive as many scores in the top two grading tiers. Second generation immigrants, however, do tend to conform towards the enrollment patterns of native Swedish students.

**Table 4.12 English and Math Enrollments, and Grades Received by Fall 1988
Grade 9 Students, (by family background and in percent)**

	<u>Swedish Student</u>	<u>Student Adopted by Swedish Parents</u>	<u>Immigrant Student who came to Sweden</u>	<u>Second Generation Immigrant Student</u>	<u>Student with at least one Immigrant Parent</u>
Enrolled in general Grade 9 English	32	30	37	33	37
Enrolled in advance Grade 9 English	67	68	47	64	59
Enrolled in general Grade 9 Math	44	46	49	47	55
Enrolled in advance Grade 9 Math	56	53	44	52	42
Received score in top 2 tiers: general Grade 9 English	32	28	26	29	28
Received score in top 2 tiers: advance Grade 9 English	40	41	38	40	39
Received score in top 2 tiers: general Grade 9 Math	35	27	23	25	27
Received score in top 2 tiers: advance Grade 9 Math	40	34	32	34	32
Received score in top 2 tiers: general Grade 9 Swedish	37	39	27	32	27

The percentages for general and advance courses do not equal 100 because the certificates for those who took a course not for credit fail to specify which course the student enrolled.

Source: *Tema Invandrare*

Table 4.13 Percentage Fall 1988 Students Not Admitted, Admitted, and Dropped Out from Upper Secondary School, (by family background)

	<u>Swedish Student</u>	<u>Student Adopted by Swedish Parents</u>	<u>Immigrant Student who came to Sweden</u>	<u>Second Generation Immigrant Student</u>	<u>Student with at least one Immigrant Parent</u>
Not Accepted to Upper Secondary School	12.6	13.1	20.1	13.6	20.4
Accepted to Upper Secondary School: Short Course	1.4	1.2	11.2	2.2	1.9
Accepted to Upper Secondary School: Long Course	86.0	85.7	68.7	84.2	77.6
Dropped Long Course During First Year	7.1	8.9	13.1	8.0	10.8

Source: *Tema Invandrare*

Immigrants are less likely to get accepted into an upper secondary school, and more likely to take a short course or drop out of a long course during their first year. (See Table 4.13.) Second generation immigrant students do exhibit acceptance and drop out patterns close to that of native Swedes. As expected, first generation immigrant students fare the worst from the select groups. Immigrant students with at least one Swedish parent fare somewhere in between that of the second generation and first generation immigrant students.

Though immigrants are less likely to get accepted into an upper secondary school, and more likely to take a short course or drop out of a long course during their first year, there are some differences among immigrant groups. (See Table

4.14 below.) One distinct difference is in the distribution of Iranian students between short and long courses, and of their low drop out rate from the long course. The Iranian drop out rate of 6.5% is lower than the rate for native Swedes, (7.1%).

Table 4.14 Percentage Fall 1988 Students Not Admitted, Admitted, and Dropped Out from Upper Secondary School, (by select citizenship)

	<u>Finland</u>	<u>Turkey</u>	<u>Chile</u>	<u>Poland</u>	<u>Iran</u>
Not Accepted to Upper Secondary School	21.0	23.3	20.3	15.7	19.9
Accepted to Upper Secondary School: Short Course	2.6	8.7	16.9	12.7	37.6
Accepted to Upper Secondary School: Long Course	76.4	68.0	62.8	71.6	42.5
Dropped Long Course During First Year	15.6	15.0	12.4	13.0	6.5

Source: *Tema Invandrare*

Given that immigrant students are more likely not to attend an upper secondary school, it is hardly surprising to find immigrants comprising a greater percentage of students in Komvux, (community education for adults). From 1979 to 1988, the percentage of immigrants in Komvux increased from 10% to 18% (*Tema Invandrare*). Within Komvux's basic education program in Stockholm county, the enrollment increase was even more dramatic: 14% in 1979, 33% in 1988, and 39% in 1994 (*Tema Invandrare; Utbildnings Statistisk Årsbok*). Thirteen of Stockholm county's 25 municipalities had Komvuxs with a student body of at least 25% immigrants in 1988. Solna's Komvux had the highest percentage of immigrant students in 1988, (40%). In conjunction with the higher

immigrant enrollment, immigrant students are also more likely to drop out of their Komvux programs.

Naturalization seems to influence significantly whether an immigrant will enroll in the basic or theoretical (advanced academic) track in Komvux. In 1988, 50% of the students with foreign citizenship in Komvux enrolled in the basic studies program while 36% enrolled in the advanced academic track. The figures for naturalized citizens were nearly the opposite, with 31% enrolled in basic education while 48% enrolled in the advanced academic program (*Tema Invandrare*). For the same year, 52% of native Swedish students enrolled in the advanced academic track, but only 18% enrolled in basic education. The figures for Turkish students in Komvux for 1988 were 59% in basic education and 27% in advanced academics.

In July 1977, the Swedish educational authorities started Grundvux. The main purpose of Grundvux is to provide remedial education for persons who have weak primary school backgrounds. In light of this mission, the overwhelming majority of students in Grundvux are immigrants. In the 1987-1988 academic year, 60% of Grundvux's students were immigrants. Stockholm, Botkyrka, Södertälje, and Huddinge were each among the top ten municipalities with the largest Grundvux enrollments in 1987-1988. Their student bodies were 84%, 92%, 89%, and 86% immigrant students respectively (*Tema Invandrare*).

As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the data on immigrant enrollment in Swedish universities because the data does not distinguish between students domiciled in Sweden and those who arrived in

Sweden explicitly to study. The available data points to the following conclusions. The percentage of immigrants in university programs has decreased slightly from 1983 to 1988, with immigrant enrollment in medicine being the major exception. Immigrants comprised 7.3% of medical students in 1988 compared to 5.3% in 1983. The percentage of foreign students in Sweden's premier institutions, the Karolinska Institute (medicine) being the exception, decreased from 1983 to 1988, but the percentage of foreign post-graduate students at the two most prestigious institutions (the Karolinska Institute and the Royal Technical Institute) increased. Uppsala University generally maintained its already high ratio of foreign post-graduate students during the same time period. (See Table 4.15.) Again, it remains unclear whether the foreign students at the institutions listed below are permanent residents in Sweden or foreign students with a temporary student visa. Foreign students with temporary student visas are unable to work legally during the academic year, not eligible for most of Sweden's welfare benefits, and cannot vote regardless of their length of stay.

Table 4.15 Percent Foreign Students in Sweden's Premier Higher Education Institutions in 1983 and 1988

	Undergraduate		Post-Graduate	
	% Foreign Students 1983	% Foreign Students 1988	% Foreign Students 1983	% Foreign Students 1988
Karolinska Institute	8.7	14.5	11	17
Royal Technical Institute	8.8	7.5	14	18
Stockholm University	10.2	8.4	17	15
Uppsala University	7.2	6.1	19	18
Lund University	5.9	4.9	13	13
Stockholm Business School	2.7	3.1	6	5

Source: *Tema Invandrare*

Immigrants in Sweden: Criminality

Perhaps one of the most sensitive issues in any discussion on the status of immigrants is that of immigrants and crime. When citizens conclude that immigrants disproportionately commit crime, citizens reason that they are justified in wanting not only to move away from immigrants, but also in wanting to limit immigration and to contain immigrant settlements. This section presents a brief overview of immigrant criminality in Sweden. No attempts will be made to link immigrant criminality to the broader societal issues such as housing segregation.

Immigrants are over-represented in the figures for persons convicted of crime. This is the case even allowing for differences in age, sex, residential region, and type of crime (*Tema Invandrare*). Furthermore, the offenses that immigrants commit tend to have an aggravated component to them. Sentencing patterns, on the other hand, are generally the same for convicted persons of Swedish and foreign citizenship (*Tema Invandrare*).

In 1988, foreign citizens were convicted of committing 15% of all crime in Sweden though foreign citizens constituted 5% of the population (*Tema Invandrare*). This means that the percentage of crime committed by foreign born persons is surely greater than 15% since naturalized citizens are included in the figure for Swedish citizens. The top three offenses were the same for Swedish and foreign citizens although the distribution of convictions was different. Of Swedish citizens convicted of crimes in 1988, 49.1% were convicted of traffic offenses, 28.6% were convicted of property crimes, and 9.0% were convicted of

“other” crimes (*Tema Invandrare*). “Other” crimes include sexual crimes or crimes with aggravated circumstances. For foreign citizens, the percentages for the same three categories were 37.8%, 32.4% and 17.1%. The percentages of Swedish and foreign citizens convicted of the remaining four categories are the same. The percentages of Swedish citizens convicted of violent crimes, crimes against the state, narcotic crimes, and crimes endangering the general public were 6.5%, 2.7%, 2.7%, and 1.4% respectively. For foreign citizens convicted of the same categories, the percentages were 6.6%, 2.1%, 2.7%, and 1.3% respectively. Assuming that “other” crimes are violent ones, then 23.7% of foreign citizens convicted for crimes were convicted for violent crimes against persons. The corresponding percentage for Swedish citizens is 15.5%.

Immigrant criminality did not diminish in the 1990s. Of convicted persons in 1992, 22% of those convicted for murder or manslaughter were foreign citizens; 20% of those convicted for assault were foreign citizens; for sexual crimes, 19% were foreign citizens; for petty theft, 32% were foreign citizens; and 20% of those convicted of major larceny were foreign citizens (Daun, Åke, Stenberg, Svantröm, and Åhs). Sixteen percent of convicted traffic offenders, 20% of convicted narcotic offenders, 48% of convicted smugglers, but only 8% of convicted tax evaders were foreign citizens (Daun, Åke, Stenberg, Svantröm, and Åhs). Foreign citizens represented 5.74% of the population in Sweden in 1992.

Immigrants are aware that they are more exposed to crime. In 1992, 7% of native Swedes were subjected to violence or the threat of violence, but 11%, 9.5%, and 8.5% of 2nd generation immigrants, naturalized citizens, and

immigrants respectively were subjected to violence or the threat of violence (*Offer för vålds- och egendomsbrott*). Given these figures, it is not surprising that anxiety about violence between 1978-1992 increased 7% for 2nd generation immigrants, 9% for naturalized citizens, and 12% for foreign citizens, but only 3% among native Swedes (*Offer för vålds- och egendomsbrott*). The rise in anxiety over violence is more pronounced among males with a non-European background. Non-European males cited concerns over violence as contributing to their avoiding public entertainment events, participating in public recreational activities, and using public transport (Martens 1998). In regards to immigrants, 2nd generation males, especially those with an active nightlife, are more likely to commit crimes or be victims of crimes (*Offer för vålds- och egendomsbrott*). The predominant crime that 16-24 year old males, (2nd generation), commit is assault against another young male or against a public authority such as a police officer or transit worker.

Men are overwhelmingly accused, arrested, or convicted of crimes. Over ninety percent of the immigrants accused, arrested, or convicted of crimes are men (*Kriminalvården*). Within the general population of Sweden, single men between the ages of 16 and 44, but especially between 16-24, are more likely to commit crimes or be victims of crimes (*Offer för vålds- och egendomsbrott*). For immigrant men, the age distribution of male criminal activity that results in a jail term is bimodal. Of the immigrant men placed in jail during the 1990's, men in the 16-24 and 35-44 age categories each represented 25% of the jailed criminal offenders (*Kriminalvården*). This statistic suggests that immigrant men between

35-44 tend to commit crimes that result in a jail term in comparison to the greater absolute number of crimes that 2nd generation immigrants commit.

Immigrants in Sweden: Health

First generation immigrants experience more health problems than the rest of the population in Sweden (*Tema Invandrare*). The differences in the sex or age structures between immigrants and native Swedes cannot explain the divergent health patterns of native Swedes and immigrants. More than likely, the root of many immigrants' health problems lies in the fact that a larger proportion of first generation immigrants are manual workers when compared to native Swedes, 53% for first generation immigrants and 42% for native Swedes in 1989, (*Tema Invandrare*). In 1988, Swedish citizens were absent from work an average of 24.5 days, while immigrants were absent for 41.3 days, (Daun, Åke, Stenberg, Svantröm, and Åhs). Foreign citizens were more likely to take long term (90 days) sickness leave and early retirement (Daun, Åke, Stenberg, Svantröm, and Åhs). Since the first generation immigrants came to Sweden as manual laborers, their poorer health status, (more sick days and greater use of early pension), should be expected. The question for researchers and policy makers concerns what degree of difference is normal. That is a question this study cannot answer.

Some immigrant groups are more prone to sickness than others. In 1988, Greek and Yugoslavian men were sick an average of 68.6 days, which is 66% more days than the average for immigrants (Daun, Åke, Stenberg, Svantröm, and Åhs). Turks also, at 65 days, had one of the higher numbers of days absence from work (Daun, Åke, Stenberg, Svantröm, and Åhs).

Greeks, Yugoslavians, and Turks are more likely to take early pension than immigrants as a whole. For example, immigrant men aged 60-64 years old in Rinkeby were more than twice as likely to be on early pension than the average for the city of Stockholm (*Stadsdelutveckling i Rinkeby 1974-1992*). Gender does not alter this tendency (Daun, Åke, Stenberg, Svantröm, and Åhs).

Immigrants in Sweden: Organizations

In regard to organizational patterns and associational life, immigrants are not much different than the general Swedish population, though immigrants are somewhat less likely to join an organization. This section presents a general outlook of immigrant associational patterns, with a focus on immigrant membership in political parties, trade unions, and immigrant organizations. The source for the statistical information is *Foreninglivet i Sverige* unless noted otherwise.

Sweden is a country with a rich associational life. For a country with a population of 8,692,013 in 1992, the fact that 494,000 persons (5.7%) held an elected position at some point in a trade union is nothing less than phenomenal. Sports organizations were a close second behind trade unions in persons holding elected positions in 1992, the number being 467,000. This is followed by tenant associations with 244,000 persons in an elected position sometime during 1992.

The high incidence of persons holding elected positions in trade unions does not signify that trade unions are the most popular type of organization in Sweden. The statistics of persons who participate in organizations but do not hold an elected office reveal a different story. Sport associations boast an active

membership of 887,000; cultural organizations, including music, dance, and theater groups, have an active membership of 278,000; while hobby groups have 237,000 active participants on their rolls. Total active membership (persons who hold elected offices plus those who do not) is the following: sports - 1,354,000, trade unions - 670,000, cultural - 468,000, tenant - 400,000, hobby - 336,000, and non-state churches - 204,000. In summary, trade union membership is high because it is strongly urged, if not mandatory, in some sectors of employment. Trade unions also have more elected posts, thereby inflating the total active membership. Most of the trade union members are in reality passive members who neither hold elective posts, attend meetings, nor participate in organization-sponsored events.

The high density of associational life in Sweden is also manifested in the high rates of organization membership within different segments of the Swedish population. (See Table 4.16.) Almost all native Swedes (92.9%) belonged to at least one organization in 1992. (Native Swedes were persons who either had both parents born in Sweden or persons who considered themselves to be a native Swede.) For foreign citizens, the number was lower (83.4%). The majority of persons belonged to between 2 to 3 different types of organizations. Roughly a third of native Swedes belonged to four or more organizations. One number that is quite interesting is the rate in which second generation immigrants belong to organizations. The rate of 92.4% for second generation immigrants suggests that in this one area, immigrant behavior conforms to the native Swedish patterns.

Table 4.16 Percentage Organizational Membership by Population and Number of Different Organizational Types

	Any Organization	Only 1 type of Organization	Between 2-3 different types of organizations	More than 4 different types of organizations
Native Swede	92.9	17.1	42.7	33.2
2nd Generation Immigrant	92.4	22.5	45.8	24.1
Naturalized Immigrant	89.6	25.2	41.4	23.0
Foreign Citizen	83.4	29.0	41.4	13.0

Source: *Foreninglivet i Sverige*

Immigrants join some types of associations more than others. Tenant associations and trade unions were tied for immigrant participation with a rate of 15%. These groups were followed by sports and motor (car, motorcycle, and boat) associations, in which 12% of the immigrant population placed membership. The less popular organizations among immigrants were: sobriety groups, hiking clubs, orders (Rotary, Lions, etc.), handicap associations, stock shareholders organizations, and local action groups. It is important to note immigrants' avoidance of local action groups. The unpopularity of local action groups probably stem from immigrants' fears of jeopardizing their residence status in Sweden.

Tables 4.17a and 4.17b provide an overview of the participation rates of four groups in Sweden: native Swedes, second generation immigrants, naturalized immigrants, and foreign citizens. The table indicates the percent of persons from the sample who held elected offices, engaged in other general activities, or were ordinary members of the various types of associations. What distinguishes the

following statistics from the ones presented above is that they are generated solely from interviews as opposed to surveys.

The researchers conducted 5,014 interviews with native Swedes, 280 interviews with second generation immigrants, 320 interviews with naturalized citizens, and 285 interviews with foreign citizens in order to compile the statistics for most of the different organizational types. The researchers conducted fewer interviews for the information presented on women, pension, immigrant, and trade union organizations. For women's organizations, 2,515, 147, 174, and 163 interviews were conducted with native Swedes, second generation immigrants, naturalized immigrants, and foreign citizens respectively. For pension organizations, 1,037 and 49 interviews were conducted with native Swedes and naturalized immigrants respectively. For immigrant organizations, 320 and 285 interviews were conducted with naturalized immigrants and foreign citizens. For trade union organizations, 2,905, 191, 176, and 169 interviews were conducted with native Swedes, second generation immigrants, naturalized immigrants, and foreign citizens respectively. Again, native Swedes were persons who either had both parents born in Sweden or persons who considered themselves to be a native Swede.

Table 4.17a Participation Rates by Demographic Group, Active Status, and Association Type in 1992

Association Type	Elected Office				Active Membership				Passive Membership				Total Membership			
	S	2G	N	F	S	2G	N	F	S	2G	N	F	S	2G	N	F
Political Party	2.1	0.4	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.3	0.5	0.0	9.1	4.5	4.5	3.4	12.2	6.2	5.6	4.0
Trade Union	11.9	11.2	10.2	6.9	3.2	2.6	4.7	3.6	68.4	62.1	69.8	64.4	83.6	75.9	84.3	75.3
Immigrant	*	*	0.9	1.5	*	*	1.7	1.7	*	*	4.9	4.9	*	*	7.4	8.1
Peace	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.9	1.3	0.3	1.0	1.2	1.6	0.3	1.8
Tenant	3.7	3.6	2.9	2.4	2.2	2.2	3.2	2.6	20.8	22.9	21.6	19.0	26.7	28.7	27.7	23.9
Sports	7.3	6.6	3.2	3.2	13.5	17.7	7.4	7.9	13.6	11.9	10.0	7.5	34.4	36.2	20.6	18.7
Humanitarian	0.6	0.0	1.0	0.8	1.4	1.8	1.6	0.7	7.1	3.7	3.7	2.1	9.1	5.5	6.4	3.6
Culture	2.8	3.6	1.6	2.2	4.4	3.2	2.2	3.0	5.8	3.0	2.2	2.0	13.0	9.8	6.0	7.2
Hobby	2.0	1.7	2.1	0.0	3.7	2.4	1.5	2.5	3.3	1.1	1.3	1.4	9.1	5.2	4.9	3.9
Motor	0.8	0.3	0.3	0.0	1.5	4.2	0.3	1.3	6.7	4.0	6.2	4.1	8.9	8.5	6.9	5.4
Parents	4.6	4.2	5.5	4.2	3.6	2.2	5.5	1.6	19.2	14.4	13.0	9.1	27.4	20.8	24.0	14.9
Handicap-Patient	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	1.4	0.3	0.0	3.1	0.7	1.2	1.3	4.3	2.1	1.5	1.3
Soberiety	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.2	1.1	0.3	0.0	1.9	1.1	0.6	0.0
Local Action Group	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.6	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.6	1.3	0.0
International Issues	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.6	0.3	2.1	2.2	0.6	1.1	2.7	2.6	1.2	1.5
Orders	1.3	0.7	0.7	0.3	1.1	0.4	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.4	0.5	0.0	3.4	1.6	1.8	0.7
Women	1.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.6	0.0	1.0	0.6	1.4	1.4	0.5	0.7	3.1	1.4	2.1	1.3
Pension	5.2	*	2.7	*	8.2	*	8.2	*	26.6	*	19.9	*	40.0	*	30.8	*
Stock Shareholders	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.0	3.7	1.6	2.2	1.1	4.5	2.3	2.5	1.1
Swedish Church	0.8	0.6	0.9	0.0	1.2	1.5	0.3	0.4	1.5	1.5	0.8	0.7	3.4	3.6	2.0	1.1
Non-Swedish Church	1.6	1.7	0.6	0.3	1.5	1.9	2.0	1.1	1.0	0.4	0.3	0.3	4.0	4.0	2.9	1.8
Consumer Co-op	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.3	0.9	0.0	32.4	21.4	29.5	17.1	33.8	21.7	30.4	17.1
Other Co-op/Mutual	1.3	0.4	0.9	0.3	0.9	0.7	0.0	0.0	5.4	2.7	3.3	1.1	7.6	3.9	4.2	1.5
Hiking/Outdoors	1.0	0.7	0.5	0.7	1.9	0.8	1.9	1.1	7.3	2.2	2.7	0.0	10.2	3.7	5.1	1.8
Environment	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.4	8.1	7.3	1.9	8.1	8.8	8.0	2.8	8.8
Voluntary Defense	1.1	1.0	0.3	0.0	1.5	1.1	0.4	0.3	1.6	2.1	1.3	0.0	4.2	4.2	2.0	0.3

S = Native Swede 2G = 2nd Generation N = Naturalized Citizen F = Foreign Citizen

Table 4.17b Top 5 Association Types for Total and Active Memberships in 1992

	Native Swede	2 nd Generation	Naturalized Citizen	Immigrant
Trade Union	Trade Union	Trade Union	Trade Union	Trade Union
Pension Assoc.	Sports Club	Pension Assoc.	Tenant Assoc.	Tenant Assoc.
Sports Club	Tenant Assoc.	Consumer Coop	Sports Club	Sports Club
Consumer Coop	Consumer Coop	Tenant Assoc.	Consumer Coop	Consumer Coop
Parents' Assoc.	Parents' Assoc.	Parents' Assoc.	Parents Assoc.	Parents Assoc.
Sports Club	Sports Club	Pension Assoc.	Sports Club	Sports Club
Pension Assoc.	Motor Assoc.	Sports Club	Trade Union	Trade Union
Culture	Culture	Parents' Assoc.	Culture	Culture
Hobby Club	Trade Union	Trade Union	Tenant Assoc.	Tenant Assoc.
Parents' Assoc.	Hobby Club	Tenant Assoc.	Parents Assoc.	Parents Assoc.

Source: *Föreningslivet i Sverige*

Tables 4.17a and 4.17b suggest a few points regarding associational life in Sweden. Trade unions, pension associations, sports clubs, consumer cooperatives, parents' associations, and tenant associations are the most popular

organizations in terms of total membership for all groups in Sweden. In other words, immigrants and Swedes are members of the same types of organizations. The rankings for active membership clearly show that sports clubs are very popular while consumer cooperatives are not. (Consumer cooperatives are shopping discount clubs.) For naturalized citizens, sports clubs do not place in the top five association types in terms of total membership, but place second in terms of active membership. Trade unions place within the top five association types in terms of active membership for 2nd generation immigrants, naturalized citizens, and immigrants, but not for native Swedes. However, when examined from a long term perspective, native Swedes are more active in the trade unions than immigrants of any category (*Levnadsförhållanden Rapport nr 91; Välfärd och ojämlikhet I 20 årsperspektiv 1975-1995*). Organizations that focus on culture also attract an active membership.

Though immigrants are less likely to be members of a political party, immigrants, like native Swedes, are more likely to be passive party members when they do join. From the sample, 75% of the native Swedes who were members of a political party were passive members. For immigrants, the figure was 73% for second generation immigrants, 80% for naturalized immigrants, and 85% for foreign citizens. From the sample, only 2.9%, 2.4%, 2.0%, and 1.7% of the native Swedes, second generation immigrants, naturalized immigrants, and foreign citizens, respectively, interviewed went to at least one political meeting during 1992, which was not an election year. Unsurprisingly, the vast majority did not attend any political meeting of any kind in 1992. (See Table 4.18)

Table 4.18 Number of Political Meetings Attended in 1992 by Group

	<u>1</u>	<u>2-3</u>	<u>4+</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>None</u>
Native Swede	2.9	2.1	2.8	7.9	92.1
Second Generation	2.4	2.2	0.4	5.0	95.0
Naturalized Citizen	2.0	1.7	1.5	5.2	94.8
Foreign Citizen	1.7	2.6	0.4	4.6	95.4

Source: *Foreninglivet i Sverige*

Non-European immigrants tend to be nominally more active than Nordic or European immigrants in political parties. According to survey data from the Swedish statistical office, 6.4% of the non-European immigrants surveyed claimed political party membership from 1975-1995, whereas the figures for Nordic and European immigrants were 5.5% and 5.2% respectively (*Välfärd och ojämlikhet i 20 årsperspektiv 1975-1995*). From the same survey, 7.4% of non-European immigrants attended a political meeting during the previous year, but only 4.0% of Nordic and 4.7% of European immigrants reported having attended a political meeting during the previous year. On the aggregated level, non-European immigrants only were slightly more active in political parties than Nordic and European immigrants (*Välfärd och ojämlikhet i 20 årsperspektiv 1975-1995*). In other words, non-European immigrants became party members, attended a meeting or two, but did not become party activists.

Regarding immigrants in trade unions, many immigrants are trade union members, but most are not active members. Between 1980-1985, 19.8% of immigrants in Sweden were not members in any trade union, while 91.9% of immigrant union members were not active union members (Vogel, Andersson, Davidsson, and Häll). The biggest blue collar trade union, Landsorganisationen

(LO), estimates that between 10-15 percent of its affiliates' members were born outside of Sweden (*The LO Immigration Policy Programme*). If, say, 13% of LO 2,230,490 members were foreign born, then in 1994, 289,964 LO members were foreign born (*LO Verjsanhets Berättelse 1994*).

Nordic immigrants are the most active immigrant members in the unions. This is easily explained by the existence of the common labor market agreement among the Nordic countries and by the fact that many Nordic immigrants can speak Swedish. According to *Välfärd och ojämlikhet i 20 årsperspektiv 1975-1995*, 10.1% of Nordic immigrants were classified as active union members. The figures for European and non-European immigrants were 8.8% and 6.7% respectively. Likewise, 35.9% of Nordic immigrants attended an union meeting during the previous year in comparison to 26.4% for non-European immigrants (*Välfärd och ojämlikhet i 20 årsperspektiv 1975-1995*).

Even though the LO supports the government's immigrant policies, there are two factors that hamper immigrant participation in trade unions. The first is immigrants' insufficient command of Swedish. Since meetings are conducted in Swedish, only those immigrants with a solid command of the language can fully understand and participate. Language is also a factor that limits the pool of immigrants suitable for union posts. Both immigrant union members and LO officials concur on the severity of the language barrier to effective immigrant participation in trade unions (*Dagens Nyheter* October 12, 1993; *The LO Immigration Policy Programme*). The second factor that dampens immigrant participation in trade unions is that many immigrants work in part-time, isolated,

or non-daytime jobs. Trade union membership and participation of these types of workers are low irrespective of the nationality of the worker (Vranken 1990).

Immigrants do join immigrant organizations, but mostly as passive members. Of the naturalized citizens who are members of immigrant organizations, 66% were passive members, among the foreign citizen members, 61% were passive members. These figures for passive immigrant membership compared unfavorably to the 49% and 40% passive membership for naturalized and foreign citizens who were members of sports associations. Immigrants are even less likely to be passive members if they join cultural associations. The figures were 37% and 28% passive membership for naturalized and foreign citizens who were members of cultural associations.

Participation in immigrant groups have fallen since 1984 for reasons that remain unclear. (See Table 4.19.) What Table 4.19 does make clear is that the membership of immigrant organizations has changed from 1984 to 1992. The first change is that the participation rates for naturalized and foreign citizens converged. From 1978 through 1984, foreign citizens constituted a significant proportion of the immigrant organizations' membership. By 1992, naturalized and foreign citizens had similar participation rates in immigrant organizations. Sweden's high naturalization rates could be a factor in explaining the convergence of the participation rates of naturalized and foreign citizens. On the other hand, foreign citizens might be participating less. Since I did not perform additional analysis, the study can not conclude which dynamic is primarily responsible for the convergence of these rates. The second change is that the

participation rate for white collar workers overtook the participation rate for blue collar workers by 1992. Again, three hypotheses remain unexamined. The rise in the participation rate for white collar workers could be linked to the rise in the participation rates of naturalized citizens. This hypothesis assumes that naturalized citizens tend to have white collar jobs, which is an assumption that the data contained within this study cannot support. The second hypothesis has the rise in the participation of white collar workers as preceding the fall of blue collar participation; that is, white collar workers might have “captured” the immigrant organizations. By succumbing to government pressure to initiate programs for women and children, white collar workers alienated a significant segment of blue collar workers. Though it is feasible that white collar workers were responsible for implementing the immigrant associations’ initiatives for women and children, there is little evidence that they drove immigrant members away. Finally, the rise in white collar participation might be attributed to the increase in immigrants finding white collar jobs, though there is no evidence to suggest that this happened by 1992.

Table 4.19 Participation Rates in Immigrant Organizations (in percent)

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1992</u>
Total Naturalized & Foreign Citizens	9.3	13.6	8.0
Naturalized Citizens	3.5	10.4	7.8
Foreign Citizens	14.8	17.4	8.2
Male	12.2	14.7	8.8
Female	7.1	12.7	7.3
Blue collar	12.6	15.0	6.3
White collar	4.6	8.1	10.6

Source: *Föreningslivet i Sverige*

The Swedish government encourages immigrant groups to organize by supporting the national-level, immigrant organizations with cash grants. In the government's budget, funds to national-level, immigrant organizations fall under the heading, "Immigrant Measures," which at various times have fallen under the jurisdiction of the Labor Market Department or the Culture Department. The information presented in Table 4.20 features the amounts of money that the government gave to the national-level immigrant organizations. These amounts and the proportion of the budget designated for these organizations have risen markedly.

Government funds constitute 73% of the operating budget of the national-level immigrant organizations (Bäck 1983). The rest of the operating budget is derived from the organizations' activities (14%), from other sources (12%), and from the local immigrant organizations (1%), (Bäck). Some countries do contribute funds to the immigrant organizations. From those funds, the typical

organization spends 33% on personnel, 28% on activities, 22% on publications, 9% on facilities, and 8% on grants given to the local-level organizations, but only 6% of the funds designated for the local organizations actually reach them (Bäck). In other words, there is a fund transfer leakage of 2%.

Table 4.20 Government Budget Expenditures on Immigrant Measures (in kronors)

Fiscal Year	Immigrant Measures	Of which to Immigrant National Organizations	% to Immigrant. National-level Organizations
FY 75/76	7,400,400	***	***
FY 76/77	7,675,000	***	***
FY 77/78	9,969,000	***	***
FY 78/79	15,950,000	***	***
FY 79/80	12,200,000	***	***
FY 80/81	17,550,000	***	***
FY 81/82	23,610,000	3,810,000	16
FY 82/83	15,365,000	4,645,000	30
FY 83/84	15,952,000	4,349,000	27
FY 84/85	16,530,000	4,480,000	27
FY 85/86	17,932,000	4,615,000	26
FY 86/87	13,090,000	9,650,000	74
FY 87/88	12,189,000	10,190,000	84
FY 88/89	13,073,000	11,326,000	87
FY 89/90	18,296,000	11,780,000	64
FY 90/91	20,320,000	12,251,000	60
FY 91/92	21,563,000	13,784,000	64
FY 92/93	22,426,000	***	***
FY 93/94	20,926,000	***	***

*** Information not available.

Source: Finance Department

Every major immigrant group in Sweden has a national-level organization. Serbs, Assyrians, Chileans, Eritreans, Estonians, Greeks, Icelanders, Italians, Japanese, Croatians, Kurds, Latvians, Palestinians, Poles, Portuguese, Salvadorans, Spaniards, Finns, Syrians, Turks, and Hungarians all have national-

level associations. In some cases, the immigrant group has more than one national association to represent their interests. Immigrant women have their own national organization also. As could be expected, some national organizations are more prominent than others. Because of the large number of Finns in Sweden, the National Federation for Finnish Associations is in a unique position.

The national-level, immigrant groups are primarily representative. The groups are representative through their consultative function with various officials and organizations, such as the Immigrant Council, trade unions, or administrative agencies. The consultative function serves as a tool helping immigrant groups to participate in the Swedish corporative political model. Uncooperative and difficult immigrant organizations need not be consulted or funded. Ålund and Schierup conclude that the ability of the government to shut out, both politically and financially, uncooperative immigrant groups effectively neutralizes whatever potential political power these groups might have.

National-level, immigrant organizations are not overtly political. Some immigrant leaders have political goals for their associations, but the government encourages individual immigrants to participate in politics through voting, the established political parties, or trade unions.

Even though immigrant associations are organized on the national level, they are organized on the local level too. As on the national level, some immigrant groups have more than one association to represent the same ethnic group. For example, there is a National Federation of Turkish Associations in Stockholm, but the local municipalities have their own, relatively autonomous

Turkish associations. In Sweden, there are 18 local Turkish Associations (Bäck). Rinkeby and Fittja (in Botkyrka) have separate Turkish Associations. Rinkeby has one Turkish association; in Fittja, there are two, one for Islamic Turks and the other for secular Turks. Fittja's having two Turkish organizations is not unusual given the history of modern Turkey (Ahmad 1993; Lewis 1968). These Turkish associations are in addition to the Swedish-Turkish Solidarity and Cultural Association and various sports clubs.

Like their counterparts on the national level, the local immigrant associations receive partial financing from the county or municipal government. A typical local association receives 36% of its operating budget from the municipality, 27% from activities, 10% from member fees, 10% from the national government, 10% from other sources, and 6% from the national level immigrant association (Bäck). A typical local association spends 63% of its budget for facilities, 31% for activities, 1% for personnel, 1% for publications, and 1% for grants to the national association.

The local immigrant associations are not overtly political, though some association leaders may have a political agenda. For example, one of the major political items of the Turkish Association in Rinkeby is to be recognized as an ethnic minority group for the purposes of minority politics. The recognition of minority group politics is explicitly against the accepted policy norms for both the Swedish government and the existing political parties. It remains unclear if discouragement from the government and the political parties contributes to the relative apolitical nature of the associations. To what degree that the

government's position contributes to the fact that only 11.3% of those who belong to an immigrant organization also belong to a political party is unknown (*Foreninglivet i Sverige*). In comparison, 62.1% of those who are members of a women's organization are also members of a political party; 29.2% of peace organization members belong to a political party; 27.8% of sobriety society members are political party members; 26.6% of local action group participants are political party members; and 23.4% of those who are members of a humanitarian organization are also members of a political party (*Foreninglivet i Sverige*). One cross membership statistic that is lower than the immigrant association-political party statistic is that for employed trade union members who are also members of political parties. That cross membership statistic is 10.8%, of what is admittedly a much larger membership base (*Foreninglivet i Sverige*).

Immigrant organizations may also serve an ethnosociological function. It is well documented that especially for rural and older Turks, the Turkish associations tend to replicate the social functions performed by the café in Turkey (Engelbrektsson; Lundberg and Svanberg 1991; Yazgan 1993). The tendency for local immigrant associations to be meeting places rather than political action vehicles may partly explain the significant expenditures that these groups allot to facilities.

Similar to many associations, immigrant associations have a small active membership. Active membership suffers in regards to women, youth, and Swedish members (Castles and Miller; Engelbrektsson; Lithman 1987; Lundberg and Svanberg; Soysal; Yazgan). There are a number of possible factors that serve

to diminish active membership. In spite of strong pressure from the Swedish government, immigrant women still are not treated as equal members of many associations. In the Turkish associations, women officially can become full voting members, but in reality, their participation is heavily controlled by their husbands or by the behavioral norms for Muslim women. At the government's insistence, associations have sponsored special programs geared to meet the needs of immigrant women. The Turkish Association in Rinkeby is no exception in this regards. In December 1994 it opened a center for Turkish Women.

Young people join the immigrant associations, but do not consider the association as a crucial part of their lives (Yazgan). Second generation Turkish boys, especially those whose parents are from urban areas in Turkey, are likely to be active participants in Swedish associations (Yazgan). Since the Turkish associations tend to replicate the social function of the café in Turkey, association leaders have a difficult time sustaining active participation among the second generation who are not intimately familiar with life in Turkey. Consequently, immigrant associations view cultural education and maintenance as a critical function of their organizations.

In regard to Swedish-immigrant interaction, many events sponsored by immigrant associations do not draw a large enough number of Swedes to make Swedish-immigrant interaction meaningful, (Lundberg and Svanberg). This fact was confirmed in interviews with leaders in the Turkish Association in Rinkeby.

Furthermore, the local associations experience difficulty in defining a political, non-cultural agenda. Goals not related to cultural maintenance are

difficult for immigrant associations to define and pursue because the package of social welfare benefits can provide the basic needs of immigrants, thereby removing the economic basis upon which many goals might be formed. Besides, troublesome groups can lose government funding, be excluded from consultative forums, or both. Yet the economic difficulties of the 1990s have given immigrant groups more latitude to pursue economic goals via political channels. Since the local authorities are encouraging immigrants to contribute solutions to ease their unemployment, some associations have come to view the situation as a possible opportunity for politics.

Finally, religion is important for many immigrants, but perhaps not religious institutions. For example, 19.5% of non-European immigrants reported having attended a church service during the 1975-1995 period; the figure for native Swedes is 9.0% (*Välfärd och ojämlikhet i 20 årsperspektiv 1975-1995*). Immigrant women attend religious services more than men; and the elderly, (65-84 years old), attend more than any age group (*Politiska resurser och aktiviteter*). Still, similar to the official state church, immigrant religious institutions have a limited social role and remain politically neutral. The social role of religious organizations is limited because Sweden's extensive welfare state attempts to provide whatever economic and social needs immigrants may have. It is unclear why immigrant religious organizations are politically neutral.

For the case of Turks, to be a Turk is to be Muslim, but many do not go to mosque or consistently practice their faith (Engelbrektsson; Yazgan). The waning of a practiced faith goes beyond the tension between modernity accompanied by

secularization and that of a traditional, Islam permeated society. (This struggle continues to play itself out in Turkish politics and society.) Turks, and immigrants in general, attribute their failure to sustain past religious practices to their economic or social situation in Sweden. In some cases, the local religious institution might be under the aegis of an undesirable group. In Rinkeby, the mosque is open to all Muslims, though the Turkish Association of Rinkeby is its sponsor. Kurdish immigrants, many of which are Turkish citizens, view the arrangement as unacceptable. In this case, the current treatment of Kurds by the Turkish government is viewed as an impediment to accepting the Turkish Association's sponsorship of the mosque. The mosque in Rinkeby is avowedly apolitical.

This chapter presented the general welfare of immigrants in Sweden as being consistently below the national average. Consider the following conclusion regarding immigrants in an official investigation on welfare in Sweden at the end of the 1970s. (The underlining is in the report text.)

Immigrants. In most respects, such as childhood conditions, working conditions, standard of living and quality of life, immigrants too are clearly less favored than both the mean population and workers in general. South Europeans are particularly exposed, and they must be considered to be the population group in Sweden with the most unfavorable welfare profile. Their low standard of living and disadvantages in respect of quality of life cannot be explained merely by lack of education.

(Social Report on Inequality in Sweden, Distribution of Welfare at the end of the 1970s)

The social welfare patterns of immigrants in Sweden are similar to that of immigrants in most other countries (Widgren 1982a). This conclusion was true when Jonas Widgren made it in 1982, and still seems to be true. The major exception to this conclusion regards immigrant associational life. For the most part, immigrants and Swedes are members and participate in the same types of associations.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN SWEDEN

Voting and holding elective offices are arguably the two most important political rights that countries extend to its citizens. Sweden is unique in that it not only extended voting and office holding rights to non-citizens, but that it was one of the first countries to do so in 1975. (Only Ireland extended these rights to non-citizens earlier in 1973.) By allowing immigrants to vote in local elections and hold local elective offices, Sweden could claim that it took its partnership with immigrants seriously. Though immigrants in Sweden did not pressure the government for political rights, immigrants acquired unqualified access to the local franchise through which they could express their political sentiments. While local governments in Sweden are not primarily responsible for formulating economic and social policies, local governments do have a significant role in the execution of social policy. Recent devolution of additional administrative responsibilities to local governments serves to strengthen the position of local governments in the provision and allocation of social benefits. Immigrants, therefore, should have every incentive to vote in order to exert control on the distribution of local resources.

Although immigrants would seem to have strong incentives to vote, the paradox that this chapter examines is immigrants' low and declining voting participation. Chapter Four revealed that immigrants as a whole were not as involved in political parties and labor unions, (the two main types of political actors in Swedish politics). Consequently, it might be reasonable to expect that

foreign citizen voters would have lower voter turnouts than Swedish citizen voters. The voting data presented in this chapter confirms this expectation. Still, immigrants' declining voting participation is a phenomenon that needs to be explained, especially in light of local governments' increasing control of the administration of social policy. Chapter Four also revealed that non-European immigrants preferred involvement in political parties than European immigrants, while European immigrants gravitated towards union involvement. (See Table 5.1.) Therefore it is reasonable to expect that non-European immigrants would have higher voter turnouts than European immigrants in Sweden's local elections. Yet the voting data suggests a much more complex dynamic at work in regards to European and non-European immigrant voters in Sweden.

Table 5.1 Summary of Immigrants' Participation in Political Associations in Sweden

	All I	N	E	Other I	All P	2SP
Political party member	6.0	5.5	5.2	6.4	10.1	10.6
Active in political party	1.7	1.6	1.7	2.3	2.6	2.7
At a political meeting last year	5.0	4.0	4.7	7.4	6.4	6.5
Member of union (employed)	79.9	83.6	75.8	77.0	83.5	84.1
Active in union (employed)	8.6	10.1	8.8	6.7	10.8	11.1
At union meeting last year (employed)	30.8	35.9	27.9	26.4	37.0	37.7

All I = all immigrants

N = immigrants from Nordic countries

E = Immigrants from European countries

Other I = immigrants from all other non-European countries

All P = Entire population

2SP = all persons born in Sweden with both parents also born in Sweden

Source: *Välfärd och ojämlikhet i 20 årsperspektiv (1975-1995)*

This chapter examines the voting data in an effort to assess immigrant political participation in Sweden. Sweden is one of five countries, (Ireland, Denmark, The Netherlands, and Norway being the other four), that allows immigrants to vote. The voting data should corroborate the findings of the survey

data of Chapter Four. Instead, the voting data suggests that the survey data on political associations presents an incomplete story. Perhaps the survey data inflates immigrant participation in political associations because it contains figures starting from the time Sweden allowed immigrants to vote in 1975. The voting data, on the other hand, indicates that immigrant political participation in Sweden is on the decline.

Since 1975, the Swedish government granted immigrants who have resided legally in the country for three years the right to vote in local elections as well as the right to run for and hold elected local offices. At that time, the Swedish government heralded the extension of these privileges to immigrants as a significant step towards realizing its goal of partnership with immigrants. Supporters of Sweden's immigrant policy hoped that with political enfranchisement, immigrants would be encouraged to voice their views as well as seek political partnerships. In the event that immigrants were not terribly interested in politics, the possibility for influencing how social welfare funds and services were allocated would prove a powerful draw for immigrants' political participation.

The evidence presented here suggests that allowing immigrants to vote and hold local offices has failed to foster or sustain their ability to form political partnerships or their voting participation. Across the board, foreign citizens are less likely to vote than Swedish citizens. Voting participation levels vary among different foreign citizen groups, but immigrant voting participation has steadily declined since 1976, the year citizens were first able to vote in local elections. No

one reason emerges that decisively explains the lower and declining immigrant voter turnout, but immigrant demographics provide a compelling account for much of the decline in immigrant voting. This study cannot attribute conclusively the political situation of immigrants in Sweden to their low voting, their political marginalization either in the eyes of immigrants or Swedes, or the ineffective political activities pursued by immigrant groups.

The chapter presents its findings in three sections. The first section is a presentation and analysis of immigrant voting participation in Sweden. The second section examines the possible explanations for the voting participation data. The third section attempts to further the analysis by examining immigrant political involvement in non-voting forums. The third section focuses on immigrant interaction with the Discrimination Ombudsman, the activities of the Cooperative Group for Immigrant Organizations in Sweden (SIOS) and the National Federation of Turkish Associations, and the operations of the local Turkish Association in Rinkeby.

Immigrants in Sweden: Political Participation

Since 1975, immigrants who are residents for three years can vote in the local elections. Given this fact, the obvious question is to what degree do immigrants exercise this right. The data addresses this question on four levels: aggregate, party, comparative local, and statistical. On the aggregate level, immigrants vote less than Swedish citizens, though some immigrant groups are more likely to vote than others. Immigrant women are also more likely to vote than immigrant men. When immigrants do vote, they overwhelmingly vote for the

Social Democrats. The only clear pattern that emerges from the voting data is that voting districts with higher percentages of foreign citizens have lower turnouts of eligible voters participating in local elections. Statistical analysis of the data suggests two conclusions: immigrant voters depress voter turnout, but the effects are not uniform across districts; and that other factors other than age distribution, income, and unemployment play a role in voter turnout, but it is not clear what these other factors might be.

Immigrants do vote, but at consistently lower levels than Swedish citizens. (See Table 5.2.) Furthermore, there is a downward trend in immigrant voting participation. As the table clearly shows, foreign citizens vote at considerably lower rates than the national rate. Both immigrant and national voting rates have been in decline from 1976 through 1994, but the decline has been steeper for immigrants (20%) than for the nation as a whole (7%). An increase in candidates of immigrant background holding offices and on the parties' candidate lists has done little to reverse the decline in immigrant voting. (Sweden has a proportional representation system where voters cast ballots for parties, not individuals. Individuals are placed in office in proportion to the votes the party garners.)

Table 5.2 Voting Turnout for Local Elections in Percentage of Registered Voters, 1976-1994

Election Year	Foreign Citizens	National
1976	60	91
1979	53	89
1980*	53	76
1982	52	90
1985	48	88
1988	43	84
1991	41	84
1994	40	84

* In 1980 there was a national referendum on Swedish nuclear policy in which the government decided that foreign residents could participate if they were entitled to vote in local elections.

Source: *Allmänna Valen, Del 3* and *Hammar 1990b:56*.

The general outlook on immigrant voting participation conceals important variations among the immigrant groups. Some immigrant groups vote more than others. (See Table 5.3.) German citizens consistently have above average voter turnouts than other foreign citizens. With the exception of 1976 and 1979, Turkish citizens vote at the same levels as Germans. The considerable dissimilarities between the two groups complicate identifying suitable hypotheses for testing. For example, Germans are among the wealthiest immigrants in Sweden while Turks are among the poorest. Germans are among the most educated immigrants while Turks are considerably less educated. German immigrants live in the better neighborhoods in Stockholm county, Turks live in what Swedes consider some of the worst neighborhoods.

The declines in voting have been steepest for Greek and Yugoslavian citizens. Possible explanations for the decline are explored in the next section. At this point it is unclear whether citizens from Chile will resemble the German and

Turkish citizens, or the ones from Greece and Yugoslavia. Contrary to what might have been expected, the voting participation of Nordic immigrants has not been especially high. The participation for Finns, the largest immigrant group in Sweden, could be considered exceptionally low.

Finnish voting participation, when compared with Turkish voting participation, is somewhat of a paradox. One popular image of Finnish immigrants is that they are unmarried men who work for short periods in Sweden, but eventually return to Finland. Consequently, they do not invest much of their lives in the local Swedish community. Under these conditions, educating oneself about local issues is less crucial to the Finnish immigrant's well being. The high return migration rate for Finns can be interpreted to support this view. Turks and their families tend to resettle in Sweden permanently. They have a direct incentive, (the well being of their spouses and children), to know how local issues might effect their lives. The low return migration rate of Turks and the higher voting participation of Turkish women, (51% for women versus 43% for men in the 1994 election), can be interpreted to support this view. Again, the possible theories that purport to explain immigrant voter turnout are examined later.

Table 5.3 Voter Turnout for Local Elections in Percentage of Registered Voters by Citizenship, 1976-1988

Citizenship	1976	1979	1982	1985	1988	1991	1994
Chile	**	**	**	77	70	65	59
Denmark	57	46	49	46	41	42	45
Ethiopia	**	**	**	**	**	**	34
Finland	56	51	49	45	39	35	40
Germany	67	64	61	59	52	51	51
Greece	76	65	61	49	46	37	28
Iraq	**	**	**	**	**	**	42
Iran	**	**	**	38	39	41	41
Italy	61	60	58	52	50	44	49
Norway	59	54	52	49	45	46	42
Poland	64	59	54	47	40	36	32
Turkey	63	62	61	59	52	51	51
United Kingdom	71	57	55	54	50	48	48
United States	45	45	47	45	44	43	40
Yugoslavia	66	56	52	45	38	35	27

Source: *Allmänna Valen, Del 3.*

Immigrant women vote more than immigrant men. (See Table 5.4.) This pattern held firm even in the midst of declining voter turnout. Among Finnish citizens, women voted more than men, though this pattern was not consistent across age groups and across time. In 1976, Finnish men above 55 years old had higher voting participation rates than Finnish women in the same age group. From 1979 through 1988, Finnish women in every age bracket had higher participation rates. During the 1991 and 1994 elections, Finnish men above 65 years old had higher voter turnout rates than women in the same age group. The pattern is different for Turkish citizens. From 1976 through the 1982 elections, the voting participation rates for Turkish men were higher than that for Turkish women. There was no difference between the voting participation rates for Turkish men and women in 1985. From 1988 through the 1994 elections, Turkish

women had higher voting rates in every age group until the age of 50, after which Turkish men voted more than Turkish women. At this point, the reasons are unclear why immigrant women, especially those from non-western societies, tend to vote more than immigrant men.

Table 5.4 Voter Participation Rates by Sex and for Finnish and Turkish Citizens by Sex

	1976	1979	1982	1985	1988	1991	1994
Men	60	51	49	45	40	38	37
Women	61	56	55	51	45	44	44
Finnish Men	55	48	44	40	35	29	32
Finnish Women	57	55	54	49	43	39	46
Turkish Men	70	63	62	54	51	50	43
Turkish Women	54	60	60	54	56	53	51


Source: *Allmänna Valen, Del 3*.

When immigrants vote, they tend to vote for parties of the left, and for the Social Democratic Party in particular. For example, Turks in the Stockholm area overwhelmingly support the Social Democrats (Lundberg and Svanberg 1991). Both trends, the declining immigrant voting participation and the Social Democratic orientation, are evident in Rinkeby. Voter turnout declined throughout the 1979-1991 elections from about 77% to about 57%, but 50% of the votes cast were for the Social Democratic Party and 15% for the Left (Communist) Party, resulting in a total of 65% of all votes cast in Rinkeby going to these two parties of the left (*Stadsdelsutveckling i Rinkeby, 1974-1992*). The Conservative Party received an average of 10% of the vote. All "other" parties, excluding the People's (Liberal) and Center (Agrarian) parties, received approximately 15% of the votes cast (*Stadsdelsutveckling i Rinkeby, 1974-1992*). Without going into detail, it is sufficient to note that the local election returns


from 1976-1994 confirm the tendency of immigrants to vote for left parties. The two factors that might help explain the immigrants' orientation towards left parties are that voters with children and the working class in Sweden tend to vote for the Social Democrats (SM 9801 Me60, 17, 29). Immigrants' families tend to have more children than the typical native Swede family; and immigrants tend to be a part of the working class.

From the district voting returns, two conclusions emerge. The first conclusion is that districts with higher proportions of foreign citizens as eligible voters have lower voter participation rates than the city administrative districts (for Stockholm) or the municipalities (cities within Stockholm county) where they reside. The second conclusion is that interdistrict comparisons of immigrant voting rates yield ambiguous conclusions. The first conclusion emerges immediately from the data, but the second conclusion emerges only from a more detailed analysis.


Graph 5.1a Voter Turnout in Spanga #19




Graph 5.1b Voter Turnout in Spanga #22




Graph 5.1c Voter Turnout in Spanga #23




Graph 5.1d Voter Turnout in Botkyrka #19



Graph 5.1e Voter Turnout in Sodertalje #31



Graph 5.1f Voter Turnout in Spanga #4



In regards to the first conclusion, Graphs 5.1 depict this phenomenon clearly. Spånga 4, Spånga 19, Spånga 22, and Spånga 23 are voting districts in Stockholm, while Botkyrka 19 and Södertälje 31 are voting districts in their respective municipalities, Botkyrka and Södertälje. All of these electoral districts, with the exception of Spånga 4 and Spånga 23 in 1988, have higher proportions of foreign citizens as eligible voters than the city administrative district or municipality. Again, with the exception of Spånga 4 and Spånga 23 in 1988, at no time did any of these districts have voter turnouts higher than the city administrative district or municipality average. In 1988 when the newly formed Spånga 23 district had a lower percent of foreign citizens in its voting population than the city administrative district (Spånga), its voting participation rate was well above the voter participation average in Spånga. Spånga 22 and 23 (Rinkeby), which are the poorest and most heavily immigrant communities in Stockholm county, also have the lowest voter turnouts in the entire county. In comparison, Spånga 4, which has the lowest immigrant concentration in Spånga, also has the highest voter participation rates in Spånga. Of the seven elections between 1976 and 1994, Spånga 4 had four years with 90%+ voter turnouts, which are well above the administrative district's average. Botkyrka 19's voter turnout approached the municipality's average only when its foreign citizen voter average approached levels found in the municipality at large.



The relationship highlighted in the previous paragraph also exists in the wealthy administrative districts and municipalities in Stockholm county, though the wealthy administrative districts and municipalities in Stockholm county do not

have anything near the high concentrations of foreign citizens as Spånga, Botkyrka, and Södertälje. In Lidingö and Danderyd, two of the wealthiest municipalities in Sweden, the electoral districts with high concentrations of immigrants, (Lidingö 23 and Danderyd 19), also have noticeably lower electoral turnouts than the municipality average.

These patterns remain unchanged in poor municipalities with low concentrations of immigrants. In poor cities with few immigrants, the voting districts that have higher concentrations of foreign citizens than the municipal average also experience lower voter turnout rates. In Norrtälje and Nynäshamn, which are two of the poorest municipalities in Stockholm county that also have two of the lowest concentrations of immigrants within the county, voting participation in districts with high concentrations of immigrant voters, (Hallsta Norra in Norrtälje and Nynäshamn 9), are lower than the city average.

Simple graphs and observations are of limited value when comparing voting participation between districts. Graphs 5.2 reveals that higher foreign citizen populations of eligible voters do not always translate into lower voter turnouts. Spånga 7 has comparable, and at times, even higher voting participation rates than Danderyd 6, despite the fact that foreign citizens generally constitute a higher proportion of Spånga 7's total voters, and that Danderyd's residents earn higher incomes. Even within the same municipality, there are exceptions to the correlation between immigrant voters and low voter turnout. Hallsta Norra and Björkö-Arholma are both within Norrtälje, but Hallsta Norra, with a much higher concentration of immigrants than Björkö-Arholma, also has a slightly higher voter

turnout than Björkö-Arholma. Björkö-Arholma's concentration of immigrant voters is never more than 2% before the district was disbanded in 1994, (compared to Hallsta Norra's average of 16.2% immigrant voters). Findings such as these suggest that other factors besides the proportion of immigrant voters influence voter turnout. This hypothesis is examined next.



In order to assess the degree that other factors influence voter turnout, it is important to specify the extent that non-citizen voters influence voter turnout. To accomplish this task, voting data was collected from the voting districts for cities within Stockholm county for the 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, and 1994 Stockholm county council elections. Since immigrants are allowed to vote only on the local level, the voting data pertained only to the election of the local governing bodies, in this case the county council. The voting data consisted of the percentage of eligible non-citizen voters and the percentage voter turnout. From this data universe, the regression analysis focused on a data subset comprising of the administrative district of Spånga in the city of Stockholm, along with the cities of Solna, Sundbyberg, Norrtälje, Nynäshamn, Lidingö and Danderyd. Spånga is the administrative district in Stockholm with a high immigrant population. Solna and Sundbyberg, both strongholds for the Social Democratic Party, have increasing populations of naturalized and non-citizen immigrants. Norrtälje and Nynäshamn, which are among the poorest municipalities in the county, are also cities with some of the lowest immigrant populations in the county. Lidingö and Danderyd have a threefold distinction. They are among the richest municipalities in the entire country, are strongholds for bourgeois parties, and have low immigrant populations, (though not as low as Norrtälje and Nynäshamn). A descriptive analysis of the data follows in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics for Voter Turnout Data (Subset)

Location	Descriptive Statistic	Citizen Voters	Non-Citizen Voters	Voter Turnout
Danderyd	Average (Mean)	0.96	0.04	0.91
	Maximum	0.98	0.09	0.97
	Minimum	0.91	0.02	0.79
	Range	0.07	0.07	0.18
Lidingo	Average (Mean)	0.95	0.05	0.89
	Maximum	0.99	0.12	0.96
	Minimum	0.88	0.01	0.74
	Range	0.1	0.1	0.23
Norrtalje	Average (Mean)	0.97	0.03	0.86
	Maximum	1	0.22	0.93
	Minimum	0.78	0	0.74
	Range	0.22	0.22	0.19
Nynashamn	Average (Mean)	0.98	0.02	0.89
	Maximum	1	0.09	0.96
	Minimum	0.91	0	0.76
	Range	0.09	0.09	0.2
Solna	Average (Mean)	0.92	0.08	0.84
	Maximum	0.98	0.3	0.93
	Minimum	0.7	0.02	0.64
	Range	0.28	0.28	0.29
Spanga	Average (Mean)	0.76	0.24	0.76
	Maximum	0.98	0.6	0.95
	Minimum	0.4	0.02	0.47
	Range	0.58	0.58	0.48
Sundbyberg	Average (Mean)	0.93	0.07	0.84
	Maximum	0.99	0.2	0.95
	Minimum	0.8	0.01	0.69
	Range	0.2	0.2	0.26

The descriptive statistics confirms that higher average percentages of non-citizen voters are correlated with larger ranges in the percentage of voter turnout. The correlation between the range of the % Voter Turnout and the average % of Non-Citizen Voters is 0.98, meaning that large ranges of the % Voter Turnout are associated with large averages of the % Non-Citizen Voters. The correlation

between the average % Non-Citizen Voters and the average % Voter Turnout is -0.81, meaning that small increases of the % Non-Citizen Voters are associated with large decreases in the % Voter Turnout.

Regression analysis reveals more about the possible relationships between voter turnout and the presence of non-citizen voters. Regression #1, which is unconventional by its use of the absolute numbers of voters and non-citizen voters as data, predictably shows that Non-Citizens Voters contribute less to the total voter turnout. But Regression #1 has a suspiciously high adjusted R^2 of 0.96. Regression #2 uses percentage data for non-citizen voters and voter turnout. The constant in Regression #2 was forced to go through zero. Without doing this, the intercept for the regression would have been -0.61, which is unproblematic. However the coefficients for the % of Citizen Voters and % of Non-Citizen Voters would have been 0.88 and 1.51 respectively. Conceptually and empirically, the data does not support these coefficients. The coefficient of 0.27 confirms how little the presence of non-citizen voters contributes to total voter turnout.

Regression #1:

$$\text{Voter Turnout} = \text{Constant} + \text{Citizen Voters} + \text{Non-citizen Voters}$$

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.98
R Square	0.96
Adjusted R Square	0.96
Standard Error	51.34
Observations	1024

<i>Coefficients</i>	
Intercept	11.22
Citizen Voters	0.89
Non-Citizen Voters	0.26

Regression #2:

$$\% \text{ Voter Turnout} = \% \text{ Citizen Voters} + \% \text{ Non-citizen Voters}$$

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.81
R Square	0.65
Adjusted R Square	0.65
Standard Error	0.04
Observations	1024

<i>Coefficients</i>	
Intercept	0
% of Citizen Voters	0.90
% of Non-Citizen Voters	0.27

Surely other factors besides the presence of non-citizen voters must influence voter turnout. Table 5.6 and Regressions #3 and #4 attempt to determine the degree to which other factors influence voter turnout. For parsimony sake, I have selected the “usual suspects” that arguably should influence voter turnout: unemployment, income, and party electoral strength. Unemployment is measured by the unemployment rate for the municipality. Tax

power denotes the amount of tax revenues per capita, standardized in 1985 kronors, that the municipality raised in the appropriate election year. In Sweden, greater tax power directly corresponds to a municipality's affluence. The percentage of votes that the two major political parties in Sweden garnered in each municipal election represents the party electoral strength. Below is a table of the correlation coefficients, highlighting the basic relationships between selected variables.

Table 5.6 Correlation Coefficients

	Correlations	
	%	
	<i>Non-Citizen Voters</i>	<i>Voter Turnout</i>
Municipal U Rate	0.13	-0.35
Tax Power (1985=100)	0.06	0.33
M	-0.33	0.49
S	0.33	-0.43

M = Conservative Party S = Social Democrats

Table 5.6 confirms the presence of the political relationships usually found in Swedish politics. Large values of unemployment are associated with lower voter turnout and are positively correlated with the presence of non-citizen voters. Large tax power values are correlated with higher voter turnout, but not with the presence of non-citizen voters. The higher the voter turnout, the higher proportion of votes the Conservative Party is likely to receive. Conversely, the lower the voter turnout, the Social Democratic Party garners a higher proportion of votes. Even though the Conservative Party's strongholds are the metropolitan regions in Sweden, the party must get out the vote in municipalities with few immigrants in order to do well. The Conservative Party does not do well in communities with high proportions of immigrant voters.

Regression #3:

% Voter Turnout = % Citizen Voters + % Non-Citizen Voters +
U Rate + Tax Power (1985=100)

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.86
R Square	0.73
Adjusted R Square	0.73
Standard Error	0.04
Observations	1024

<i>Coefficients</i>	
Intercept	0
% of Citizen Voters	0.94
% of Non-Citizen Voters	0.32
U Rate	-0.16
Tax Power (1985=100)	0.00

Unlike Table 5.6, Regression #3 does yield two unexpected results. The first is that the coefficient for the tax power variable is so small to the point that it is effectively zero, suggesting that the affluence of the municipality has very little affect on voter turnout. Table 5.5 suggests that such a relationship might be possible since Norrtälje and Nynäshamn, two of the poorest municipalities in Stockholm County, have voter turnouts comparable to those of Lidingö and Danderyd. Therefore, the effects of wealth on voter turnout needs further analysis, an analysis which cannot occur here. Furthermore, the coefficient for the unemployment rate is not as strong as the correlation value would predict. When the variable for tax power is dropped as in Regression #4, then the regression coefficients are more in line with what would be conceptually consistent.

Regression #4:

$$\% \text{ Voter Turnout} = \% \text{ Non-Citizen Voters} + \% \text{ Citizen Voters} + \text{U Rate}$$

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.84
R Square	0.71
Adjusted R Square	0.71
Standard Error	0.04
Observations	1024

<i>Coefficients</i>	
Intercept	0
% of Citizen Voters	0.91
% of Non-Citizen Voters	0.31
U Rate	-0.89

Regressions #5 and #6 attempt to assess the impact of citizen and non-citizen voters on voter turnout within four municipalities in Stockholm county. Regression #5 focuses on Solna and Sundbyberg, which are cities where immigrants are becoming an increasing proportion of its residents. Regression #6 focuses on Norrtälje and Nynäshamn, which are communities with low proportions of non-citizen voters.

Two findings emerge from Regressions #2, #5, and #6. The first finding is that the proportion of citizen voters within a municipality has the same influence on voter turnout. The coefficients for the % of Citizen Voters in Regressions #2, #5, and #6 are 0.90, 0.89, and 0.88 respectively, yet the proportion of non-citizen voters in the three equations vastly differ. Swedish citizens, so it seems, have the same propensity to vote despite their socio-economic differences. This finding explicitly includes naturalized citizens.

The second finding is that while the increasing proportion of immigrant voters might serve as an useful predictor of voter turnout, the opposite is not

necessarily true; that is, voter turnout may not be related directly to the low proportion of immigrant voters in the communities that happen to have low proportions of immigrant voters. The coefficients for the % of Non-Citizen Voters in Regressions #2, #5, and #6 are different: 0.27, 0.17, and 0.27 respectively. The difference suggests that while the increasing presence of non-citizen voters may depress the coefficient for the % of Non-Citizen Voters, the opposite is not true. In Solna and Sundbyberg, non-citizen voters arguably contribute less to the total voter turnout than they do for the entire data subset. The R^2 for Regression #6 is 0.12, meaning that the regression can explain only 12% of the observed variance in the voter turnout. The R^2 for Regression #6 is much lower than those for #2 or #5. The number of observations for Regressions #5 and #6 are the same. Consequently, other socio-economic and political factors are driving voter turnout in municipalities with low proportions of immigrant voters.

Regression #5:

**% Voter Turnout = % Citizen Voters + % Non-citizen Voters
in Solna and Sundbyberg**

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.68
R Square	0.46
Adjusted R Square	0.46
Standard Error	0.04
Observations	315

<i>Coefficients</i>	
Intercept	0
% Citizen Voters	0.89
% Non-Citizen Voters	0.17

Regression #6:

**% Voter Turnout = % Citizen Voters + % Non-citizen Voters
in Nynashamn and Norrtälje**

<i>Regression Statistics</i>	
Multiple R	0.35
R Square	0.12
Adjusted R Square	0.12
Standard Error	0.04
Observations	315

<i>Coefficients</i>	
Intercept	0.00
% Citizen Voters	0.88
% Non-Citizen Voters	0.27

In summary, the descriptive statistics and regression exercises support two primary points. The first point is that non-citizen voters do vote less than citizens, but the lower participation is not uniform across all non-citizen groups or all municipalities. This point is not unexpected considering that some immigrant

groups are more likely to vote than others and that immigrants tend to live in enclaves along with compatriots.

A hypothesis worthy of further exploration is that in voting districts with higher concentrations of non-citizen voters, there are also higher concentrations of naturalized citizens who do not vote. Thereby lower voter turnouts in voting districts with high non-citizen voters are partly due to the failure of naturalized citizens to vote. Regressions #2 and #5 suggest that this relationship might not exist, but conceptually, the hypothesis cannot be ruled out. I develop this argument further in the next section. If the hypothesis is true, then a liberal naturalization policy does not necessarily promote immigrant participation.

The first conclusion has important ramifications for the Social Democratic Party, the immigrants' party of choice. Since the bourgeois parties are strongest in Sweden's three largest municipalities, the Social Democrats need every advantage to do well there. Luckily for the Social Democrats, 54% of the immigrant population in 1994 lives in Stockholm, Malmö, and Gothenburg counties. The challenge for the Social Democrats is to reverse the trend of declining non-citizen voter turnout. Reversing this trend is obviously important because the Social Democratic Party needs the votes, but also because of the possibility that higher non-citizen voting populations also translate into lower (naturalized) citizen voter turnouts. The added challenge for the Social Democrats is to identify and target immigrant groups or areas that will produce a better yield of non-citizen votes.

The second conclusion is that income differences do not contribute much to the level of voter turnout. An unspoken but somewhat obvious conclusion is that the descriptive statistics and regression exercises reveal nothing regarding the reasons voters choose to vote or refrain from voting. Still, the declining levels of immigrant voting seem to demand an explanation.

Immigrants in Sweden: Explanations for Voting Participation Patterns

Immigrants' lower voting rates are not the phenomenon that begs for an explanation; rather, it is the magnitude of the steady decline of immigrant voting. Between 1976 and 1994, voting participation in Sweden declined 7%, (from 91% to 84%), whereas the decline for immigrant voters was 20%, (60% to 40%). The theories that purport to explain the drop in immigrant voting can be classified into four groups: those based on demographics, those based on immigrants having a deficit of some kind, those based on the reasons for immigration, and those based on the rules defining membership. This section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each in turn, followed by an alternative explanation that provides, I believe, a closer fit to the political experiences of immigrants in Sweden.

A common explanation for immigrant political behavior is demographics. Demographic explanations for immigrant political behavior rely on the fact that immigrants are usually young, unmarried, and come with little education and income. By implication, immigrants are not at the stage where voting is a high priority in their lives. Instead, immigrants are more concerned with becoming economically stable, finding a spouse and starting a family, and acquiring the basic information or contacts that will enhance their daily lives. Voting may

become important for immigrants at some point in the future, but not in the short or medium term. Voting participation comes only after immigrants have become economically stable, form families, and have resided in the country of immigration for many years. The voting data does confirm that older men for some immigrant groups and married persons are more likely to vote. Income and education levels generally are undisputed factors that positively influence political involvement; yet the data regarding these two factors in Sweden yield inconclusive information.

In Sweden's case, demographic factors can adequately explain the decline in immigrant voting, but not why the decline for certain immigrant groups is steeper than the decline for other groups. Nor can demographic explanations account for the tendency for immigrant women to vote more than immigrant men; especially since many non-Nordic, immigrant women in Sweden have not been in the country as long as the men, are employed less often than men, are in the labor market less often than men, or come from countries devoid of liberal western views of women. This discussion will not address the differences between the voting rates between immigrant men and women.


A possible explanation for the decline in immigrant voting is that the immigrant voting pool changed or increased. A change in the immigrant voter pool could occur if significant numbers of persons emigrated only to be replaced by new immigrants. A 'rotation' in the composition of the immigrant voter population would mean that immigrant voters are likely to be younger and less inclined to vote. If the immigrant voting population increased, then the new

voters would likely be young persons, who are not inclined to vote. The rise in net migration to Sweden beginning in 1974 and again in 1983 shows that the immigrant voting population clearly grew. (See Graph 5.3.) The increase in immigrants in 1974 means that these persons would obtain their voting rights beginning in 1977, after the 1976 elections. In 1972 and 1973, there was negative net migration to Sweden, meaning that the immigrant voting population was contracting during the first election in which immigrants could vote. The 1979 elections would be the first elections where immigrants who arrived in 1974 would be eligible to vote. Immigrant voting participation dropped 7% (from 60% to 53%) from 1976 to 1979. As net migration increased beginning in 1983, immigrant voting participation continued its protracted descent. Immigrant voting participation declined by 8% (from 48% to 40%) from 1985 to 1994. (Naturalization rates as a percentage of the foreign population in Sweden remained relatively constant from 1980 until 1992. The naturalization rate increased in 1993.) The downward voting trend may have been reinforced by the fact that the new immigrants were from places outside Europe such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Chile, Iran, and Iraq. These immigrants came from places and situations where they had limited contact with West European political mechanisms.

Increasing net migration from non-European lands provides a plausible explanation for decreasing immigrant voting rates, but increasing net migration cannot explain the decrease in voting of some immigrant groups from Europe. The voting rates for Greeks, Poles, and Yugoslavs declined, but these groups have non-growing populations and have lived in Sweden for a long time. The

population of Greeks, Poles, and Yugoslavs in Sweden had stabilized by 1989, but from 1988 to 1994, the voting participation rates for these groups declined 18%, 8%, and 11% respectively. (See Table 5.4.) Table 5.5 breaks down in more detail the duration of time various immigrants groups have resided in Sweden as of 12/31/89. As of 12/31/89, 75.9% and 80.1% of all Greeks and Yugoslavs respectively had lived in Sweden over ten years. In contrast, the participation rates for immigrants from Germany, Turkey, and the United Kingdom experienced modest declines during the same 1988-1994 period.

Graph 5.3 Net Migration to Sweden (1967-1992)



Source: *Svensk Invandrar Politik*
Invandrar och Flyttingpolitiken
Immigrant and Refugee Policy

Table 5.4 Duration of Stay as of 12/31/89 and Voter Turnout in Local Elections of Foreign Persons by Country

Country	% Foreign Born in Sweden >5 years	% Voter Turnout in 1988	% Voter Turnout in 1991	% Voter Turnout in 1994
Chile	44.3	70	65	59
Finland	93.1	39	35	40
Germany	93.4	52	51	51
Greece	87.4	46	37	28
Iran	18.1	39	41	41
Poland	75.9	40	36	32
Turkey	73.2	52	51	51
UK	72.6	50	48	48
USA	74.9	44	43	40
Yugoslavia	87	38	35	27

Source: *Tema Invandrare and Allmänna Valen, Del.3*

Table 5.5 Foreign Born Persons, by Country of Birth and Duration of Stay in Sweden as of 12/31/89

Country	in percent					
	>5 years	<5 years	>10 years	5-9 years	2-4 years	<2 years
Chile	44.3	55.7	24.8	19.5	22.6	33.1
Finland	93.1	6.8	87.6	5.5	3.4	3.4
Germany	93.4	6.7	88.9	4.5	3.5	3.2
Greece	87.4	12.7	75.9	11.5	6.8	5.9
Iran	18.1	81.9	9	9.1	41.4	40.5
Poland	75.9	24.1	49.5	26.4	14.3	9.8
Turkey	73.2	26.8	50.9	22.3	14.3	12.5
UK	72.6	27.4	54.1	18.5	13.2	14.2
USA	74.9	25.2	64.8	10.1	12.6	12.6
Yugoslavia	87	13	80.1	6.9	6.4	6.6

Source: *Tema Invandrare*

The absence of liberal western views as typically found in non-European immigrants is an example of a theory that explains immigrant political behavior on the basis of a deficit of some kind, be it cultural, political, cognitive, or psychological. A cultural deficit is best described as some aspect of an immigrant's native culture, (be it religious, social, or political), that serves to

reduce his capacity to participate effectively in politics. For example, Ingrid Lundberg and Ingvar Svanberg (1991, 20-21) write that the degree of violence or threats of violence that existed in Turkish association meetings in the mid-1970s were due to the members limited experience with democratic processes and a reflection of the volatile political situation in Turkey where extreme polarization and political violence were common. Religion and ethnicity are the other cultural factors cited that serve to limit the political effectiveness of Turkish immigrants in Sweden (Alpay 1980; Engelbrektsson 1995; Lundberg and Svanberg). For example, Turks from the province of Konya in central Anatolia are more traditional than their counterparts from Istanbul who are usually more modern.

Political and cognitive deficits translate into immigrants' lower political participation because immigrants either do not know what the political issues are or do not recognize which issues are vital to their interests. These assumptions partly explain the Swedish government's political education and outreach efforts in the 1979 and 1982 elections. Table 5.6 contains data that can support the validity of explanations based on political knowledge and cognitive deficits. For example, immigrants from non-European countries are less likely to be active in a union, as well as attend union meetings. This is not surprising since union meetings are conducted entirely in Swedish, a language many immigrants do not know fluently. Immigrants are also less likely to be active in political discussions or feel capable of appealing against a public official. (Conversely, immigrants are more likely not to be active in political discussions or feel incapable of appealing against a public official.)

Table 5.6 Summary of Immigrants' Political Situation in Sweden

	<u>All I</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>Other I</u>	<u>All P</u>	<u>2SP</u>
Political party member	6.0	5.5	5.2	6.4	10.1	10.6
Active in political party	1.7	1.6	1.7	2.3	2.6	2.7
At a political meeting last year	5.0	4.0	4.7	7.4	6.4	6.5
Member of union (employed)	79.9	83.6	75.8	77.0	83.5	84.1
Active in union (employed)	8.6	10.1	8.8	6.7	10.8	11.1
At union meeting last year (employed)	30.8	35.9	27.9	26.4	37.0	37.7
Not active in political discussions	33.4	31.2	30.3	41.3	25.6	24.6
Active in political discussions	37.6	39.5	40.5	33.8	42.1	42.6
Able to appeal against public official	57.6	64.4	59.7	44.7	67.6	68.8
Unable to appeal against public official	7.5	5.1	6.3	11.5	3.9	3.5

All I = all immigrants

N = immigrants from Nordic countries

E = Immigrants from European countries

Other I = immigrants from all other non-European countries

All P = Entire population

2SP = all persons born in Sweden with both parents also born in Sweden

Source: *Välfärd och ojämlikhet i 20 årsperspektiv (1975-1995)*

Psychological deficit explanations point to the effects of being an outsider as a deterrent to immigrant political involvement. Not only do immigrants view themselves as different, but they are aware that the dominant society not only views them as different, but also has lower expectations of them (Engelbrektsson; Daun, Stenberg, Svanström, and Åhs 1994; Yazgan 1993). Time in the country may reduce the effects of being an outsider, but the fate of the second generation remains paramount in determining whether psychological deficits continue. Second generation Turks in Sweden do internalize many Swedish ways, but still report a distinct notion of being a Turk that prevents their full incorporation into Swedish society, (Ehn 1992; Engelbrektsson; Yazgan).

The major criticism against deficit theories is that they tend to be immigrant group specific; that is, these theories fail to explain political behavior across immigrant groups. In spite of their limited experience with orderly

democracy, Turkish immigrants have one of the highest voting participation rates among immigrants in Sweden. (See Table 5.3.) Danish, Norwegian, and Finnish citizens in Sweden should not have a cultural deficit, but their voting participation is lower than Turks. Likewise, political knowledge and cognitive deficits are attractive explanations for the low voting rates of non-Nordic immigrants, but would seem hard pressed to explain the low voting rates of Nordic immigrants. Because of a history of close cooperation among the Nordic countries, political knowledge and cognitive deficits should be less frequent, but Nordic immigrants are no more likely to vote than non-Nordic immigrants. This remains true despite the fact that many Nordic immigrants, who are not particularly active in political parties, are better organized than the non-Nordic immigrants, (Hammar 1990a). In Table 5.6, Nordic citizens are less likely than European or non-European immigrants to be active members of a political party or attend a political meeting. Non-European immigrants are more likely to be members of a political party than Nordic citizens, though Nordic citizens are unquestionably more familiar with the political parties in Sweden.

There is a deeper problem with deficit based explanations. If various deficits explain the low voting rates for immigrants, then one would expect to see increasing levels of voting participation as immigrant groups reside in Sweden for longer periods of time. The opposite is true. Immigrant voting participation is decreasing over time. The decrease affects relatively recent immigrants as well as immigrants who have been residents a long time. Concerning Greeks and Yugoslavs, the overwhelming majority of persons in these groups had lived in

Sweden for over 10 years as of 12/31/89, but their voting rates continued to decline. (See Table 5.5.) The decrease occurred in spite of the government's efforts to disseminate information to immigrants. Explanations dependent on the psychological factors associated with being a newcomer are susceptible to the same criticism. Immigrants do not exhibit increasing levels of political participation as they cease being newcomers.

The third body of theories that seek to explain immigrant political behavior focuses its attention on the reasons immigrants left their home countries. These reasons are then subjected to an analysis similar to that found in Albert Hirschman's *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* in order to predict the country towards which the immigrant's political energies may focus.

Though people emigrate for numerous reasons, economic opportunity, familial reunion, and personal safety are the top three reasons for emigration to Sweden. Immigrants originally came to Sweden in response to a labor shortage in Sweden. The Swedish government tried to ease the labor shortage by signing agreements that facilitated emigration of labor from other countries. The Swedish government terminated these agreements at the first sign of the economic crisis of the early 1970's. Instead of returning to their home countries during the economic crisis of the 1970s, immigrants remained in Sweden and arranged to have their families join them. From the mid-1980s, refugees account for the majority of immigrants to Sweden.

Therefore many immigrants in Sweden are expressing a "loyalty and exit" option; that is, immigrants remain loyal to the state they left, but are exercising

their option to exit (Tung 1981). Refugees would be expressing a “voice and exit” option; that is, they remain in opposition to the government regimes at home, but are forced to flee to a safe haven. Irrespective of their reasons for emigration, immigrants did not come to Sweden to participate in its politics. Since the political orientation of immigrants would remain geared towards politics back home, immigrants are more likely to use the political machinery of the host country for expressing political views in their home country. Therefore, if immigrants practice politics in their adoptive countries, they tend to use non-standard political vehicles to support unconventional political demands (Tung 1981).

This theoretic approach to immigrant political behavior is appealing because it is parsimonious and intuitively logical. It can explain both immigrant fixation on politics in their native countries as well as the declining voting participation of immigrants in Sweden. As stated earlier, since immigrants have exercised their exit option, many times for reasons totally divorced from politics, they are not prone to exhibit voice on arrival. In this light, the lower voting turnouts are not surprising. Immigrant voting is declining because Swedish political parties are not good vehicles through which immigrants can press their political agendas in their native countries. Consequently, the immigrants least likely to understand how to be effective in the Swedish political system show an interest in Swedish political parties. There are two reasons for this. Initially, if immigrants should exhibit voice, it would likely concern politics in their home country. Alpay’s (1980) study reached this conclusion in its 1976 examination of

the Turkish community in Stockholm. Yet in the 1990s, the politically charged atmosphere among Turkish groups in Stockholm has largely dissipated. Declining immigrant voting becomes a symbol of their exit or opting out from Swedish politics, not because immigrants are protesting by forming an opposition, but rather because Swedish political parties are not vehicles for political concerns in their native countries. The Swedish government's insistence that the immigrant organizations it sponsors be devoid of home country politics reinforces to immigrants the unavailability of Swedish organizations for political action on issues back home. Finally, the immigrant groups most likely to become involved in Swedish politics for reasons other than political issues in their native countries are those immigrants who understand early that they are settling in Sweden. These immigrants tend to be from outside the Nordic area. They are also less likely to understand how to be effective in the Swedish political system.

Despite the appeal of analyzing the reasons for emigration within Hirschman's framework, this approach leaves two very important questions unanswered. Why do immigrants reorient themselves towards politics in the new country, with reorientation meaning dropping one set of interests in order to pursue another set of interests? How do organizational structure and membership rules determine immigrant political behavior? Regarding the first question, economic analysis inadequately deals with the formation and manipulation of political interests. Immigrants could decide that their involvement in their home country politics is ineffective or even counterproductive, but that decision need not translate into the adoption of a new political orientation. Research exists that

demonstrates the fluidity of immigrant political involvement; that is, sometimes immigrants quickly become very involved in the politics of the host country (Miller 1981; Gerholm and Lithman 1988; Schoeneberg 1986; Soysal), but at other times their interest in the politics of their adopted country is tepid at best. The fluidity of immigrant political participation implies the possibility that the issues for which immigrants seek political solutions are ever changing. Regarding the second question, organizational structures are portrayed as static to which people respond with a combination of loyalty, opposition, or exit. The Swedish government reorganized its immigrant policy and agencies in order to better promote the civic and social re-education of its immigrants. An economic analysis of immigrant voting in Sweden would need to identify the mechanisms that are contributing to the decline in immigrant voting. Government funding of immigrant organizations or the fact that the structure of social policy in Sweden is determined at the national level, where immigrants cannot vote, both seem to be more plausible explanations for the decline in immigrant voting than immigrants' realization that Swedish political parties are inadequate vehicles through which to pursue political agendas in their native countries.

The rules of membership, which for political purposes are the country's immigrant and citizenship policies, as well as its organizational structures, are at the core of the fourth set of theories explaining immigrant political involvement. Sweden's immigrant and citizenship policies not only announce that immigrants should participate in society, but also that government policies should initiate, direct, and perhaps change immigrant actions. The rules of membership

determine not only who can participate in society, but also how members should participate. Consequently, the rules of membership shape immigrants' political participation and associational patterns.

Despite the powerful descriptive and qualitative evidence in support of how the rules of membership rearrange and channel political involvement, the political effects of formal citizenship policies are difficult to quantify. It is not clear that immigrants who become citizens organize or vote differently than immigrants who remain foreign residents. Neither is there decisive proof that naturalized citizens are more politically involved than non-citizens, though citizens as a whole in Sweden are clearly more likely to participate by voting. It is reasonable to expect that immigrants who become citizens have higher voting participation rates than immigrants who remain foreign residents. However, Sweden does not maintain voting data on naturalized citizens; so the hypothesis cannot be tested.

The argument that the rules of membership define political goals, the forms of political participation, and immigrant associational patterns leaves critical issues unaddressed. Immigrant groups do not always limit their forms of political participation and associational patterns to those supported by membership rules. Miller presents numerous instances where immigrants' political activities were clearly outside what the rules of membership would consider the norm. The rules of membership inadequately addresses why some immigrant groups rebel against the established forms of political process, but acquiesce to others. It is also unclear if the rules of membership create new

political demands and identities. Governments do not knowingly initiate policies resulting in political consequences beyond its control. Ålund and Schierup (1991) argue that governments create policies to co-opt and control immigrant groups. Any uncontrollable political reactions or groups arising from the membership rules were unintentional.

There is circumstantial evidence to support Ålund's and Schierup's claim that in Sweden, the rules of membership co-opt and control immigrant groups, as opposed to simply defining political goals, political participation, and associational patterns. For example, the Swedish National Board of Immigration managed to persuade several competing Kurdish associations to merge into one administrative unit so that they would be eligible for the status of 'national alliance,' along with its associated annual subsidy. The alternative to government recognition and financial support is marginalization. The ruling government need not consult marginalized groups in the policy formation or remiss process. Many of the immigrant organizations visited for this study discussed with enthusiasm their new programming to address the issues of immigrant women. Given the position of women in many immigrant cultures, one could not help but wonder about the origins of the newly expressed interest in women issues. Similar remarks can be made regarding the 'reconciliation' between the differences in the position of children in Swedish and immigrant societies. Swedish law forbids corporal punishment in addition to providing a broad network of laws promoting a non-confrontational approach to child rearing. The Swedish approach to child rearing is uncommon in many of the immigrants' native countries. Conferences

and meetings for the immigrant associations are often sponsored and organized by a government agency, many times through the agency's 'development' and 'co-operation' sections. A partnership with immigrant groups should imply that all cultures are treated equally and with respect, but practically, the unequal power relations that exist make this impossible. The views of the Swedish authorities often prevail at these conferences. Still, there is little empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that government financial support of immigrant organizations co-opts these organizations and drives them out of politics. Government funding does seem to reorient some immigrant organizations in such a manner that if they choose to become political, they are more likely to select strategies that forward their agendas and maximize or maintain access to government funds.

Given these four categories of explanations for the decline in immigrant voting, demographic factors provide the most powerful, albeit incomplete rationale behind declining immigrant voting. A political component is needed to fully account for the decline in immigrant voting because Swedish immigrant policy is oriented towards the promotion of voting and the political incorporation of immigrants. An adequate explanation of the decline in immigrant voting must take into account the composition of the immigrant voting population, which is affected by immigration and naturalization, and the political experiences of immigrants in Sweden.

As outlined earlier, the increase in net migration starting in 1974 and again in 1983 means that the immigrant voting population grew with non-Nordic

immigrants in the 1970s and with non-European immigrants in the 1980s. Though not an exact depiction of the relationship between the immigrant voting population and naturalization, Table 5.7 provides a sketch of the possible dynamics transforming the pool of immigrant voters in Sweden. (Table 5.7 makes the assumption that all persons emigrating to Sweden are eligible to vote, an assumption which is clearly not true.) The first point to be made is that the total net migration from 1987 to 1990 represents a 10% increase of the total immigrant population in Sweden in 1990. This fact is important because immigrants arriving in 1987 would have become eligible to vote beginning in 1990. Therefore the immigrant voting population in Sweden had an upper expansion limit of 10%, though the immigrant voting population grew far less than that. Actual naturalizations more closely match persons eligible under Sweden's 4-year rule for refugees than the 5-year rule for all other immigrants. Refugees do not arrive to stable living situations, as often is the case for immigrants who arrive for family reunification. It is hard to imagine refugees placing a high priority on voting in Swedish local elections.

Naturalization is often overlooked as a contributing factor to declining immigrant voting. The actual naturalization figures suggest that immigrants who have resided in Sweden longer than 5 years are also deciding to naturalize. This point is important for two reasons. The first reason is that as immigrants naturalize, they are counted as Swedish citizens, thereby no longer showing up on statistics for immigrants in Sweden. (Sweden does not keep records of the voting patterns of naturalized citizens.) The second reason is that the immigrants

remaining who do not naturalize, are more likely to be oriented toward their home country. Therefore the voting statistics for foreign citizens reflect the political behavior of a self-selected group of immigrants who are likely to be less interested in interaction with the Swedish society. This dynamic would explain the declining voter participation for the stable populations of Greeks, Poles, and Yugoslavs. This hypothesis is further strengthened by the fact that Yugoslav nationals represented 26% (almost 11,000 persons) of the naturalizations in 1993. (See Graph 5.4.)

Table 5.7 Tracking Net Migration Cohorts
From Arrival to Voting Eligibility to Naturalization (in thousands)


Year	Net Migration	Eligible to Vote	Eligible to Naturalize (4 year rule)	Eligible to Naturalize (5 year rule)	Actual Naturalizations
1984	11.4				
1985	13.9				
1986	18.6				
1987	25.5	11.4			20
1988	32.6	13.9	11.4		18
1989	45.7	18.6	13.9	11.4	17.8
1990	37.2	25.5	18.6	13.9	16.8
1991	28.9	32.6	25.5	18.6	27.7
1992	27	45.7	32.6	25.5	29.4
1993		37.2	45.7	32.6	42.7

Source: *Invandrar och Flyktingpolitiken* and *Statistics in Focus 1995:11*

The dramatic swelling of the immigrant voting population with non-European refugees and high naturalization comprise the strongest demographic reasons for the decline in immigrant voting, but the political experience of immigrants suggests that the existence of other impediments to immigrants' political participation. The next section argues that the ability for coalition

building on the national level and engagement of authorities on the local level are the nexus for effective political representation. Coalition building and engaging the local authorities seem to be two things that immigrant groups have yet to master.

**Graph 5.4 Composite of Naturalizations in Sweden
(by select immigrant groups)**



Source: Statistical Yearbook of Sweden

Immigrants in Sweden: Immigrant Interactions in Non-Voting Forums

Statistical analysis does not always provide an “on the ground” view of the dynamics that shape a group’s political responses. Consequently, this section attempts to present a more micro-level examination of immigrants’ political responses in Sweden. This examination involves three cases where immigrant groups reasonably could be assumed to have an interest, though maybe not the skill or resources, to bring about effective change. The presentation focuses on immigrant involvement in the establishment of the Discrimination Ombudsman, the activities of the Cooperative Group for Immigrant Organizations in Sweden (SIOS) and the National Federation of Turkish Associations, and the operations of the local Turkish Association in Rinkeby. Immigrant participation in the establishment of the Discrimination Ombudsman is significant because the ombudsman, whose role is to protect the population of Sweden against illegal discrimination, would seem by default to become a boon to immigrants as they have traditionally faced higher rates of unemployment and residential segregation. The second case study analyzes the agenda and methods of political action of the SIOS and the National Federation of Turkish Associations by examining the communiqués and remises of these two organizations. The third case study discusses the operation of the Turkish Association in Rinkeby. This case study is critical because it focuses on the change of a local association that was little more than a replica of coffeehouse society in Turkey into the beginnings of what seems to be an association willing to engage the political sphere in order to achieve its goals.

In 1986, the government established the Ombudsman against Discrimination, (Diskriminerings Ombudsmannen - DO), as the authority to educate against discrimination and to facilitate consciousness about discrimination. The government's decision to establish the DO is consistent within Sweden's historical context. In 1970, Sweden ratified the 1965 United Nations Convention on the abolishment of all forms of race discrimination. That same year, Sweden adopted provisions in its criminal codes on the persecution of ethnic groups and on illegal discrimination (BrB 16:9). In 1975 the government developed a cohesive immigrant policy founded on the principles of equality, freedom of choice, and partnership. The government's 1975 policy was an admittance that immigrants in Sweden were likely to be long term residents who needed to be incorporated into Swedish society. Equality promotes immigrants attaining the same living standards as native Swedes; freedom of choice encourages immigrants to make their own decisions regarding their cultural identity; and partnership implies that Swedes and immigrants both can benefit from working together.

The establishment of the DO is also consistent with Swedish institutional practices. Sweden currently has six ombudsmen. The first ombudsman began with the establishment of the Parliamentary Ombudsmen, (Justitieombudsmännen - JO), in 1809. It is important to briefly examine the JO because of its long history and because it can be used as a measure against which the DO can be compared.

The JO is invested with substantial powers. Even though the JO does not supervise cabinet ministers, parliamentary members, and local government officials, the JO does have jurisdiction over all central and local government agencies, their staff, and all other persons who exercise public authority. Anyone may submit a written complaint to the JO. The JO has full discretion to decide which cases to investigate. The JO may launch long-term investigations into any authority under its supervision without need to show cause for undertaking the investigation. Moreover, the JO serves as a special prosecutor with disciplinary powers in cases that involve breaches of duty in public administration. Furthermore, the JO is empowered to direct other agencies to investigate cases more appropriately handled within their established expertise. The JO investigates all complaints, but concentrates on those in which significant issues are at stake, which usually involve a contention between the claims of the community against the freedom of the individual. The majority of the complaints are summarily dismissed, but around 600 cases, including JO initiated investigations, are reported out each year. Around 130 of these decisions are serious enough to warrant media attention. Finally, the JO is autonomous from the parliament. The four parliamentary ombudsmen are elected.

Ombudsmen came back into administrative fashion starting in the 1970s. Starting in 1971, the Swedish government instituted five ombudsman offices. The powers of the later ombudsmen differ vastly from the JO. Since the differences in the powers of the latter ombudsmen are a direct result of political maneuvering during the remiss process, it is important to outline the powers of the successive

ombudsmen in detail. The first one is the Consumer Ombudsman, (KO), established in 1971, whose main function is to investigate allegations of misleading advertising. In its investigations, there is a reverse burden of proof; that is, the advertiser must be able to prove the correctness of the information, claims, or promises contained in the advertisements, packaging, or other publicity materials bearing the advertiser's name. The Secretariat of the Consumer Ombudsman can start legal proceedings in the Market Court in cases related to marketing practices, hazardous products, or unfair contract terms. Before legal proceedings start, the KO usually attempts first to rectify the situation by holding discussions with the offending party. If a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached, then the matter is referred to the Market Court, which usually issues an injunction or fine. There is no appeal of decisions made in the Market Court. Because there is no appeal of the Market Court's punitive actions, defendants have a strong incentive to settle disputes before they reach the Market Court. Of the 4,000 cases that the KO handles annually, only 15 or so ever reach the Market Court.

The Equal Opportunities Ombudsman, (JämO), was established in 1980. The main function of the JämO is to support active measures to promote gender equality in the workplace. Gender equality is promoted by focusing on creating equal rights and opportunities for men and women in work duties, contracts, pay, and career development opportunities. The burden of initiative is placed on the employer to end sexual harassment, wage discrimination, and patently unequal working conditions. In practice, this means that employers with ten or more

employees are requested to draw up a gender equality plan which incorporates concrete and measurable goals. The plan should be reviewed and revised annually. Since 1994, employers are also required to conduct a survey designed to measure wage and non-objective wage differences with an eye to remedy differences that are based on gender. The JämO reviews an employer's plan every time an individual files a complaint. For wage discrimination complaints, a comparable person of the opposite sex and employed by the same employer has to be identified. Wage discrimination remains the single issue in which most complaints are filed. In the instance of a group complaint, the JämO has discretion regarding which cases it will pursue. Like the KO, the first response of the JämO to a complaint is persuading employers to comply with the appropriate law. The JämO can also ask the Equal Opportunities Commission to fine the offending firm. However, the commission can refuse to do so. If the employer refuses to comply with the law, or if reaching an agreement is not possible, then the JämO can take the case to the Labor Court. Unlike the KO, the JämO can, (and does), lose cases in the Labor Court, which results in no further action against the employer.

In 1986, the Ombudsman Against Ethnic Discrimination, (DO), was established. The DO combats ethnic discrimination in working life and other spheres of social life. Ethnic discrimination officially occurs when a person or group of persons is treated unfairly compared to others, or is otherwise subjected to unjust or insulting treatment because of race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, or religious faith. The DO, who is appointed by the government but is

independent of the government, has three main functions. The first function is to provide advice to those who are experiencing ethnic discrimination on how to exercise their legal rights. The second function is to instigate measures against ethnic discrimination through discussions with authorities, companies, or organizations, as well as launching advertising campaigns or disseminating information. Finally, the DO presents proposals aimed at combating ethnic discrimination to the government. Since July 1, 1994, the DO is able to represent a person with a discrimination complaint against an employer in the Labor Court, contingent on a number of conditions. The first condition is that the person is not being represented by a trade union or other professional organization. Another condition is that the case is important for reasons of principle or that there are particular reasons for the DO's pursuing the case. The DO may not try any case that the trade union or professional organization fails to bring to trial. Employers are obligated to attend discussions and provide information about the employer's relationships with job seekers and employees. Government authorities are generally required to attend such discussions when the DO requests their presence. Finally, persons able to prove that they suffered from ethnic discrimination at work or in the labor market are entitled to financial compensation as appropriate.

Most complaints to the DO involve claims of discrimination at work, in applying for work, in the housing market, in the credit market, in admissions to restaurants, and in contacts with the police and customs officials. In these cases, the DO generally informs the applicant of the legal and practical means of

recourse available. When appropriate, as determined by the DO, the DO may contact the opposite party and investigates the scope for achieving a remedy or clarification of any misunderstandings. It may also contact the appropriate trade or professional organization. In the case where the complaint is reported to the police, the DO tracks the matter to determined how the case is handled. By acting as a liaison, the DO attempts to prevail upon institutions to do more to combat ethnic discrimination than they otherwise would have done. In comparison to the JO, KO, and JämO, the DO is a weaker institution. For example, the DO only received the ability to take a complaint to court in 1994. As of this writing, it has yet to do so.

Table 5.8 Number of Inquiries Handled by the Discrimination Ombudsman

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>
Housing (H)	30	89	71	60	61	29	45	NA	NA	NA
Acts Against Racial Groups (RG)	21	42	29	35	84	36	43	NA	NA	NA
Acts Against Individuals (IND)	40	93	96	78	113	68	86	NA	NA	NA
All Other	151	229	199	206	193	143	99	NA	NA	NA
Total Complaints (TC)	242	453	395	379	451	276	273	NA	NA	NA
Invitations (INV)	29	111	180	164	184	98	142	NA	NA	NA
All Other Administrative	33	111	81	136	101	80	127	NA	NA	NA
Total Administrative (TA)	62	222	261	300	285	178	269	NA	NA	NA
Total Inquiries (TI)	304	675	656	679	736	454	542	819	823	962
(H)/(TC)	12.40%	19.65%	17.97%	15.83%	13.53%	10.51%	16.48%			
(RG)/(TC)	8.68%	9.27%	7.34%	9.23%	18.63%	13.04%	15.75%			
(IND)/(TC)	16.53%	20.53%	24.30%	20.58%	25.06%	24.64%	31.50%			
(INV)/(TA)	46.77%	50.00%	68.97%	54.67%	64.56%	55.06%	52.79%			
(TC)/(TI)	79.61%	67.11%	60.21%	55.82%	61.28%	60.79%	50.37%			
(TA)/(TI)	20.39%	32.89%	39.79%	44.18%	38.72%	39.21%	49.63%			

Source: Discrimination Ombudsman

Totals for 1993-1995 were available, but the classifications were different; therefore that information is not presented. The Total Inquiries figure for 1995 is a projected estimate.

Given its limited powers, the DO still receives a significant number of inquiries, though many of the inquiries are invitations involving the DO or requests for information and interviews regarding the administration of the DO institution itself. Table 5.8 provides a breakdown of the proportion of complaint

and administrative inquiries. Complaints have decreased from a high of 79.61% of the inquiries that the DO handled in 1986 to 50.37% in 1992. Even according to the DO's revised inquiry classifications, complaints constituted roughly 52% of its inquiry caseload in 1994. Meanwhile, administrative inquiries increased from 20.39% of the DO's caseload in 1986 to 49.63% in 1992. Of the administrative inquiries, the DO spent most of his time issuing or responding to invitations to meetings or other general events. Complaints regarding housing, group, and individual discrimination remain a significant proportion of the complaints submitted to the DO. All other complaints comprise of complaints against employers, social welfare authorities, and government agencies. The rise in the absolute number of complaints suggests either that immigrants believe that discrimination against them is increasing or that immigrants are more willing to report incidences of discrimination. Unemployed immigrants, in particular, see discrimination as a problem (Lange 1995). For example, 54%, 49%, and 46% of the unemployed Africans, Arabs, and other Asians surveyed and interviewed believed that the main cause of their unemployed status was discrimination. What remains unclear is whether immigrants have found other avenues to resolve their grievances.

The Children's Ombudsman, (in Swedish, Barnombudsmannen, hence BO), was established on July 1, 1993 with the purpose of ensuring the best possible outcome for children and young persons in all situations. The BO also watches over juvenile rights and interests as stipulated in the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of a Child. The purpose of the BO is not to better the

material situation of children in Sweden, which in an international perspective is quite good; rather the BO focuses on being a children's advocate in situations that involve them, as in divorce, custody disputes, and abuse of various kinds. In this vein, the BO's work centers largely on taking part in public debates with the goal of molding public opinion on conditions as they affect children. The BO also tries to influence government opinion on proposed legislation. The BO submits an annual report to the government outlining how Sweden has complied with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The BO is not responsible for initiating legal action in specific cases. Specific cases are referred to the appropriate authorities.

The Office of the Disability Ombudsman, (DisO), was established on July 1, 1994 to monitor issues concerning the rights of persons with functional disabilities. The DisO seeks to promote full participation and equality for disabled persons. The DisO seeks not only to remedy legislative deficiencies by bringing matters to the attention of the appropriate government body, but also by requesting information from, or engaging in negotiations with government authorities, who are mandated to cooperate. Moreover, the DisO must engage in continuous discussions with organizations representing the disabled. The DisO does not bring specific cases to court. Similar to the BO, the DisO refers specific cases to the appropriate authorities.

This short description of ombudsmen in Sweden suggests that the government has resurrected its use of ombudsmen, but has substantially weakened the institution. The JO is not only a very prestigious institution, but also has the

most discretionary power at its disposal. The KO makes up for its lesser prestige with its ability to credibly and consistently punish its targets. The later ombudsmen, especially the DO, BO, and DisO are noticeably weaker institutions than its three predecessors.

The Swedish government instituted a weak DO over the opposition of immigrant associations. Immigrant groups were able to voice their concerns and solutions regarding discrimination, but they were not able to prevail against the powerful groups promoting a weak DO institution. Among the powerful groups aligned against the creation of a strong DO were the Swedish Immigrant Authority, LO (blue collar union), TCO (public sector union), SAF (employers association), Swedish Lawyers Association, Justice Chancellor, and JO. The JämO was the only prominent Swedish institution outside the immigrant associations that argued stridently for a more powerful DO modeled after itself. Stated differently, the immigrant groups lacked powerful allies in high places.

The immigrant associations had most of their opportunities to influence the creation of the DO through their remisses. The government produced ample reports which served as opportunities for immigrant associations to submit a remiss. The main reports were: Immigrants and Minorities (SOU 1974:69), Law Against Ethnic Discrimination in Worklife (SOU 1983:18), In the Right Direction, Ethnic Relations in Sweden (SOU 1984:55), Immigrant and Minority Policy (SOU 1984:58), On Foreigners' Legal Position (Ds A 1984:6), On Illegal Discrimination (Ds A 1984:7), An Ombudsman Against Ethnic Discrimination (Ds A 1985:6), Immigrant Policy (Prop. 1985/86:98), Immigrants and the Labor

Market, Are the New Jobs Good or Bad? (Ds 1990:35), Organized Racism (SOU 1991:75), Committee Against Ethnic Discrimination in Worklife (SOU 1992:96), Measures Against Racist Criminality and Ethnic Discrimination in Worklife (Prop. 1993/94:101), Immigrant and Refugee Policy (Prop. 1994/95:131), and Work for Immigrants (SOU 1995:76). The following is an overview of the opposition that immigrant groups faced during the remiss process in the five reports that preceded the establishment of the DO.

Before the release of SOU 1983:18 (Law Against Ethnic Discrimination in Worklife), the Swedish government did not view prejudice and discrimination as conditions in Sweden needing further remediation. The fact that the highest court in Sweden (Högsta Domstolen) heard only one case involving the 1970 anti-discrimination law (BrB16:9) would seem to support the low incidence of discrimination (Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 1979:118). The government's view of prejudice in Sweden was laid out in the appendix of SOU 1979:69 (Immigrant Investigation, Immigrants and Minorities), which was also presented as a separate report, SOU 1979:70. Arne Trankell, who authored the appendix to SOU 1979:69, summarized the government's approach to dealing with prejudice as, "the insecurity out of which prejudice arises, that is the evil we have to identify and rectify. This intrinsic evil is not the feeling of insecurity, but the material or existential foundation of that feeling," (SOU 1979:69, 31). Trankell's statement is in line with the government's emphasis on equality as one of the three pillars of Sweden's immigrant policy.

By 1983, the government expressed reservations concerning its earlier view on prejudice in Sweden. SOU 1983:18 presented convincing statistical evidence that discrimination not linked to the performance of the economy was occurring in the labor market. This report also noted that the criminal code did contain a law against ethnic discrimination, but that the law did not cover ethnic discrimination in working life (SOU 1983:18, 56). The report recommended that the government adopt a law forbidding ethnic discrimination in the labor market, and give the Labor Court sole jurisdiction to enforce the law. The recommended legislative draft had many commonalities with the Equal Opportunities Act that created the JämO. It also recommended that the powers of the JämO be increased to cover ethnic discrimination in the workplace.

The immigrant groups' remisses, which were 7 from a total of 65, could not match the legal and political firepower of the groups that criticized the report and its recommendations. The immigrant groups that submitted remisses were: the Estonian Representation, the National Federation of Italian Associations, the National Federation of Yugoslavian Associations, the National Federation of Turkish Associations, the Armenian Cultural Association, the Turkish Workers Union, and the Greek Academic Association. The unions, (LO, TCO, and SACO), stressed that proving ethnic discrimination is a complex endeavor, more complicated than proving gender discrimination. The LO noted that further information and education were more appropriate solutions to prejudice. SAF believed that it and the LO had sufficient mechanisms to deal with ethnic discrimination in the workplace. After all, the Labor Court confirmed that from

the 33 gender discrimination cases it heard since after the establishment of the JämO, 29 of those cases involved gender discrimination in the public sector, (Prop 1985/86:98, 166). The Labor Court argued that the reverse burden of proof that the JämO's cases assume, would be wholly inappropriate for discrimination cases in the private sector, (Prop 1985/86:98, 169). The State Immigrant Bureau (SIV) expressed concern over the purported vagueness of the proposed law, in addition to its view that the law would undermine the merit system (Prop 1985/86:98, 189). The JO bluntly stated that it remained unconvinced that a law specifically targeted to the workplace was a suitable solution to the problem (Prop 1985/86:98, 165). The immigrant groups' and JämO's positive assessments of SOU 1983:18 were drowned out by these criticisms and the seemingly effective strategies that the LO and SAF used to address gender discrimination in the workplace. The proposed law was not adopted.

In 1984, the government released SOU 1984:55, (In the Right Direction, Ethnic Relations in Sweden). The title of the report adequately summarizes the report's findings. Ethnic relations were moving in the right direction in spite of the severe immigrant criticism of the authorities. The police and the educational authorities received the strongest criticism. The criticisms claimed that these two institutions were especially aggressive, mistrusting, provocative, disrespectful, and condescending. Immigrants reported that their biggest obstacle in Sweden were the authorities. "Discrimination from the general public they learn to bear and escape, but discrimination from the authorities, they cannot flee," (SOU 1984:55, 52). The report also revealed that most immigrants saw themselves as

discriminated against in the labor market, though a good many referred to their low educational status and their need for further education, (technical as well as in the Swedish language), as the major obstacles to career or employment opportunities. The report proposed a law to combat organized racism and racist groups.

Of the 73 groups that submitted remisses, 9 came from immigrant groups. The immigrant groups that submitted remisses were: the National Federation of Finnish Associations, the National Association of Yugoslavian Associations, the National Federation of Turkish Associations, the Estonian Committee, the Lettish Central Council, the Lettish Help Committee, the National Federation of Finnish-Swedes Associations, the National Federation of Latvian Associations, and the National Federation of Croatian Associations. Overall, the remisses were favorable to the report. Though the SIV, the Labor Market Board (AMS), the National Federation of Turkish Associations, and the National Federation of Latvian Associations viewed the proposed ordinance as strengthening Sweden's policy of equality, freedom, and partnership, these groups were not able to counter the concerns of possible infringement on the right to freedom of association that the Justice Chancellor, the National Federation of Finnish Swedes Associations, and the Social Democratic Women's Association raised. The proposed law was not adopted.

Immigrant and Minority Policy, (SOU 1984:58), also received a generally favorable review in the remiss process. Of the 95 remisses submitted, 11 came from immigrant groups. The immigrant groups that submitted remisses were: the

National Federation of Finnish Associations, the National Association of Yugoslavian Associations, the National Federation of Turkish Associations, the National Federation of Italian Associations, the National Federation of Assyrian Associations, the Estonian Representation, the Estonian Committee, the National Federation of Finnish-Swedes Associations, the National Federation of Croatian Associations, the National Federation of Finnish Speaking Community Work, and the Immigrant Newspapers Journalist Club. This report is unique among the reports mentioned in that the Ambassadors from Finland and Turkey submitted remisses. The government used the report as a forum for a discussion on immigrant and minority policy instead of a vehicle to propose law. In this light, the report and the remisses covered a vast array of topics. Many remisses expressed confusion over the difference between immigrant and minority policy. The National Federation of Croatian Associations noted the need for an official minority policy, one explicitly recognizing minorities as groups from a political perspective. The Estonian, Assyrian, and Croatian organizations criticized the freedom of choice aspect of the government's equality, freedom of choice, and partnership policy towards immigrants. These groups argued that freedom of choice was meaningless because there were few practical avenues for immigrant groups to execute their decisions, especially their desire to engage in minority politics, (Prop 1985/86:98, 141). SOU 1984:58 also raised general questions about the workings of the Swedish labor market. As expected, these questions drew extensive and withering criticism from the unions and SAF. Finally, the report explicitly discussed the pros and cons of housing segregation. The pros

were that services catering to immigrants were easier to organize and that immigrants gained the benefits from the proximity of support groups of their countrymen. The cons were that immigrants had little opportunities to interact with the native Swedish population. The report viewed such interaction as necessary for improving immigrants' educational and employment prospects.

The report Ds A 1984:7, (On Illegal Discrimination), was similar in content to SOU 1984:55, (In the Right Direction, Ethnic Relations in Sweden). In agreement with immigrants' views about the authorities found in SOU 1984:55, Ds A 1984:7 also severely criticized the authorities, especially the police, in their handling of immigrants and discrimination. The report left little doubt that it thought the authorities could do more to combat illegal discrimination.

Of the 52 remisses, immigrant groups submitted only 5. The immigrant groups that submitted remisses were: the National Federation of Yugoslavian Associations, the National Federation of Finnish-Swedes Associations, the Estonian Representation, the Lettish Central Council, and the Lettish Help Committee. The National Federation of Turkish Associations did not submit a remiss. Neither did SAF. The low level of interest in Ds A 1984:7 suggests that many groups did not view the contents of the report, or the likelihood that legislation would come from it, as serious enough to warrant a remiss. However, two sets of groups found the report serious enough to submit strident remisses. These groups were police and prosecutor associations. Of the 52 remisses submitted, 17, or 33%, came from these groups alone. Prosecutor groups

submitted 10, while police groups submitted 7. The five immigrant groups submitted positive reviews of the report.

By 1985, the Labor Market Department itself argued for the need of an anti-discrimination statute aimed at working life. In 1985 the Labor Department released Ds A 1985:6, (An Ombudsman Against Ethnic Discrimination). The report supported the establishment of a DO, though not one armed with the same powers as the JämO.

As with SOU 1983:18, the same players aligned behind similar positions in their remises to Ds A 1985:6. Fifty-two remises were submitted, of which 13 came from immigrant groups. The immigrant groups that submitted remises were: the National Federation of Finnish Associations, the National Federation of Yugoslavian Associations, the National Federation of Turkish Associations, the National Federation of Italian Associations, the National Federation of Assyrian Associations, the National Federation of Finnish-Swedes Associations, the National Federation of Polish Associations, the National Federation of Greek Associations, the National Federation of Spanish Associations, the National Federation of Portuguese Associations, the Lettish Help Committee, the Lettish Central Council, and the National Federation of Immigrant Associations. Immigrant organizations clearly viewed Ds A 1985:6 as proposing legislation in their interests since 25% of the remises submitted were from immigrant groups. (See Table 5.9.) Table 5.9 presents in table form the immigrant groups that submitted remises in the political process that led to the establishment of the DO.

Table 5.9 Remisses Submitted by Immigrant Groups During the Establishment of the DO					
	SOU 1983:18	SOU 1984:55	SOU 1984:58	Ds A 1984:7	Ds A 1985:6
Armenian Cultural Association	Yes				
Estonian Committee		Yes	Yes		
Estonian Representation	Yes		Yes	Yes	
Greek Academic Association	Yes				
Immigrant Newspapers Journalist Club			Yes		
Lettish Central Council		Yes		Yes	Yes
Lettish Help Committee		Yes		Yes	Yes
Assyrian Associations (NF)			Yes		Yes
Croatian Associations (NF)		Yes	Yes		
Finnish Associations (NF)		Yes	Yes		Yes
Finnish Speaking Community Work (NF)			Yes		
Finnish-Swedes Associations (NF)		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Greek Associations (NF)					Yes
Immigrant Associations (NF)					Yes
Italian Associations (NF)	Yes		Yes		Yes
Latvian Associations (NF)		Yes			
Polish Associations (NF)					Yes
Portuguese Associations (NF)					Yes
Spanish Associations (NF)					Yes
Turkish Associations (NF)	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Yugoslavian Associations (NF)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Turkish Workers Union	Yes				
Total Immigrant Remisses Submitted (I)	7	9	11	5	13
Total Remisses Submitted (R)	65	73	95	52	52
% Remisses from Immigrant Orgs (I/R)	11%	12%	12%	10%	25%
NF = National Federation of...					
Source: Prop 1985/86:98					

As expected, immigrant groups argued for a strong DO having the ability to bring cases to court concerning discrimination in housing, in employment, and in their interactions with government agencies. The JämO argued for a DO structured much like itself. The unions and SAF repeated their arguments from their remisses for SOU 1983:18. There was no indication that the Labor Court or the Justice Chancellor revised their earlier position against a strong DO. The highest court in Sweden only heard one discrimination case since its 1979 ruling, (Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 1985:34). Finally, the JO reiterated its doubt that a strong DO would prove practically effective. The only difference between SOU 1983:18

and Ds A 1985:6 is that the government decided to accept the call for a weaker DO as embodied in Prop 1985/86:98. It was the best it and the immigrant groups could get through the Parliament.

The immigrant groups' lack of powerful allies remained unchanged when the government granted the DO expanded powers in 1994. The remisses for the reports released between 1986 and the proposed legislation that increased the powers of the DO, (Prop 1993/94:101), showed that the policy actors were fractured along familiar lines. The only difference regarding remisses from the groups representing immigrants is the addition of the DO, SIOS (Cooperative Group for Immigrant Organizations in Sweden), and additional immigrant groups.

There was little impetus from organizations or government agencies in Sweden to do more to combat ethnic discrimination in the workplace. The highest court heard only one case on discrimination after 1985, (Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 1994:89).

Two factors changed the political landscape under which the DO was strengthened in 1994. The first factor was the international and domestic criticism that Sweden received for failing to live up to the ILO (International Labor Organization) Convention #111 concerning Discrimination in Respect to Employment and Occupation, (SOU 1992:96). The second factor was the marked increase in immigrant unemployment. In 1990, the committee that supervised compliance with ILO Convention #111 requested the Swedish government to describe what measures it had taken in the form of an agreement between parties in the labor market to prohibit ethnic discrimination. The committee also

requested that the government describe what laws it had enacted to prohibit discrimination in the workplace. To this request, the government could not point to any tangible evidence. There were no formal agreements between unions, SAF, and the government to combat ethnic discrimination, though LO and SAF pointed to the low number of discrimination cases in the private sector that arrived before the Labor Court. The criminal code BrB16:9 did not cover discrimination in the labor market. The right to compensation for persons who have suffered ethnic discrimination in their employment did not exist. The Swedish government admitted to these facts not only in SOU 1992:96, but again in Prop 1993/94:101. The government also recognized that the actual conditions of the labor market, e.g. high immigrant employment, would seem to make discrimination more likely (SOU 1992:96, 26). Though Prop 1994/95:131 was released after the DO's powers were enlarged, it included evidence on immigrant unemployment that many people must have suspected to exist in 1993 and 1994. Prop 1994/95:131 noted that in the second half of 1993, 40% of the unemployed non-Nordic citizens in Sweden were long term unemployed, that in the first half of 1994, only 45.5% of foreign citizens were in the labor market on a full time basis, compared to 72.1% for Swedish citizens, and that during the 1993-1994 budget year, 19% of those enrolled in labor market training programs were non-Nordic citizens (Prop 1994/95:131, 43-44).

There are eight new sections in the revised Act Against Ethnic Discrimination (SFS 1994:134), four of which are worthy of special mention. Section 8 of SFS 1994:134 explicitly prohibits ethnic discrimination in hiring.

Section 9 explicitly prohibits ethnic discrimination in work contracts, work assignments, and in work dismissals. Section 13 makes the employer liable for financial compensation for non-compliance with Section 8, while Section 14 makes the employer liable for financial compensation for non-compliance of Section 9. As mentioned earlier, SFS 1994:134 gives the DO the ability to represent a person with a discrimination complaint against an employer in the Labor Court contingent on the conditions that the person is not being represented by a trade union or other professional organization and that the case is important for reasons of principle.

Immigrant groups submitted remiseses during the legislative processes that established and strengthened the DO, but perhaps the establishment and strengthening of the DO were not important issues for immigrants. To address this possibility, it is important to examine the range of issues that immigrant groups do submit remiseses or position papers. What follows is a brief examination of a subset of remiseses and position papers submitted by the Cooperative Group for Immigrant Organizations in Sweden (SIOS) and position papers published by the National Federation of Turkish Associations. Both groups provided the material from their libraries as a panoramic view of the issues they consider important. SIOS provided sixteen remiseses and position papers, while the National Federation of Turkish Associations submitted only five position papers.

Of the sixteen remiseses and position papers that the SIOS submitted, social issues predominate. (See Table 5.10.) The SIOS provided six remiseses on

pensions and handicap benefits. As the SIOS readily admits, it is interested in these issues because of the disproportionate numbers of immigrants who utilize handicap benefits or take early retirement pension. The SIOS points out that the hard working conditions and low wages of the jobs immigrants obtain contribute to their high utilization of these benefits. Since immigrants earn less, their benefit levels are lower, thereby forcing immigrants to turn to municipal welfare payments to top-off their incomes. Consequently, the SIOS is a staunch advocate of increasing the monetary worth of early retirement and handicap benefits. Six documents on the list focus on cultural issues, (#2, #8, #9, #13, #15, and #16). Item #2 is unique in that it not only addresses immigrants' cultural concerns, but also the government's equality, freedom of choice, and partnership policy as a whole. In a nutshell, these documents argue that true freedom of choice necessitates the government to financially support immigrant organizations, mother tongue instruction, immigrant cultural institutions, and research done by immigrants. Only two remisses explicitly focus on employment or racism, (#5, #14 and #3, #5, respectively). The final two remisses focus on the residence status of immigrants, (#7 and #10). All of the documents that the SIOS selected are generally two or three pages in length with an upper limit of 15 pages.

Even though the National Federation of Turkish Associations had submitted remisses in the past, the National Federation of Turkish Associations submitted no remisses as part of its document compilation. Perhaps because of the high costs of the government reports, which immigrant groups must buy, immigrant federations are selective in their remiss production. Of the five

documents that the federation submitted, three concerned employment and two were omnibus in scope. The federation sent one document to the Labor Department, another to the Stockholm County Labor Committee, one to the press, and another to all the political parties. It is unclear to whom the federation sent the last document. The document to the political parties argued for further decentralization of the political process to increase democratization in society, for government support for immigrant culture, for better educational opportunities that promote bi-lingualism, for stronger action against discrimination in the labor market, for support of unconventional programs designed to increase immigrant employment, for further equality between the living standard of immigrants and native Swedes, for acceptance of multiculturalism, and for support for non-

#	Title of Document	Date	Remiss/Paper
1	Handicap and Welfare	6/6/90	Remiss: SOU 1990:19
2	Stop the Disarming of Immigrant and Minority Policies	11/27/90	Position Paper
3	Organized Racism	6/2/92	Remiss: SOU 1991:75
4	To the Pension Working Group	12/2/92	Remiss: Ds 1992:89
5	Compact Against Ethnic Discrimination in Work Life	3/1/93	Remiss: SOU 1992:96
6	A Society for All [on the handicapped]	5/26/93	Remiss: SOU 1992:52
7	Deportation Because of Crime	10/15/93	Remiss: SOU 1993:54
8	The Organization Support Grant	12/16/93	Remiss: SOU 1993:71
9	Stop the Reduction of Mother Tongue Language Instruction	1/19/94	Position Paper
10	Residence Permit and [Permit] Denials, How Should Immigrant Conduct be Measured?	3/30/94	Remiss: SOU 1993:120
11	Reforming the Pension System	4/15/94	Remiss: SOU 1994:20
12	The Right to Early Pension and Sickness Payments	10/17/94	Remiss: Ds 1994:91
13	Untitled [on multiculturalism]	9/4/95	Position Paper
14	Concerning the Need for Female Researchers	9/10/95	Position Paper
15	Work for Immigrants	1995	Remiss: SOU 1995:76
16	The Direction of Culture Policy	2/14/96	Remiss: SOU 1995:84

Christian religious, (Muslim), practice. In regards to increasing democratization, the federation expressed the desire to have its own Turkish candidates placed higher on the candidate lists. In Sweden's proportional representation system, office seats are allotted to party candidates in proportion to the number of votes

that the party receives. Low placement on the list decreases the chances that a candidate will receive an office seat.

The document that went to the political parties and one of the employment documents were the only ones to mention discrimination in any substantive way. The document to the Stockholm County Labor Committee was an application to the European Union's social funds for the Turkish Labor Market Project. The Turkish Labor Market Project sought to increase employment among Turkish women and youth through information centers, internships, small business grants, and education. The final omnibus document is a sociological study of the Turkish community in Stockholm.

The documents submitted by the SIOS and the federation generally share one or more of the following three characteristics. The documents are often general manifestos on the immigrant condition in Sweden. The documents usually argue for government financial support of cultural institutions and social benefits. With the exception of the sociological report submitted by the federation, the documents do not make use of the vast array of statistical data available. The first and last characteristics are mutually reinforcing. Given these weaknesses, immigrant remises and position papers lack the empirical basis and technical prowess that would enhance a minority position. Yet given the financial resources and education levels of immigrants, it is perhaps unreasonable to expect immigrant organizations to produce politically savvy remises. Another possible reason for the weakness of the remises submitted by the immigrant organizations is that these organizations tend to function as umbrella institutions interested in a

broad spectrum of issues ranging from cultural, political, economic, and social. In contrast, the typical Swedish organization is often specialized. The implication is that specialized groups have a better grasp of the facts, arguments, and counter-arguments in presenting their positions. The government report *Immigrants and Minority Policy* makes this conclusion (SOU 1984:58).

The limited political effectiveness of the National Federation of Turkish Associations does not imply ineffectiveness of the local Turkish associations. The Turkish Association in Rinkeby provides an example of a local immigrant association that has decided to break away from the localized café society that epitomizes many local Turkish associations in Lundberg and Svanberg's 1991 study.

Lundberg and Svanberg (1991) described Turkish associations in Stockholm county as isolated organizations which were little more than social networks of support and control for its members. The organizations are isolated in that their contacts with local politicians are few and that their contacts with other local Turkish associations are limited and formal. The café, which every Turkish association has, is the focal point that facilitates interaction among the members. The café is usually the largest room of a typically small facility. The café is generally open from 11:00 AM until 8:00 PM and serves tea and coffee to the association's male members. Women do not patronize the café. Nor do women generally participate in running the association. The association's governing structure bears a distinctly Swedish influence. There is a board of directors and a chairman. Associations apply for government grants to support

their projects, which usually focus on the needs of women and children. These projects are usually cultural or athletic in nature. The associations have limited political contacts. Members often express the view that local politicians only visit them during elections in order to secure their votes (Lundberg and Svanberg 1991, 29).

Lundberg and Svanberg identify two factors that contribute to the associations' tendency to become social networks and control mechanisms. The first factor is that in a welfare state such as Sweden's, where all basic needs are provided, immigrant institutions have a minimal role in the control, organization, and dispersal of material benefits (Lundberg and Svanberg 1991, 44). The second factor is that these associations are not created from below, by the immigrant themselves. Instead, the associations are created from above, by the Swedish authorities who maintain their right to define what groups and priorities should receive support (Lundberg and Svanberg 1991, 46).

The case of the Turkish Association in Rinkeby is noteworthy because until recently, the association operated as outlined by Lundberg and Svanberg. The Turkish Association in Rinkeby was established in 1972 as the Swedish-Turkish Association in Rinkeby. (This study refers to the association as the Turkish Association in Rinkeby because there are no Swedish members.) The association rented a small locale in which the café dominated. The number of association activities declined over the years. The association did not interface with local politicians.

Three changes within the association marked the beginning of its transformation. The first change was the election of new leadership. The second change was the adoption of new priorities. The last change was the initiation of new programs.

The election of a new chairman in 1995, Mazhar Göker, marked the beginning of the transformation of the association. Göker is a second generation Turk who believes that the second generation is an important bridge between the old Turkish society and the new Swedish society into which Turks must integrate. Having this viewpoint, Göker was willing to displace, if not repudiate, long established modes of operation within the association. The first break with the past came with the explicit decision that the association was no longer the appropriate forum for discussions on Turkish politics. The association was no longer interested in these "old problems." Instead, the association was to be oriented exclusively towards life in Sweden.

The association's reorientation translated into the emphasis on securing new facilities, forming working relationships with other immigrant groups, increasing its contacts with local politicians, and changing its priorities. The association moved from its basement location of twenty years into a much larger complex. The café still dominates the complex, but the complex also has recreational facilities that are attractive to teenage males, as well as office space for its leaders. In December 1994, Turkish women and children acquired their own Center for Turkish Women and Children. The center is a new, fully equipped, stand alone structure. Most programs in the immigrant associations

were suggested by government officials, but not this one. Turkish women themselves were the instigators for the center. Due to religious convictions, Göker is the director of the center, but Turkish women dominate the board of directors and are responsible for the center's day-to-day operations. Officially, the association is a secular institution, but it also has the concession from the local authorities to run the mosque in Rinkeby. Göker has sought to normalize relations between the Turkish and Kurdish associations in Rinkeby by increasing contact between the two organizations. However, the altercations between these groups that marred Rinkeby's 1995 International Festival reveal the limited success of his efforts. On the other hand, Göker points to the good relationship between the Greek-Swedish and Turkish associations as proof that his strategy can work. (Greeks and Turks remain sensitive over the Cyprus issue.) In addition to extending periodic invitations for candidates to come to Rinkeby to discuss issues, the Turkish Association in cooperation with other associations in Rinkeby invite local politicians to give weekly talks in the local library. Again, in cooperation with other associations and government authorities, the association was part of a successful political effort to get the local authorities to open a new police station in Rinkeby.

The association subordinated cultural preservation as a priority. Instead, it adopted the pursuit of building a multicultural identity for its members as a prime objective. Acceptance of a multicultural identity means that Turks, especially the second and third generations, are encouraged to embrace both Turkish and Swedish languages and traditions. In other words, the association does not want

to be an organization that isolates its members from Swedish society. The association offers evening Swedish language classes not only to increase its members language skills, but also the social competence of its members. The association does its share of sponsoring cultural events, but cultural maintenance is no longer the sole motivation for these events. The cultural events are sponsored for their entertainment and educational value.

Women and children issues also have become top priorities. Undoubtedly, the Swedish government strongly influenced the association's adoption of these priorities, but as of 1995, no other immigrant organization in Sweden had incorporated these issues to the extent that the Turkish Association in Rinkeby had. In addition to day care for children, the center offers educational and vocational programs for women. In November of 1995, 45 women were engaged in labor market training programs. Moreover, the Turkish women have increased opportunities for acquiring leadership and management skills through their responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the center. What is remarkable about the center is that it accomplishes all this while accommodating Islam's separation of the sexes. With the exception of Göker, men have limited access to the center. (I was able to conduct one of my interviews with Göker at the center because I was an escort for a female researcher to an interview that occurred outside the center's hours of operation.) Other immigrant groups are examining ways to duplicate the Turkish Association's success in this area.

Decreasing unemployment in the Turkish community is also a prime goal of the association. Another purpose of day care at the center is to encourage

Turkish women to join the labor force. Since immigrants are over-represented among persons on long term disability and early retirement, the association has entered into a cooperative agreement with the insurance authorities to encourage its members who are on long term disability to seek rehabilitation and jobs in the service sector. In December of 1995, the association started a Turkish cooking school with the aim of increasing the number of Turkish restaurants and Turkish cooks in Stockholm. The program is open to Turkish men. Finally, Göker was the first person to submit a proposal to the European Union's social funds for his Turkish Labor Market Project. He was invited to Brussels to give a presentation on the proposal.

This brief overview of the transformation of the Turkish Association in Rinkeby from being a typical, isolating institution of social networking and control into a more politically adept institution is in stark contrast to the ineffectual, larger immigrant organizations. Why was this local Turkish organization able to succeed in advancing its agenda while the national organizations were not? After all, new leadership, new priorities, and new programs do not guarantee success.

This study proposes that the coincidence of three factors contributed to the transformation of the local Turkish association. The first factor is membership rules, in this case, voting rules. Rules of membership do matter. Immigrants cannot vote on the national level. Therefore there are no electoral sanctions that immigrants can mete out to its opponents. From this perspective, immigrants make unattractive coalition partners. On the local level, however, immigrants can

vote. Theoretically, the threat is always present that immigrants will mobilize to oppose issues or candidates that transgress the limits of what they are willing to accept. The declining levels of immigrant voting participation make any such threat hard to take seriously. Here is where the second factor comes into play. In January 1997, Stockholm was divided into 24 social districts. The purposes of this devolution were to increase democracy and increase the amount of local control over the delivery of social welfare. The decision to proceed with devolution was in part a response to Rinkeby, one of the areas in Sweden where devolution was tested. Rinkeby is renown in Sweden for its low voter turnout and poor quality of social services, but it is also known in Sweden for its innovation in the delivery of social services. Many of the innovative ideas are generated locally. In this light, the local immigrant associations built a history of fruitful cooperation with the authorities. Government partnerships with local immigrant groups may be laced with problems, but the potential for success is real. In the case of Turks, they have the added benefit of being among the immigrant groups with the highest voting participation rates. Finally, the structural changes in the Swedish economy, (the abolishment of capital controls, a decline in manufacturing, the breakdown of the 1938 Saltsjöbaden Agreement, and the fiscal restraint mandated by Sweden's joining the European Union), along with its dramatic increase in unemployment have opened a window of opportunity for local immigrant groups. Whereas Göker is an assertive leader, he also has encountered a government apparatus that is relatively less assertive in protecting its prerogative in social welfare.

CHAPTER SIX

AN OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL SITUATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN GERMANY

This chapter presents an overview of the economic, social, and political situations of immigrants in Germany. Its purpose is to compare the lives of immigrants in Sweden, a country whose government has publicly committed itself to integrating its foreign citizens into its society, with the lives of immigrants in Germany, a country whose government views the foreign citizens' legal and cultural distinctiveness as permanent. Given these differences, we might predict that immigrants in Sweden not only would be more integrated into Swedish society, but also more participatory within Swedish society.

Our findings are quite different from this expectation. Despite the government's declaration that Germany is not a land of immigration, immigrants in Germany lead lives just as participatory, though perhaps not as integrated, as immigrants in Sweden. The economic situation of immigrants in Germany is comparable to, and definitely not worse, than that of immigrants in Sweden. Even though Germany's welfare state is organized differently than Sweden's, immigrants in Germany have access to many of the same benefits as their counterparts in Sweden. Immigrants in Germany face the same challenges posed by housing segregation, lower levels of education, and overrepresentation in the crime statistics. Immigrants in Germany participate in a vast array of associations, which for the most part are financed without government monetary support. Immigrants' inability to vote or hold political office on any level in Germany does not seem to prevent immigrants from political engagement.

Through their associations, many of which are organized along the same political and social cleavages found in Turkey, Turkish immigrants in Germany continue to demonstrate their interest in politics in Turkey. However, many Turkish organizations are focused on addressing issues pertinent to life in Germany.

The chapter is organized into four major sections. The chapter begins by summarizing the growth of the immigrant population in Germany and the German government's immigrant policy, and then presents in brief the economic, social, and political situations of immigrants in Germany. The general picture painted within the chapter of the lives of immigrants in Germany should serve as a point of reference with the situation in Sweden, which explicitly affirms its intention of integrating immigrants. In sum, immigrants in Sweden do not experience lives different from those in Germany, whose government has a low commitment to immigrant integration. A final note regarding statistics and terminology is needed. Because of Germany's reunification in 1990, the statistics for the years up to 1990 represent figures for the Federal Republic of Germany, while figures beginning with 1990 are those either of the Federal Republic of Germany or of the re-united Germany as stipulated. This dissertation uses Germany throughout to refer to the pre-1990 federal republic as well as to the re-unified Germany.


Immigrants and German Immigrant Policy

In many respects, the growth of the immigrant population in Germany reflected the same economic and social forces that marked the growth of the immigrant population in Sweden. In the 1960s, immigrants came to Germany due to a labor shortage. In the 1970s, chain migration (family reunification) was the

driving force that maintained the influx of immigrants into Germany. In the 1980s and beyond, refugees and asylum seekers were the majority of immigrants to Germany.

Immigrants began coming to Germany in the 1960s from the Mediterranean region, (Turkey, Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece, and Spain), in response to the labor shortage in Germany. With the closing of Eastern Europe and the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, Germany sought bilateral agreements with a number of countries that would allow German industry access to foreign laborers. In 1961, the German government reached an agreement with Turkey for the organization and emigration of Turks to Germany. As stipulated in the agreements and by German law, the Federal Employment Office opened recruitment centers in various countries through which German industry would gain access to foreign labor. The increase in the proportion of foreign workers recruited through the Federal Employment Office from 40% in the early 1960s to over 70% by the 1970s attests to the efficiency of the Federal Employment Office (Katzenstein 1987). Since immigrant workers were supposed to come to Germany on a rotational basis, the German government did not view them as people who would need to be integrated into the German society. Immigrants were to be healthy persons who would live in private or company-sponsored facilities fairly close to places of employment. As guest workers, immigrants eventually would return home after completing their work contracts. Immigrants were not supposed to be 'here for good,' (Castles 1984). In response to the

recession beginning in 1973, the German government terminated the bilateral agreements that allowed for the emigration of foreign workers.



Source: *Strukturdaten über die ausländische Bevölkerung; Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit, Ausländer 1993; Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit, ausländische Bevölkerung 1997; Wirtschaftspolitik*

The termination of the bilateral agreements in 1973 did not reduce the growing numbers of foreign citizens in Germany. (See Graph 6.1.) The government expected that terminating the bilateral agreements in conjunction

with the recession would induce workers to return to their native lands. After all, during the short recession in 1966-1967, at least 300,000 foreign workers left Germany (Katzenstein), thus suggesting that foreign workers might be “shock absorbers” in the German labor market by easing labor shortages with their presence and easing unemployment with their repatriation. By the 1970’s, foreign workers were anything but “shock absorbers” in the German labor market. The rotation of foreign workers did not occur as originally envisioned by the government and German industry. As long as jobs remained, work contracts were extended. New workers did not replace existing ones in established positions. Even though German employers were first to offer jobs to German citizens, then to citizens of European Union countries, many employers discovered that some jobs were simply unattractive to these populations. Simply stated, immigrants took jobs that Germans did not want (Czada, Tolksdorf, and Yenel 1992). In some sectors, immigrant workers became part of the core, permanent workforce (Esser and Korte 1985). As immigrant workers become part of the core workforce, immigrants were able to bring their families into Germany because of the German economy’s continuing need for foreign workers. For German employers, the benefits of employing family members were obvious. Employers could avoid paying the 300 DM (later 1000 DM) processing fee charged by the Federal Employment Office for each immigrant worker, in addition to being freed of the responsibility of arranging living arrangements for the new immigrants. By the time the bilateral agreements were terminated, employed foreign workers already had the right to bring their spouses and children into Germany, a right

many immigrants chose to exercise. Finally, since the naturalization process in Germany was long, difficult, and expensive, immigrants and their children remained foreign citizens.

Not only did the number of immigrants continued to increase after 1973, but the number of non-European immigrants, especially Turks, continued to rise. By 1987, Turks comprised 34% of the total immigrant population in Germany. By 1995, Turks were 28% of the total immigrant population in Germany, but the decline in the Turkish percentage of the foreign population occurred because of the large increase in non-Turkish immigrants. The absolute population of Turks in Germany continued to increase. In 1980, there were 1,462,442 Turkish citizens in Germany. In 1995 there were 7,173,900 foreign citizens in Germany, of which 2,014,311 were Turkish citizens. Viewed differently, the 1995 population of Turks in Germany represented a 38% increase over the 1980 Turkish population. The 1995 figure for the number of immigrants in Germany does not include the 1.2 million 'Aussiedler' who arrived in Germany between 1988 and 1991. Aussiedler are immigrants who have a German bloodline, thereby being eligible to claim German citizenship upon arrival. Aussiedler, many who came from the former Soviet Union, knew no German and had only minimal knowledge, if any, of German society. Even though aussiedler were technically citizens, many Germans considered them to be foreigners too (Bade 1992; Klusmeyer 1993). Regarding asylum seekers and refugees in the 1980s and 1990s, appropriately 38% came from outside Europe, while another 28% came from the former Yugoslavia and its associated countries.

In a 1978 report, the federal and state governments belatedly and halfheartedly acknowledged that many immigrants in Germany were going to be permanent residents (Katzenstein). The report recommended that the federal and state governments adopt an immigrant policy that adhered to a few basic principles. These principles are summarized below (Katzenstein).

1. The Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration.
2. A permanent freeze of foreign workers must be maintained over the long run.
3. Foreign workers will be needed in the Federal Republic of Germany on a long-term basis, albeit at decreasing levels.
4. We need to reinforce the readiness and the ability of foreign workers and their families now residing in West Germany to return. The countries of origin have to share in this responsibility.
5. Foreign workers and their families living in the Federal Republic of Germany should enjoy a secure social and legal status, and they should live fully integrated into West German society.
6. In the future, employment policies dealing with foreign workers should pay special attention to the problems of the second generation of the children of foreign workers growing up in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The German government implemented in a piecemeal fashion an immigrant policy that tried to incorporate the report's recommendations. To the extent that immigrant policy largely had been executed through the German states

(Länder), municipalities, and various ministries, organizations, or agencies, Germany did not have a coherent immigrant policy (Esser and Korte). One area where the federal government had sole jurisdiction was naturalization law. Germany did not amend the citizenship criteria established by the Imperial Naturalization Law of 1913, (Reichs-Staatsbürgergesetz), which provided that citizenship passed by descent from parent to child. Naturalization remained an expensive and time consuming process. Immigrants had to be continuous residents of Germany for 10 years, employed the entire time, maintain a clean record with the police, speak German fluently, and demonstrate an enduring attachment to German society before they could even *apply* for citizenship. Children born to foreign residents in Germany did not automatically receive citizenship. Similar, complicated rules applied to them also, though these have been scrapped in 1999. (Children born in Germany will automatically be entitled to citizenship provided that at least one parent was born in the country or arrived before the age of 14 and currently holds a residence permit. Others can apply for citizenship after 8 years of residency in Germany. Dual citizenship will be tacitly tolerated, but not condoned.) Germany's naturalization policy did not encourage high levels of naturalization, as Table 6.1 shows.

Table 6.1 Naturalizations among the Foreign Population

Year	# of Naturalizations		% Naturalizations	
	Germany	Sweden	Germany	Sweden
1980	14969	20833	0.37	4.94
1981	13372	18858	0.29	4.56
1982	13064	18303	0.28	4.51
1983	14187	18237	0.31	4.58
1984	14513	21844	0.33	5.59
1985	13764	20498	0.31	5.27
1986	13878	20695	0.31	5.30
1987	13883	19958	0.33	4.98
1988	16521	17966	0.37	4.27
1989	17573	17752	0.36	3.85
1990	20078	16770	0.38	3.47
1991	27162	27663	0.46	5.60
1992	36906	29389	0.57	5.89
1993	44999	42659	0.65	8.41

Source: *Statistics in Focus 1995:11*

Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit, Ausländer 1993

Employed immigrants enjoy the same industrial rights as German workers. As in Sweden, the major trade union, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, (DGB), supported the immigration of foreign workers as long as these workers were paid the same wages as their German counterparts. In addition to wage protections, German unions allowed foreign citizens to become members. Still, the availability of union membership did not translate into foreign workers' satisfaction with their position within the unions. A series of wildcat strikes in 1969 and in 1973, (starting at the Ford plant in Cologne), persuaded the DGB to do more to incorporate foreign workers within the union (Katzenstein; Miller 1981). In 1975, the DGB pressed the federal government to grant foreign citizens stronger protections for freedom of speech and of association, better representation in government advisory boards, and improved access to language and vocational training (Katzenstein). The DGB itself became active in recruiting

more foreign shop stewards and giving them the right to call meetings, parallel to regular union meetings, where foreign languages could be used.

Immigrants enjoy not only the same industrial rights as Germans, but also the same social rights. Immigrants are legally entitled to rent subsidies, unemployment benefits, and child allowances. All insurance and pension claims acquired in Germany are paid in full, even in the event that an immigrant returns to his native country. As the case in Sweden, Germany's immigrant policy utilizes its established mechanisms for delivering social services to immigrants. The states, unions, sickness funds, and quasi-public organizations all play a significant role in the delivery of welfare benefits to immigrants. The provision of social services to foreign citizens has been delegated to private welfare agencies or the municipalities. For example, Caritas takes care of Catholic immigrants, mainly Spaniards, Italians, Portuguese, and some Yugoslavs. Diakonisches Werk, a Protestant agency, works with Greek immigrants. The union affiliated Arbeiterwohlfahrt is responsible for working with Turks and some Yugoslavs. The religious groups are partially funded through large subsidies from the state and local governments, but the Arbeiterwohlfahrt is wholly funded by the government.

Immigrants in Germany do not have voting rights nor the right to seek and hold elective offices. Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court in 1991 invalidated a law that one state (Schleswig-Holstein) had passed in 1989 giving immigrants the right to vote and hold local offices. Nevertheless, immigrants can become members of the political parties and hold party offices if the party permits

it. Foreign (citizen) political parties are illegal in Germany. Immigrants can, however, work on local advisory committees as permitted by the state governments. These local committees are commonly called *Ausländerbeiräte*, (foreigners' councils).

Immigrants in Germany: Their Economic Situation

The focus of this section is to present empirical data on the immigrant experience within the German economy. The economic situation of immigrants is compared to that of the general population in Germany, and when possible, with that of German citizens. This section also presents data on the employment situation of Turks, as well as data on the sectors in which immigrant employment is concentrated.

Immigrants experience higher levels of unemployment than Germans, much in the same way that immigrants in Sweden experience higher levels of unemployment than Swedes. (See Table 6.2.) Until 1992, immigrants in Germany were more unemployed than immigrants in Sweden. In this respect, immigrants in Sweden would seem better off. However, in comparison to the unemployment rate for immigrants in Sweden, the unemployment rate for immigrants in Germany was never more than twice the rate for the general population, whereas in Sweden, this was always the case after 1985. Even though the growth in Sweden's gross domestic product remained above 2% from 1985 to 1989, (Table 6.3), the multiple between the unemployment rate for immigrants and the general population continued to spread throughout the period. The multiple between the unemployment rate for immigrants and the general

population in Germany also widened during the same period until 1989, but the growth in Germany's gross domestic product was more erratic. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 suggest that other factors besides general economic performance might have a role in the relationship between the unemployment rates of immigrants and the general population. The most obvious factor that probably influences the unemployment rate of immigrants is the sectors that immigrants tend to find work. If immigrants work in the non-growth sectors of the economy, then differences in unemployment between immigrants and the general population can remain even in times of economic growth.

Table 6.2 Unemployment Rates (National and Immigrant, in %) in Sweden and Germany (Federal Republic only)

<u>Year</u>	<u>National</u>		<u>Immigrant</u>		<u>Multiple (I/N)</u>	
	<u>Sweden</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Sweden</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Sweden</u>	<u>Germany</u>
1985	2.8	9.3	5.2	13.9	1.86	1.49
1986	2.2	9.0	4.8	13.7	2.18	1.52
1987	1.9	8.9	4.4	14.3	2.32	1.61
1988	1.6	8.7	3.8	14.4	2.38	1.66
1989	1.4	7.9	3.4	12.2	2.43	1.54
1990	1.5	7.2	4.0	10.9	2.67	1.51
1991	2.7	6.3	6.6	10.7	2.44	1.70
1992	4.8	6.6	12.8	12.2	2.67	1.85
1993	8.2	8.2	20.8	15.1	2.54	1.84
1994	8.0	9.2	21.0	16.2	2.63	1.76

Source: *Arbetskraftsundersokningen (AKU) Strukturdaten uber die auslandische Bevolkerung*

Table 6.3 Percentage Change in Gross Domestic Product

<u>Year</u>	<u>Sweden</u>	<u>Germany</u>
1985	2.2%	1.9%
1986	2.3%	2.3%
1987	2.9%	1.9%
1988	2.3%	3.7%
1989	2.6%	0.8%
1990	1.4%	2.5%
1991	-1.2%	***
1992	-1.9%	-5.5%
1993	-2.1%	7.1%

Source: *Basic Statistics for the European Union*

Notes: (1) Calculations used 1985=100 for market prices.
(2) 1985-1990 statistics are for the Federal Republic.
(3) 1991 is left blank due to unification of Germany.
(3) Post 1991 statistics are for the unified Germany

As in Sweden, immigrants locate employment in specific sectors. Immigrants in Germany overwhelmingly work in the industrial, mining, construction, and service sectors (Czada, Tolksdorf, and Yenel). In 1993, immigrants comprised 8.5% of the population in Germany and 8.2% of the total number of employed persons in Germany. However, 29.5% of all miners were immigrants; 80.6% of them were Turks (*Im Blickpunkt: ausländische Bevölkerung in Deutschland*). There were 293,000 immigrants classified as general workers' helpers in 1993, 29.3% of the total number of workers' helpers, of which 45.5% were Turks (*Im Blickpunkt*). Other examples include immigrants representing 17.4% of those employed in the textile and clothing industries, of which 45.5% were Turks; 23.0% of those employed as construction workers' helpers, of which 29.8% and 24.5% were Turks and Yugoslavs respectively; and 15.4% of those employed as machinists, of which 40.0% were Turks (*Im Blickpunkt*). In contrast, immigrants represented only 4.3% of those employed in

the technical fields, (engineers, physicists, chemists, etc.), of which 11.2% were Turks, and 3.2% of those employed in office or administrative positions, of which 10.8% were Turks (*Im Blickpunkt*).

Table 6.4 contains a more systematic presentation of the sectors where immigrants are employed. As in Sweden, immigrants are predominately employed in the industrial and manufacturing sectors of the Germany economy, though the percentage of immigrants working in these sectors has declined steadily. Immigrants are increasingly finding jobs in social services or the public sector. The employment patterns of Germans remained relatively consistent, with roughly a third of employed Germans finding jobs in the industry/manufacturing or the social service/public sectors. The second generation of workers in Germany find employment in similar sectors, the industry/manufacturing and the social services/public sectors. For second generation immigrants, the social services/public sector has supplanted the business/trade sector as a place to find employment. This has always been the case for second generation Germans. Similar to immigrant men, immigrant women tend to secure jobs in industry, though this trend too has been declining. This is in contrast to Sweden, where immigrant women locate the majority of their jobs in the public sector. The figures for immigrant women employment in Germany suggest that the public sector will increasingly become a significant source of employment for immigrant women. Perhaps the only surprising information about where Turks locate employment is the magnitude of Turks' working in the industrial sector and the magnitude of the decline of Turks in the industrial sector. As in the rest of the

Germany economy, trade and services are becoming more significant in providing opportunities of employment for Turks.

		in %							
Sector		Immigrant				German			
		1984	1989	1991	1995	1984	1989	1991	1995
Total									
	Industry/Manufacturing	63	64	58	50	33	35	33	31
	Construction	13	13	11	14	8	6	6	6
	Business/Trade	8	6	8	11	16	16	18	19
	Production Services	2	3	2	3	7	8	8	7
	Consumer Services	6	6	8	8	3	3	3	3
	Social and Public Services	6	5	10	13	28	29	28	31
2nd Generation									
	Industry/Manufacturing	43	55	57	45	35	40	32	33
	Construction	10	7	3	7	8	9	7	6
	Business/Trade	23	12	14	14	20	15	22	18
	Production Services	1	4	4	5	6	8	8	6
	Consumer Services	15	9	4	6	4	4	3	4
	Social and Public Services	6	12	16	23	24	23	26	30
Women									
	Industry/Manufacturing	63	57	48	38	22	24	22	20
	Construction	0	1	0	0	2	2	1	2
	Business/Trade	9	7	8	14	21	20	22	22
	Production Services	2	6	4	7	9	10	8	7
	Consumer Services	13	13	17	14	6	5	5	3
	Social and Public Services	12	17	22	27	36	38	38	44
Turkish Immigrants									
	Industry/Manufacturing	71	69	61	53				
	Construction	11	12	11	9				
	Business/Trade	6	5	8	11				
	Production Services	2	3	3	8				
	Consumer Services	4	3	5	7				
	Social and Public Services	5	7	12	13				

Source: *Datenreport 1997: Zahlen und Fakten über die Bundeszentrale Deutschland*
Notes: (1) Figures representative of population in the earlier Federal Republic states only.
(2) 2nd generation workers are German and foreign persons aged 16 in 1984.
The 2nd generation workers would be 25 years old in 1995.

Table 6.5 Employed Germans and Immigrants Type of Position

		in %							
		Immigrant				German			
Sample Size		1086	1141	1004	937	2565	2755	2837	2694
Year		1984	1989	1991	1995	1984	1989	1991	1995
<u>Type of Position</u>									
Total									
	Unskilled	25	20	22	16	4	4	3	3
	Semi-skilled	45	44	40	39	12	12	11	8
	Skilled	19	23	24	23	18	17	18	16
	Lower Management	4	3	3	8	10	9	5	11
	Middle/Higher Management	3	6	8	10	33	37	43	41
	Self-Employed	4	4	3	4	12	11	10	12
2nd Generation									
	Unskilled	22	15	10	2	9	3	2	1
	Semi-skilled	25	35	33	25	11	14	14	8
	Skilled	32	28	33	30	21	24	25	24
	Lower Management	14	7	7	16	18	11	4	14
	Middle/Higher Management	5	15	15	26	29	37	43	43
	Self-Employed	2	2	1	1	3	6	4	4
Women									
	Unskilled	35	33	36	27	6	7	7	6
	Semi-skilled	48	44	40	38	12	14	11	9
	Skilled	3	5	3	2	3	4	5	3
	Lower Management	8	7	7	15	21	18	9	20
	Middle/Higher Management	3	8	12	17	39	42	54	45
	Self-Employed	4	4	2	2	13	9	8	10
Turkish Immigrants									
	Unskilled	36	27	27	22				
	Semi-skilled	42	42	41	35				
	Skilled	14	22	24	26				
	Lower Management	5	2	3	8				
	Middle/Higher Management	2	6	4	8				
	Self-Employed	2	1	2	2				

Source: *Datenreport 1997: Zahlen und Fakten über die Bundeszentrale Deutschland*

Notes: (1) Figures representative of population in the earlier Federal Republic states only.

(2) 2nd generation workers are German and foreign persons aged 16 in 1984.

The 2nd generation workers would be 25 years old in 1995.

From Table 6.5 it is clear to see that immigrants and Germans work at very different types of jobs. At no time in the period considered did the combined percentage of immigrants employed in unskilled, semi-skilled, or skilled positions fall below 75%. Likewise, at no time in the same period did the combined percentage of Germans employed in management or self-employed fall below 50%. Even though the percentage of immigrants locating positions in middle and higher management has increased, immigrants still face a different job market than Germans. The increase in immigrants in middle and higher management positions can be attributed to the gains of second generation immigrants. Second generation immigrants in Sweden cannot boast such inroads into positions of management. The dichotomy of the job market for immigrants and Germans also persists in regards to women. Immigrant women find the majority of their positions among the unskilled and semi-skilled, (but not skilled), job openings, while German women find their positions in management. Similar to second generation immigrants, immigrant women increasingly are finding work in management positions. For example, 32% of immigrant women worked in management positions in 1995. As in Sweden, the majority of these positions are undoubtedly in the public sector. In 1995, 27% of immigrant women worked in the social services/public sector. Turks are overwhelmingly concentrated in unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled positions.

Immigrants as a group do not earn as much as Germans, (Table 6.6). Immigrants in Germany earn lower wages than immigrants in Sweden. Yet a careful examination of immigrant wages in Germany reveals a more complex

picture. Second generation immigrants and Turks earn as much as their German counterparts. Contrary to the common perception, unskilled and semi-skilled immigrants actually earn more than their German counterparts, which is a situation unmatched in Sweden. Immigrants in middle and upper management face declining earning power in comparison to Germans. Perhaps a reason for the decline in earning potential for immigrant middle and upper management is that immigrants are competing directly with a large pool of better trained Germans for these desirable positions. When incomes are compared by sector, immigrants in general earn much less than Germans.

Table 6.6 appears to suggest contradictory conclusions. How can immigrants who work as unskilled or semi-skilled laborers make more than Germans, but earn less in their sectors? How can second generation immigrants earn as much as their German counterparts, but immigrants in middle and upper management face a widening gap between themselves and Germans? These contradictions are explained by the fact that Table 6.6 reflects information from two different job markets, one for immigrants and another for Germans. Immigrants do not earn as much as Germans across the sectors because Germans are in management while immigrants are not. Second generation immigrants earn as much as their German counterparts because a significant portion of second generation immigrants still work as semi-skilled or skilled workers. The fact that Germany seems to have a bifurcated job market complicates any analysis of immigrant employment. If Germany's job market is structured along ethnicity, then immigrants should not expect to make significant inroads into the lucrative

management positions. However, the data suggests that second generation immigrants are making inroads into management positions.

	Immigrant			
	1984	1989	1991	1995
Total	0.87	0.90	0.82	0.80
2nd Generation	1.01	1.00	1.04	0.99
Women	0.93	0.89	0.81	0.86
Turkish Immigrants	0.96	0.98	0.98	0.98
Type of Position				
Unskilled	1.23	1.43	1.41	1.32
Semi-skilled	1.06	1.13	1.05	1.06
Skilled	1.01	0.99	0.98	0.96
Lower Management	0.96	1.09	1.12	1.09
Middle/Higher Management	1.08	0.97	0.84	0.80
Sector				
Industry/Manufacturing	0.81	0.82	0.77	0.75
Construction	0.94	0.95	0.99	0.89
Business/Trade	1.08	1.04	0.84	0.90
Production Services	***	***	0.59	0.65
Consumer Services	0.85	0.85	0.86	1.00
Social and Public Services	0.95	1.03	0.73	0.80

Source: *Datenreport 1997: Zahlen und Fakten über die Bundeszentrale Deutschland*

Notes: (1) Figures representative of population in the earlier Federal Republic states only.
 (2) 2nd generation workers are German and foreign persons aged 16 in 1984.
 The 2nd generation workers would be 25 years old in 1995.

Berlin (West) does not present immigrants with the best job markets. Like Stockholm, (West) Berlin is not in the major industrial area of the country. Unlike Stockholm, (West) Berlin is not Germany's center of public service jobs, though this situation should change with the relocation of the capital back to Berlin. Whereas the unemployment rate in Stockholm is not always higher than that of the country, the unemployment rate in Berlin is always higher than that of Germany. (See Table 6.7.) Though the unemployment rate for immigrants in

Berlin is not shown in the table, the unemployment rate for immigrants in Berlin is always higher than that for immigrants in the rest of the country. Turks represent a smaller proportion of unemployed immigrants in Berlin than their proportion of the immigrant population in Berlin. Turks represent a proportionate share of the employed immigrants in Berlin, as depicted in Table 6.7. Even though Turks seem to be at the bottom of a stratified hierarchy for foreigners in Germany, (Esser and Korte; Castles), their position does not always translate into their employment status or wage. As in Stockholm, blue collar workers face more unemployment than white collar workers. In Berlin, the majority of the unemployed are between the ages of 25-35, but in Stockholm, workers between the ages of 20-24 face the greatest employment challenges.

The low standing of Turks does not prevent business ownership. In 1991, Turks owned roughly 3,500 businesses in Berlin (Lundt, Tolun, Schwarz, and Fischer 1992). Fourteen hundred of these businesses were establishments that sold meals or groceries. Undoubtedly the size of the Turkish population in Berlin contributed to this phenomenon. The immigrant presence in the small business community in Berlin is duplicated in many areas throughout Germany. The percentage of the immigrant population who are self-employed or who are employed in the family business has increased from 3% to 4.4% to 8% in 1970, 1978, and 1993 respectively (*Im Blickpunkt*). In 1993, immigrants were 8.46% of the population in Germany. Likewise, the numbers of immigrants self-employed or working in family businesses increased from 51 thousand to 90 thousand to 230 thousand throughout the same period (*Im Blickpunkt*). For Germans, 9.2% of

them were self-employed during 1993 (*Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*).

Table 6.7 Various Labor Statistics for West Berlin (in %)

Year	FRG		(West) Berlin					% of employed Foreigners who are Turks
	Total	Foreign	Total	Percentage of Unemployed				
				Turks	Blue Collar	White Collar	25 to 35	
1985	8.5	13.5	10.0	***	60.9	39.2	28.0	50.7
1986	9.0	13.7	10.5	17	62.8	37.2	28.2	50.6
1987	8.9	14.3	10.5	***	64.8	35.2	27.8	50.2
1988	8.7	14.4	10.8	18	61.6	38.4	29.1	49.6
1989	7.9	12.2	9.8	***	58.8	41.2	29.4	49.4
1990	7.2	10.8	9.4	16	61.4	38.6	29.5	49.0
1991	6.9	10.7	9.4	***	63.7	36.3	29.8	48.9
1992	6.6	12.2	11.1	21	64.6	35.4	30.0	47.7
1993	6.2	15.1	12.3	22	63.9	36.1	29.5	44.6
1994	9.2	16.2	13.3	22	62.9	37.1	***	43.5

Percentage Unemployment
*** Data Unavailable

Source: *Strukturdaten über die ausländische Bevölkerung*
Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Statistisches Jahrbuch, Berlin

Immigrants in Germany: Their Social Situation

Even though there are many differences in the details of the social situation of immigrants in Sweden and Germany, the overall themes remain the same. Immigrants live in segregated communities in urban areas, rely on social assistance services more, have lower levels of educational attainment, and are over-represented in the country's crime statistics. The major difference in the settlement patterns of immigrants in Sweden and Germany is that immigrants in Sweden tend to live in the "Million Homes" satellite communities that Swedes find unattractive while immigrants in Germany tend to live in the decrepit sections of the inner cities. With the exception of Turks, many immigrants in

Germany receive social services from quasi-public organizations that may have an affiliation with a religious organization. In Sweden, the state controls the disbursement of social benefits. Though immigrants in Germany have lower educational attainment levels and are over-represented in programs designed to move them into the blue collar work force, immigrants in Germany are making greater inroads into white collar employment than immigrants in Sweden. As in Sweden, immigrants in Germany experience a rich associational life. Unlike immigrant associations in Sweden, immigrant associations in Germany are self-supporting for the most part. There is no systematic financial support from the government for immigrant organizations in Germany.

Immigrants in Germany tend to live in the decrepit sections of the inner cities in the industrial areas of the post-war boom. These cities are in the Ruhr, the Rhine-Main conurbation around Frankfurt, the industrial areas around Stuttgart and Mannheim, and in southern Bavaria. Berlin is the main exception to this settlement pattern in that Berlin is not considered to be a major industrial area in Germany; though in Berlin, immigrants also live in the decrepit, industrial parts of the inner city. Berlin has the largest absolute number of immigrants of any German city, but not the highest concentration of immigrants in its population. Immigrants were 28.3% of Frankfurt am Main's total population in 1993, but only 12% of Berlin's total population. Cologne, Mannheim, Düsseldorf, Munich, Stuttgart, and Offenbach all have higher immigrant concentrations, (greater than 15%), in their populations than Berlin (Castles; Czada, Tolksdorf, and Yenal). Certain immigrant groups also tend to dominate in

various cities. Turks are the dominate immigrant group in Berlin, Cologne, and the areas around the Ruhr mines. Yugoslavs dominate in Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart.

As in Swedish cities, immigrants in Germany congregate within certain districts. Graph 6.2 shows the immigrant percentage of the population in the three districts in (West) Berlin with the highest and lowest immigrant concentrations. (The drop in the immigrant proportion of Berlin's population in 1990 is due to reunification of the city.) Kreuzberg is an old working class area next to the former border zone. Wedding is Berlin's old industrial area. As in Stockholm's Rinkeby where immigrants comprise 73.8% of the area's population, there are a few districts in German cities where immigrants are an extremely large percentage of the population. Berlin does not have such a district, but the immigrant population of Frankfurt's Bahnhofsviertel (Train Station Quarter) is 81% (*Bevölkerung von Frankfurt am Main nach Stadtbezirken*). In contrast to Rinkeby's immigrant concentration, the immigrant proportion of Kreuzberg's Mariannenplatz and Wedding's Karl Marx Straße populations were 49% and 30% in 1991 respectively (*Melderechtlich registrierte Ausländer in Berlin, 31 Dezember 1991*).

Unsurprisingly, the inner city areas where immigrants tend to live are usually seen as ghettos (Hermann 1992; *Mieter Magazin*). As in Stockholm, Berlin's ghettos also have high population densities, high usage of social services, and undesirable living facilities. Kreuzberg has the highest population density of any of Berlin's city districts in either East or West Berlin. The population


densities of Kreuzberg and Wedding compared to Steglitz and Tempelhof are 14,571 and 10,411 persons per square kilometer compared to 5,871 and 4,551 persons per square kilometer respectively (*Region Berlin, Bevölkerung und Wohnungen*). In 1989, Kreuzberg and Wedding also had the lowest percentage of apartments with private bathing facilities at 79.7% and 80.9% respectively, (*Region Berlin, Bevölkerung und Wohnungen*). Immigrants in Berlin live in the sections where either old and substandard buildings predominate or in sections needing substantial environmental reconditioning (Kapphan 1995). Unlike Stockholm, immigrants overwhelmingly reside in apartments rented from private landlords (Castles). Still, immigrants rent apartments wherever they can get them (Kapphan). As in Stockholm, immigrants in Berlin find their housing choices limited by finances, discrimination, and their desire to live in neighborhoods with persons of the same nationality (Kapphan). Finally, as in Stockholm, some immigrant groups have more rental opportunities in Berlin's housing market than other immigrant groups. Turks are most likely to live with other immigrants or in blue collar districts, while Italians are less likely either to live with other immigrant groups or in blue collar districts. (See Table 6.8.) American, British, and other Northern European immigrants are least likely to live with other immigrants in blue collar districts.

Table 6.8 Correlation of Various Groups Living in the Same District in Berlin

	<u>Immigrants</u>	<u>Turks</u>	<u>Yugoslavs</u>	<u>Greeks</u>	<u>Italians</u>
Blue Collar	0.68	0.77	0.66	0.50	0.25
Immigrants		0.91	0.69	0.81	0.58

Source: Kapphan

Graph 6.2 Percentage Foreign Population in Berlin and Selected City Districts




Source:

Melderechtlich registrierte Ausländer in Berlin, 31 Dezember 1991

Melderechtlich registrierte Einwohner in Berlin, 31 Dezember 1991

Immigrants are over-represented on the social assistance rolls in Germany as they are in Sweden. (See Graph 6.3.) In 1992, 35% of the persons who received social assistance in Germany were immigrants, a situation reached in Sweden in 1988 when 35.6% of persons receiving social assistance were immigrants. Beginning in 1992, the German government began to move asylum seekers off the federal social assistance rolls and onto a separate fund for asylum seekers. This budgeting change explains the decline in immigrants as a percentage of social assistance recipients. Still, the immigrant proportion of the social assistance rolls remained high in comparison to the immigrant proportion of Germany's total population. Moreover, the immigrant percentage of the social assistance rolls resumed its rise in 1994. Immigrants' use of social assistance in (West) Berlin replicates the pattern of immigrants' use of social assistance in Germany. In April 1994, 23% of all persons in (West) Berlin receiving unemployment payments were immigrants, while 31% of all persons receiving other financial support were immigrants (*Statistisches Jahrbuch Berlin 1995*). The statistics on immigrant social assistance usage not only serves to reinforce the perception that immigrant districts have become inner city ghettos, but also that immigrant districts are becoming the nation's poor houses (*Mieter Magazin*).



Source: *Sozialleistungen, Reihe 2: Sozialhilfe 1996*

Immigrants in Germany experience lower levels of educational attainment than German students. (Educational attainment is defined as the type of school attended and whether the program was successfully completed.) Of the students leaving school in 1993, only 8.3% of foreign students were leaving from a university or college program, whereas the percentage for German students was 25.4% (*Im Blickpunkt; Strukturdaten über die ausländische Bevölkerung 1997*). Of the foreign students leaving school in 1993, 64.4% of foreign students were leaving high school, of which 32.3% were leaving without graduating (*Im Blickpunkt*). For German students leaving school in 1993, only 33.4% of them were leaving high school, of which 23.4% were leaving without graduating.

Stated differently, 20.8% of all foreign students leaving school in 1993 were foreign students leaving high school without completing it, but only 7.8% of all German students leaving school in 1993 were leaving high school without completing it.

German students are more likely to participate in a course of study that prepares them for management and service sector jobs, while immigrants participate in studies that prepare them for blue collar jobs. It has already been noted that a greater percentage of German students leaving school are leaving from university programs than is the case for immigrant students. Likewise in 1993, 40.4% of German students leaving school were graduating from high schools with specialized programs of study; whereas the percentage of foreign students graduating from these programs was 26.6% (*Im Blickpunkt*). A question that remains unexamined is whether there is a relationship between the percentages of foreign and German students graduating from these programs and the percentages of second generation immigrants and Germans who found jobs in middle and higher management. As Table 6.5 shows for 1995, 26% of second generation immigrants, but 43% of Germans of the same age cohort found jobs in middle and higher management. Immigrants are represented in apprenticeship programs in line with their proportion of the population in Germany (*Im Blickpunkt*). Similar to German students in training programs, immigrant apprentices are overwhelmingly in programs designed to introduce them to the blue collar job market.


As in Sweden, immigrants in Germany are over-represented in persons accused of committing crimes. (See Graph 6.4.) When the types of crimes that only immigrants are prone to commit are discounted, such as infractions on asylum, immigrant, or identification laws, immigrants are still over-represented in the crime statistics. In 1991 for example, immigrants represented 61% of those charged with evading child support obligations, 55.8% of those charged with illegal gambling, 43.7% of those charged with organized theft, 35.4% of those charged with narcotics crimes, and 34.4% charged with robbery (*Im Blickpunkt*). Immigrants are over-represented in the statistics for persons charged with serious crimes. In 1996, immigrants represented 33.2% of all persons charged with murder and manslaughter, 33.7% of those charged with rape, 29.1% of those charged with dangerous or severe assault, and 23.2% of those charged with larceny committed under aggravated circumstances (*Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 1996*).

Though the percentage of Turks in the immigrant population has been roughly one third and declining, the percentage of Turks among immigrants charged with crime has been roughly 25% and declining. (See Graph 6.5.) Yet the decline in the number of Turks committing crimes cannot be interpreted to suggest that Turks are also committing less serious crimes. The reasons for the lower percentage of Turks among immigrant offenders remain unclear, though a number of reasons suggest themselves. Turks, who have been legal residents in Germany for a long time, are less prone to commit immigrant law and identification violations, which are included in the crime statistics. In 1995, of the


total number of Turks accused of crime, only 12.6% of those were accused of committing violations against asylum or immigrant policy laws, meaning that Turks were accused of other crimes (*Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 1996*). The proportion of Turks among immigrants accused of committing crime may be declining because Turks are prone to have other family members in Germany who have financial resources they can tap during economic difficulties. Finally, since Turks have been in Germany longer, they know the laws better than other groups who have recently arrived to Germany. Since figures on the number of Turks who commit serious crimes are not presented here, the types of crimes Turks are prone to commit remains undiscovered.

Immigrants are over-represented in the number of persons accused of crime in the major metropolitan areas where they reside. In 1996 for example, 62.7%, 45.7%, and 42.9% of all persons accused of crime in Frankfurt am Main, Stuttgart, and Munich were immigrants (*Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 1996*). In Berlin, the percentage was 33.1%, but 26.4% when asylum and immigrant policy infractions were deducted (*Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 1996*). Immigrants between the ages of 30 and 40 have been the age group consistently accused of committing the greatest number of crimes, followed by those in the 25 to 30 age group (*Im Blickpunkt*). Over half of all immigrants accused of crimes in Germany fall within these age groups. In Sweden, persons between the ages of 16-24 and 35-44 represent slightly over half of the immigrants committing crimes that result in jail terms.

Graph 6.4 Percent Immigrant of Those Accused of Crime



Graph 6.5 Percent Turks of Immigrants Accused of Crime



Source: *Strukturdaten über die ausländische Bevölkerung 1997*

Immigrants in Germany not only experience a rich associational life, but also are able to support financially their associations. Immigrants in Germany maintain union membership in accordance with their types of employment. Sports associations are also popular with immigrants in Germany. Associations that seek to cater to immigrant needs can play a relevant role in immigrants' lives. For example, Caritas (Catholic) and the Diakonisches Werk (Greek Orthodox) are agencies charged with caring for immigrants within their religious faiths. To the extent that these organizations are surrogates for German authorities supplying social services to immigrants, the German government channels its social expenditures through them. Even though the Arbeiterwohlfahrt has a pivotal role in aiding Turks, Turkish immigrants themselves still have established a dense network of organizations offering a plethora of social services.

Turks have established a vibrant and extensive network of associations in Germany. Being the largest immigrant group in Germany has played a role in building the breadth and depth of Turkish associations. Turks in Germany also enjoy a wide range of bookstores, restaurants, theater groups, and religious associations. Three Turkish papers are printed in Germany; and Turkish television, cable, and radio programs are readily available. Like Sweden, there are associations whose long term mission is integration into the German society. These organizations typically seek dialogue both with Germans and other immigrants. The German-Turkish Children's Club (Deutsch-Türkischer Kinderclub) and the Turkish Parents Association (Türkischer Elternverein e.V.) are good examples of these types of organizations. Other Turkish organizations

are solely about preserving or promoting national and ethnic identity, such as the Turkish Women's Association of Berlin (Türkischer Frauenverein Berlin e.V.). As in the case with the Turkish Women's Association of Berlin, organizations that seek to preserve or promote national or ethnic identity need not be radical or religious, though these sorts of Turkish organizations also exist in Germany. The (Berlin) Senate's Foreigners' Commissioner and the Foreigners' Commissioner Office of the District of Kreuzberg published a small booklet in order to provide immigrants with a broad, but not extensive, overview of the associations available to them. In this publication, *Kiez International*, the commissioners list 160 organizations in Berlin, of which 34 (21.25%) provide services specifically for the Turkish community. Rainer Mällée (1991) produced an address book for those interested in doing political work in Berlin. His comprehensive, 600 page catalog lists immigrant, religious, cultural, business, and housing groups, in addition to the usual government, party, and union organizations that immigrants would find useful.

A rich associational life does not mean more integration between immigrants and Germans. Convincing evidence exists that despite a better knowledge of the German language, immigrants over time reported having fewer interethnic friendships (*Datenreport 1997*). This finding held true for second generation immigrants, women, and Turks.

In Germany, a rich associational life is also the product of the cleavages that fragment various immigrant groups. Turkish associations in Germany are the supreme example of this dynamic at work. Though Turkish associations are

polarized along political or philosophical lines, many Turkish organizations fall into three categories: religious orthodox or fundamentalist, conservative or nationalistic, or socialist or communist (Schoeneberg 1985). These categories are in addition to the Turkish-Kurdish cleavage that divides many citizens from Turkey. Turkish religious associations tend to disclaim partisanship, but since the debate over the role of Islam in Turkey remains unsettled, the Turkish government refuses to support Islamic Centers in Germany, while the German government is wary of getting involved (Schoeneberg). This study has not uncovered any Islamic group that the German government used for a surrogate to provide social services to Turks. Only recently in November 1998 did Muslims win the right to receive Islamic instruction in Berlin schools. In comparison, the Stockholm government expressed little qualms about assigning the Turkish Association in Rinkeby the concession for running the local mosque. Neither was there an expressed fear by Swedish government officials that Islamic instruction would serve to hinder immigrants' efforts at integration. Conservative or nationalistic Turkish organizations are usually oriented towards politics in Turkey. For the most part, leftist Turkish organizations remain committed to promoting cooperation with German organizations, (particularly unions), as well as promoting integration of immigrants into German society (Schoeneberg). Therefore, immigrants who are active in leftist organizations tend to have more interaction with Germans and other immigrant groups (Schoeneberg).

One hypothesis worth mentioning, but cannot be explored here, is whether the abundance and structure of immigrant associations in Germany serve to keep

these organizations politically weak, much in the same way that the Swedish government's role in organizing and financing immigrant organizations can be seen as keeping those organizations politically weak. The weak fiscal condition and dependence on government funds of most immigrant organizations in Sweden have forced immigrant associations to adopt strategies that pursue reasonable goals without sacrificing government funding. In this respect, immigrant organizations in Sweden conform to the model stipulated by the government authorities. In Germany, the independent financial condition of immigrant groups, religious associations, and mosques would seem to contribute to a greater program independence for these groups. However, financial resources and program independence does not mean that immigrant groups in Germany are effective in achieving their political aims.

Immigrants in Germany: Their Political Situation

A major difference between the political situation of immigrants in Germany and immigrants in Sweden is that immigrants in Germany cannot vote or hold an elective office; whereas in Sweden immigrants can vote in local elections and hold elective local offices. The Swedish government encountered little opposition when it decided to grant immigrants the franchise (Tung 1985). In Germany, the opposition to extending voting rights to immigrants was fierce, formidable, and constitutional. The opposition was fierce in that a consistent, significant portion of the German population was against granting immigrants voting rights. Opposition to immigrant voting participation was not primarily limited to the areas where conservatives parties dominate; rather, the opposition to

immigrant voting rights was broad based. Given the divisiveness of the issue, the conservative parties did not fail to exploit proposals for immigrant voting rights to their fullest political advantage (Klusmeyer; O'Brien 1990). Even as recently as the autumn of 1998, the German conservative parties used Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's proposal to *tolerate* dual citizenship as a platform to secure electoral gains in the state of Hessen. The opposition to immigrant voting rights is supported by the Basic Law, (constitution), in Germany. The Basic Law reserves for German citizens exclusively the right to vote (Article 20.2) and the right to form parties (Article 21.1), (O'Brien). By implication, any immigrant or minority parties would not survive a legal challenge to their existence or political participation. The Federal Constitutional Court reaffirmed this interpretation by invalidating in 1991 a law that Schleswig-Holstein had passed giving immigrants the right to vote and hold local offices. Still, immigrants are entitled to be consulted and to provide information to municipal government bodies (Hönekapp and Ullman 1982).

Despite these public and legal hurdles to immigrant political participation, immigrants in Germany are politically active. The question is how effective immigrants are in successfully realizing items on their political agendas. Some immigrant groups espouse a political platform geared towards politics in their home countries. This section will not present evidence on the influence of these groups on politics in their native countries. Instead, the focus of this section is whether immigrants are effective in pursuing political agendas that revolve around their lives in Germany.

Evidence suggests that the effectiveness of immigrant political action is mixed. Early in their sojourn in Germany, immigrants were able to use unauthorized strikes as a means to pursue political solutions to economic injustices, (Castles and Kosack 1985; Katzenstein; Miller). In 1969, striking immigrants were unsuccessful in their efforts to address discriminatory pay scales. Immigrants were somewhat more successful in 1973 to obtain the reinstatement of fired immigrant workers and to obtain a pay raise. While the strikes were not unqualified successes, they did force IG-Metall, (the local union at the plants), and the DGB to redouble their efforts to integrate immigrants within their organizations. The DGB responded by increasing its recruitment of immigrant shop stewards, who were able to call meetings which were conducted in a foreign language. The DGB also argued for the federal government to adopt a package of policies that would make immigrants' lives in Germany more secure. The DGB's stance was striking because foreign workers themselves were not involved in any way during the policy process (Katzenstein). There was no such counterpart action by immigrants in Sweden that had a similar effect on the LO.

Immigrants can and do join the political parties in Germany, but they have very little influence because only persons who have the right to vote are legally permitted to participate in nominating candidates. Consequently, immigrants cannot serve as delegates or take part in the choice and presentation of candidates for elections (Hönekapp and Ullman). As in Sweden, immigrants do not join political parties in the same proportions that citizens do.

When immigrants do decide to affiliate or work with a political party, they overwhelmingly chose parties of the left, in particular, the Social Democratic, Green, or Communist parties. Immigrants' membership in unions help solidify their association with the Social Democratic party. As mentioned earlier, if a Turkish organization is not religious/fundamental or nationalistic/conservative, then it is usually leftist. Assuming that immigrants who naturalize tend to live in immigrant communities, then an examination of Berlin's voting returns from the October 1994 election confirms that parties of the left do best in voting districts with the most immigrants. Table 6.9 provides a composite of the percentage of votes received by the top four parties during the October 1994 election in Berlin. Of the 120 voting districts, Sigrun Below (1994) separates them into districts with low, medium, and high proportions of immigrant residents. Below also separates the data into districts in East and West Berlin, because of the 40 districts with low proportions of immigrant residents in the entire city of Berlin, 39 of them are in the East. (As expected, Kreuzberg and Wedding have the highest proportions of immigrants in their populations.) When separated into East and West Berlin, the Green and Communist parties tally a higher percentage of votes in districts with high proportions of immigrant voters, irrespective of where the districts may be. The Social Democratic Party is able to attract its largest percentage of voters in West Berlin among voters who live in areas with high immigrant concentrations, but attracts its largest percentage of voters in the East from districts with the lowest immigrant concentrations. For Berlin taken as a whole, the Green Party is especially dependent on attracting voters who live in areas with high immigrant

concentrations. Perhaps this contributed to the party's decision to place Cem Özdemir high enough on their candidate list enabling him to become the first person of Turkish descent elected to the German Parliament. Özdemir himself claimed that in the parliament he served as the voice for Turkish people (Weber 1995).

Table 6.9 Percent Votes by Party and % Immigrant Population in District

% of Immigrants	# of Districts	CDU	SPD	PDS	GRN
East Berlin					
Low	16	19.9	34.2	34.6	5.3
Medium	17	20.1	34.1	32.2	7.6
High	16	18.5	30.9	37.3	7.7
Total	49	19.5	33.1	34.7	6.9
West Berlin					
% of Immigrants	# of Districts	CDU	SPD	PDS	GRN
Low	23	45.0	33.4	1.6	7.5
Medium	24	40.1	33.7	2.1	11.4
High	24	31.1	36.7	4.1	17.9
Total	71	38.7	34.6	2.6	12.3
Berlin					
% of Immigrants	# of Districts	CDU	SPD	PDS	GRN
Low	40	20.6	33.6	32.8	6.8
Medium	40	38.6	32.4	9.5	8.2
High	40	33.9	35.9	4.0	15.4
Total	120	31.4	34.0	14.8	10.2

CDU = Christian Democratic Union
 SPD = Social Democratic Party
 PDS = Party for Democratic Socialism (Communist)
 GRN = Green Party

Source: Below

In the larger cities and areas where immigrants concentrate, immigrants can have local boards, councils (Ausländerbeirat), and ombudsmen/commissioners (Ausländerbeauftragte) that advise the municipalities about issues that are important to foreign citizens. However, these representatives are politically ineffective and of little account to immigrants (Katzenstein; Miller). In its

introductory pamphlet, the Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs lists its number one duty as "formulating the basic questions concerning the Berlin's Senate's policy on foreigners and integration, to consult with all the departments, and to coordinate the work." The commissioner's third major duty is to offer advice to policy makers on policies that impact immigrants. The commissioner lists its anti-discrimination work as organizing training courses to counteract discrimination and violence. From this perspective, the Discrimination Ombudsman (DO) in Sweden has substantially greater authority in dealing with discrimination. Like the DO in Sweden, Berlin's Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs expends considerable resources on public relations such as the *Kiez International* and *Miteinander Leben in Berlin* publications. For the same reasons that the DO was able to press the Swedish Parliament into increasing its powers in 1994, Berlin's Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs advocated strengthening the laws against ethnic discrimination. The DO in Sweden and the Commissioner for Foreigners' Affairs in Germany both hold an office with weak powers.

Conclusion

Immigrants in Germany live fundamentally different lives than native Germans, much in the same way that immigrants in Sweden live fundamentally different lives than native Swedes. Though the details are different, immigrants in Germany and Sweden share common experiences despite the difference in how the German and Swedish governments view immigrants. In Sweden, the government believed that immigrants could be incorporated into the Swedish society. With incorporation in mind, the government adopted an immigrant

policy to encourage immigrant incorporation and participation within the Swedish society. Differences between the lives of immigrants and native Swedes remain potential issues to be addressed by legislation. The German government never decided that the incorporation of immigrants should be the proper focus of immigrant policy. Consequently, German policy makers advocated a vaguely defined policy of integration that allowed for a broad spectrum of interpretation by the public, organizations, and the state and local governments. From the German perspective, some differences between the lives of immigrants and Germans are to be expected.

Despite differences in Swedish and German perspectives on immigrant policy, the fact that immigrants in Sweden do not seem better off than immigrants in Germany is a puzzle. Economically, immigrants in Germany do not seem to be worse off than immigrants in Sweden. Until 1992, the unemployment rate for immigrants in Sweden was substantially less than that of immigrants in Germany, but Germany's unemployment rate was higher than Sweden's. The unemployment rate for immigrants in Sweden has been greater than twice the national rate since 1985, which is a situation not replicated in Germany. The percentage of self-employed immigrants in Sweden and Germany is virtually identical. Though immigrant workers earn less than Germans, immigrant workers are beginning to move into the sectors and positions where Germans seek employment. This phenomenon is especially true for second generation immigrants. In Sweden, second generation immigrants have difficulty securing positions commensurate with their education.

Tendencies toward social segmentation in the areas of social assistance, housing, education, and crime are present in Sweden and Germany. The details are different, but the same motifs that characterize the social situation of immigrants in Sweden can be found in the lives of immigrants in Germany. Immigrants are disproportionate users of social assistance, live in segregated communities, experience lower educational attainment, and are over-represented in the crime statistics. In Germany, immigrant segmentation is reinforced by the channels through which social services are delivered. Immigrant segmentation probably contributes to the vibrant associational life that immigrants enjoy in Germany. For Turks, the political and religious factions found in Turkey duplicate themselves in Germany, but not in Sweden. There are three possible reasons for the durability of immigrant factions in Germany. The first reason is that the German government's stance of non-incorporation towards immigrants means that the government does not take an active role in forcing factions to work together under the same umbrella organizations. In contrast, the Swedish government insists that all Turks work through their umbrella organizations. The Swedish government will not fund or consult immigrant faction groups. The second reason for the durability of factions in Germany is that immigrant groups are self-funded. The German authorities therefore have little say in what the group does or espouses as long as the organization does not engage in illegal activities. The final reason is the size of the immigrant population in Germany. In 1993, the immigrant population in Germany is more than 13 times as large as the immigrant population in Sweden. In 1993, the Turkish population in

Germany was more than 81 times as large as the Turkish population in Sweden, (1,918,395 versus 23,649).

Despite the barriers to their political participation, immigrants in Germany seem as active in politics as immigrants in Sweden. However, immigrants and their organizations in Germany do not seem to be any more effective in politics than their counterparts in Sweden. Immigrant groups in Germany do not submit remises to the national parliament, nor vote at local elections, but immigrants in Germany try to work through trade unions and their local representative bodies, councils or commissioners. One occurrence that is prevalent in Germany, but not in Sweden, is the existence of immigrant organizations that explicitly are committed to working with a political party towards a political goal or ideal.

The evidence in this chapter raises important questions. If immigrants live distinctly different lives in Sweden and Germany than the native citizens of those countries, then does immigrant policy really matter? After all, if an interventionist, integration oriented policy does not make a noticeable difference in the lives of immigrants, then it would seem logical, if not economical, for governments to adopt an immigrant policy that focuses on basic needs rather than integration, equality, and political participation. Does the type of welfare state matter for the well-being of immigrants? Specifically, immigrants do not appear better served by Sweden's universalist and comprehensive welfare state than by Germany's corporatist one. Finally, immigrants in Sweden and Germany have rich associational lives; yet associations in Sweden do not appear to promote voting. What role do associations have in promoting democratic participation

among immigrants? Immigrant associations in Sweden have an organizational structure as mandated by the government. Does this make a difference in the ability of associations to promote democratic participation? Because of immigrants' past strike activity in Germany, their ability to form alliances with German political parties, their involvement in local boards and councils, and their ability to form financially self-supporting organizations, a case can be made that immigrants in Germany are more politically active than immigrants in Sweden. The next chapter examines these questions in detail.

CHAPTER SEVEN

IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: A DISCUSSION

Because immigrants in Sweden and Germany do not escape the “immigrant experience” of intergenerational integration into the host society, it would seem that immigrant policy, however important, is not a catalyst for economic and social integration. Nor does immigrant policy seem vital to immigrant political participation. After all, immigrants did not travel to these countries in order to participate in their local politics. If low immigrant political participation is the norm, then perhaps immigrant policy is not the appropriate vehicle to promote immigrants’ democratic participation. This chapter argues that while Sweden’s immigrant policy is ineffective for promoting voting, immigrant policy does play a vital role in fostering immigrants’ political participation.

Immigrant policy does matter for the promotion of democratic participation among immigrants, but perhaps in ways not yet fully understood. By formulating a comprehensive immigrant policy, Sweden acted on its belief that government policy could promote and structure democratic participation. The government hoped to integrate immigrants into its economy and society by granting immigrants access on the same basis as Swedish citizens to its universalistic welfare state. The government hoped to foster political participation by granting immigrants the franchise in local elections and through encouraging immigrants to participate in associational life in Sweden. The evidence shows that many of the Swedish government’s hopes did not materialized.

Sweden's immigrant policy did not realize its full potential, I believe, because of two factors. First, the Swedish government based its immigrant policy on two assumptions that may not hold true. The first assumption is that equal access to the policy implementation apparatus and welfare benefits was essential for the integration and political incorporation of immigrants. The second assumption is that associations and civic life promote democratic participation. Swedish political history in the twentieth century contains numerous examples to support this assumption. The influence of the temperance societies on Sweden's alcohol policy, the victory of working class politics in the construction of the welfare state, and the innovation in social services due to devolution are good examples of associations and civic activities that promoted political participation.

The second factor that threatened the policy goals of Sweden's immigrant policy is that immigrants approach democratic politics from a different perspective, mainly that of an ethnic minority. The increasing heterogeneity that immigration brings to Sweden is a relatively recent development. Native citizens in Sweden for the most part view the existing social and political systems as legitimate. The Swedish government assumes that immigrants also view the existing political apparatus as legitimate, but the low and declining voting participation of immigrants calls this assumption into question. The Swedish government faces the task of how to increase democratic participation among a population that is not very interested in participating. Immigrants desire the government to accept ethnicity as a valid basis for political organization, but Swedish policy expressly denies this. Consequently, it is unclear how the

government can increase immigrant voter participation to the traditional Swedish levels of over 80%. These issues are not new phenomena. They are new to Sweden because Sweden does not have a history of being a country of immigration. This chapter reviews the basic findings, then examines the assumptions of immigrant policy that need reconsideration, and concludes with a discussion on the dilemmas that immigrants pose for democratic practice.

Failing to Alter the “Immigrant Experience”

Sweden’s immigrant policy was successful in broadening and deepening immigrants’ exposure to Swedish sociopolitical institutions, but was not successful in integrating immigrants economically, socially, or politically. (See Table 7.1.) Immigrants are more unemployed, take early pension more often, have poorer health, experience financial hardships more often, and more likely to live in an apartment in a segregated community. The economic and social profiles for immigrants and Swedes are dissimilar and not converging. Though Table 7.1 reflects data for 1990-1995, which contains some bad years for the Swedish economy, much of the picture for immigrants was clear before this time. For example, immigrants already were living in apartments in segregated housing before 1990. Furthermore, some aspects of immigrants’ economic and social profiles logically follow from the conditions which immigrants arrive to Sweden. Immigrants are economically disadvantaged because they often arrive to the labor market as low skilled labor. Immigrants’ economic conditions should worsen if they work in contracting industries, which is the case in Sweden. Immigrants are prone to take early pension because they suffer from poorer health to which their

strenuous, manual labor jobs probably contribute. Recent immigrants may possess more formal education than native Swedes, which was not the case when immigrants initially came to Sweden, but questions regarding the quality of the academic credentials result in their non-recognition by prospective employers. Immigrants use more social services because they are more unemployed, poorer, and have bigger families. However, some aspects of immigrants' economic and social profiles do not follow logically from the conditions which immigrants arrive to Sweden. Immigrants' withdrawal from the labor force in Sweden is one prime example of this.

Sweden's extension and support for immigrant political rights is not fully successful in promoting immigrant political participation. Immigrant voting levels not only are lower than that of Swedish citizens, but they are declining. This finding is startling for three reasons. First, the Swedish government actively encouraged immigrants to vote. For example, the government gave 7,000,000 kronors to the political parties in the 1981-1982 fiscal year expressively for the purpose of providing immigrants with information on the 1982 elections. This amount was 1.84 times larger than the total amount that the government gave to the immigrants' national associations that fiscal year. (These amounts have since decreased.) Second, the immigrants' employment and housing situations would seem to be suitable targets for political action, not only because the discrepancies between the employment and housing patterns of immigrants and native Swedes are quantifiable, but also because of official government policy to address these imbalances. The third reason is that

Table 7.1 Summary of Immigrants' Economic, Social, and Political Situation in Sweden (1990-1995, 16-74 years old)

	<u>All I</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>Other I</u>	<u>All P</u>	<u>2SP</u>
At least 3 years secondary school	41.8	30.4	53.3	45.0	36.4	35.8
At least 3 years post secondary school	11.3	7.2	15.0	15.2	9.9	9.6
Unemployed	8.7	7.9	9.8	13.7	5.5	4.8
Early pension	9.0	10.0	9.0	7.5	5.3	4.7
Poor general health	9.2	7.0	10.3	12.7	4.4	3.8
Experienced economic crisis	25.7	22.9	22.8	40.0	15.9	14.3
Social assistance household	15.8	8.8	10.5	37.8	4.9	3.4
Under official subsistence level	10.6	4.4	9.9	28.2	3.9	3.0
Income (in thousands of kronor)	123	139	127	87	149	152
Live in villa or small house	38.0	46.1	38.4	20.5	59.5	62.7
Live in low rise apartment bldg	40.6	37.7	39.2	50.6	29.6	28.0
Live in high rise apartment bldg	20.2	15.0	21.3	27.6	10.0	8.5
Took vacation trip last year	65.1	71.7	70.3	48.7	63.8	63.5
Visit the library	38.6	37.9	34.7	41.8	27.1	25.9
Visit the movies	14.8	16.3	16.8	13.6	15.8	15.9
Went to a church service	11.5	8.8	12.4	19.5	9.2	9.0
Participated in outdoor sports	25.9	29.0	26.2	20.6	36.4	37.7
Participated in indoor sports	30.8	32.1	32.9	28.8	36.2	37.1
Political party member	6.0	5.5	5.2	6.4	10.1	10.6
Active in political party	1.7	1.6	1.7	2.3	2.6	2.7
At a political meeting last year	5.0	4.0	4.7	7.4	6.4	6.5
Member of union (employed)	79.9	83.6	75.8	77.0	83.5	84.1
Active in union (employed)	8.6	10.1	8.8	6.7	10.8	11.1
At union meeting last year (employed)	30.8	35.9	27.9	26.4	37.0	37.7
Not active in political discussions	33.4	31.2	30.3	41.3	25.6	24.6
Active in political discussions	37.6	39.5	40.5	33.8	42.1	42.6
Able to appeal against public official	57.6	64.4	59.7	44.7	67.6	68.8
Unable to appeal against public official	7.5	5.1	6.3	11.5	3.9	3.5

All I = all immigrants

N = immigrants from Nordic countries

E = Immigrants from European countries

Other I = immigrants from all other non-European countries

All P = Entire population

2SP = all persons born in Sweden with both parents also born in Sweden

Source: Välfärd och ojämlikhet i 20 årsperspektiv (1975-1995)

social services in Sweden are primarily administered, and to a large extent, controlled on the local level. Therefore it would seem to pay dividends for

immigrants to become political involved, especially in local elections since they are geographically concentrated.

Table 7.1 shows immigrants less likely to be members of a political party, less likely to participate in political discussions, and more likely to feel unable to appeal against a public official. On economic issues, non-European immigrants in Sweden do not seem to work through the labor unions as much as those in Germany. Perhaps immigrants in Sweden are reluctant to work through unions because all union meetings are held in Swedish and because the unions do not address labor market discrimination that immigrants believe to exist. The Swedish unions' intransigence over the discrimination issue is especially revealing when the government itself is beginning to voice concern over the possible connection between discrimination and high immigrant unemployment. After immigrant wildcat strikes, the German labor unions allowed immigrants to hold meetings in other languages besides German. In addition, the advance of second generation immigrants into lower and middle management positions suggests that education in Germany does result in better job opportunities. In Sweden, educated immigrants, young and old, do not face improved employment prospects.

Immigrants do not use the ballot, political parties, and trade unions as much as Swedes, but immigrants do exhibit some interest in local politics. However immigrant interest in politics is not systematic, but confined to particular groups or persons. The Turkish Association in Rinkeby is one of many immigrant associations in Rinkeby, but the association, through the efforts of a

new chairman, has been able successfully to use its political contacts to secure items on its agenda.

While not necessarily successful in promoting immigrant political participation along the same levels as Swedes, Sweden's immigrant policy is successful in defining the forms of immigrant political participation, configuring immigrant associational patterns, and influencing immigrant political goals. Soysal (1994, 85) states, "Even with similar social networks and 'organizational traditions,' migrants' collective organization takes different forms in different host countries. In other words, Turks in Sweden are organized differently than Turks in France or Switzerland, in ways that reproduce the predominant organizational models of the particular host country." The evidence presented in the dissertation supports this conclusion. Table 7.2 shows that native Swedes, 2nd generation immigrants, naturalized citizens, and immigrants basically join and participate in similar types of associations. Whereas immigrants seem to be 'dropping out' from Sweden's economic and political life, they remain connected to associations. Trade unions, pension associations, sports clubs, consumer cooperatives, parents' associations, and tenant associations are able to attract and retain immigrant membership. Immigrants become active members in sports clubs, cultural associations, trade unions, and tenant and parents' associations. Even though Table 7.2 shows trade unions placing within the top five association types in terms of active membership for 2nd generation immigrants, naturalized citizens, and immigrants, native Swedes are more active in trade unions in the long run. (See Table 7.1.)

Table 7.2 Top 5 Association Types for Total and Active Memberships in 1992			
Native Swede	2 nd Generation	Naturalized Citizen	Immigrant
Trade Union	Trade Union	Trade Union	Trade Union
Pension Assoc.	Sports Club	Pension Assoc.	Tenant Assoc.
Sports Club	Tenant Assoc.	Consumer Coop	Sports Club
Consumer Coop	Consumer Coop	Tenant Assoc.	Consumer Coop
Parents' Assoc.	Parents' Assoc.	Parents' Assoc.	Parents Assoc.
Sports Club	Sports Club	Pension Assoc.	Sports Club
Pension Assoc.	Motor Assoc.	Sports Club	Trade Union
Culture	Culture	Parents' Assoc.	Culture
Hobby Club	Trade Union	Trade Union	Tenant Assoc.
Parents' Assoc.	Hobby Club	Tenant Assoc.	Parents Assoc.

Source: *Föreningslivet i Sverige*

Many immigrant groups in Sweden have publicly dropped any interest in politics in their home countries. This general disinterest in home country politics seems remarkable in light of the fact that Turks in Germany remain keenly interested, if not active, in politics in Turkey. Moreover, the Swedish government has been able successfully to prevent Turkish associations from forming along the cleavages found in Turkey; in contrast to Germany, where Turkish associations replicate their religious, nationalistic, or political affiliations. The Turkish associations in the Stockholm area disavow any political ties to political groups in Turkey, though this is not the case for Kurds who are citizens of Turkey. This reorientation towards Swedish politics suggests that leaders of immigrant groups are cognizant of the political environment in the host country.

Assumptions about the “Immigrant Experience,” Policy, and Politics

The Swedish government believed that equal access to the policy implementation apparatus and welfare benefits was essential for the integration and political incorporation of immigrants. By obtaining access to welfare

benefits, immigrants were to gain access to social citizenship. By granting the franchise, the Swedish government not only pursued a policy of granting immigrants political citizenship, but also a policy of cultivating a political solidarity that would include citizens and immigrants (Esping-Andersen 1993; SOU 1974:69). However immigrants in Sweden were no more integrated than immigrants in Germany, a country which made no attempts to foster social or political citizenship among immigrants. In both countries, welfare benefits softened the material deprivation associated with immigrants' inferior economic position, but the intergenerational integration of immigrants remained unaffected. As the pattern of low and declining voting participation among immigrants emerged, the Swedish government wondered why immigrants did not grasp the value of political citizenship.

Two responses emerged that attempted to explain the persistence of the economic, social, and political differences between immigrants and native Swedes. One response noted that immigrants really did not have full political rights since immigrants could not vote in the national elections, (Hammar 1985a, 1990a). One solution was to grant immigrants the right to vote in the national elections, since this right remained the only political right that immigrants did not have. Though Sweden made no policy announcement as Germany did in 1999, the Swedish government tacitly allowed dual citizenship for immigrants who wanted to naturalize but could not relinquish their native country citizenship. However, the data in this study suggests that naturalized immigrants also might have low and declining voting participation rates.

The second response to the failure of immigrants' integration is that the government or the Swedish, universalistic welfare state somehow had captured immigrants and turned them into clients of the state (Ålund and Schierup 1991). Though it is unclear whether the Swedish welfare state has reinforced immigrants' economic and social patterns, the view that the welfare state might transform immigrants into subjects dependent on the state instead of empowered citizens is not a new one. "One view of welfare policy is that it tends to immobilize those who are subject to it. In his discussion in *Society and Democracy in Germany* Ralf Dahrendorf (1969:70) insists that while social policy has the potential to strengthen the sense of responsibility in citizens and guarantee the status of citizenship, it is also possible that social policy can hold citizens in tutelage." (Barbalet 1988:65) Marshall too acknowledges this possibility. "The significant point here, though, is the recognition that social policy has the capacity to adversely influence the ability of individuals to act on their own behalf and on their own terms." (Barbalet 1988:66) If social policy has the potential to place citizens "in tutelage," it is hard to imagine why the same cannot happen to immigrants. Perhaps it is a sign of the Swedish government's success of extending cross-class support of the universalistic welfare state to include the protection of immigrants in that there is very little talk in Sweden of immigrants being held captive to the welfare state or of the state fostering immigrant dependency on social benefits.

Questions of whether the welfare state maintains distinctions between immigrants and citizens is inapplicable in the German context. The German

welfare state is a corporatist one, meaning that it maintains class differences (Esping-Andersen). In this case, the German welfare state acknowledges and maintains the differences between immigrants and Germans, and among the immigrants themselves by using quasi-public associations around which to organize the provision of welfare benefits. Consequently, immigrants have agencies that provide services specifically for them. Social citizenship is not the theoretical justification for provision of services in Germany. Instead, the German government wants immigrants' basic needs met in ways that are consistent with its corporatist welfare apparatus. Finally, in Germany, there is little pretense that immigrants should have political citizenship. The right to vote, as stated in Germany's Basic Law, belongs to citizens only.

Regardless of one's views on the importance of social and political citizenship to immigrants, we learn little about what promotes integration since integration did not occur in either Sweden or Germany. Sweden's failure to integrate its immigrants implies that immigrant policy is irrelevant. Instead, I believe that further research is needed because all immigrant policies do not end in failure. For example, Germany is able to place second generation immigrants into lower and middle management positions. The growth of the service sector would be an obvious factor contributing to second generation immigrants' securing these positions, but as in the Swedish case, the growth of the service sector has not translated into greater job opportunities for second generation immigrants. Research is needed that explains why the expansion of the service

economy leads to employment for second generation immigrants in Germany but not in Sweden.

Immigrant policy is important because although Sweden's immigrant policy did not alter the general "immigrant experience," it certainly changed the immigrant. Immigrants in Sweden changed by their conforming to the predominant associational patterns as encouraged through government policy. Immigrants in Sweden also changed by their public acceptance of Swedish views on women and children, as well as other aspects of Swedish society. That policy, rules of membership, and institutions produced changes in immigrants is in itself not a spectacular finding. What is of interest is the idea that governments through institutional design, as opposed to political platforms, can influence democratic participation.

The second assumption that Swedish immigrant policy makes is that a rich associational life promotes democratic participation. Swedish immigrant policy was relatively successful in sculpting immigrant associational patterns to resemble those of native Swedes. But it remains unclear if immigrant associational life encourages their political participation. Nor is it clear that immigrant associational life prepares immigrants to be effective political actors. In other words, associational density does not always translate into better political performance or higher levels of political capacity for immigrants. Of course, some association leaders are 'learning by doing,' but in Sweden these immigrant leaders seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Robert Putnam (1993:173) writes, "Networks of civic engagement, like the neighborhood associations, choral

societies, cooperatives, sports clubs, mass-based parties, and the like...are an essential form of social capital: The denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit.” Granted, but whether social capital directly translates into political capital remains an open question.

We need to discover the conditions under which civic tradition or associational life translates into greater political capacity or participation. As Gunnar Myrdal (1962) noted in his study of African-Americans in the 1930s and 1940s, blacks participated in many associations, but for the most part these associations did not politicize blacks or enhance black political participation. Very little “learning by doing” was occurring in Myrdal’s findings. However by the 1960s, churches and student organizations were playing an important role in the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Likewise, the organizational density and immigrant participation in associations in Sweden are comparable to that of Swedish citizens, yet immigrant voting participation is declining. There are strong demographic reasons for the decline in immigrant voting, but the voting data also suggests that naturalized citizens, (who tend to live in the same areas as foreign citizens), also vote less than native Swedes. If immigrants and their associations make choices regarding their political activity, then they seem to consider exit with loyalty as a viable political choice.

The role that civic tradition, (or history), plays in enhancing immigrant political participation in Sweden is also unclear. The government’s immigrant policy integrates immigrants of very different traditions within the Swedish civic

tradition. Despite Turkey's social traditions and its turbulent political history this century, the Swedish government was able to re-orient Turks toward the political process in Sweden. The government's success was not a foregone conclusion because in the 1970s, Turkish Association meetings were still plagued with strife. Sweden's ability to remake Turkish associational patterns is all the more remarkable considering the durability of the cleavages that separates Turks in Germany.

Perhaps because the Swedish government financially supports immigrant groups, the government co-opts or neutralizes these groups in politics. By receiving government funds, immigrant groups are also vulnerable to reconfiguration as mandated by the authorities. To reconfigure an organization means that the membership, finances, and operational procedures are rearranged, but the organizational interests remain completely under control of the group. A group that has been reconfigured should emerge empowered to pursue effectively its agenda. From this definition, it is clear that the Swedish government accomplished more than reconfiguring immigrant organizations since immigrant groups disavow interest in politics in their native countries, as well as adopt social positions, (on women and children, for example), that they would not adopt in their native countries. To co-opt an organization not only entails taking control of its organizational interests and agenda, but also enlisting the organization to champion causes in the political arena that the dominant power espouses. The Swedish government clearly has not done this. The Swedish government does influence immigrant organizations, mainly through its financial contributions or

program requirements, but the government also finds immigrant groups submitting highly critical remises of its proposed policies. To neutralize an organization entails reconfiguring it, influencing its agenda from within through financial sponsorship and program stipulations, and stymieing its undesirable positions from without through institutional rules and political alliances. When a group is neutralized, it is demobilized if need be, while its actions are circumvented by political procedures or institutions.

Immigrant groups in Sweden seem neutralized. Immigrant groups can champion whatever causes they like, but championing causes that challenge the positions of the established corporatist partners are bound to fail. The government can withhold money. Powerful corporatist groups, such as the LO and SAF, can easily find coalition partners, while weaker groups seek to join alliances on periphery issues in hope of extracting compromises on issues important to them. If immigrants are unrepresented in corporatist bargaining, which remains an open question, then voting is of little real value. From the vantage point of facing opposition from major corporatist bodies, it is significant that immigrant groups submit critical remises at all. The circumstantial evidence suggests that immigrant neutralization has occurred in other areas of immigrant life as well. Immigrants in Sweden avoid radicalization, nationalism, and religious fundamentalism. In the case of Turks, the absence of nationalistic or Islamic fundamentalist groups in Sweden is remarkable given the significant presence of these groups in Germany.

Dilemmas that Immigrants Pose to Democratic Theory

The first chapter of this study supported the normative position that the political incorporation of long-term immigrant residents should be encouraged. Permanent residents should have a voice in the formation and passing of laws that affect them. Furthermore, Sweden seemed to have found a powerful cocktail of policies to bring immigrants into the political sphere. The data presented in the study suggests that Swedish immigrant policy disengages immigrants from political attachments in their native countries, encourages immigrants to replicate the associational patterns of the host society, and facilitates immigrants' interest and activity in local politics when they decide to get involved. On the other hand, Swedish immigrant policy is not able to sustain immigrants' interest in voting. The fact that Sweden's immigrant policy is partially successful in its influence of immigrant political participation is compelling proof that policy is an important factor for immigrants' political participation. Sweden's partial success also confirms the special challenges that immigrants pose to democratic theory.

Immigrants arrive in advanced industrialized democracies to find social and political systems that essentially are legitimate in the eyes of its citizens. However, the political system may not be legitimate in the eyes of the immigrants. This means that from the immigrants' point of view, the democracies in the advanced industrialized nations look republican in nature. Republican citizenship stipulates that a citizen is someone who plays an active role in shaping society by participating in public discussion, (Arendt 1958; Barber 1984; Beiner 1995; Habermas 1984; Miller 1995; Rousseau 1968). In republican democracy,

groups identify with the political community because earlier debates and discussions have resulted in voluntary agreement about what ought to be done politically. Immigrants usually have not participated in these earlier debates. Consequently, it should hardly be surprising that immigrants do not identify with the political community even when encouraged to do so. This dynamic might be partially responsible for the low and declining voting rates of immigrants. Nor is there reason to conclude that naturalization would reverse the voting trend of immigrants since naturalized citizens also come to a political system that has been legitimized in the eyes of its native citizens. To legitimize the political community to immigrants, the government would have to reopen normative political questions that society considers closed. German governments expose themselves to strident criticism when they reopen questions of what it means to be a German (citizen). Swedish policy gives immigrants the option to choose their political identities, but then provides strong incentives for immigrants to choose a political identity in line with the Swedish model. Ethnicity, as the basis for political identity, the Swedish government ignores altogether. Despite the abundance of associations in Sweden, the civicness that is crucial to the operation of republican notions of political participation is weak among immigrants.

How much immigrants should politically participate remains a contentious question, even in the advanced industrialized democracies. This question is important because governments in most advanced industrialized democracies grant and protect a package of basic economic and social rights, however defined, for their legal, non-citizen residents. Chapter One noted that one of the six ideals

of citizenship to which nation-states subscribe is that citizenship should be consequential, meaning that citizenship should mean something in quantifiable ways. Since becoming a citizen should be better than remaining a non-citizen, immigrants should view citizenship status as something worthy of acquiring. Immigrants in Sweden and Germany receive economic and social rights on par with citizens. Trade unions in both countries insist that immigrants receive the same wages as citizens for the same work. Until recently, Sweden's wage compression policies helped to narrow wage differentials. Immigrants in both countries enjoy the same welfare benefits as citizens. Sweden uses the same agencies to deliver benefits to immigrants and citizens, whereas Germany resorts to quasi-public agencies in keeping with its corporatist welfare state. Consequently, political rights remains a primary benefit distinguishing citizenship from non-citizenship. One of the clear benefits of citizenship in Germany is the right to participate in electoral politics. Political participation is not limited to voting and holding offices, but also the right to form parties. In Germany, one of the things that naturalized immigrants have done is to form an immigrant political party. In Sweden, voting in the national elections is the remaining aspect of citizenship to which immigrants do not have access. Naturalized immigrants in Sweden have not formed an immigrant party. Moreover, Swedish policy expressly discourages minority politics. Because the data suggests that naturalized citizens probably vote at lower levels than native Swedes, it is hard to imagine that immigrants in Sweden naturalize in order to exercise this remaining feature of citizenship. Yet immigrants in Sweden tend to naturalize. Therefore,

immigrants in Sweden naturalize for reasons other than to participate in Swedish politics. In Sweden, this is a fact that is difficult for some policy makers to accept. Voter education, party outreach, and devolution in the delivery of social services have not caused immigrants, (and perhaps naturalized citizens too) in Sweden to reexamine the value of voting.

Perhaps the hardest challenge that governments in the advanced industrialized democracies face is how to increase democratic participation if immigrants are not interested in participating. Sweden's attempts have proved unfruitful in reversing the decline in immigrant voting. Still, policy can help. The policies that may help are for Sweden to fund immigrant associations that are organized along lines other than those prescribed by the authorities, and to permit immigrants to pursue minority politics. The fact that Turkish organizations in Sweden initially exhibited some of the same cleavages found in organizations in Turkey suggests that Swedish intervention in the organization of these associations changed their politics. Turkish associations are no more politically effective in Germany than in Sweden, but at least in Germany, the political diversity of the Turkish associations suggests that how immigrants organize can be a manifestation of their politics. Minority politics, (championing rights or policies on the basis of ethnic, religious, or lifestyle status), is important because some immigrant leaders in Sweden expressed an interest in it and because the Swedish political apparatus seems capable of accommodating it. Although governments in Sweden discourage minority politics, they do extend a sympathetic hearing to issues raised by Finnish immigrants and the indigenous

Sami population in northern Sweden. Likewise, Finnish governments also extend sympathetic treatment to the concerns of the Swedish minority in Finland. In this light, minority politics is not totally alien to the Swedish political process. Minority rights might actually invigorate immigrants in politics because under the present system, immigrants need to present their concerns as something, if addressed, that would benefit the entire population. Sweden's universalistic welfare state would seem to mandate this approach. Immigrants do not appear to have the resources or political capacity to accomplish this. By accepting minority politics, the Swedish authorities would place immigrant associations in a better position to allocate their limited resources and to use their segregated housing patterns to their best advantage in local politics. In the document to the political parties, the National Federation of Turkish Associations argued that minority politics is a logical extension of the decentralization of the political process as well as an increase in the democratization of society.

Even though the economic and social lives of immigrants in Sweden and Germany are different from that of native citizens, but similar to each other, policy remains an important tool of the modern state for integrating immigrants into society. Advanced industrialized democracies have accepted that a degree of economic and social integration of legal immigrants is desirable for the well being of current citizens and immigrants. Still, it is hard to see how the modern state can transform immigrants into citizens who exhibit a degree of affinity and loyalty to it without also pursuing meaningful political integration of immigrants. Local authorities have little incentive to consider immigrants' concerns if

immigrant policy ignores the political representation, integration, and participation of immigrants. Furthermore, the political inflexibility when contrasted to the economic flexibility for importing labor, I believe, sends the wrong message to immigrants about the true nature of democracy in the advanced industrialized countries. The dilemma that immigrants pose to the advanced industrialized democracies is that no known mechanisms exist that rapidly absorb, integrate, and legitimize immigrants in nations that are presented as finished and closed entities (Moulier-Boutang 1985).

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